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Abstract 
The first half of this thesis focuses on the effect of conditional rebates by an incumbent 
when the firm’s product is a must stock for the buyer. It is inspired by the Intel case. 
The first essay analyses the baseline model and shows that although the incumbent can 
exclude the entrant by conditional rebate, the incumbent does not use the rebate to 
exclude the entrant, because just selling the must stock units with a high price is more 
profitable. Moreover, the model shows the limitation of the model in the sense that the 
incumbent has an ability to set incredibly high price to capture all the surplus of the 
market.  
Developing the main insight of the baseline model in the first essay, the second essay 
analyses four extended models to analyse the anticompetitive effects of conditional 
rebate and other pricing behaviours. The first extended model considers the case where 
the incumbent’s good is not literally ‘must stock’, but just has superiority over the 
competitors’ products. The results suggest that we can overestimate the exclusionary 
effect of conditional rebates when we erroneously assume a quite strong must stock 
property. The second, third and fourth extended models show that the incumbent can 
have an incentive to exclude a more efficient competitor in the following situations; 1) 
there is uncertainty about the must stock proportion, 2) there is uncertainty about 
demand size or 3) the must stock property is vulnerable in the sense that it becomes 
weaker if entry happens.  
The second half of this thesis develops a framework to analyse the competition through 
platforms that help consumers to get awareness of the sellers. It is motivated by the 
hotel booking platform cases. An informative advertising model is adapted to model 
platform investment. The third essay analyses the case where there are a monopoly 
platform and a monopoly seller and the effect of a narrow price parity clause on 
competition. The result shows that the introduction of the price parity clause increases 
the platform’s investment, which has a positive effect on the consumer surplus through 
giving more opportunity for consumers to become aware of the product. On the other 
hand, it also has a negative effect on consumer surplus by raising the direct sales price. 
In some situations, the net effect on consumer welfare can be negative.  
The fourth essay considers the case where there are duopoly platforms and duopoly 
sellers and analyses the effect of wide price parity clauses on competition. The results 
show that wide price parity clauses have a more straightforward effect on competition 
in the sense that the clauses make it possible for the platforms to avoid competition 
through undercutting commissions and so set their commissions at the collusive level. 
The analysis in this chapter shows that without wide price parity clauses the platforms 
try to undercut each other’s commissions, but the clauses eliminate the possibility of 
undercutting by the other platform. The result also shows that the introduction of the 
price parity clause increases the platform’s investment.
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Introduction 
Most countries adopt competition laws to stimulate their economies and increase 
welfare by protecting effective competition and prohibiting conduct that may harm 
competition. Competition authorities that enforce such laws have regulated cartels and 
bid riggings, along with vertical restraints of dominant firms to exclude competitors. 
For example, predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, and conditional rebates are typical 
examples of unilateral conduct.  
While the anticompetitive effects of horizontal agreement such as cartels and bid 
riggings are relatively clear and, hence, deemed per se illegal in many jurisdictions, 
vertical contract is difficult to differentiate from legal and pro-competitive conduct. 
This is because these contracts used widely and many of those contracts are considered 
to be pro-competitive.  
In light of the increasing importance of considering a variety of factors and effects on 
competition to evaluate whether a vertical contract should be prohibited by competition 
laws, it is extremely important to clarify in which situation such conduct is likely to 
harm competition, and to set the criteria to be used to judge whether such conduct 
violates competition law, in order to minimise both the chilling effects on enterprises’ 
pro-competitive actions by over-enforcement and the adverse effect on competition by 
under-enforcement. To establish such criteria, economic theory can be fairly 
informative. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to examine the anti-competitive and 
pro-competitive effects of vertical contract. 
Based on this motivation, this thesis adopts a microeconomic theoretical approach, 
particularly using industrial organisation and game theory. Specifically, this thesis will 
set up oligopoly models where a dominant firm is allowed to adopt a vertical contract 
and analyse the effects on competition such as market foreclosure effect. This thesis 
will also examine whether competition laws should prohibit such conduct by a 
dominant firm and, if so, what criteria should be introduced to judge the illegality of 
such activities. 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first three chapters focus on one type of 
vertical contract, conditional rebate inspired by the Intel case handled by the European 
Commission. The last two chapters are concerned about the behaviours of consumers, 
sellers and platformers in platform industry (especially, online hotel booking) and the 
effects on competition and consumer welfare of another type of vertical contract, price 
parity clauses or most-favoured-nation clauses, inspired by the hotel booking platform 
cases handled by national competition authorities in Europe. 
 
The first three chapter cover conditional rebates, which are behaviours such that a firm 
offers a certain reward to its customers when the customers meet a certain condition, 
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such as transaction volume and the share of the purchasing volume from the firm on 
total purchasing volume proposed by the firm.  
Chapter 1 is the introduction of the three chapters. It introduces the background of the 
regulatory issues about conditional rebates, especially the Intel case, which inspired the 
first half of this thesis. This chapter also covers the basic mechanism of harm on 
competition by conditional rebates and the relevant researches so far.  
Chapter 2 analyses a baseline model about conditional rebate under simple assumptions. 
This chapter considers a situation where two suppliers, an incumbent firm and an 
entrant, compete with each other to sell a good to one representative buyer. This model 
is close to Aghion and Bolton (1987), which analyse exclusive dealing and find that 
this can exclude the more efficient competitor if there is uncertainty about the entrant’s 
cost. In Chapter 2, we consider the case where there is no uncertainty. This model also 
assumes that the competition between the incumbent and the entrant is Bertrand 
competition. Like Ide et. al. (2016) and Chone and Linnemer (2016), it is assumed that 
the incumbent has a competitive advantage such that the incumbent’s good is a “must-
stock” item. Our model differs from their models in the sense that we do not restrain 
the price of the incumbent firm and we do not assume a Nash bargaining process 
between the incumbent firm and the buyer. 
The results of analysis show that the optimal behaviour for the incumbent is one of two 
types. The first pricing behaviour is setting the maximum price such that the incumbent 
can exclude the entrant. In the linear pricing case, the optimal price is to set the price 
just below the entrant’s cost (competitive linear pricing). This type of pricing is 
preferred by the incumbent when the entrant’s cost is higher than a certain point. The 
incumbent’s profit from this pricing is equal to the difference between the entrant’s cost 
and the incumbent’s cost. On the other hand, in the two-part tariff case and the 
conditional rebate case, the incumbent can exclude the entrant regardless of the 
entrant’s cost through setting a high fixed price in the two-part tariff case (exclusive 
two-part tariff) and setting the pre-discount price very high in the conditional rebate 
case (exclusive conditional rebate). This gives the incumbent a monopoly profit without 
constrained by the entrant. 
The second type of the optimal behaviour for the incumbent is giving up competing 
with the entrant and exploiting the profit from the “must stock” part of the market by 
setting the highest possible price to let the entrant enter the market. Then, the incumbent 
can extract the full of the buyer’s surplus (exploitative pricing). The incumbent prefers 
such pricing when the entrant’s cost is lower than a certain point. The threshold point 
is equal to the incumbent’s cost in the two-part tariff case and the conditional rebate 
case. The threshold in the linear pricing case is higher than the incumbent’s cost. The 
lower the entrant’s cost, the higher the profit the incumbent obtains, because the lower 
entrant’s cost means the larger room that the incumbent can exploit.  
The results of the analysis also show that although an incumbent can exclude an entrant 
by exclusive two-part tariff or conditional rebate, the incumbent prefers the exploitative 
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pricing behaviour over exclusive two-part tariff or conditional rebate when the entrant 
is more efficient. This is because exploitative pricing behaviour is more profitable. The 
result is that an incumbent will not use exclusive two-part tariff or conditional rebate to 
foreclose the more efficient entrant from the market because the incumbent does not 
have an incentive to do so. This result is similar to the view of the Chicago School that 
there is no foreclosure of a more efficient entrant through exclusive dealing, but it is 
importantly different from the Chicago School’s view in that consumers can be made 
worse off.  
While illustrating the important mechanism, this simple model predicts that the 
incumbent may set incredibly high price to capture all the surplus of the market. Chapter 
3 analyses four extended models with more realistic assumptions.  
The first extended model considers the case where the incumbent’s good is not literally 
‘must stock’, but merely be the option strongly preferred the competitors’ products is 
analysed. The result shows that the profitability of exploitative pricing and exclusive 
conditional rebate / two-part tariff is constrained by the possibility that the incumbent 
might be excluded by the entrant. This predicts that the incumbent’s price can be not so 
high. Because this possibility both constrains the profitability of exploitative pricing 
and exclusive conditional rebate / two-part tariff, the result in the baseline model that 
the incumbent does not introduce exclusive conditional rebate / two-part tariff to 
exclude the entrant who is more efficient than the incumbent still holds in this model. 
The second and third extended models in Chapter 3 introduces uncertainty. The second 
model assumes uncertainty about must-stock proportion and the third model assumes 
uncertainty about the size of the contestable demand. Both models show that the 
incumbent can have an incentive to exclude the entrant by conditional rebate. This is 
because the exclusive conditional rebate can adapt to such uncertainty better than 
exploitative pricing. The third model also shows that a market-share-based rebate is 
better for the incumbent than a quantity-based rebate and two-part tariff.  
The fourth extended model about conditional rebate analyses the case where the game 
is played more than once and the must-stock property of the incumbent’s good is eroded 
when the buyer becomes familiar with the entrant’s product. The analysis shows that 
exclusion of the more efficient entrant can happen and, hence, maintaining the must 
stock property of its product can be the motivation to introduce exclusive conditional 
rebate for the incumbent.   
 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 covers the competition through platform and the effect of price 
parity clauses on such competition, inspired by the hotel booking platform cases in 
Europe. In recent years, online platformer grows rapidly. Such companies offer a 
variety of services such as e-commerce, travel booking and brings huge benefits to 
consumers and small and small/medium sized enterprises by making the transactions 
between them easier. On the other hand, it is pointed out that most favoured nation 
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(MFN) clauses or platform parity clauses, which prohibit companies using platforms 
from selling at more preferable condition (e.g. price) on the other platforms or  their 
own website, can have negative impacts on competition.  
Platform parity clauses or MFNs are divided into two types depending on the scope 
they cover. If the restriction applies to other platforms, such clauses are called “wide” 
MFNs or parity clauses. On the other hand, if the restriction applies only to direct sales 
from the party and not to other platforms, such clauses are called “narrow” MFNs or 
parity clauses. There is no consensus across competition authorities with respect to the 
regulatory approach toward narrow and wide price parity clauses. For example, while 
French, Italy and Swedish authorities concluded that narrow-platform parity clauses 
can be justified in the hotel booking platform cases, the German Federal Cartel Office 
published the decision that not only wide-platform parity clauses but also narrow-
platform parity clauses should be prohibited.  
From those backgrounds, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 analyse economic models 
considering this aspect by adapting the informative advertising model introduced in 
Grossman and Shapiro (1984), which is the linear Hotelling model assuming that only 
a part of consumers know about the existence of products. This is because this type of 
model can take into account the important motivation for enterprises to use such 
platformers, which is consumer awareness. This model allow us to consider a 
platform’s incentive to make investment for increasing consumer awareness. 
Chapter 4 covers the case where there are one seller and one platform and the seller can 
sell its product to the consumers directly. This chapter analyses the effect of narrow 
price parity clause. The result shows that the introduction of the price parity clause 
increases the platform’s investment, which has a positive effect on the consumer surplus 
through giving more opportunities to be aware of the product. On the other hand, it also 
has the negative effect on the consumer surplus by the rise of the direct sales price and 
in some situations the net effect on the consumer welfare can be negative. The 
introduction of price parity clauses is likely to have negative effect on consumer welfare 
when the number of active consumers is small or the seller is less known by the 
consumers. 
Chapter 5 covers the case where there are two sellers and two platforms but the seller 
cannot sell directly. This chapter analyses the effect of wide price parity clause on 
competition. The result shows that wide price parity clauses enables platforms to set 
higher commissions compared to when the clauses are not allowed. Consequently, this 
causes the increase of sellers’ prices and the increase of the investment by platforms. 
While the former has a negative impact on consumer welfare, the latter has a positive 
impact on consumer welfare.  
However, the improvement of consumer welfare through the introduction of wide price 
parity clauses is unlikely to occur when there is a fierce competition between the two 
sellers. Moreover, the wide price parity clauses have a more straightforward effect on 
competition in the sense that the clauses make it possible for the platforms to avoid the 
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competition through undercutting commissions and to set their commissions to the level 
where they can set where they collude with each other.  
On the other hand, the results in Chapter 4 show that the possible price rise by the 
narrow parity clause is limited to the direct sales price. In addition, the motivation of 
introducing a narrow price parity clause, preventing a free riding is more plausible 
reason than that of wide price parity clauses, avoiding the competition through 
undercutting commissions. Those results imply that wide price parity clauses could be 
more strictly regulated than narrow price parity clauses.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction about Conditional Rebate 
and its Issues from the Viewpoints of Competition 
Policy and Economics  
1.1. Motivation 
Most countries adopt competition laws to stimulate the economy and increase welfare 
by protecting effective competition and prohibiting conduct that may harm competition. 
Competition authorities enforcing such laws have regulated cartels and bid riggings, 
along with unilateral conduct (or vertical restraints) of dominant firms to exclude 
competitors. Such conduct can include predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, and 
conditional rebates. Such exclusionary conduct can bring about negative effects such 
as raising prices above the competitive level, decreasing the efficiency of the economy, 
and diminishing consumer welfare.  
Although the anticompetitive effects of cartels and bid riggings are relatively clear and 
although such conduct is in many jurisdictions deemed to be per se illegal, unilateral 
conduct has a feature that makes it difficult to differentiate from legal and pro-
competitive conduct. For example, selling goods at discount prices is supposed to be 
desirable from the perspective of competition policy in general. However, discounting 
by a dominant firm to exclude its competitors or to enforce predatory pricing can violate 
competition law. Reflecting this difficulty, most jurisdictions judge the legality of such 
conduct by considering various related factors, including its pro-competitive effects, 
such as efficiency. For example, American courts have assessed unilateral conduct 
based on the rule of reason, an approach that decides whether an action is unlawful by 
weighing its pro-competitive effects against its anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the 
European Commission adopts an “effects-based approach” against exclusionary 
conduct, which focuses on the effects of the alleged conduct on consumers along with 
efficiency gains from the conduct. 
In this way, recognising the difficulty of distinguishing between exclusionary conduct 
and pro-competitive conduct, competition authorities and courts have taken a cautious 
attitude against exclusionary conduct. In addition, the business industry has required 
clarification of the criteria for the illegality of such conduct because the ambiguous 
border of the illegality would cause a chilling effect and prevent pro-competitive action. 
On the other hand, in more than a few cases, massive multinational corporations have 
excluded their competitors and negatively affected their competition by abusing their 
dominant positions. For example, certain competition authorities, including the 
European Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and Japan Fair Trade 
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Commission, have investigated a large semiconductor company, Intel, which was 
allegedly preventing its rivals from selling their central processing units (CPUs) to their 
customers by abusing its dominant position. In one instance, it introduced rebates to 
customers on the condition that almost all of the CPUs incorporated into their 
computers must be those made by Intel. The European Commission ultimately imposed 
a large monetary penalty on Intel in 2009.  
In light of these situations, it is extremely important to set the criteria for unilateral 
conduct such that the constraint on pro-competitive actions by over-enforcement and 
the adverse effect on competition by under-enforcement are minimised in a sufficiently 
clear manner to prevent any chilling effects. In establishing such criteria, economic 
theory can be fairly informative. Therefore, this the following chapters examine the 
anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects of exclusionary rebates and the appropriate 
criteria to regulate such conduct.    
1.2. Characteristics of Conditional Rebates 
1.2.1 General Definition 
Conditional rebates or loyalty rebates refers to discounts such that customers can obtain 
when the customers meet certain conditions. The conditions of such rebates vary by 
case, and normally the conditions regard purchase volume of customers or the share of 
the firm providing such rebates. For example, in the case of Intel, the company’s rebates 
to personal computer manufacturers were conditional upon purchasing 95% or 100% 
of CPUs used in their personal computers, a condition deemed by the European 
Commission to be an abuse of a dominant market position.  
According to International Competition Network (2009), conditional or loyalty rebates 
can also be classified by a method to calculate the amount of discounts. If the discounts 
are given only to the volume exceeding the threshold in a certain period, such rebates 
are called “incremental rebates”. If the amount depends on the total purchased volume 
in a specific period, such rebates are categorised as “retroactive rebates”. For instance, 
assume a company offers a 10% discount rebate whose threshold is £1,000. A customer 
purchases £1,200. If the rebate is incremental, the customer obtains a £20 refund: 
(£1,200 – £1,000) × 10% = £20. On the other hand, if the rebate is retroactive, the value 
is £120: £1,200 × 10% = £120. Hence, if the same discount rate is applied, retroactive 
rebates provide larger payments than do incremental payments because the former takes 
into account threshold trade volume. 
Conditional rebates are categorised as one type of non-linear pricing. The revenue 
functions of retroactive rebates and incremental rebates are exemplified in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2, respectively. Another type of non-linear pricing is a two-part tariff. When a 
customer wants to trade with a company offering a two-part tariff, the customer has to 
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pay a certain amount in fixed costs. Aside from the fixed cost, the customer is also 
required to pay variable costs depending on the quantity purchased. The revenue 
function is exemplified in Figure 1.3. As Figures 1.1 and 1.2 demonstrate, while the 
revenue function of a two-part tariff is smooth and continuous, the revenue functions 
of conditional rebates can be discontinuous or kinked. In addition, a three-part type is 
also categorised as non-linear pricing. Like a two-part tariff, a three-part tariff consists 
of variable costs and fixed costs. However, when a customer is offered a three-part tariff, 
certain allowances are granted to the customer. In other words, as long as the purchasing 
volume is below a certain threshold, the costs that the customer has to pay include the 
fixed costs only. The revenue function of a three-part tariff is exemplified in Figure 1.4, 
which shows that whilst the revenue functions of a three-part tariff are kinked and 
continuous, the first segment of the revenue functions is flat, as is the case for 
incremental rebates. 
 
Figure 1.1 Revenue function of retroactive rebates 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Revenue function of incremental rebates 
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Figure 1.3 Two-part tariff 
 
Figure 1.4 Three-part tariff 
 
As is the case for other types of exclusionary conduct, conditional rebates are deemed 
to be normal business activities and beneficial for consumers in many situations 
because they decrease prices and increase the quantity of production. On the other hand, 
when a company with dominant power introduces such rebates, they may harm 
competition, as discussed in the following chapters of this thesis. For example, Maier-
Rigaud (2006) and Bishop and Walker (2010) discuss that when buyers must purchase 
a certain amount of goods from a company at the same time as the company and its 
competitors compete for the remaining demand, the company can exclude its 
competitors (including those who are equally efficient or more efficient than the 
company) by introducing rebate schemes. They explain that such exclusion occurs 
because when a company introduces rebate programmes, the price for the remaining 
demand can be negative or smaller than the marginal cost of the company itself. The 
price for the remaining demands called an “effective price”. If the effective price is 
negative or smaller than the company’s marginal cost, its equal or more efficient 
competitor cannot compete with the company without incurring a loss. Maier-Rigaud 
(2006) calls this effect as “suction effect”. 
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As Bishop and Walker (2010) point out, such exclusionary effects are similar to those 
of another type of exclusionary unilateral conduct, “tying”. Tying is conduct such that 
a company offers one product or service on the condition that a buyer must purchase 
another only from the company. A dominant company’s use of tying is also regarded 
as a measure that may exclude its competitors by leveraging the dominance of the 
company in one market to influence another competitive market.  
1.2.2 Regulatory Approach towards Conditional Rebates 
As explained earlier, competition authorities and courts in general take the rule of 
reason approach against exclusionary unilateral conduct. The other options are per se 
legal and per se illegal approach. Compered to per se approaches, it is certain that a 
Rule of Reason approach is difficult to carry out in real cases. This is because many 
factors have to be considered to examine whether the alleged conduct is illegal. 
However, Motta (2009) points out that taking into account that unilateral conduct has 
both pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects, the only measure consistent with 
economic analysis is supposed to be the rule of reason approach. 
Because the rule of reason remains ambiguous, however, certain economic tests have 
been used to judge whether exclusionary conduct is illegal. From the viewpoint of 
economic theory, whether alleged conduct reduces consumer (or total) welfare or not 
is a desirable benchmark. However, such a welfare test is extremely difficult to 
implement in actual cases due to the difficulty of measuring welfare. For this reason, 
other standards have been used in practice. As Vickers (2008) explains, the other 
examples of economic tests are the profit-sacrifice test and the as-efficient competitor 
test. The profit sacrifice test is also known as the “no-economic-sense test” or the “but-
for test”. This type of test assesses whether a company suffers a loss because of its 
alleged conduct. The idea behind this test is that a rational firm does not carry out such 
behaviour unless it gains profit by excluding its competitors. The below-cost test, 
adopted for investigating predatory pricing in many jurisdictions, is a typical example 
of this kind of test.  
The as-efficient competitor test evaluates whether such conduct makes it difficult for 
competitors, who are as efficient as the firm engaging in such conduct, to compete 
effectively with the firm. The logic of this test is as follows: the principle of competition 
law is not to protect “competitors” but to protect “competition”. Hence, on this view, a 
company that excludes its rivals does not necessarily need to be sanctioned. However, 
if a company’s behaviour excludes a competitor who is as efficient as the company with 
the exclusionary behaviour, such behaviour should still be prohibited, according to this 
test, because such behaviours distort competition.  
Some competition authorities publish guidance papers to clarify their enforcement 
policy against exclusionary conduct. Conditional rebates are often supposed to share 
similarities with exclusive dealing, a type of unilateral conduct that makes it difficult 
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for other companies to trade with their customers. Hence, their illegality should be 
judged by similar standards. In the guidance on enforcement policy against 
exclusionary conduct, the European Commission and the Japan Fair Trade Commission 
mention that they treat exclusive dealing similarly to how they treat conditional rebates. 
In addition, the European Commission mentions in its guidance paper that it will 
examine whether loyalty rebates by a dominant firm would foreclose a competitor as 
efficient as the company introducing the rebates.  
 
While the rule of reason approach has gained popularity, especially with economists, 
the case laws in Europe and the United States seem to take different approaches. Until 
recently, the European courts and the European Commission were known by their 
hostile attitudes towards conditional rebates. Such attitudes have been often criticised 
as too formalistic. One of the representative cases is the Michelin II case, in which the 
European Commission classed Michelin’s rebate programme, which included quantity 
rebates with multiple thresholds, as an abuse of a dominant position in 2001.1 The 
European Court of First Instance upheld the Commission’s Decision in 2003. Motta 
(2009) evaluates that this judgement substantially considers that conditional rebates by 
a dominant company are per se illegal. Motta (2009) then concludes that the European 
Commission and the Court of First Instance should have considered the pro-competitive 
effects of such rebates and shown how Michelin’s rebate program had market 
foreclosure effects.  
Then, the European Commission found that Intel’s market share rebate fell under an 
abuse of dominant position in 2009.2 This case was the first case of conditional rebates 
after the Commission clarified that it would adopt an effect-based approach on abuse 
of dominance cases. In the decision, the Commission focuses on the fact that Intel’s 
CPUs were “must-stock” items for the computer manufacturers and the effective price 
of Intel’s CPU was below its cost. The Commission further shows that the rebate 
programme “enables Intel to use the inelastic or “non-contestable” share of demand of 
each customer, …, as leverage to decrease the price for the elastic or ‘contestable’ share 
of demand” and can prevent as efficient competitors from expanding or entering the 
market. 
In the Intel case, the European Commission carried out an “as-efficient-competitor 
(AEC) test” to quantitatively evaluate the effect of conditional rebates on competition 
in practice. The AEC test compares the actual contestable share with the share that 
competitors who are as efficient as the dominant firm need to compete with a dominant 
firm offering a rebate scheme based on the following formula: 
                                                            
1 See the European Commission’s decision against Michelin in COMP/E-2/36.041/PO (2001). 
2 See the European Commission’s decision against Intel in COMP/C-3/37.990 (2009). 
12 
 
ݏ ≡ ோሺ஺ௌ௉ି஺஺஼ሻ/௏,3 
where ݏ denotes the required share.  
If ݏ is smaller than the required share, the rebate scheme is regarded as exclusive, 
because even the as-efficient-competitor cannot compete with the dominant company 
by setting its price equal to its cost given this rebate scheme. The amount of rebate 
given to the customer per unit is represented by ܴ, while ܣܵܲ is a sales price, ܣܣܥ is 
the average avoidable cost of the dominant firm, and ܸ denotes the number of the units 
that the customer requires to obtain the discount. The test is based on the logic that 
when a dominant firm’s product is must-stock for the buyers and that firm introduces a 
rebate scheme, the effective price of the dominant firm’s product for the contestable 
demand is lower than the dominant firm’s nominal price. When the effective price is 
lower than the dominant firm’s unit cost, the competitor who is as efficient as the 
dominant firm will be excluded from the market even if that competitor sets its price as 
low as possible (i.e., the dominant firm’s cost).   
The buyers’ internal documents, in particular the quantities that the buyers think they 
must-stock are often used as a proxy for the share of the must-stock demand.4 When 
such documents are not available, the share of Intel is sometimes alternatively used as 
the proxy.5  
In 2014, the General Court upheld the European Commission’s decision. 6  In its 
judgment, the court mentioned that the analysis of the anticompetitive effect including 
the AEC test is not necessary to establish the illegality of such rebate, because we 
should regard as illegal all exclusive rebates such that discounts are given on condition 
that customers purchase all or most of their requirements from a dominant company.  
However, in 2017, the European Court of Justice annulled the General Court’s 
judgement and remanded the case to the court on the ground that the court had failed to 
evaluate the Intel’s argument to challenge the application of the AEC test by the 
European Commission.7 Hence, this case is ongoing as of June 2019.  
The application of the AEC test is not limited to the case of Intel. The test has also been 
used in other European cases. For example, in a decision concerning Google, the 
European Commission used this test. In this case, Google provides financial incentives 
to the device manufacturers “on condition that they exclusively pre-installed Google 
Search across their entire portfolio of Android devices”. The European Commission 
                                                            
3 para 1196 in COMP/C-3/37.990. 
4 For example, paras 1202-1213 in COMP/C-3/37.990. 
5 paras 1551-1558 in COMP/C-3/37.990. 
6 See the General Court’s judgement in Case T286/09 (2014). 
7 See the European Court of Justice’s judgement in Case C413/14P (2017). 
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proved that a rival search engine could not compensate device manufacturers for the 
loss of the payment from Google.8 
 
In contrast to Europe’s case law, in US case law, as Kobayashi (2005) introduces, the 
US courts charge a high burden to establish that loyalty discounts are anticompetitive 
on plaintiffs. Specifically, in the case of Barry Right Corporation about volume 
discounts for a single product, the First Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the negative 
attitude towards the illegality of volume discounts where the price is above cost in 1983. 
Kobayashi (2005) points out that the Court’s approach is consistent with the approach 
presented in the Supreme Court’s judgement in the 1993 Brooke Group case, famous 
for stating a regulatory standard of predatory pricing. In the case, the court held that to 
establish the illegality of predatory pricing, a claim must satisfy two conditions: (1) 
“that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs”; 
and (2) “a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices”. 
With regard to rebate cases related to multi-markets, it seems that there is room to 
establish illegality when the prices are above cost. In the case of Concord Boat 
Corporation about market share discounts, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 
1983 that “[b]ecause only one product, stern drive engines, is at issue here and there 
are no allegations of tying or bundling with another product, we do not find these cases 
persuasive”. 
Moreover, conditional rebates in the market in some cases entail that one party’s 
product is must-stock in the market. For example, in the pulse oximetry product case 
(Masimo v. Tyco and Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco), the illegality of the rebate scheme by 
Tyco was debated in court.9 The pulse oximetry products consist of durable goods, 
monitors, and consumable goods, sensors. The defendant, Tyco, produce both monitors 
and sensors. The plaintiffs, who are competitors in the sensor market, claimed that 
Tyco’s product is must-stock in the sensor market, because some customers (i.e., 
hospitals) need to purchase sensors compatible with Tyco’s monitors, and competitors 
cannot produce such sensors until Tyco’s patents expired. However, the US courts have 
dealt with rebate cases as one type of discount and have not seriously treated the 
argument about the suction effect based on must-stock property. 
Although the US case laws treat conditional rebates as tying or predatory pricing, some 
academics in the US claim that a specific approach is needed to evaluate illegality of 
conditional rebates like in the EU. Scott Morton and Abrahamson (2016) suggest that 
loyalty discounts should be judged based on a metric called “effective entrant burden 
(EEB)”, which is the product of the threshold of a rebate and its discount divided by a 
contestable share. This metric summarises a financial penalty on buyers that purchase 
                                                            
8 See the European Commission’s press release on 18 July 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-4581_en.htm. 
9 For example, see Masimo v. Tyco Health Care Group, CV 02-4770 MRP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006) 
and Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco Health Care Group, 592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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from competitors under a rebate scheme. The higher EEB means that the rebate places 
the higher financial burden on the competitors to compensate the loss of the discount 
to the buyers. As they recognise, this approach is consistent with the AEC test used in 
the EU. On the other hand, they emphasise that it is better to compare EEB with long 
run average incremental cost (LRAIC) rather than marginal cost or average cost, 
because fixed costs such as R&D costs to enter the market is important to evaluate the 
anticompetitive effect. They also point out that this approach is especially suitable to 
evaluate product-line cases in which competitor do not sell all types of the products 
such as the Tyco pulse oximetry product case.  
1.3 Review of Theoretical Literature 
Until recent years, economic studies on conditional rebates were limited. On the other 
hand, exclusive dealing has often been dealt with as an economic research topic. Similar 
to other types of exclusionary unilateral conduct, the economic discussion on exclusive 
dealing started with the Chicago School’s criticism of intervening in such cases, and 
post-Chicago counterarguments followed.  
According to Whinston (2006), the Chicago School, represented by Posner (1976) and 
Bork (1980), argued that if a firm wants to foreclose its competitor from the market by 
making a payment to the customer, the amount of the payment necessary to persuade 
the customer to agree to the contract is so large that the firm incurs a loss; hence, it does 
not make sense for the firm to make such a payment. Whinston (2006) also indicates 
that, since the 1980s, based on developments in economics such as game theory, it has 
been suggested that extending the Chicago School’s models makes possible the 
explanation that rational firms can engage in exclusive dealing in order to exclude their 
rivals in certain situations.  
The post-Chicago studies on exclusive dealing can be categorised into two types. The 
first type is the “rent-shifting” model conceived by Aghion and Bolton (1987), which 
shows that exclusive dealing can be used in order to exclude rivals when there exists 
uncertainty about rivals’ costs. Aghion and Bolton (1987) demonstrate that the contract 
can be exclusionary for a sales contract between a dominant seller and a buyer such that 
if the seller purchases not from the dominant company but from other new entrants, the 
buyer must pay a certain amount of money for compensation. This is because this 
contract enables a dominant firm to exploit new entrants’ profits and can prohibit their 
entry into the market in certain situations. The second type is the “naked exclusion” 
model represented by Rasmussen et. al. (1991). This model shows that a dominant firm 
can exclude its rivals by signing exclusive contracts with buyers when there are scale 
economies, respectively. Most research on exclusive dealing develops either model. For 
example, the model by Fumagalli and Motta (2006) is based on the  
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 exclusion model, but it consider the special case where the buyers compete with each 
other in the finial consumer market by using the dominant firm or the rivals’ goods as 
inputs.  
Based on the development of economic discussion on exclusive dealing and the 
accumulation of the antitrust cases of conditional rebates, conditional rebate is one of 
the areas of antitrust economics that is developing rapidly. For instance, Maier-Rigaud 
(2006) and Bishop and Walker (2010) explain how conditional rebates function as a 
tool to exclude competitors. They discuss that when buyers must purchase a certain 
amount from a company, and the company and its competitors compete for the 
remaining demand, the company can exclude a competitor who is equal to or more 
efficient than the company because the effective price of the company’s products for 
the remaining demand can be lower than those of the equally efficient competitor. These 
models help to explain why the incumbent can exclude its competitors through rebate 
schemes when an incumbent’s product is a must-stock item. Moreover, studies have 
analysed economic models regarding conditional rebates with an assumption that an 
incumbent’s product is must-stock. Ide et. al. (2016) examines the effects of rebates 
where an incumbent’s product is must-stock by applying the rent-shifting model and 
the naked exclusion model introduced in Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Rasmussen et. 
al. (1991), respectively. They conclude that under the rent-shifting assumption of cost 
uncertainty, the incumbent firm does not have an incentive to exclude the competitor 
by a rebate whose effective price is lower than its cost, since just focusing on selling 
the must-stock portion is more profitable. They also show that in the naked exclusion 
setup, while the foreclosure by the exclusive contract is profitable for the incumbent, 
foreclosure by rebate is not profitable because the incumbent cannot completely commit 
the buyers to comply with exclusivity through rebates. 
Chone and Linnemer (2016) analyse the optimal price schedule of non-linear pricing, 
including rebates inspired by the rent-shifting model in the presence of the incumbent’s 
must-stock property. However, they take different approach from Aghion and Bolton 
(1987) and Ide et. al. (2016) in the sense that they assume that a Nash bargaining process 
takes place after observing the incumbent’s offer, and they agree on the point at which 
the surplus is shared depending on the parameter of the competitor’s bargaining power 
against the buyer. One other difference is that they assume not only uncertainty about 
the competitor’s information but also uncertainty about the share of the contestable 
market.  
Chao et. al. (2018) introduce examines the foreclose effects of retroactive rebate in the 
case where a rival faces a capacity constraint. They set up the sequential model where 
there are three players: a dominant firm, a rival firm who is equally efficient as the 
dominant firm but subject to a capacity constraint, and a buyer. They also assume that 
the buyer’s demand declines on the prices the buyer faces, in contrast to the horizontal 
demand that is adopted in Ide et. al. (2016). They show that the dominant firm can use 
the all unit discounts to partially exclude an equally efficient competitor that has a 
capacity constraint by offering a price schedule such that the quantity threshold to 
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obtain a discount is high enough to guarantee the following: The buyer prefers not to 
purchase the competitor’s good at an amount equal to the competitor’s maximum 
capacity, which the buyer does prefer in the case in which the dominant firm offers 
linear pricing.   
In addition, although the economic studies on conditional rebates shown above assume 
one-shot games, Ordover and Shaffer (2013) consider a two-period game where the 
buyer's demand consists of a captive unit and a contestable unit. It is assumed that the 
contestable unit can be supplied by either an incumbent or an entrant and the buyer will 
be locked-in to the seller supplying the contestable unit in the second period. They 
demonstrate that if the buyer incurs switching costs, if it switched supplier in the second 
period, the exclusion of the equally efficient entrant can happen in the equilibrium. 
Some other economic studies on conditional rebates consider the case without the 
assumption that the goods of a company are must-stock items. Karlinger and Motta 
(2012) extend the naked exclusion model to conditional rebate cases. Chen and Shaffer 
(2014) also covers the naked exclusion model where there is uncertainty about the fixed 
cost that an entrant need to pay to analyse the effects of market share-based conditional 
rebate. They show that the optimal threshold percentage of conditional rebate can be 
less than 100 per cent of the market share, because in such situation the incumbent does 
not necessary have to fully compensate each buyer for the loss if it is sure that the 
entrant is excluded. Calzolari and Denicolo (2013) analyse a model in which there is 
incomplete information about demand and find that market share discounts can harm 
competition while exclusive contract is pro-competitive.  
Kolay et. al. (2004) consider the effect of quantity-based rebate when there are a 
dominant upstream manufacturer and a dominant retailer. They find that in the case 
where the demand size of the consumer is both known to the manufacturer and the 
retailer, conditional rebate can eliminate double marginalisation, because the 
manufacturer can choose the target quantity such that the retailer is induced to set the 
price such that the joint profit of the manufacture and the retailer is maximised. In this 
situation, the two firms enjoy higher profit and the consumers are better off due to the 
lower price compared to when the manufacture offers a linear pricing. They also show 
that in the case where the demand size is the private information that the manufacturer 
does not know, the manufacturer can obtain a higher profit by conditional rebate than 
when offering a two-part tariff, the rebate induce the retailer to reveal the true demand 
size. However, the effect on the welfare is ambiguous in this case. 
Majumdar and Shaffer (2009) extend Kolay et. al.’s model by adding an assumption 
that there is a competitive fringe, which enables them to analyse the effect of market 
share-based conditional rebate. They analyse the case where there is uncertainty about 
the demand size (high or low) for the dominant manufacturer. They shows that the effect 
of such rebate on welfare is ambiguous and, hence, market share-based rebate may not 
be harmful. They point out that by such rebate the manufacturer can achieve the 
outcome that would happen if there is no demand uncertainty. In this outcome, the 
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retailer cannot obtain the information rent in the high demand case and there is no 
distortion in output in the low demand case in the sense that the retailer has a smaller 
incentive to misreport the demand size. They conclude that their result support the 
circumspect approach against conditional rebate as taken in the US. 
The next two chapters analyse the exclusionary effects and the welfare-related effects 
of linear pricing, two-part tariffs, and conditional rebates where an incumbent firm’s 
goods include a must-stock item, as in the case of Intel, discussing in what situations 
those kinds of pricing behaviours should be prohibited.  
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Chapter 2: Anticompetitive Effects of Conditional 
Rebate Where an Incumbent’s Product Is Must-Stock 
Item 
2.1. Introduction  
As introduced in Chapter 1, whether conditional rebates have anticompetitive effects, 
especially when a dominant firm’s product is must-stock for buyers, is a hot topic in 
competition policy, but the debate still offers no clear conclusion, as evidenced by the 
fact that Intel case is still in dispute in European courts. Against this background, this 
chapter and the next chapter examine whether a company whose product is must-
stock for buyers introduces conditional rebates to exclude its competitors through its 
suction effect, as summarised in Maier-Rigaud (2006), and whether such behaviour 
harms the consumer welfare or not through setting up and analysing a theoretical 
model.  
In particular, this chapter considers a situation in which two suppliers, an incumbent 
firm and an entrant, compete with each other to sell a good to one buyer based on the 
economic models that analyse exclusive dealing, such as Aghion and Bolton (1987). 
This model also assumes the sequential game such that the entrant is a first mover and 
assuming Bertrand competition between the incumbent and the entrant, based on their 
model. As in the Intel case and in previous studies, it is assumed that the incumbent has 
a competitive advantage such that the incumbent’s good is a must-stock item. Hence, 
the model analysed in this chapter is similar to Ede et. al.’s (2016) model, which applies 
Aghion and Bolton’s model to a case in which an incumbent firm whose product is a 
must-stock item introduces a rebate. In addition, the assumption that the buyers demand 
is inelastic as long as the price is below a certain threshold, adopted in Ede et. al. (2016), 
is also used in this chapter. 
On the other hand, this study adopts certain differences from Aghion and Bolton (1987) 
and Ede et. al. (2016). First, the model analysed in this chapter does not assume 
uncertainty, since this chapter aims to examine and confirm the Chicago studies on 
exclusive dealing represented by Posner (1976) and Bork (1980). In this case, it is not 
rational for an incumbent firm to foreclose its competitor by using exclusive contracts. 
What changes will happen when uncertainty is assumed are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Another important difference from Ede et. al. (2016) is that the upper-bound price 
assumed in their model is relaxed. Specifically, their model assumes that the incumbent 
cannot set a higher price than the buyer’s reservation price for 1 unit. On the other hand, 
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the model analysed in this chapter assumes that the buyer purchases the product as long 
as the total cost to procure the units the buyer demands does not exceed the buyer’s 
reservation price. For example, in this model, even if the incumbent’s price is higher 
than the buyer’s reservation price for 1 unit, the buyer may purchase the must-stock 
goods from the incumbent when the buyer could purchase from the entrant at a lower 
price for the contestable demand. As discussed in the next chapter, this difference causes 
a difference in the results in the sense that the constraint for the incumbent to set a high 
price limit the profitability of a conditional rebate such that the competitor is excluded.  
Moreover, this chapter and the next chapter also aim to deepen the understanding of 
must-stock property. While exclusive rebates with the existence of must-stock property 
of dominant firms’ product are aggressively discussed in legal cases, policy debates and 
economic literatures, what must-stock means, exactly, is has not been clarified so far. 
From this perspective, the model set up in this chapter literally defines the must-stock 
property. It is assumed that if the buyer’s purchase volume falls below a certain point, 
the buyer’s willingness to pay for the product or service becomes zero. What happens 
when this assumption is relaxed is discussed in the next chapter. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the assumptions of the model 
and the process of the game. Section 3 then analyses the optimal behaviours of the 
incumbent, the entrant and the buyer when the incumbent offers linear pricing, a two-
part tariff and a conditional rebate individually. Section 4 analyses the welfare in the 
three cases, and Section 5 analyses which pricings the incumbent prefers and offers 
concluding remarks. 
2.2. Basic Assumptions  
In order to analyse pricing behaviours of a dominant company, consider a situation in 
which an incumbent firm (I) and an entrant (E) compete with each other to sell a good 
to a buyer (B), as in the economic models of Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Rasmussen 
et. al. (1991). Incumbent firm I incurs constant marginal costs, ܥூ ൌ 0.5, and E incurs 
a constant marginal cost, ܥா ∈ ሺ0,1ሿ, to produce a unit of the good. Based on the Intel 
case, it is assumed that I has the advantage that, for a distributional reason, if the 
proportion of I’s good on B’s total purchase volume falls below a certain point, ߙ, the 
benefit for B to purchase the good is significantly harmed, where ߙ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ.10  
For simplicity, in the following sections, a simple demand function is used. The demand 
size of B is assumed to be always 1, and B’s willingness to pay for a unit of the good is 
1 if the buyer purchases equal to or more than ߙ units. It is assumed that if B fails to 
procure at least ߙ units of the good from I, the value of 1 unit of the good for B is 
                                                            
10 ߙ must be strictly positive because some of the optimal prices obtained in this model are such prices 
that the denominator is α, the amount of the must-stock demand. This implies that if α is equal to zero, 
the price has a value that is divided by zero, entailing that the price becomes infinite. 
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decreased to zero. Hence, ߙ units of I’s product are literally must-stock for B in the 
sense that 1 unit of the good is useless for B if B cannot procure the must-stock item. It 
follows that if the minimum B’s total cost to purchase 1 unit of the good is equal to or 
less than its willingness to pay, B decides to buy. Otherwise, B will not purchase 
anything. The case where I’s good is not literally must-stock, but merely has superiority 
over E’s good, is analysed in the Chapter 3. The relationship between B’s reservation 
price for 1 unit of the product and the volume that B purchases from I can be 
summarised in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Buyer’s reservation value for 1 unit of the product 
 
Incumbent firm I can offer three types of pricing schemes: (1) linear pricing, (2) two-
part tariff or (3) conditional rebate. In the first pricing scheme, I offers a fixed price per 
unit, ூܲ௅, where ூܲ௅ ൐ 0. In the second scheme, I offers a price schedule,ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ, where 
ூܲி ൐ 0 is the fixed cost that B has to pay when B purchases any amount from I, and 
ூܲ௏ ൒ 0 is the variable cost per unit. In the third scheme, I offers a price schedule, 
ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ, where ூܲோ ൒ 0 is a fixed price per unit but if the purchase volume from I to 
total purchase volume is equal to or more than a threshold volume, ߛ ∈ ሺߙ, 1ሿ, the unit 
price for I’s good is discounted by ߚ ∈ ሺ0, ூܲோሿ , which means that the rebate is 
retroactive in the sense that the discount is applied to all the units B purchased. Entrant 
E offers only a linear pricing scheme, ாܲ ൒ 0 . The rebate scheme analysed in this 
section is a quantity-based rebate. Note that when the demand size is always fixed to 1, 
a quantity-based rebate and a market-share-based rebate—in which a discount is given 
on the condition that the share of purchase volume from I to total purchase volume is 
equal to or more than a threshold—have equivalent effects. These assumptions are quite 
similar to Ide et. al. (2016) that extend Aghion and Bolton (1987) to a conditional rebate 
case, although the model analysed in this and the next chapters does not assume 
uncertainty about the entrant's cost. However, unlike their model, I can offer the price 
larger than B's willingness to pay for 1 unit (i.e. ூܲ௅, ூܲி, ூܲ௏ or	 ூܲோ can be larger than 1). 
The process of the game is assumed to be as follows:  
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1) ܥா is realised and known to I and E. 
2) I offers a pricing scheme to B. 
3) After observing the pricing scheme offered by I, E offers its price to B. 
4) B determines whether it trades with I and E or not and determines the quantities that 
B purchases from I and E. If the total cost for B is the same, B prefers to purchase E’s 
good as much as possible. 
2.3. Analysis 
This section analyses economic models based on the assumptions discussed in Section 
2, and this chapter focuses on the case where I’s good is literally must-stock in order to 
analyse in particular, investigating whether exclusion of the more efficient entrant 
ሺܥா ൏ 0.5ሻ by I’s two-part tariff or conditional rebate can happen or not. Sections 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3 examine the optimal price of I when I offers (1) linear pricing, (2) two-part 
tariff, and (3) conditional rebate individually.  
2.3.1 Optimal Linear Pricing  
In this section, the game in which both I and E offer linear pricing to B is analysed. In 
this game, I, E and B make their decisions in turn.  
Analysis of this model is done by the backward induction approach (i.e., analysis on 
consumer behaviour, seller behaviour and platform behaviour in turn), which provides 
the below proposition, to be proved in subsequent sections. 
 
Proposition 2.1. If the incumbent offers a linear price to the buyer, the set of subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium is given by the following: 
ሺ ூܲ௅∗, ாܲ∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ൝
ሺܥா െ ߝ,൅∞, 1, 0ሻ	݂݅ܥா ൐ 	ܥா෪
ሺଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ , ܥா, ߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෪
ൡ, 
where ܥா෪ ൌ ଷିఈସିଶఈ, ߝ is a small positive amount and ாܲ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that the entrant 
decides not to enter. 
 
The results summarised in Proposition 2.1 show that I’s optimal behaviours can be 
divided into two types. The first is when I sets a competitive price to capture the entire 
market (hereafter referred as competitive linear pricing). When I adopts this option, 
setting its price just below E’s marginal cost maximizes I’s profit ( ூܲ௅ ൌ ܥா െ ߝ). This 
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strategy gives I a high market share (more precisely, it completely dominates the 
market), but with a relatively low margin.  
The second type is for I to give up competing with E and exploit the profit from the 
must-stock part of the market (hereafter referred as exploitative linear pricing).  
The proposition also shows that the profits of competitive and of exploitative pricing 
are the same if ܥா is equal to ܥா෪ ൌ ሺ3 െ ߙሻ/ሺ4 െ 2ߙሻ. If ܥா > ܥா෪, competitive linear 
pricing yields higher profit than exploitative linear pricing.  
Finally, because the first derivative of ሺ3 െ ߙሻ/ሺ4 െ 2ߙሻ  is positive, ܥா෪  is strictly 
increasing in ߙ. When ߙ is close to 0, ܥா෪ is close to 0.75, which is halfway between I’s 
cost and the maximum cost of E. When ߙ approaches 1, competitive linear pricing is 
almost never chosen in the equilibrium because ܥா෪ is close to 1. In this sense, the larger 
the must-have share of the market, the more likely it is that I will choose exploitative 
linear pricing; and even if ߙ is close to 0, exploitative linear pricing will still be chosen 
by I if E has only a moderate cost disadvantage (i.e., if ܥா ൏ 0.75). 
 
In order to prove Proposition 2.1, first analyse B’s optimal behaviour. The optimal 
response of B given I and E’s offers is shown by Lemma 2.1 below. 
Lemma 2.1. Given ூܲ௅	and ாܲ, the buyer’s optimal purchasing volume is 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൏ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ 	൑ 1	
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ቑ .  
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Lemma 2.1 shows that B purchases only I’s good if I’s price is lower than E’s price as 
long as I’s price does not exceed 1. If E’s price is lower than I’s price, B purchases both 
I’s good and E’s good as long as the total cost does not exceed B’s willingness to pay 
for 1 unit. In this situation, all the contestable demand is covered by E’s good.  
 
Lemma 2.1 also implies that the expected profit for E can be written as 
 
ߎா ൌ ൜ሺ ாܲ െ ܥாሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ
௅ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
0	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ൠ	. 
This equation implies that E is subject to the following constraints to trade with B 
without incurring a loss: 
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ܽሻ [Entrance condition] E’s price must be no higher than I’s price ( ாܲ ൑ ூܲ௅). 
ܾሻ [B’s willingness to pay] E’s price must be low enough to guarantee that the total cost 
does not exceed B’s willingness to pay to make the buyer’s demand strictly positive 
( ூܲ௅ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1). 
ܿሻ	[Non-negative profit] E’s unit price must cover its cost ( ாܲ ൒ ܥா). 
Given B’s inelastic demand, E charges the highest possible price that meets the three 
conditions above as long as there exist such ாܲ. Otherwise, E decides not to enter the 
market. Entrant E’s optimal pricing given I’s offer to B can be written as Lemma 2.2 
below. 
 
Lemma 2.2. Given 	 ூܲ௅, the entrant’s optimal pricing is 
ாܲ∗ ൌ ൝
ூܲ௅	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா
ଵି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈ 	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈ ൒ ܥா
ൡ. 
If 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா	݋ݎ	݂݅		 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൏ ܥா	, E decides not 
to enter the market. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Lemma 2.2 implies that while E offers the same price as I’s price as long as such pricing 
gives non-negative profit to E when I’s price does not exceed B’s willingness to pay for 
1 unit, when I’s price is larger than B’s willingness to pay for 1 unit, E must set the 
price lower than I’s price because B’s willingness to pay is now binding. Note that it is 
quite feasible for I to set its price higher than 1 because when I’s good is a must-have 
good, E’s supply can make it worthwhile for B to purchase a combination of the 
expensive but must-have good of I and the cheaper good of E. If I’s price exceeds B’s 
willingness to pay, E’s profit is given by 1 െ ூܲ௅ߙ െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻ, which decreases as ூܲ௅ 
increases. This decrease in E’s profit provides the opportunity for I to exploit E’s 
surplus. Incumbent firm I chooses its optimal behaviour taking B and E’s expected 
responses into account.  
 
Lemmata 2.1 and 2.2 imply that the expected profit for I can be written as 
 
ߎூ ൌ
ە
۔
ۓ ூܲ െ 0.5	݂݅		 ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா
ሺ ூܲ െ 0.5ሻߙ	݂݅	ܽሻ	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	 1 െ ூܲ
௅ߙ
1 െ ߙ ൒ ܥா
0	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
	݋ݎ	ܾሻ		 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா
ۙ
ۘ
ۗ
. 
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Solving this profit-maximisation problem gives I’s optimal behaviour, which is 
summarised in Lemma 2.3. 
 
Lemma 2.3. The incumbent’s optimal pricing is 
ூܲ௅
∗ ൌ ൝ ܥா െ ߝ	݂݅ܥா ൐ 	ܥா
෪
ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻ
ఈ 	݂݅ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෪
ൡ , where ܥா෪ ൌ ଷିఈସିଶఈ and ߝ is a small positive amount. 
The entrant enters the market only if ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෪. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Lemma 2.3 shows that there are two types of equilibrium pricing for I: setting slightly 
lower than E’s price (competitive linear pricing) or exploiting the profit from the must-
stock part of the market (exploitative linear pricing). Note that while I’s profit from the 
competitive linear pricing, which is given by ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ, increases as	ܥா becomes 
larger, and I’s profit from the exploitative linear pricing, which is given by ሺ1 െ
αሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ , increases as	ܥா  becomes smaller, because the lower cost for E 
implies that there is more room for I to exploit. The two profits have the same value if 
E’s cost is ܥா෪. 
When I chooses exploitative linear pricing, the price is set such that the total cost for B 
is equal to its reservation price. On the other hand, when I chooses competitive linear 
pricing, I’s price is lower than B’s reservation price for 1 unit, because E’s entry works 
as a constraint. It follows that B’s welfare is positive if ܥா෪ ൏ ܥா ൏ 1 and that if ܥா is in 
this range, B’s welfare decreases as ܥா becomes larger. 
 
Proposition 2.1 follows directly from Lemmata 2.1–2.3.  
2.3.2 Optimal Two-Part Tariff 
This section analyses the game with the following conditions: While E offers a linear 
pricing to B,11 I offers a two-part tariff, ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ, where ூܲி ൐ 0 is the fixed cost that B 
has to pay when purchasing any amount from I, and ூܲ௏ ൒ 0 is the variable cost per unit. 
                                                            
11 If it is assumed that E can offer a two-part tariff, the result does not differ from when E only offers 
linear pricing because E’s product is not “must-stock”; hence, E cannot leverage the “must-stock” 
portion of the market to attract the contestable demand.  
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As in the linear pricing model analysed in Section 3.1, in the case at hand, I, E and B 
make their decisions in turn.  
Analysis of this model provides the following proposition, which will be proved in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
Proposition 2.2. If the incumbent offers a two-part tariff to the buyer, there exist perfect 
Nash equilibria. In the equilibria, the incumbent offers a two-part tariff such that 
ሺ ூܲி∗, ூܲ௏∗ሻ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ܽ݊ݕ	݌ܽ݅ݎ	݋݂	ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	ܾ݋ݐ݄	 ூܲி ൌ 1 െ ூܲ௏	ܽ݊݀	0 ൑ ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா	݂݅ܥா ൒ 	0.5
ܽ݊ݕ	݌ܽ݅ݎ	݋݂	ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	ܾ݋ݐ݄	 ூܲி ൌ 1 െ ூܲ௏ߙ െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻ
	ܽ݊݀	ܥா ൏ ூܲ௏ ൏ ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ 	݂݅ܥா ൏ 	0.5 ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
The set of the entrant’s price and the buyer’s purchasing volume is 
ሺ ாܲ∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ൜ ሺ൅∞, 1, 0ሻ	݂݅ܥா ൒ 	0.5ሺܥா, ߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅ܥா ൏ 0.5ൠ,  
where ாܲ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that the entrant decides not to enter. 
The results summarised in Proposition 2.2 show that I’s optimal behaviours can be 
divided into two types, as with linear pricing. The first one sets a low variable price to 
exclude E (exclusive two-part tariff). When I adopts this option, I can exclude E by 
setting the variable price lower than E’s price. However, in contrast to linear pricing 
case, I can obtain a large profit by setting a high fixed price. In such a case, the most 
profitable exclusive two-part tariff is such that both the variable price is lower than E’s 
price and the total price for 1 unit is equal to B’s willingness to pay, and I can obtain a 
profit of 0.5 regardless of how efficient E is. Hence, this strategy not only enables I to 
dominate the market, but also gives I considerable profit. 
The second type is giving up capturing the entire market by setting the variable price 
lower than E’s price and exploiting the profit from both the must-stock part of the 
market and the fixed price (exploitative two-part tariff). This strategy is equivalent to 
exploitative linear pricing in the linear pricing case. 
This proposition also implies that the profits of exclusive two-part tariffs and 
exploitative two-part tariffs are the same if E is equally efficient to I (ܥா ൌ 0.5). If ܥா ൐
0.5, an exclusive two-part tariff yields higher profit than does an exploitative two-part 
tariff. The result also implies that while I is able to exclude E by introducing an 
exclusive two-part tariff regardless of the value of E’s marginal cost, I has an incentive 
to do so only if E is equally or less efficient compared than I (ܥா ൒ 	0.5) because if 
ܥா ൏ 0.5, an exploitative conditional rebate is more profitable.  
Proposition 2.2 also shows that the incumbent’s profit is strictly larger than I’s profit if 
I offers a linear pricing if ܥா ൐ 0.5. 
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In order to prove Proposition 2.2, first analyse B’s optimal behaviour. The optimal 
response of B given I and E’s offers is shown by Lemma 2.4 below. 
 
Lemma 2.4. Given ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ	and ாܲ, the buyer’s optimal purchasing volume is 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗	ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௏ ൏ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲி ൅	 ூܲ௏ 	൑ 1	
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௏ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ቑ .  
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Lemma 2.4 shows that B purchases only I’s good if I’s variable price is lower than E’s 
price, but if E’s price is lower than I’s variable price, all the contestable demand is 
covered by E’s good as long as the total cost does not exceed B’s willingness to pay for 
1 unit. 
 
Lemma 2.4 also implies that the expected profit for E can be written as 
 
ߎா ൌ ൜ሺ ாܲ െ ܥாሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ
௏ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
0	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ൠ	. 
Lemma 2.4 implies, in turn, that E is subject to the following constraints to trade with 
B without incurring a loss: 
1) [Entrance condition] E’s price must be no higher than I’s variable price ( ாܲ ൑ ூܲ௏). 
2) [B’s willingness to pay] E’s price must be low enough to make the buyer’s demand 
strictly positive ( ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1). 
3) [Non-negative Profit] E’s unit price covers its cost ( ாܲ ൒ ܥா). 
Given B’s inelastic demand, E charges the highest possible price subject to the three 
conditions above as long as there exist such ாܲ. Otherwise, E decides not to enter the 
market. Entrant E’s optimal pricing given can be written as Lemma 2.5 below. 
 
Lemma 2.5. Given ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ, the entrant’s optimal pricing is 
ாܲ∗ ൌ ൝
ூܲ௏	݂݅	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௏ ൒ ܥா
ଵି௉಺ಷି௉಺ೇఈ
ଵିఈ 	݂݅	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵି௉಺ಷି௉಺ೇఈ
ଵିఈ ൒ ܥா
ൡ. 
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If 	 ூܲி ൅ 	 ூܲ௏ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா	݋ݎ	݂݅		 ூܲி ൅ 	 ூܲ௏ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲி െ 	 ூܲ௏ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ
ߙሻ ൏ ܥா, the entrant decides not to enter the market. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
This lemma implies that, as in the case of linear pricing, E offers the same price as I’s 
variable price as long as such pricing gives non-negative profit to E when the total cost 
for 1 unit purchased only from I does not exceed B’s willingness to pay for 1 unit. If 
the total cost exceeds B’s willingness to pay, E must set its price lower than I’s variable 
price, because B’s willingness to pay is now binding.  
 
Lemmata 2.4 and 2.5 imply that the expected profit for I can be written as 
 
ߎூ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
ூܲி ൅
ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5	݂݅	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா
ሺ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5ሻߙ	݂݅	ܽሻ	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	 1 െ ூܲ
ி െ ூܲ௏ߙ
1 െ ߙ ൒ ܥா
ܾሻ	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௏ ൒ ܥா
	݋ݎ
	0	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem gives I’s optimal behaviour, which is 
summarised in Lemma 2.6 below. 
 
Lemma 2.6. The incumbent’s optimal pricing is 
ሺ ூܲி∗, ூܲ௏∗ሻ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ܽ݊ݕ	݌ܽ݅ݎ	݋݂	ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	ܾ݋ݐ݄	 ூܲி ൌ 1 െ ூܲ௏	ܽ݊݀	0 ൑ ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா	݂݅ܥா ൒ 	0.5
ܽ݊ݕ	݌ܽ݅ݎ	݋݂	ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	ܾ݋ݐ݄	 ூܲி ൌ 1 െ ூܲ௏ߙ െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻ
	ܽ݊݀	ܥா ൏ ூܲ௏ ൏ ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ 	݂݅ܥா ൏ 	0.5 ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Proposition 2.2 follows directly from Lemmata 2.4–2.6.  
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The result in the two-part tariff case shows that in contrast to linear pricing case, B does 
not benefit from competition even when E’s cost is high because I blocks entry by 
exclusive two-part tariff. Another key difference from the linear pricing case is that an 
exploitative two-part tariff is chosen only when E is less efficient than I (i.e. ܥா ൏ 	0.5), 
which implies that inefficient production never occurs in this case. 
2.3.3 Optimal Conditional Rebate 
This section considers a game in which while E offers linear pricing to B,12 I offers a 
conditional rebate scheme, ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ , where ூܲோ ൒ 0 is a pre-discount price per unit 
and where ߚ ∈ ሺ0, ூܲோሿ is the discount per unit that B can obtain if the purchase volume 
from I is equal to or more than a threshold, ߛ ∈ ሺߙ, 1ሿ. As with the linear pricing model 
analysed in Section 3.1, in the present case I, E and B make their decisions in turn.  
Analysis of this model provides the following proposition, which will be proved in 
subsequent sections. 
 
Proposition 2.3. If the incumbent offers a conditional rebate to the buyer, there exist 
perfect Nash equilibria. In the equilibria, the incumbent offers a conditional rebate 
such that 
൫ ூܲோ∗, ߚ∗, ߛ∗൯
ൌ
ە
۔
ۓ ܽ݊ݕ	ݐݎ݅݌݈݁	݋݂	ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1, ߛ ൌ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ ൐ 1 െ ܥா
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
ߙ 	݂݅ܥா ൒ 	0.5	
ܽ݊ݕ	ݐݎ݅݌݈݁	݋݂	ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	 ூܲோ ൌ 1 െ ܥா
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
ߙ 	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ
ோ െ ߚ ൐ 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߛሻߛ 	݂݅ܥா ൏ 	0.5ۙ
ۘ
ۗ
. 
The set of the entrant’s price and the buyer’s purchasing volume is 
ሺ ாܲ∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ൜ ሺ൅∞, 1, 0ሻ	݂݅ܥா ൒ 	0.5ሺܥா, ߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅ܥா ൏ 0.5ൠ,  
where ாܲ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that the entrant decides not to enter. 
 
The results summarised in Proposition 2.3 show that like the two-part tariff case, I’s 
optimal behaviours can be divided into two types. The first type is setting a high enough 
pre-discount price that giving up the discount by purchasing the cheaper good of E is 
unreasonable for B (exclusive conditional rebate). When I adopts this option, I can 
exclude E by offering a rebate scheme such that the effective price for the contestable 
demand of B, who must buy ߙ units, is lower than E’s marginal cost as long as the total 
cost does not exceed B’s willingness to pay for 1 unit. However, in contrast to the case 
                                                            
12 If it is assumed that E can offer conditional rebate, the result does not differ from when E only offers 
linear pricing, as in the two-part tariff case, because E’s product is not “must-stock”; hence, E cannot 
leverage the “must-stock” portion of the market to attract the contestable demand. 
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of linear pricing, I can obtain a large profit by setting a high discounted unit price ( ூܲோ െ
ߚ). In such a case, the most profitable conditional rebate satisfies the following three 
conditions: the discount is given if B purchases only from I (ߛ ൌ 1); the effective price 
is lower than E’s marginal cost ( ூܲோ െ ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൏ ܥா); and the discounted unit price 
is equal to B’s willingness to pay for 1 unit ( ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1). In this situation, I can obtain 
a profit of 0.5 regardless of how efficient E is. Hence, this strategy not only enables I 
to dominate the market, but also gives I large profit. 
The second type is giving up capturing the entire market and exploiting the profit from 
both the must-stock part of the market and the fixed price (exploitative conditional 
rebate). This strategy is equivalent to exploitative linear pricing in the linear pricing 
case. 
Proposition 2.3 also shows that the profit is the same as the profit when I offers a two-
part tariff. It follows that Proposition 2.2 also shows that I’s profit is strictly larger than 
the profit attained if I offers linear pricing, given that ܥா ൐ 0.5. Note that Chapter 3 
covers the extended model where a market-share-based rebate has a different effect 
than a two-part tariff and quantity-based rebate. 
In order to prove Proposition 2.3, first analyse B’s optimal behaviour. The optimal 
response of B given I and E’s offers is shown in Lemma 2.7 below. 
 
Lemma 2.7. Given ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ and ாܲ, the buyer’s optimal purchasing volume is 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗	ሻ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ாܲ ൐ ூܲோ െ ߚ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ െ ߚ	 ൑ 1	ሺߛ, 1 െ ߛሻ	݂݅	 ூܲோ െ ఉఊఊିఈ ൏ ாܲ ൑ ூܲோ െ ߚ	ܽ݊݀	ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚሻߛ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߛሻ ൑ 1
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ாܲ ൑ ூܲோ െ ఉఊఊିఈ 	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
 .  
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Lemma 2.7 shows that the expected profit for E can be written as 
 
ߎா
ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓሺ ாܲ െ ܥாሻሺ1 െ ߛሻ	݂݅	 ூܲோ െ ߚߛߛ െ ߙ ൏ ாܲ ൑ ூܲ
ோ െ ߚ	ܽ݊݀	ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚሻߛ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߛሻ ൑ 1
ሺ ாܲ െ ܥாሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ாܲ ൑ ூܲோ െ ߚߛߛ െ ߙ 	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ
ோߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
0	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
	. 
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This lemma implies that E has two options to trade with B: (1) capturing the whole of 
the contestable demand by offering a price lower than the effective price of I’s good for 
the contestable demand or (2) offering a price low enough to make B purchase only the 
threshold volume to obtain the discount from I and purchase all other units from E. 
Note that if the threshold is equal to 1, E can enter only if it offers its price lower than 
the effective price. Hereafter, this section focuses only on the case in which the 
incumbent introduces the rebate requiring the buyer not to trade with the entrant at all 
(ߛ ൌ 1), since as shown in the appendix, the imperfect exclusive rebate scheme (ߛ ൏
1) is never chosen in the equilibrium. 
If the threshold to obtain the discount is equal to B’s demand, E is subject to the 
following constraints to trade with B without incurring a loss: 
1) [Entrance condition] E’s price must be no higher than I’s effective price ( ாܲ ൑ ூܲோ െ
ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ). 
2) [B’s willingness to pay] E’s price must be low enough to make the buyer’s demand 
strictly positive ( ூܲோߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1). 
3) [Non-negative profit] E’s unit price covers its cost ( ாܲ ൒ ܥா). 
 
Given B’s inelastic demand, E charges the highest possible price while meeting the 
three conditions above as long as there exists such ாܲ. Otherwise, E decides not to enter 
the market. Entrant E’s optimal pricing can be written as shown in Lemma 2.8. 
 
Lemma 2.8. Where	ߛ ൌ 1, given ሺ ூܲோ, ߚሻ, the entrant’s optimal pricing is 
ாܲ∗ ൌ ቐ
ூܲோ െ ఉଵିఈ 	݂݅ ூܲோ െ ߚ	 ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ െ
ఉ
ଵିఈ ൒ ܥா
ଵି௉಺ೃఈ
ଵିఈ 	݂݅ ூܲோ െ ߚ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵି௉಺ೃఈ
ଵିఈ ൒ ܥா
ቑ. 
If ூܲோ െ ߚ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ െ ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൏ ܥா	݋ݎ	݂݅	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲோߙሻ/ሺ1 െ
ߙሻ ൏ ܥா, the entrant decides not to enter the market. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Lemma 2.8 implies that if ߛ ൌ 1, E has to set its price strictly lower than the effective 
price of I’s good for the contestable demand in order to capture whole the contestable 
demand. This requirement applies because if B purchases any unit from E, B loses an 
opportunity to obtain the discount from I, so in order to trade with B, E must compensate 
B’s loss of the discount that B could have obtained.  
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This lemma also implies that if I’s discounted price is larger than 1, E must set its price 
lower than the effective price, because B’s willingness to pay is now binding. 
 
Lemmata 2.7 and 2.8 imply that where	ߛ ൌ 1, the expected profit for E can be written 
as 
 
ߎூ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ூܲோ െ ߚ	 െ 0.5	݂݅	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ െ ߚ1 െ ߙ ൏ ܥா
ሺ ூܲோ െ 0.5ሻߙ	݂݅	ܽሻ	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	 1 െ ூܲ
ோߙ
1 െ ߙ ൒ ܥா
݋ݎ	ܾሻ	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ െ ߚ1 െ ߙ ൒ ܥா
	0	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
. 
 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem gives I’s optimal behaviour, which is 
summarised in Lemma 2.9 below. 
 
Lemma 2.9. The incumbent’s optimal pricing is 
൫ ூܲோ∗, ߚ∗, ߛ∗൯
ൌ
ە
۔
ۓ ܽ݊ݕ	ݐݎ݅݌݈݁	݋݂	ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1, ߛ ൌ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ ൐ 1 െ ܥா
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
ߙ 	݂݅ܥா ൒ 	0.5	
ܽ݊ݕ	ݐݎ݅݌݈݁	݋݂	ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	 ூܲோ ൌ 1 െ ܥா
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
ߙ 	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ
ோ െ ߚ ൐ 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߛሻߛ 	݂݅ܥா ൏ 	0.5ۙ
ۘ
ۗ
. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Proposition 2.3 follows directly from Lemmata 2.7–2.9.  
 
The result in the conditional rebate case is the same as that of the two-part tariff case 
in the sense that the exploitative conditional rebate is chosen only when E is less 
efficient than I, and inefficient production, which happens when 0.5 ൏ ܥா ൏ 	ܥா෪ in 
the case of linear pricing, never occurs in this case. 
2.3.4 Welfare Analysis 
This section analyses welfare when I offers a linear pricing, a two-part tariff and a 
conditional rebate, respectively. The results are summarised in Table 2.1, whose 
details are discussed in the following sections.  
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Table 2.1 Summary of the welfare analysis 
i) ܥா ൑ 0.5 
 I’s Surplus E’s 
Surplus
B’s 
Surplus 
Total Welfare 
Linear Pricing ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅0.5ߙ  
 
0 0  
 
ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሿ߱  
 
Two-Part Tariff ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅0.5ߙ  
 
0 0 ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሿ߱  
 
Conditional 
Rebate 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅0.5ߙ  
 
0 0 ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሿ߱  
 
Maximum 
Attainable Total 
Welfare 
 (ω ൌ 0.5) 
n. a. n. a. n. a. ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሿ0.5 
 
Maximum 
Attainable Total 
Welfare 
 (ω ൏ 0.5) 
n. a. n. a. n. a. ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅0.5ߙሿሺ1 െ ߱ሻ  
 
 
ii) ܥா ൐ 0.5 
 I’s Surplus E’s 
Surplus
B’s 
Surplus 
Total Welfare 
Linear Pricing 
(0.5 ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥா෪ ) 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅0.5ߙ  
0 0  
 
ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሿ߱ 
 
Linear Pricing 
 (ܥா ൐ ܥா෪ ) 
ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ 
 
0 1 െ ܥா ൅ߝ  
ሺ2߱ െ 1ሻܥா ൅ 1.5 െ 2߱  
Two-Part Tariff 0.5  0 0 0.5߱  
Conditional 
Rebate 
0.5  0 0 0.5߱  
Maximum 
Attainable Total 
Welfare 
 (ω ൌ 0.5) 
n. a. n. a. n. a. 0.25  
Maximum 
Attainable Total 
Welfare 
 (ω ൏ 0.5) 
n. a. n. a. n. a. 0.5ሺ1 െ ߱ሻ  
2.3.4.1 Welfare of Each Player under the Linear Pricing Case  
As shown in Section 3.1, in the game where both I and E offer linear pricing to B, I will 
choose either to set a competitive price to capture the entire market (competitive linear 
pricing) or to exploit the profit from the must-stock part of the market (exploitative 
linear pricing). Incumbent firm I’s profit of the competitive linear pricing is ܥா െ 0.5 െ
ߝ and that of the exploitative linear pricing is ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ.  
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If ܥா ൌ 1, I prefers competitive linear pricing because the profit of such pricing is 0.5 െ
ߝ, while the profit of the exploitative linear pricing is 0.5ߙ. However, the gap between 
the two levels of profit shrinks because the profits of the competitive linear pricing 
decrease as ܥா becomes smaller, while the profits of the exploitative linear pricing 
increase as ܥா becomes smaller. As shown in Section 3.1, the profits from exploitative 
linear pricing exceed that of the competitive linear pricing if 
(2.1) ܥா ൑ ܥா෪.  
The relationship between I’s surplus from its optimal linear pricing and E’s cost is 
shown in Figure 2.2 below. 
 
Figure 2.2 Incumbent’s surplus when Incumbent offers a linear pricing 
 
In contrast to I’s surplus, E’s surplus is always zero. The results show that if Inequality 
(2.1) does not hold, I prefers exploitative linear pricing. In this situation, E can enter 
the market and sell 1 െ ߙ units to B. However, E’s profit remains zero because I sets 
the highest possible price to let E enter the market and let B decide to purchase from 
both I and E. Hence, only if E sets the lowest possible price (ܥா) can E enter the market, 
and E does set such pricing. If E set its price higher than ܥா, B would decide to purchase 
from neither I nor E since the total cost exceeds B’s willingness to pay, though ாܲ may 
be cheaper than ூܲ௅ . In other words, in this game, a more efficient E implies more 
exploitation of E’s potential profits by I. If Inequality (2.1) holds, I prefers to set its 
price just below E’s cost to exclude E. Hence, in this situation, E is unable to enter the 
market. This inability implies that the producer’s surplus is equal to I’s surplus. 
With regard to B’s welfare, if Inequality (2.1) does not hold, I will block the entry by 
setting its price just below E’s cost ( ூܲ௅ ൌ ܥா െ ߝ). In this case, B purchases 1 unit from 
I and does not trade with E at all, meaning that B’s surplus (1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝ) is just above 
zero (ߝ) if ܥா = 1, and it increases as ܥா becomes smaller, because ூܲ௅ becomes lower. 
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However, when E’s cost falls below a certain point, B’s surplus becomes zero, since I 
will set its price at the maximum price that B finds acceptable so as to maximises profit 
from the must-stock portion. This sequence of events happens when Inequality (2.1) 
does not hold. The relationship between B’s surplus from its optimal linear pricing and 
E’s cost is shown in Figure 2.3 below. 
 
Figure 2.3 Buyer’s surplus when Incumbent offers a linear pricing 
 
In order to analyse the total welfare of the economy, the weighted total welfare can be 
defined as ߱ሾሺܫᇱݏ	݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐሻ ൅ ሺܧᇱݏ	݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐሻሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߱ሻሺܤᇱݏ	ݏݑݎ݌݈ݑݏሻ , where ω 
denotes the weight of the producer’s surplus in the total welfare. Because most 
competition authorities put more emphasis on consumer welfare, only the cases where 
ω satisfies 0 ൑ ߱ ൑ 0.5 are analysed in this chapter. If ߱ ൌ 0.5, the producer’s surplus 
and the consumer’s surplus are equally weighted. If 0 ൏ ߱ ൏ 0.5 , the consumer’s 
surplus is more heavily emphasised than is the producer’s surplus. If ߱ ൌ 0 , the 
producer’s surplus is not regarded at all when considering the total welfare. Since B’s 
surplus is always zero, the total welfare is the weighted average of I’s profit and B’s 
surplus. When Inequality (2.1) does not hold, the weighted total welfare is ߱ሺܥா െ
0.5 െ ߝሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߱ሻሺ1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝሻ ൎ ሺ2߱ െ 1ሻܥா ൅ 1 െ 1.5߱. It follows that when ܥா 
decreases from 1, the weighted total welfare increases if 0 ൏ ߱ ൏ 0.5 and is constant 
if ߱ ൌ 0.5, as long as Inequality (2.1) does not hold. This difference between the case 
in which ߱ ൌ 0.5 and that in which ߱ ൏ 0.5 where Inequality (2.1) does not hold can 
be explained as follows: If Inequality (2.1) is not satisfied, B always purchases 1 unit 
from I regardless of ܥா. This implies that the sum of the producer’s surplus and the 
buyer’s surplus is fixed at 0.5 when Inequality (2.1) does not hold. Though ܥா does not 
have any influence on the quantities B purchases from I and E, it affects the condition 
of the transaction between I and B. What happens in this situation is a transfer of profits 
between I and B. If ܥா ൌ 1, I’s profits is just below 0.5 and B’s profit is just above 0. 
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As ܥா decreases from 1, more profits are transferred from I to B as long as Inequality 
(2.1) is not satisfied.  
When Inequality (2.1) is satisfied, the weighted total welfare is equal to I’s surplus 
multiplied by ω , which implies that the weighted total welfare increases as ܥா 
approaches to zero if 0 ൏ ߱ ൏ 0.5 and is always zero if ω ൌ 0. Figure 2.4 below shows 
the weighted total welfare when the producer’s surplus and B’s surplus are equally 
weighted (߱ ൌ 0.5), when the consumer surplus is the more appreciated (߱ ൌ 0.1) and 
when the consumer surplus is only appreciated (߱ ൌ 0). 
 
Figure 2.4 Total welfare when Incumbent offers a linear pricing 
iሻ	߱ ൌ 0.5 
 
iiሻ	߱ ൌ 0.1 
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iii) ω = 0 
 
The result above show that in this case, the weighted total welfare is ሺ2߱ െ 1ሻܥா ൅
1 െ 1.5߱ if Inequality (2.1) holds and ߱ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሿ if Inequality (2.1) 
does not hold. Comparison between the actual weighted total welfare and the maximum 
attainable weighted total welfare is carried out next. In this chapter, the maximum 
attainable weighted total welfare is defined as the weighted total welfare that is 
maximised on the condition that the profits of each player must be non-negative. 
When ߱ ൌ 0.5, the maximum attainable welfare is achieved if efficient production is 
achieved. Entrant E is more efficient than I if ܥா ൏ 0.5 and less efficient than I if ܥா ൐
0.5. It follows that if ܥா ൏ 0.5, efficient production is achieved when I sells ߙ units and 
E sells 1 െ ߙ units to B. If ܥா ൐ 0.5, efficient production is achieved when I sells 1 unit 
to B. If ܥா ൌ 0.5 , efficient production is achieved as long as B purchases 1 unit. 
However, the result above shows that if 0.5 ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥா෪, I prefers to sell ߙ units to B by 
adopting exploitative linear pricing though I, which is more efficient than E, and hence, 
in this segment inefficient production arises. The efficient production happens if 
0 ൑ ܥா ൑ 0.5 or ܥா ൐ ܥா෪.  
When 0 ൑ ߱ ൏ 0.5, the maximum attainable welfare can be achieved only if the total 
cost for B is as low as possible, because B’s surplus is emphasised more. The lowest 
possible cost for B is 0.5 if ܥா ൒ 0.5 and ܥா  if ܥா ൏ 0.5. However, the realised total 
cost for B is 1 if Inequality (2.1) holds and ܥா െ ߝ if Inequality (2.1) does not hold. It 
follows that in this situation, the maximum attainable welfare always fails to be 
achieved. 
Therefore, the maximum attainable welfare is achieved only if both of the following 
conditions are satisfied: ω ൌ 0.5 and 2ሻ	0 ൑ ܥா ൑ 0.5	݋ݎ	ܥா ൐ ܥா෪. 
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Another interesting result is that B’s benefit from the competition between I and E arises 
only if ܥா ൐ ܥா෪. Otherwise, B’s total cost is equal to its willingness to pay because I 
prefers the exploitative linear pricing.  
2.3.4.2 Welfare of Each Player under the Two-Part Tariff Case  
As shown in Section 3.2, in the game that I offers a two-part tariff to B, I will choose 
either setting a low variable price and a high fixed price to exclude E (exclusive two-
part tariff) or will exploit the profit from the must-stock part of the market by setting 
ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ  such that both ூܲி ൌ 1 െ ூܲ௏ߙ െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻ  and ூܲ௏ ൒ ܥா  are satisfied 
(exploitative two-part tariff). The profit of the exclusive two-part tariff is always 0.5. 
The profit of the exploitative two-part tariff is ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ, which is equal 
to the profit of exploitative linear pricing. The two match  because when I adopts these 
two pricing behaviours, I aims to sell ߙ units to B at the highest possible price that B 
can accept, which satisfies ூܲி ൅ 	 ூܲ௏ߙ ൌ 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻ.  
In the linear pricing case, I prefers the alternative option, namely competitive linear 
pricing only when ܥா  is high (e.g., ܥா ൐ ܥா෪). On the other hand, in the two-part tariff 
case, I prefers the exclusive two-part tariff when ܥா ൒ 0.5, because the profit of the 
exclusive two-part tariff is 0.5 regardless of the value of ܥா. The relationship between 
I’s surplus from its optimal two-part tariff and E’s cost is shown in Figure 2.5 below. 
 
Figure 2.5 Incumbent’s surplus 
 
On the other hand, E’s surplus is also always zero since the entry is blocked by I’s two-
part tariff when I adopts the exclusive two-part tariff (e.g., 0.5 ൑ ܥா ൑ 1), and I sets 
such high price that the only price E can set is equal to E’s marginal cost when I adopts 
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the exploitative two-part tariff (e.g., 0 ൑ ܥா ൏ 0.5). In addition, B’s surplus is always 
zero since the total cost for B is always 1. Since E’s welfare and B’s welfare are always 
zero, the weighted total welfare is equal to I’s surplus multiplied by ω. Hence, the 
weighted total welfare is ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሿω if 0 ൑ ܥா ൏ 0.5, and it is 0.5ω 
if 0.5 ൑ ܥா ൑ 1. 
The above result shows that if ω ൌ 0.5, the weighted total welfare when I introduces a 
two-part tariff is equal to the maximum attainable weighted total welfare. The two are 
equal because efficient production is always achieved. In this situation, I sells 1 unit to 
B if I is more efficient, and I sells only α units and E sells 1 െ ߙ units to B if otherwise. 
Hence, compared to the linear pricing case analysed in Section 3.1, the weighted total 
welfare when 0.5 ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥா෪ is improved.  
If ω ൏ 0.5, the weighted total welfare when I offers a two-part tariff is always below 
the maximum attainable weighted total welfare, as in the case of linear pricing. This is 
because while the lowest possible cost for B is 0.5 if ܥா ൒ 0.5 and ܥா  if ܥா ൏ 0.5, the 
realised total cost for B is always 1. This implies that compared to the linear pricing 
case, weighted total welfare declines in the case of a two-part tariff. 
Therefore, compared to the linear pricing case analysed in Section 3.1, the weighted 
total welfare is improved if ω ൌ 0.5 and 0.5 ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥா෪, stays constant if ω ൌ 0.5 and 
0 ൑ ܥா ൑ 0.5 or ܥா ൐ ܥா෪ and worsens if ω ൏ 0.5 and ܥா ൒ 0.5. 
Moreover, in contrast to the case of linear pricing, B’s benefit from the competition 
between I and E, which happens when Inequality (2.1) does not hold in the linear 
pricing case, does not arise because B’s total cost is always equal to its willingness to 
pay.  
2.3.4.3 Welfare of Each Player under the Conditional Rebate Case  
As shown in Section 3.3, in the game that I offers a conditional rebate to B, I will choose 
either offering a rebate scheme such that E cannot compete with it (exclusive 
conditional rebate) or will give up excluding E by a conditional rebate and instead 
exploit the profit from the must-stock part of the market (exploitative conditional 
rebate). Incumbent firm I’s profit from the exclusive conditional rebate is always 0.5. 
The profit of the exploitative conditional rebate is ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ. As such, 
the profits of the two options are the same as the two-part tariff case. Note that Chapter 
3 will cover the extended model where market-share-based rebate has a different effect 
from two-part tariff and quantity-based rebate. 
Hence, I chooses the exploitative conditional rebate if ܥா ൏ 0.5  and chooses the 
exclusive conditional rebate if ܥா ൒ 0.5. Therefore, the relationship between I’s surplus 
from its optimal conditional rebate and E’s cost is the same as that in the two-part tariff, 
as shown in Figure 2.5. As with the two-part tariff case, E’s surplus and B’s surplus are 
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always zero. In addition, the weighted total welfare is ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሿω if 
0 ൑ ܥா ൑ 0.5, and it is 0.5ω if 0.5 ൑ ܥா ൑ 1.  
The above result shows that like the two-part tariff case, if ω ൌ 0.5, the weighted total 
welfare when I introduces a conditional rebate is equal to the maximum attainable 
weighted total welfare and if ω ൏ 0.5 ; the weighted total welfare when I offers a 
conditional rebate is always below the maximum attainable weighted total welfare. In 
addition, as in the two-part tariff case, efficient production is always achieved at B’s 
benefit from the competition between I and E not rising.  
2.3.5 Endogenous Pricing Type  
From the results regarding the welfare of each player under the two pricing types, 
linear pricing and conditional rebate13 (as summarised in Table 2.1), Proposition 2.4 
can be derived. 
Proposition 2.4. When the incumbent can introduce either linear pricing or 
conditional rebate,  
i) the incumbent’s optimal behaviour is exclusive conditional rebate if ܥா ൒ 	0.5 and 
exploitative linear pricing or conditional rebate if ܥா ൏ 	0.5; and 
ii) the surplus of the entrant and the buyer is zero regardless of the value of the entrant’s 
cost, which means that the buyer is worse off and the incumbent is better off compared 
to the case where conditional rebate is not allowed if ܥா෪ ൏ ܥா ൏ 1. If ߱ ൌ 0.5. The 
maximum attainable weighted total welfare is always achieved, which means the 
welfare is improved when 0.5 ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥா෪ since the entry of the less efficient entrant 
that occurs in the case where conditional rebate is not allowed does not happen. On 
the other hand, if ߱ ൏ 0.5, the maximum attainable weighted total welfare is never 
achieved, and where ܥா ൒ 0.5 holds, the welfare is worse than the case where only the 
linear pricing is allowed.  
 
The results show that in those three cases, I will choose from either one of two types of 
optimal pricing behaviours. The first is the pricing behaviour that excludes E. When I 
offers linear pricing, it does so by setting its price just below E’s marginal cost 
(competitive linear pricing). When I offers a rebate scheme, I can exclude E by offering 
a rebate scheme such that E cannot compete with it (exclusive conditional rebate). Note 
that if I can choose a two-part tariff, I is indifferent to whether I chooses a two-part 
tariff or conditional rebate, because the two types have equivalent effects. The profit of 
the competitive linear pricing is ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ, and the profit of the exclusive two-part 
                                                            
13 For simplicity, two-part tariff is not taken into account. However, even if two-part tariff is also 
considered, the result will not substantially change, because two-part tariff and conditional rebate have 
equivalent effects. 
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tariff and the exclusive conditional rebate is 0.5. It follows that if these three types of 
pricing behaviours are available to I, I always prefers the exclusive two-part tariff and 
the conditional rebate to the competitive linear pricing since ܥா ൑ 1. 
The other option is to give up excluding E and focus instead on exploiting profit from 
the must-stock part of the market. As shown in Section 3.3, this option is also available 
when I offers a conditional rebate (exploitative conditional rebate). However, the 
exploitative conditional rebate is substantially equal to the linear pricing to exploit the 
profit from the must-stock part of the market (exploitative linear pricing). The profit of 
the exploitative linear pricing is given by ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ. 
Hence, if the two types of pricing behaviours are available to I, the optimal pricing for 
I is either the exploitative pricing or the exclusive conditional rebate. Therefore, if the 
two types of pricing behaviours are available to I, I prefers exclusive linear pricing if 
ܥா ൏ 0.5 and prefers exclusive conditional rebate if ܥா ൒ 0.5. 
With regard to the comparative statics about the proportion of the must-stock part of 
the market, ߙ, the size of ߙ does not have any influence on I’s surplus of competitive 
linear pricing and exclusive conditional rebate and E’s and B’s surplus. On the other 
hand, it does influence I’s surplus of exploitative pricing, since the larger ߙ means that 
there is the more room for I to exploit E’s efficiency. Hence, if ܥா ൏ 0.5, I’s surplus of 
exploitative pricing increases as ߙ  becomes larger, and if ܥா ൏ 0.5 , I’s surplus of 
exploitative pricing decreases as ߙ becomes larger. This effect also implies that the 
value of ܥா such that competitive linear pricing and exploitative pricing are equivalent 
for I, ܥா෪, increases as ߙ becomes larger. These relationships are summarised in Figure 
2.6.  
 
Figure 2.6 Incumbent’s surplus when ߙ is high and low 
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The results of the analysis in this chapter also show that where I’s product is a must-
stock item, a conditional rebate can work as a powerful tool to exclude E, even though 
the rivals are more efficient than the incumbent. However, this model shows that I will 
not use a rebate scheme (and two-part tariff) to exclude the more efficient entrant. If 
this model is accurate, the exclusion by a dominant firm’s exclusionary pricing 
behaviour may not usually occur. Hence, determining in what situations a dominant 
firm uses a two-part tariff or a rebate scheme to exclude the entrant may be important. 
Chapter 3 will show that if the game is repeated, exclusion of the more efficient 
competitor can happen.  
The other interesting result is that exploiting the profit from the must-stock part of the 
market is an attractive option for I. When E is more efficient than I, I prefers the 
exploitative option, although the exclusive two-part tariff and the exclusive conditional 
rebate gives I a profit of 0.5, which is equal to the profit that I can obtain when there is 
no rival in the market. This result implies that if E is the more efficient, I may set its 
price much higher than B’s willingness to pay. For example, if ܥா ൌ 0.4 and ߙ ൌ 0.5, 
the optimal pricing for I is setting its price at 1.6. If ܥா ൌ 0.4 and ߙ ൌ 0.2, the optimal 
price is 3.4. Note that the minimum pre-discount price ( ூܲோ) necessary to exclude E by 
conditional rebate increases as ߙ becomes smaller, since the condition to exclude E is 
given by 
(2.2) ூܲோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ߙ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܥாሻ/ߙ ൅ ܥா. 
However, setting such a high pre-discount price satisfying Inequality (2.2) seems not to 
happen normally. Furthermore, the results imply that if I uses the exclusive conditional 
rebate, the price offered to B can greatly exceed B’s willingness to pay. For example, 
assume that I will set the lowest possible ூܲோ when it prefers exclusive conditional 
rebate and that ߝ ൒ 0.001 must be satisfied. In this circumstances, if ܥா ൌ 0.5 and ߙ ൌ
0.8, the incumbent will exclude E and obtain the profit of 0.5 by setting ூܲோ at 1.126 
and ߚ at 0.126. If ܥா ൌ 0.5 and ߙ ൌ 0.1, the incumbent will exclude E by setting ூܲோ at 
5.501 and ߚ at 4.501. If ܥா ൌ 0.1 and ߙ ൌ 0.1, the incumbent will exclude E by setting 
ூܲோ at 9.101 and ߚ at 8.101. However, such pricing also seems unrealistic. 
One possible explanation for these unrealistic results is that the assumption that I’s good 
is literally a must-stock item is too strong. In reality, the must-stock item may not be 
literally must-stock, but merely be the option strongly preferred over the competitors’ 
products, as will be discussed in the Chapter 3. 
2.4. Conclusion 
The results of this chapter’s analysis show that in each of the three pricing behaviours, 
the optimal behaviour for the incumbent is one of two types. The first pricing behaviour 
is setting the maximum price such that the incumbent can exclude the entrant. This type 
of pricing is preferred by the incumbent when the entrant’s cost is higher than a certain 
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point. In the case of linear pricing, the optimal price is to set just below the entrant’s 
cost (competitive linear pricing). The incumbent’s profit from this pricing is equal to 
the difference between the entrant’s cost and the incumbent’s cost. On the other hand, 
in the two-part tariff case and the conditional rebate case, the incumbent can exclude 
the entrant by obtaining a monopoly profit regardless of how efficient the entrant is 
through setting a high fixed price in the two-part tariff case (exclusive two-part tariff) 
and setting the pre-discount price very high in the conditional rebate case (exclusive 
conditional rebate). If the incumbent chooses this type of pricing, the entrant’s profit is 
zero. The buyer’s surplus is positive in the linear pricing case, but the surplus is zero in 
the two-part tariff case and the conditional rebate case. 
The second type of optimal behaviour for the incumbent is to give up competing with 
the entrant and instead exploit the profit from the must-stock part of the market by 
setting the highest possible price to let the entrant enter the market. The total cost for 
the buyer is equal to its willingness to pay (exploitative pricing). This type of optimal 
behaviour is common to the three cases, and the incumbent prefers such pricing when 
the entrant’s cost is lower than a certain point. The lower the entrant’s cost, the higher 
the profit the incumbent obtains, because the lower cost for the entrant means more 
room that the incumbent can exploit. If the incumbent chooses this type of pricing, the 
entrant’s profit and the buyer’s profit are zero. 
The results of the analysis also show that although an incumbent can exclude an entrant 
by exclusive two-part tariff or conditional rebate even if the entrant is more efficient 
than the incumbent, the incumbent prefers exploitative pricing behaviour over an 
exclusive two-part tariff or conditional rebate because exploitative pricing behaviour is 
more profitable. The result is that an incumbent will not use exclusive two-part tariffs 
or conditional rebates to foreclose the more efficient entrant from the market because 
the incumbent does not have an incentive to do so. This result is similar to the view of 
the Chicago School that there is no foreclosure of a more efficient entrant through 
exclusive dealing, but it is importantly different from the Chicago School’s view in that 
consumers can be made worse off.  
Note that the result that the incumbent does not introduce a rebate to exclude the more 
efficient entrant is similar to Ide et. al. (2016), although the logic is different. In their 
model, the incumbent does not introduce exclusive conditional rebate because the 
profitability is limited under the assumption prohibiting setting a high list price. On the 
other hand, this chapter shows that if this assumption is relaxed, the incumbent can 
obtain a monopoly profit by using conditional rebate such that the list price is higher 
than the buyer's willingness pay and the unit price after the discount is applied is equal 
to the buyer's willingness pay.  However, the incumbent does not use such rebate, 
because it can obtain a larger profit through exploitative pricing, which is also 
prohibited in Ide et. al. (2016).  
The welfare analysis shows that when the incumbent offers an exclusive conditional 
rebate in the equilibrium, the surplus of the entrant and the buyer is zero. However, the 
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improvement of the buyer’s surplus by prohibiting the conditional rebate and two-part 
tariff happens only when the entrant’s cost is very high (i.e., ܥா෪ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1). In addition, 
it is shown that prohibiting the two-part tariff and conditional rebate decreases total 
welfare when the entrant’s cost is a little less efficient than that of the incumbent (i.e., 
0.5 ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥா෪), because the two-part tariff and conditional rebate prevent inefficient 
production in the sense that I chooses to dominate the market rather than only producing 
the good for the must-stock demand.  
The aim of this chapter has been to identify a mechanism that comes into force with 
exclusive conditional rebates. Its discussion has been highly simplified. At least one 
prediction does not seem to happen normally in the sense that the incumbent sets an 
extremely high pre-discount price when it excludes the entry by conditional rebate or 
extremely high price when it exploits the entrant’s efficiency. We relax some 
assumptions in the next chapter in order to explore this observation. One of the possible 
explanations of those unrealistic results is that the assumption that I’s good is literally 
a must-stock item is too strong. Section 3 of the next chapter will analyse the case in 
which the must-stock item may not be literally must-stock, but is superior to 
competitors’ products. Chapter 3 also covers the extensions to the baseline model 
analysed in this chapter in order to explore the situations in which the exclusion of the 
more efficient entrant by conditional rebate and two-part tariff happens and in which 
the exclusion is best achieved by market-share-based rebate rather than a two-part tariff 
and quantity-based rebate.  
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2.5. Appendix A 
2.5.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1 
In this situation, only linear pricing schemes are available to B, and B must purchase at 
least ߙ units from I unless B decides not to buy the good. Furthermore, since both I and 
E offer only linear pricing, B prefers a cheaper good for its contestable demand, whose 
size is 1 െ ߙ. Those imply that the purchase volume of B from I and E, ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ, must 
be either ሺ1, 0ሻ, ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ or ሺ0, 0ሻ. When ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ is equal to ሺ1, 0ሻ, B’s total cost can 
be written as ூܲ௅. When ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ is equal to ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ, B’s total cost can be written as 
ூܲ௅ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ. Hence, the condition that B prefers purchasing ሺ1, 0ሻ to purchasing 
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ is ூܲ௅ ൏ ூܲ௅ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ. This equation can be modified to ூܲ௅ ൏ ாܲ. On 
the other hand, if B’s total cost to purchase 1 unit is more than 1, B decides not to 
purchase at all, because the cost exceeds its willingness to pay. ■ 
2.5.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2 
The conditions ܽሻ	and ܾሻ	can be modified as follows:  
ܽᇱሻ	 ாܲ ൑ ூܲ௅ and ܾ′ሻ	 ாܲ ൑ ଵି௉಺
ಽఈ
ሺଵିఈሻ . 
These modifications imply that while the upper bound of ாܲ in the condition ܽᇱሻ	, ூܲ௅, 
is increasing in ூܲ௅ , the upper bound in the condition ܾᇱሻ , ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ , is 
decreasing in ூܲ௅. The upper bounds in the conditions ܽᇱሻ	and ܾᇱሻ	coincide with each 
other at a single point, where ூܲ௅ ൌ 1 holds. It follows that which constraint is binding 
depends on whether ூܲ௅ is larger than 1. If ூܲ௅ ൏ 1, only ܽᇱሻ is binding. In this situation, 
E’s optimal behaviour is to set the highest possible price satisfying ܽᇱሻ	, which is equal 
to ூܲ௅ as long as the condition ܿሻ is met (i.e., E’s unit price covers its cost ( ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா)). 
If ூܲ௅ ൐ 1, only ܾᇱሻ is binding. In this situation, the highest possible price satisfying ܾᇱሻ 
is 
 (A2.1) ாܲ ൌ ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ. 
Offering the price satisfying Equation (A2.1) is E’s optimal behaviour as long as the 
condition ܿሻ is satisfied (i.e., ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൒ ܥா)). ■  
2.5.3 Proof of Lemma 2.3 
The proof of Lemma 2.3 is divided into two steps. In Step 1 we find optimal linear 
pricing such that both ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 and ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா (optimal competitive linear pricing). In 
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Step 2, we find the optimal linear pricing such that ூܲ௅ ൐ 1 and ܥா ൑ ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ
ߙሻ hold or both	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா hold (optimal exploitative linear pricing); we 
then analyse which type of linear pricing is more profitable.  
Step 1: Optimal competitive linear pricing 
Lemma 2.2 implies that if I chooses competitive linear pricing, I has to offer ூܲ௅ such 
that both ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 and ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா. In this situation, setting ூܲ௅ just below ܥா maximizes I’s 
profit. In other words, the most profitable price is 
(A2.2) ூܲ௅ ൌ ܥா െ ߝ. 
The profit of I when I chooses competitive linear pricing and offers a price satisfying 
Equation (A2.2), ߎூ஼௅, can be written as 
(A2.3) ߎூ஼௅ ൌ ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ.  
 
Step 2: Optimal exploitative linear pricing 
Lemma 2.2 also implies that if I chooses exploitative linear pricing, I has to offer ூܲ௅ 
such that either both 	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1  and ܥா ൑ ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ  hold or both 	 ூܲ௅ ൑
1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா hold. These conditions can be combined as follows: 
(A2.4) ܥா ൑ ூܲ௅ ൑ ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ . 
Because I’s profit is given by ூܲ௅ߙ, the most profitable price satisfying Inequality (A2.4) 
is 
(A2.5) ூܲ௅ ൌ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ߙ. 
The of I when I chooses exploitative linear pricing and offers the price satisfying 
Equation (A2.5), ߎூா௉௅, can be written as 
(A2.6) ߎூா௉௅ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ. 
From Equation (A2.3) and (A2.6), the condition I prefers to offer competitive linear 
pricing can be written as 
ܥா	– 	0.5 ൐ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ. 
The rearrangement yield the following: 
ܥா ൐ ଷିఈସିଶఈ. ■ 
2.5.4 Proof of Lemma 2.4 
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As Lemma 2.1 shows, the purchase volume of B from I and E, ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ, must be either 
ሺ1, 0ሻ, ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ or ሺ0, 0ሻ. As in the linear pricing case, the condition that B prefers 
purchasing only from I to purchasing just 1 െ ߙ units from I is the variable cost of I’s 
product is lower than that of E’s product. The difference from the linear pricing case is 
the total cost for B when ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ ൌ ሺ1, 0ሻ  is ூܲி ൅ 	 ூܲ௏ , and the total cost when 
ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ ൌ ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ is ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ.■ 
2.5.5 Proof of Lemma 2.5 
The conditions ܽሻ and ܾሻ	can be modified as follows:  
ܽᇱሻ	 ாܲ ൑ ூܲ௏ and ܾᇱሻ ாܲ ൑ ଵି௉಺
ಷି௉಺ೇఈ
ଵିఈ . 
This modification implies that while the upper bound of ாܲ in the condtion ܽᇱሻ	, ூܲ௏, is 
increasing in ூܲ௏, the upper bound in the condition ܾᇱሻ, ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲி െ 	 ூܲ௏ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ, is 
decreasing in ூܲ௏. The upper bounds in the conditions ܽᇱሻ	and ܾᇱሻ	coincide with each 
other at a single point, where ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൌ 1 holds. It follows that which constraint is 
binding depends on whether ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ is larger than 1 or not. If ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൏ 1, only ܽᇱሻ 
is binding. Hence, E’s optimal behaviour is to set the highest possible price satisfying 
ܽᇱሻ	, which is equal to ூܲ௏ as long as the condition ܿሻ is met ( ூܲ௏ ൒ ܥா). 
If ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൐ 1 , only ܾᇱሻ  is binding. In this situation, the highest possible price 
satisfying ܾᇱሻ is 
(A2.7) ாܲ ൌ ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲி െ 	 ூܲ௏ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ. 
Offering the price satisfying Equation (2.7) is E’s optimal behaviour as long as 
condition ܿሻ is satisfied (i.e., 1 െ 	 ூܲி െ 	 ூܲ௏ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൒ ܥா). ■  
2.5.6 Proof of Lemma 2.6 
The proof of Lemma 2.6 is divided into two steps. In Step 1 we find the optimal 
exclusive two-part tariff. In Step 2, we find the optimal exploitative two-part tariff and 
analyse which type of two-part tariff is more profitable.  
Step 1: Optimal exclusive two-part tariff 
Lemma 2.5 implies that if I chooses an exclusive two-part tariff, I has to offer ூܲ௅ such 
that both ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1 and  
(A2.8) ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா. 
 Note that in this situation, since I’s profit is given by ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5, I can obtain a 
large profit by setting high fixed cost while lowering its variable price to exclude E. 
Hence, the most profitable ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ satisfies;  
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(A2.9) ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൌ 1. 
Incumbent firm I’s profit when I chooses exclusive two-part tariff and offers ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ 
satisfying Inequality (A2.8) and Equation (A2.9), ߎூா஼ଶ், can be written as 
 (A2.10) ߎூா஼ଶ் ൌ 0.5. 
Step 2: Optimal exploitative two-part tariff 
Lemma 2.5 also implies that if I chooses exploitative two-part tariff, I have to offer 
ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ such that both ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൐ 1 and ܥா ൑ ሺ1 െ ூܲி െ ூܲ௏ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ are satisfied. 
The condition can be modified as 
	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ߙ ൑ 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ αሻ. 
Because I’s profit is given by 	 ூܲி ൅ ሺ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5ሻߙ, the most profitable ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ satisfies 
(A2.11) 	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ߙ ൌ 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ αሻ. 
I’s profit when I chooses exploitative two-part tariff and offers the price satisfying 
Equation (A11), ߎூா௉ଶ்,can be written as 
(A2.12) ߎூா௉ଶ் ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ.  
Because ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൐ 1,	 ூܲி ൐ 0 and ܥா ൑ ሺ1 െ ூܲி െ ூܲ௏ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ	must be satisfied, 
such pricing must be subject to 
(A2.13) ܥா ൏ ூܲ௏ ൏ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ߙ.  
From Equation (A2.10) and Inequality (A2.13), the condition that I prefers to offer 
exclusive two-part tariff can be written as follows: 
0.5 ൒ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ. 
Rearrangement of this equation yields 
ܥா ൒ 0.5. ■ 
2.5.7 Proof of Lemma 2.7 
As Lemma 2.1 shows, the possible pairs of the purchase volume of B from I and E, 
ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ are ሺ1, 0ሻ, ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ or ሺ0, 0ሻ. However, in this situation, while the unit price 
of E’s good is constant, the unit price of I’s good differs depending on whether the 
purchase volume of B from I achieves the threshold volume or not. While the unit price 
of I’s good is ூܲோ if ݍூ ൏ γ, the unit price of I’s good is ூܲோ െ ߚ if ݍூ ൒ γ. This implies 
that ሺγ, 1 െ γሻ is the other possible pair of ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ.  
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When ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ is equal to ሺ1, 0ሻ, B’s total cost can be written as ூܲோ െ ߚ. When ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ 
is equal to ሺߛ, 1 െ ߛሻ , B’s total cost can be written as ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚሻߛ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߛሻ . It 
follows that the condition that B prefers purchasing ሺ1, 0ሻ to purchasing ሺߛ, 1 െ ߛሻ is 
ூܲோ െ ߚ ൏ ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚሻߛ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߛሻ. This equation can be modified to  
 ாܲ ൐ ூܲோ െ ߚ.  
When ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ is equal to ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ, B’s total cost can be written as ூܲோߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ. 
Hence, the condition that B prefers purchasing ሺߛ, 1 െ ߛሻ to purchasing ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ is 
ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚሻߛ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߛሻ ൏ ூܲோߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ. This equation can be modified to  
 ாܲ ൐ ூܲோ െ ఉఊఊିఈ.  
On the other hand, if B’s total cost to purchase 1 unit is more than 1, B decides not to 
purchase at all, because the cost exceeds its willingness to pay. ■ 
2.5.8 Proof of Lemma 2.8 
If ߛ ൌ 1, the conditions ܽሻ and ܾሻ	can be modified as follows:  
ܽ′ሻ ாܲ ൑ ூܲோ െ ఉଵିఈ and  
ܾ′ሻ	 ாܲ ൑ ଵି௉಺
ೃఈ
ሺଵିఈሻ . 
This modification implies that while the upper bound of ாܲ in the condtion ܽᇱሻ	, ூܲோ െ
ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ, is increasing in ூܲோ, the upper bound in the condition ܾᇱሻ, ሺ1 െ ூܲோߙሻ/ሺ1 െ
ߙሻ, is decreasing in ூܲோ. The upper bounds in the conditions ܽᇱሻ	and ܾᇱሻ	coincide with 
each other at a single point, where ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1 holds. It follows that which constraint 
is binding depends on whether ூܲோ െ ߚ  is larger than 1. If ூܲோ െ ߚ ൏ 1, only ܽᇱሻ is 
binding. Hence, E’s optimal behaviour is to set the highest possible price satisfying ܽᇱሻ	, 
which is equal to ூܲோ െ ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ as long as the condition ܿሻ is met ( ூܲோ െ ߚ/ሺ1 െ
ߙሻ ൒ ܥா). 
If ூܲோ െ ߚ ൐ 1 , only ܾᇱሻ  is binding. In this situation, the highest possible price 
satisfying ܾᇱሻ  is equal to ሺ1 െ ூܲோߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ , the same as for Equation (A2.1). 
Offering the price satisfying Equation (A2.1) is E’s optimal behaviour as long as 
condition ܿሻ is satisfied (i.e., ሺ1 െ ூܲோߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൒ ܥா).■  
2.5.9 Proof of Lemma 2.9 
The proof of Lemma 2.9 is divided into three steps. In Step 1, we find the optimal 
exclusive conditional rebate when I decides to offer the optimal rebate scheme such 
that ߛ ൌ 1 holds. In Step 2, we show that any exclusive conditional rebate scheme 
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such that ߛ ൏ 1 cannot be in equilibrium because such a rebate is less profitable than 
the exclusive conditional rebate satisfying ߛ ൌ 1. In Step 3, we find the optimal 
exploitative conditional rebate and analyse which type of conditional rebate is more 
profitable. 
Step 1: Optimal exclusive conditional rebate satisfying ߛ ൌ 1 
Lemma 2.9 implies that if I chooses exclusive conditional rebate satisfying ߛ ൌ 1, I has 
to offer ሺ ூܲோ, ߚሻ such that both ூܲோ െ ߚ ൑ 1 and  
(A2.14) ூܲோ ൏ ܥா ൅ ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ.  
Note that since I’s profit is given by ூܲோ െ ߚ െ 0.5 in this situation, I can obtain a large 
profit by setting a high fixed cost while setting a pre-discount fixed price so high that 
giving up the discount by purchasing a cheaper good from E is unreasonable for B. 
Hence, I’s profit is maximised when ሺ ூܲோ, ߚሻ satisfies the following condition: 
(A2.15) ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1.  
By substituting Equation (A2.15) into Inequality (A2.14), the condition of ூܲோ  for 
profit-maximising exclusive conditional rebate can be rewritten as 
(A2.16) ூܲோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ߙ. 
Incumbent firm I’s profit when I chooses exclusive conditional rebate and offers 
ሺ ூܲோ, ߚሻ satisfying Equation (A2.15) and Inequality (A2.16), ߎூா஼஼ோ, can be written as 
(A2.17)	ߎூா஼஼ோ ൌ 0.5. 
Step 2: Optimal exclusive conditional rebate satisfying ߛ ൏ 1 
Lemma 2.8 also implies that I is also able to exclude E by offering a rebate scheme such 
that ߛ ൏ 1 . The profit I can obtain by selling ߛ  units to B can be written as 
ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚ െ 0.5ሻߛ. That profit must satisfy both the constraint of B’s willingness to pay 
(ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚሻߛ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߛሻ ൑ 1) and the condition for E to enter the market ( ாܲ ൒ ܥா). 
These conditions can be combined as follows: 
ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚ െ 0.5ሻߛ ൑ 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߛሻ െ 0.5ߛ. 
However, 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߛሻ െ 0.5ߛ is equal to or smaller than the profit from exclusive 
conditional rebates (i.e., 0.5) if ܥா ൒ 0.5 , and it is smaller than the profit from 
exploitative conditional rebate (i.e., 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻ െ 0.5ߙ ) if ܥா ൏ 0.5 . Hence, a 
rebate scheme such that ߛ ൏ 1 cannot represent optimal pricing for I. 
 
Step 3: Optimal exploitative conditional rebate 
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Lemma 2.8 also implies that if I chooses an exploitative two-part tariff, I has to offer 
ሺ ூܲோ, ߚሻ  such that both ூܲோ െ ߚ ൐ 1  and ܥா ൑ ሺ1 െ ூܲோߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ  are satisfied. The 
condition can be modified as 
ூܲோߙ ൑ 1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ αሻ. 
Because I’s profit is given by ூܲோߙ  , the most profitable priceሺ ூܲோ, ߚሻ  satisfies the 
following condition: 
(A2.18) ூܲோ ൌ ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ .  
Incumbent firm I’s profit when I chooses an exploitative conditional rebate and offers 
a price satisfying Equation (A2.18), ߎூா௉஼ோ, can be written as 
(A2.19) ߎூா௉஼ோ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ. 
Note that in order to make such exploitation possible, I needs to exclude the possibility 
that B purchases ߛ units from I and 1 െ ߛ units from E. The condition that I excludes 
the possibility that B purchases ߛ units from I and 1 െ ߛ units from E can be written as 
ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚሻߛ ൅ ܥாሺ1 െ ߛሻ ൐ 1. 
This condition can be rewritten as 
ூܲோ െ ߚ ൐ ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఊሻఊ . 
Note that ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߛሻሿ/ߛ ൐ 1 holds. 
 
From Equations (A2.17) and (A2.19), the condition that I prefers to offer exclusive 
conditional rebate can be written as follows: 
	0.5 ൒ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ. 
This equation can be modifies in this way: 
ܥா ൒ 0.5. ■ 
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Chapter 3: Extension Models Related to 
Anticompetitive Effects of Conditional Rebate Where 
an Incumbent’s Product Is a Must-Stock Item  
3.1. Introduction  
In Chapter 2, the anticompetitive effects of linear pricing, two-part tariffs and 
conditional rebates where an incumbent firm’s product is a must-stock item have been 
analysed. The results show that an incumbent can exclude an entrant by exclusive two-
part tariff or conditional rebate even if the entrant is more efficient than is the incumbent. 
However, when the entrant is more efficient, the incumbent prefers exploitative pricing 
behaviour over exclusive two-part tariffs or conditional rebates because exploitative 
pricing behaviour is more profitable. The result implies that an incumbent will not use 
exclusive two-part tariffs or conditional rebates to foreclose the more efficient entrant 
from the market because the incumbent does not have an incentive to do so; this 
conclusion is similar to the view of the Chicago School on exclusive dealing. In addition, 
the results of the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2 show the limitations of the model 
in the sense that the incumbent has an ability to set an incredibly high price to capture 
all the surplus of the market.  
This chapter expands the basic theoretical framework to analyse the anticompetitive 
effects of conditional rebates and other pricing behaviours raised in Chapter 2. In 
Section 2 of this chapter, we introduce the basic assumptions common to the extended 
models analysed in this chapter. Sections 3–6 cover four extension models. Section 3, 
considering the limitation of the baseline model such that the must-stock assumption 
may be too strong, analyses the case where the incumbent’s good is not literally must-
stock, but is only superior to competitors’ products.  
The next three sections show that by adding certain assumptions, the incumbent can 
have an incentive to exclude the more efficient entrant by conditional rebate. Section 4 
analyses the case of uncertainty about must-stock proportions. Section 5 covers the case 
where uncertainty is assumed regarding the size of the contestable demand. In this 
extended model, a market-share-based rebate is a better scheme to exclude the entrant 
than is a two-part tariff or quantity-based rebate in the sense that the market-share-based 
rebate adapts to the uncertainty better than do other pricing scheme. Section 6 analyses 
the model such that the game is played more than once and that the must-stock property 
of the incumbent’s good is not fixed over time, in order to show that the incumbent can 
have an incentive to exclude the more efficient entrant to maintain its advantage of 
must-stock property. Finally, Section 7 gives concluding remarks and policy 
implications. 
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3.2. Basic Assumptions  
The basic assumptions in the extended models analysed in this chapter are common to 
those in Chapter 2, unless otherwise specified. It is assumed that there are three types 
of players; an incumbent firm (I) and an entrant (E) compete with each other to sell a 
good to a buyer (B). Incumbent firm I incurs a constant marginal costs, ܥூ ൌ 0.5, and 
E incurs a constant marginal cost, ܥா ∈ ሺ0,1ሿ, to produce a unit of the good. Based on 
the case of Intel, I is assumed to have the advantage that from a distributional 
perspective, if the proportion of I’s good on B’s total purchase volume falls below a 
certain point, ߙ, the benefit for B to purchase the good is significantly harmed, where 
ߙ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ.14  
 
The demand size of B is assumed always to be 1. Buyer B’s willingness to pay for a 
unit of the good is 1 if B purchases equal to or more than ߙ units. It is assumed that if 
B fails to procure at least ߙ units of the good from I, the value of 1 unit of the good for 
B is decreased to zero. Hence, ߙ units of I’s product is literally must-stock for B in the 
sense that 1 unit of the good is useless for B if B cannot procure the must-stock item. 
These conditions entail that if B’s minimum total cost to purchase 1 unit of the good is 
equal to or less than its willingness to pay, B decides to buy. Otherwise, B will not 
purchase at all. The case where I’s good is not literally ‘must-stock’ but merely superior 
to E’s good (0 ൏ ߣ ൏ 1) is analysed in Section 3. 
Incumbent firm I can offer three types of pricing schemes; (1) linear pricing, (2) two-
part tariff or (3) conditional rebate. In the first pricing scheme, I offers a fixed price per 
unit, ூܲ௅ where ூܲ௅ ൐ 0. In the second scheme, I offers a price schedule, ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ, where 
ூܲி ൐ 0 is the fixed cost that B has to pay when B purchases any amount from I and 
where ூܲ௏ ൒ 0 is the variable cost per unit. In the third scheme, I offers a price schedule, 
ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ, where ூܲோ ൒ 0 is a fixed price per unit, but if the purchase volume from I to 
total purchase volume is equal to or more than a threshold volume, ߛ ∈ ሺߙ, 1ሿ, the unit 
price for I’s good is discounted by ߚ ∈ ሺ0, ூܲோሿ. The rebate is therefore a retroactive 
rebate in the sense that the discount is applied to all units B purchases. Entrant E offers 
only a linear pricing scheme, ாܲ ൒ 0. Since our interest is the conditional rebate such 
that the entry is blocked (ߛ ൌ 1) and since such a rebate is more profitable than the 
exclusive rebate, such that ߛ ൏ 1 holds in the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2, we 
assume ߛ is equal to 1, for simplicity. In other words, we consider the rebate only such 
that the discount is given on the condition that B does not purchase from E at all.  
The rebate scheme analysed in this section is quantity-based unless otherwise specified. 
Note that when the demand size is always fixed to 1, a quantity-based rebate and a 
market-share-based rebate—in which a discount is given on the condition that the share 
of purchase volume from I to total purchase volume is equal to or more than a 
threshold—have equivalent effects. As discussed in Section 5, if there is uncertainty 
about the size of the contestable demand, a quantity-based rebate and a market-share-
                                                            
14 ߙ must be strictly positive because some of the optimal prices obtained in this model are such prices 
that the denominator is α, the amount of the must-stock demand. This implies that if α is equal to zero, 
the price has a value that is divided by zero, meaning that the price becomes infinite. 
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based rebate have different effects. Hence, only in this case both a quantity-based rebate 
and a market-share-based rebate are analysed. 
The process of the game is assumed to be as follows:  
1) ܥா is realised and known to I and E. 
2) I offers a pricing scheme to B. 
3) After observing the pricing scheme offered by I, E offers its price to B. 
4) B determines whether it trades with I and E or not, and the quantities that B purchases 
from I and E. If the total cost for B is the same, B prefers to purchase E’s good as much 
as possible. 
3.3. Optimal Pricing Where the Must-Stock Nature of Incumbent’s 
Product Is Limited 
Chapter 2 analyses the baseline case where I’s good is literally must-stock, and this 
analysis reveals the limitation that derives from the assumption of such strong “must-
stock” nature. Taking that limitation into account, this section analyses the case where 
I’s good is not literally must-stock, but is simply superior to competitors’ products. Like 
the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2, assuming that the game is played only once, 
this section analyses an optimal behaviour of I when I offers (1) linear pricing, (2) a 
two-part tariff, and (3) a conditional rebate individually. Specifically, this section 
considers whether the extreme results persist such that the optimal pricing for I is set 
quite high so as to maximise profit from the must-stock part of the market. In the 
analysis of the cases where I offers (2) two-part tariff and (3) conditional rebate, only 
the equilibrium such that E is excluded is analysed. This is because there may exist 
another type of equilibrium, exploitation by I, which is equivalent to the exploitative 
equilibrium in a linear pricing case, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
This section is organised as follows. Section 3.1 explains the assumptions of the model 
and the process of the game. Then, Section 3.2 analyses the optimal behaviours of the 
incumbent, the entrant and the buyer when the incumbent offers linear pricing, an 
exclusive two-part tariff and an exclusive conditional rebate individually. That section 
also analyses which pricings the incumbent prefers, and then in Section 3.3 concluding 
remarks are offered. 
3.3.1 Assumptions  
This section relaxes the assumption of such strong “must-stock” nature. To relax this 
assumption, we introduces a valuable, ߣ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ, to measure the extent to which the 
must-stock property of I’s product is strong. Specifically, it is assumed that if B fails to 
procure at least ߙ units of the good from I, the value of 1 unit of the good for B is 
decreased by ߣ. Hence, if that is a case, B pays at most 1 െ ߣ to obtain 1 unit of the 
54 
 
good. As such, in the case where ߙ units of I’s product are literally must-stock for B, as 
is analysed in Chapter 2, ߣ is equal to one. Hence, if the minimum total cost for B to 
purchase 1 unit of the good is equal to or less than its willingness to pay, B decides to 
buy. Otherwise, B will not purchase at all. The relationship between B’s reservation 
price for 1 unit of the product and the volume that B purchases from I can be 
summarised in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1 Buyer’s reservation value for 1 unit of the product 
 
3.3.2 Analysis  
This section analyses the game in which I can offer (1) linear pricing, (2) two-part tariffs 
or (3) conditional rebates. Analysis of this model by the backward induction approach 
provides the following proposition, which will be proved in the following sections.  
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the incumbent can introduce either linear pricing, a two-
part tariff or conditional rebates.  
i) The incumbent is indifferent between exclusive two-part tariffs and exclusive 
conditional rebates. 
ii) If either ܽሻ	ߣ ൒ 0.5 and ܥா ൒ 	0.5 or ܾሻ ߣ ൑ 0.5 and ܥா ൒ ݉݅݊ ቂ	ܥாതതത, 0.5 ൅ ఒఈቃ hold, 
there exist perfect Nash equilibria where the incumbent offers an exclusive 
conditional rebate, where ܥாതതത ൌ ଴.ହ൫ଵିఈ
మ൯ାఈିఈఒ
ଵାఈିఈమ . In the equilibria, the incumbent offers 
a conditional rebate such that 
൫ ூܲோ∗, ߚ∗൯ ൌ
ቐ ܽ݊ݕ	݌ܽ݅ݎ	݋݂	ሺ ூܲ
ோ, ߚሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ ൐ ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ 	݂݅ܥா ൒ 1 െ ߣ		
ܽ݊ݕ	݌ܽ݅ݎ	݋݂	ሺ ூܲோ, ߚሻ	ݐ݄ܽݐ	ݏܽݐ݅ݏ݂݅݁ݏ	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ ܥܧ ൅ ߣെ ߝ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲோ ൐ ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ 	݂݅ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ
ቑ, 
where ߝ is a small positive amount. 
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Equivalently, the incumbent chooses the exclusive two-part tariff. 
In this equilibrium, the entrant decides not to enter and the set of the buyer’s purchasing 
volume is ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ሺ1, 0ሻ. 
If neither ܽሻ	ߣ ൒ 0.5 and ܥா ൒ 	0.5 nor ܾሻ ߣ ൑ 0.5 and ܥா ൒ ݉݅݊ ቂ	ܥாതതത, 0.5 ൅ ఒఈቃ hold, 
there exists a unique perfect Nash equilibria where the incumbent offers an 
exploitative pricing. The set of the prices and the buyer’s purchasing volume in the 
equilibrium is given by  
ሺ ூܲ௅∗, ாܲ∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ቀଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ , ܥா, ߙ, 1 െ ߙቁ 	݂݅1 െ ߣ ൏ ܥா ൏ 	0.5
ቀ ఈଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ െ ߝ	,
ଵିఒି஼ಶఈమ
ଵିఈమ ൅ ߝ, ߙ, 1 െ ߙቁ ݂݅	1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ
ቀܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ, ܥா ൅
ሺଵିఈሻఒ
ఈమ െ ߝ, ߙ, 1 െ ߙቁ ݂݅	0.5 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ
ሺ൅∞, 1 െ ߣ, 0,1ሻ	݂݅	ܥா ൑ 0.5 െ ఒఈమ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
, 
where ூܲ௅ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that the incumbent leaves the market and ߝ is a small 
positive amount. 
iii) If both ߣ ൑ 0.5 and ݉݅݊ ቂ	ܥாതതത, 0.5 ൅ ఒఈቃ ൑ ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ hold, the buyer’s surplus is 
positive even though the incumbent chooses an exclusive conditional rebate. If either 
both ߣ ൒ 0.5 ఈమଵାఈ and 0.5 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൏ 1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ or ߣ ൏ 0.5
ఈమ
ଵାఈ and 0.5 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൏
0.5 ൅ ఒఈ hold, the buyer’s surplus is positive even though the incumbent chooses 
exploitative pricing. Otherwise, the buyer’s surplus is zero. 
iv) If ܥா ൏ ݉݅݊ ቂ	1 െ ߣ, ܥாതതത, 0.5 ൅ ఒఈቃ hold, the entrant’s profit is positive. Otherwise, 
the entrant’s profit is zero. 
v) The improvement of the profit of the entrant due to a policy that prohibits two-part 
tariff and conditional rebate occurs only if  
ܽሻ	both	0.5 ఈమଵାఈ ൑ ߣ ൏ 0.5 and ܥாതതത ൏ ܥா ൏
଴.ହ൫ଵିఈమ൯ାఈାఒ	
ଵାఈିఈమ  hold or 
ܾሻ	both	ߣ ൏ 0.5 ఈమଵାఈ and 0.5 ൅
ఒ
ఈ ൏ ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ hold. 
The improvement of the surplus of the buyer by prohibiting a two-part tariff and 
conditional rebate happens only if  
ܽሻ	both	ߣ ൒ 0.5 and ܥா෪ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 hold, 
ܾሻ	both	0.5 ఈమଵାఈ ൑ ߣ ൏ 0.5 and 
଴.ହ൫ଵିఈమ൯ାఈାఒ	
ଵାఈିఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 hold or 
ܿሻ	both	ߣ ൏ 0.5 ఈమଵାఈ and ܥா෪ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 hold, where ܥா෪ ൌ
ଷିఈ
ସିଶఈ. 
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If ݀ሻ	both	0.5 ఈమଵାఈ ൑ ߣ ൏ 0.5 and ܥாതതത ൑ ܥா ൑
଴.ହ൫ଵିఈమ൯ାఈାఒ	
ଵାఈିఈమ  hold or 
݁ሻ	both	ߣ ൏ 0.5 ఈమଵାఈ and 0.5 ൅
ఒ
ఈ ൑ ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ hold, the buyer becomes worse off by 
prohibiting the two-part tariff and conditional rebate. 
 
Proposition 3.1 i) shows that conditional rebates and two-part tariffs have an equivalent 
effect, as was found in the baseline model of Chapter 2. 
Proposition 3.1 ii) shows that like in the baseline model, exclusive two-part tariffs or 
exclusive conditional rebates are chosen by I in the equilibrium when ܥா is higher than 
a certain value. Proposition 3.1 ii) also implies that the profitability of exploitative 
pricing, exclusive two-part tariff, and exclusive conditional rebate is limited if ܥா ൏
1 െ ߣ, influenced by the possibility that I is excluded by E. It follows that if ߣ is small 
(i.e., the difference from the baseline model is large), I’s behaviour is more likely to be 
influenced by such possibility.  
Moreover, Proposition 3.1 ii) shows that if E is extremely efficient (ܥா ൏ 0.5 െ ߣ/ߙଶ), 
I leaves the market even in the equilibrium, which does not happen in the baseline 
model. This situation occurs because I anticipates that E will undercut its price to 
exclude I even when I sets the best exploitative pricing. 
It is also shown that, as in the baseline model, I still does not have an incentive to 
exclude the more efficient E by a two-part tariff or conditional rebate. This incentive is 
lacking because if ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ  holds while the possibility that I is excluded by E 
constrains the profitability of exploitative pricing, the possibility even more severely 
constrains the profitability of exclusive conditional rebates.  
The profit of I for each type of equilibrium pricing and E’s profit and B’s surplus 
depending on I’s behaviours can be summarised as in Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. The 
details of each type of equilibrium pricing are discussed in subsequent sections. 
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Figure 3.2 Incumbent’s profit for each type of pricing 
ܽሻ	ߣ ൒ 0.5  
 
ܾሻ	0.5 ఈమଵାఈ ൑ ߣ ൏ 0.5  
 
ܿሻ	ߣ ൏ 0.5 ఈమଵାఈ  
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Figure 3.3 Entrant’s profit when Incumbent offers competitive linear pricing, 
exploitative pricing and exclusive two-part tariffs or conditional rebates 
ܽሻ	ߣ ൒ 0.5  
 
ܾሻ	0.5 ఈమଵାఈ ൑ ߣ ൏ 0.5  
 
ܿሻ	ߣ ൏ 0.5 ఈమଵାఈ  
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Figure 3.4 Buyer’s surplus when Incumbent offers competitive linear pricing, 
exploitative pricing and exclusive two-part tariffs or conditional rebates 
ܽሻ	ߣ ൒ 0.5  
 
ܾሻ	0.5 ఈమଵାఈ ൑ ߣ ൏ 0.5  
 
ܿሻ	ߣ ൏ 0.5 ఈమଵାఈ  
 
60 
 
 
The results summarised in Figure 3.2 show that if ߣ is large (ߣ ൒ 0.5), the result is 
similar to the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2 in the sense that I’s optimal 
behaviour is exclusive conditional rebate or two-part tariff if ܥா ൒ 0.5 and exploitative 
pricing if ܥா ൏ 0.5. The result differs from the baseline model only when the entrant’s 
cost is close to zero (i.e., ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ ). In this situation, the profitability of the 
exploitative pricing is limited by the possibility that I is excluded by E.  
On the other hand, if ߣ is small (ߣ ൏ 0.5), the situation becomes more complicated 
because I’s pricing is influenced by the possibility that I is excluded by E unless ܥா is 
high. In this situation, exploitative pricing can be optimal even when the entrant is less 
efficient. In this situation, I even leaves the market in a state of equilibrium when ܥா is 
close to zero (ܥா ൏ 0.5 െ ߣ/ߙଶ), because the expected profit from exploitative pricing 
is negative. Note that I never leaves the market if ߣ ൒ 0.5 holds. 
With respect to B’s surplus, as summarised in Proposition 3.1 iii), if I chooses 
exploitative linear pricing in the equilibrium, B can have a positive surplus when 0.5 െ
ߣ/ߙଶ ൏ ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ/ߙଶ holds. If I chooses the exclusive two-part tariff  or conditional 
rebate in the equilibrium, B can have a positive surplus when ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ holds. Note 
that as long as ܥா is in the range where those two types of pricing are optimal for I, B’s 
surplus increases as ܥா becomes smaller. However, as in the baseline model, when I 
chooses exploitative linear pricing or exclusive conditional rebate in the equilibrium 
but the possibility that E dominates the market does not effectively constrain I’s 
behaviour, which can happen when ܥா ൒ 1 െ ߣ holds, B’s surplus is zero. Moreover, 
B’s surplus is also zero when ܥா ൏ 0.5 െ ߣ/ߙଶ  holds, because in this situation E 
becomes a monopolist after I leaves the market. 
With respect to E’s profit in the equilibrium, as summarised in Proposition 3.1 iv), the 
profit is zero when I chooses exclusive two-part tariffs or conditional rebates in the 
equilibrium, because the market entry is blocked. When ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ  holds and I 
chooses exploitative pricing, while I’s profitability of exploitative pricing is limited by 
the possibility that E excludes I, E can obtain a positive profit instead. In this situation, 
as long as ܥா is a little less than 1 െ ߣ, E’s surplus increases as ܥா becomes smaller. 
However, if ܥா decreases to 1 െ ߣ/ߙଶ, E’s surplus is constant with ܥா because in this 
situation B enjoys the improvement of E’s efficiency.  
 
Proposition 3.1 v) summarises the effect of prohibiting two-part tariffs and conditional 
rebates. In this case, the improvement of E’s profit and B’s surplus can occur. However, 
such improvement can happen only if E is less efficient than I. Moreover, if ߣ ൏ 0.5, B 
can be worse off by prohibiting those price schemes when E is less efficient than the I. 
This is because in this situation, exclusive conditional rebate and two-part tariffs are 
more beneficial for the buyer than is exploitative pricing when ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ holds. 
61 
 
3.3.2.1 Optimal Linear Pricing  
In this section, the game where both I and E offers a linear pricing to B is analysed. In 
this game I, E and B make their decisions in turn. The only difference between this case 
and the model analysed in the linear pricing case in the baseline model analysed in 
Chapter 2 is that in this case, B may purchase only from E when this option is the most 
attractive for B despite the decrease of B’s willingness to pay by ߣ. It follows that the 
purchase volume of B from I and E, ሺݍூ, ݍா), must be either ሺ1,0ሻ, ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ, ሺ0,0ሻ or 
ሺ0,1ሻ. Hence, the optimal behaviour of I in this case can be obtained by analysing the 
situation in which B prefers to purchase only from E.  
Analysis of this model by the backward induction approach provides the following 
proposition, which will be proved in subsequent sections. 
Proposition 3.2. [Equilibrium linear pricing] If the incumbent offers a linear price to 
the buyer, the set of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be written as follows: 
ܽሻ If	ܥா෪ ൐ 1 െ ߣ, 
ሺ ூܲ௅∗, ாܲ∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ሺܥா െ ߝ, ൅∞, 1, 0ሻ݂݅	ܥா ൐ 	ܥா෪
ቀଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻఈ , ܥா, ߙ, 1 െ ߙቁ 	݂݅1 െ ߣ ൏ ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෪
ቀ ఈଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ െ ߝ	,
ଵିఒି஼ಶఈమ
ଵିఈమ ൅ ߝ, ߙ, 1 െ ߙቁ ݂݅	1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ
ቀܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ, ܥா ൅
ሺଵିఈሻఒ
ఈమ െ ߝ, ߙ, 1 െ ߙቁ ݂݅	0.5 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ
ሺ൅∞, 1 െ ߣ, 0,1ሻ	݂݅	ܥா ൑ 0.5 െ ఒఈమ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
, 
where ܥா෪ ൌ ଷିఈସିଶఈ, ߝ is a small positive amount and ௜ܲ∈ூ,ா ൌ ൅∞ denotes that i decides 
to leave or not to enter. 
ܾሻ If 1 െ ߣ ൒ ܥா෪, 
ሺ ூܲ௅∗, ாܲ∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ ሺܥா െ ߝ, ൅∞, 1, 0ሻ	݂݅	ܥா ൐ ܥாതതത
ቀ ఈଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ െ ߝ	,
ଵିఒି஼ಶఈమ
ଵିఈమ ൅ ߝ, ߙ, 1 െ ߙቁ ݂݅	1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥாതതത
ቀܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ, ܥா ൅
ሺଵିఈሻఒ
ఈమ െ ߝ, ߙ, 1 െ ߙቁ ݂݅	0.5 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ
ሺ൅∞, 1 െ ߣ, 0,1ሻ	݂݅	ܥா ൑ 0.5 െ ఒఈమ ۙ
ۖ
ۘ
ۖ
ۗ
, 
where ܥாതതത ൌ ଴.ହ൫ଵିఈ
మ൯ାఈାఒ
ଵାఈିఈమ , ߝ is a small positive amount and ௜ܲ∈ூ,ா ൌ ൅∞ denotes that 
i decides to leave or not to enter. 
 
As shown in Proposition 3.2, five types of equilibria exist, corresponding to the five 
types of pricing behaviours for I: competitive linear pricing, unconstrained exploitative 
linear pricing, first-type constrained exploitative linear pricing, second-type 
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constrained exploitative linear pricing and leaving the market. Based on these 
behaviours, the outcome of the game can be classified into the following five outcomes; 
while the first two outcomes are equivalent to the possible outcomes in the baseline 
model analysed in Chapter 2, the last three outcomes do not arise in the baseline model: 
1) Competitive exclusion by I (I’s optimal behaviour: competitive linear pricing) 
This outcome arises when ܥா is quite high (ܥா ൐ minൣܥா෪, ܥாതതത൧). When ܥா has such a 
high value, I prefers to undercut its price low enough to exclude the possibility of the 
entrance of the market by E, which is less efficient than I. In this case, B enjoys a non-
negative profit derived from the competition (i.e., threat of entry), although E gets 
nothing. Hence, in this case, the surplus of the economy is shared by I and B.  
2) Unconstrained exploitation by I (I’s optimal behaviour: unconstrained exploitative 
linear pricing) 
This outcome occurs when ܥா is low enough that exploitative linear pricing is more 
profitable than competitive linear pricing, but so high that competitive pressure is not 
applied by the possibility that E dominates the market (ܥா ൐ 1 െ ߣ). In this situation, I 
can fully exploit all the surplus of the market. Hence, although E enters the market, the 
surpluses of E and B are zero, respectively. 
3) Joint full exploitation by I and E (I’s optimal behaviour: first-type constrained 
exploitative linear pricing) 
This outcome occurs when ܥா decreases to the point where I can no longer extract all 
the surplus due to the threat that E could attract all B’s demand, including the must-
stock part of the market if I’s price is too high. This threat constrains I’s ability to extract 
all the benefit of E’s efficiency from the must-stock part of the market. In this case, I 
can obtain the positive profit, but I can no longer dominate the entire surplus, while E 
can obtain a non-negative profit, which is equal to the profit I loses. Buyer B’s surplus 
is always zero, which implies that the benefits of the economy are shared by I and E. 
4) Joint partial exploitation by I and E with non-negative profit for B (I’s optimal 
behaviour: second-type constrained exploitative linear pricing) 
This outcome occurs when ܥா  is further decreased to the point where first-type 
constrained exploitative linear pricing is no longer optimal for I due to the threat that E 
could attract all B’s demand, but I can still obtain non-negative profit from exploitative 
linear pricing. In this case, I and E can obtain non-negative profits, but the joint profit 
of the two is not equal to the total surplus. Instead, B obtains non-negative profit owing 
to competitive pressure. Hence, in this situation, I, E and B share the surplus of the 
economy. Note that one of the conditions for the fourth segment to exist is ߣ ൏ ߙଶ.  
5) Unconstrained exploitation by E (I’s optimal behaviour: leaving the market) 
This outcome happens when ܥா  is so low that I leaves the market because I cannot 
compete with such an efficient entrant. In this case, E dominates the market. It follows 
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that E obtains the entire surplus and that I and B get nothing. Note that one of the 
conditions by which this outcome can occur is ߣ ൏ 0.5ߙଶ. 
The last three types of equilibria do not happen in the baseline model analysed in 
Chapter 2. Their absence shows that when ܥா is low, the likelihood increases that E 
excludes I or constrains I’s ability to extract all the benefit of E’s efficiency, from which 
follows the various outcomes, limited exploitation and E’s dominance. 
Proposition 3.2 also shows that the result differs slightly depending on whether the 
threshold point of ܥா —where I’s profits from competitive linear pricing and 
unconstrained exploitative linear pricing are equal, 	ܥா෪—is larger than 1 െ ߣ , the 
threshold point where the optimal pricing changes from unconstrained exploitative 
linear pricing to first-type constrained exploitative linear pricing.  
In order to prove Proposition 3.2, first analyse B’s optimal behaviour. The optimal 
response to B given I and E’s offers is shown by Lemma 3.1 below. 
 
Lemma 3.1. Given ூܲ௅	and ாܲ, the buyer’s optimal purchasing volume is 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗	ሻ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ
௅ ൏ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ 	൑ 1	
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ െ ఒఈ ൏ ாܲ ൑ ூܲ௅	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ
ሺ0,1ሻ	݂݅	 ாܲ ൑ ூܲ௅ െ ఒఈ 	ܽ݊݀	 ாܲ ൑ 1 െ ߣ
൑ 1
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
 .  
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Lemma 3.1 implies that the minimum price that E needs to set in order to sell 1 unit to 
B is equal to I’s price subtracted by the decrease of B’s willingness to pay for 1 unit 
when B’s purchases from only E are divided by the demand size of the must-stock item 
(i.e., ߣ/ߙ).  
Entrant E chooses its optimal behaviour accounting for B’s expected response, as 
summarised in Lemma 3.1. In order to analyse E’s best response given I’s price, 
consider the maximum profits when E sells 1 െ ߙ units and 1 unit individually, and 
compare them. Entrant E’s optimal behaviour and profit when it decides to sell 1 െ ߙ 
units is analysed in Chapter 2 as summarised in Lemma 2.2. Then, consider E’s optimal 
behaviour when it decides to sell 1 unit. From Lemma 3.1 and the definitions of the 
model, the following conditions need to be met for E to sell 1 unit to B without incurring 
a loss: 
1ሻ	E’s price must be no higher than I’s price subtracted by the decrease of B’s 
willingness to pay divided by ߙ ( ாܲ ൑ ூܲ௅ െ ߣ/ߙ) as shown in Equation (2.3).  
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2ሻ	E’s price must be low enough to make the buyer’s demand strictly positive. The 
condition is ாܲ ൑ 1 െ ߣ  
3ሻ	E’s unit price covers its cost ( ாܲ ൒ ܥா) 
Given B’s inelastic demand, E charges the highest possible price that meets the three 
conditions above as long as there exist such ாܲ. Otherwise, E decides not to enter the 
market.  
 E’s optimal pricing given can be written as Lemma 3.2 below. 
 
Lemma 3.2. Given 	 ூܲ௅, the entrant’s optimal pricing is 
ாܲ∗ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ூܲ௅	݂݅	ܥா ൑ ூܲ௅ ൑ ݉݅݊ ቂܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ, 1ቃ	
ଵି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈ 	݂݅	1 ൏ ூܲ௅ ൑ ݉݅݊	 ቂ
ଵିሺଵିఈሻ஼ಶ
ఈ ,
ఈ
ଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ െ ߝቃ
ூܲ௅ െ ఒఈ 	݂݅	݉݅݊ ቂܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ,
ఈ
ଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁቃ ൑ 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 ൅
ଵିఈ
ఈ ߣ	
1 െ ߣ	݂݅ ூܲ௅ ൐ 1 ൅ ଵିఈఈ ߣ	ܽ݊݀	ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
, 
where ߝ is a small positive amount. 
If		 ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா	݋ݎ	݂݅		 ூܲ௅ ൐ ଵିሺଵିఈሻ஼ಶఈ 	ܽ݊݀	ܥா ൐ 1 െ ߣ, E decides not to enter the market. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
The optimal E’s behaviour in Lemma 3.2 can be summarised in Figure 3.5 below. 
 
Figure 3.5 Entrant’s optimal response given Incumbent’s price 
i) if ߣ ൏ ߙ 
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ii) if ߣ ൒ ߙ 
 
Lemma 3.2 and Figure 3.5 show that E dominates the market if E’s marginal cost is 
lower than B’s willingness to pay for 1 unit when B purchases only from E (i.e., ܥா ൑
1 െ ߣ) and I’s price is high enough that selling 1 unit by setting at a lower price is more 
profitable than selling ߙ  units (i.e., 	 ூܲ௅ ൒minሾܥா ൅ ߣ/ߙଶ, ሾߙ/ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻሿሾܥா ൅ ߣ/ߙଶ ൅
1/ߙሿ	ሿ).  
In the linear pricing model analysed in Chapter 2, I’s optimal behaviours can be divided 
into two types: competitive linear pricing or exploitative linear pricing. When I 
introduces competitive linear pricing ( ூܲ௅ ൌ ܥா െ ߝ), there is no room for E to sell any 
unit to B. On the other hand, Lemma 2.2 implies exploitative linear pricing may be 
constrained by competitive pressure such that E dominates the market. In Chapter 2, 
when I uses exploitative pricing, I fully exploits E’s efficiency by setting a price such 
that E will enter the market by setting its lowest possible price, ܥா and B’s total cost is 
equal to its willingness to pay (unconstrained exploitative linear pricing). However, in 
this model, unconstrained exploitative linear pricing may not be possible. If that is the 
case, I must set its price low enough to guarantee that E prefers not to dominate the 
market. 
Incumbent firm I’s optimal behaviour taking such constraint into account is 
summarised in Lemma 3.3. 
 
Lemma 3.3. The incumbent’s optimal pricing is 
ܽሻ if 1 െ ߣ ൐ ܥா෪, 
ூܲ௅
∗ ൌ
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ ܥா െ ߝ	݂݅ܥா ൐ 	ܥா෪ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻ
ఈ 	݂݅1 െ ߣ ൏ ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෪
ఈ
ଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ െ ߝ	݂݅	1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ
ܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ	݂݅	0.5 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ۙ
ۖ
ۘ
ۖ
ۗ
 , where ܥா෪ ൌ ଷିఈସିଶఈ; or 
ܾሻ if 1 െ ߣ ൏ ܥா෪, 
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ூܲ௅
∗ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ܥா െ ߝ	݂݅ܥா ൐ ଴.ହ൫ଵିఈ
మ൯ାఈାఒ
ଵାఈିఈమ
ఈ
ଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ െ ߝ	݂݅	1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑
଴.ହ൫ଵିఈమ൯ାఈାఒ
ଵାఈିఈమ
ܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ	݂݅	0.5 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
 . 
If ܥா ൑ 	0.5 െ ఒఈమ, I decides to leave the market. The entrant enters the market only if 
ܥா ൑ ଴.ହ൫ଵିఈ
మ൯ାఈାఒ
ଵାఈିఈమ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Lemma 3.3 shows that similar to the baseline model in Chapter 2, I will choose either 
to set a competitive price to capture the entire market (competitive linear pricing) or to 
exploit the profit from the must-stock part of the market (exploitative linear pricing). 
The difference from the baseline model in Chapter 2 is that the possibility that E can 
dominate the market does constrain I’s ability to extract all the benefits of E’s efficiency 
and, hence, such unconstrained exploitative linear pricing may not be optimal behaviour 
for I.  
This situation happens occurs if ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ. If ܥா  is slightly lower than 1 െ ߣ, I’s 
optimal exploitative pricing is to set ூܲ௅ slightly lower than ሾߙ/ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻሿሾܥா ൅ ߣ/ߙଶ ൅
1/ߙሿ (“first-type constrained exploitative linear pricing”), because I needs to set a price 
low enough to guarantee that E sets a price such that E sells only ߙ units rather than 
setting a price low enough to exclude I. If ܥா is lower than a certain point, 1 െ ߣ/ߙଶ, 
I’s optimal exploitative pricing changes. In this situation, I sets ூܲ௅ slightly lower than 
ܥா ൅ ߣ/ߙଶ (“second-type constrained exploitative linear pricing”).  
If ܥா  is further down to 0.5 െ ߣ/ߙଶ , I decides to leave the market, because in this 
situation, I can obtain non-negative profits by neither exploitative linear pricing nor 
competitive linear pricing. 
Proposition 3.2 follows directly from Lemmata 3.1–3.3.  
3.3.2.2 Optimal Two-Part Tariff  
This section analyses the game that while E offers linear pricing to B, I offers a two-
part tariff, ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ, where ூܲி ൐ 0 is the fixed cost that B has to pay when purchasing 
any amount from I and ூܲ௏ ൒ 0  is the variable cost per unit. The only difference 
between this case and the two-part tariff case analysed in Chapter 2 is that in this case, 
B may purchase only from E when this option is the most attractive for B. As well as 
the linear pricing case analysed in the previous section, the purchase volume of B from 
I and E, ሺݍூ, ݍா), must be either ሺ1,0ሻ, ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ, ሺ0,0ሻ or ሺ0,1ሻ. Hence, the optimal 
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behaviour of I in this case can be obtained by analysing in what situation B prefers to 
purchase only from E.  
Analysis of this model through backward induction provides the following proposition, 
which will be proved in subsequent sections. 
Proposition 3.3. [Optimal exclusive two-part tariff] The incumbent can exclude the 
entrant by offering the two-part tariff such that both 	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൌ ݉݅݊ሾ1, ܥா ൅ ߣ െ ߝሿ 
and ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா  hold and can obtain a profit of ݉݅݊ሾ0.5, ܥா ൅ ߣ െ 0.5 െ ߝሿ as long as 
ܥா ൒ 0.5 െ ߣ, where ߝ is a small non-negative amount. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Proposition 3.3 shows there are two types of equilibria in which E is excluded from the 
market, and those equilibria correspond to the following two types of exclusive pricing 
behaviour for I; unconstrained exclusive two-part tariffs and constrained exclusive two-
part tariffs. Based on this proposition, the outcome of the game can be classified into 
the following two outcomes. While the first outcome is equivalent to the possible 
outcome in the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2, the second outcome does not 
occur in the baseline model. 
Note that I does choose the exclusive two-part tariff only if the profit is higher than 
that of exploitative pricing. The condition is shown in Proposition 3.1. 
1’) Unconstrained exclusion by I (I’s optimal behaviour: unconstrained exclusive two-
part tariff) 
This outcome arises when ܥா is high (ܥா ൐ minሾ0.5,1 െ ߣሿ). In this case, I can capture 
the entire surplus, although E and B get nothing. This result is maintained as long as ܥா 
does not fall below a certain point, 0.5. 
2’) Constrained exclusion by I (I’s optimal behaviour: constrained exclusive two-part 
tariff) 
This outcome happens when ܥா is decrease to the point where the competitive pressure 
by the possibility that E dominates the market (ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ) works, but is still high 
enough that an exclusive two-part tariff is more profitable than exploitative pricing 
(ܥா ൐ 0.5). In this case, though I can exclude E, I no longer captures the entire surplus 
of the economy. The rest of the surplus is shared by B. 
Note that if ܥா ൏ 0.5 െ ߣ holds, I prefers not to introduce an exclusive two-part tariff 
because the profit will be negative. 
This result shows that when ܥா is low, the possibility that E excludes I constrains I’s 
ability to obtain profit from the two-part tariff, from which follows that the divergent 
outcomes, with limited profitability from the exclusive two-part tariff, may arise. 
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3.3.2.3 Optimal Conditional Rebate  
In this section, the game considered is that while E offers a linear pricing to B, I offers 
a conditional rebate scheme, ሺ ூܲோ, ߚሻ, where ூܲோ ൒ 0 is a pre-discount price per unit, 
and ߚ ∈ ሺ0, ூܲோሿ is the discount per unit B can obtain if B purchases 1 unit form I. The 
only difference between this case and the two-part tariff case analysed in Chapter 1 is 
that in this case, B may purchase only from E when this option is the most attractive for 
B. As well as the linear pricing case analysed in the previous section, the purchase 
volume of B from I and E, ሺݍூ, ݍா), must be either ሺ1,0ሻ, ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ, ሺ0,0ሻ or ሺ0,1ሻ. 
Hence, the optimal behaviour of I in this case can be obtained by analysing in what 
situations B prefers to purchase only from E.  
Analysis on this model by the backward induction approach provides the following 
proposition, to be proved in the subsequent sections. 
Proposition 3.4. [Optimal exclusive conditional rebate] The incumbent can exclude 
the entrant by offering the conditional rebate such that both ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ ݉݅݊ሾ1, ܥா ൅
ߣ െ ߝሿ and ூܲோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ߙ  hold and can obtain a profit of ݉݅݊ሾ0.5, ܥா ൅
ߣ െ 0.5 െ ߝሿ, where ߝ is a small non-negative amount. 
 
Proposition 3.4 shows that a conditional rebate has the same effects as a two-part as in 
the baseline model in Chapter 2. In specific, there are two types of equilibria in which 
E is excluded from the market, corresponding to the following two types of exclusive 
pricing behaviours from I; unconstrained exclusive conditional rebates and constrained 
exclusive conditional rebates. Based on this result, the outcome of the game can be 
classified into the following two outcomes. While the first outcome is equivalent to the 
possible outcome in the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2, the second outcome does 
not occur in the baseline model. 
Note that I does choose the exclusive conditional rebate only if the profit is higher than 
that of exploitative pricing. The condition is shown in Proposition 3.1. 
1’) Unconstrained exclusion by I (I’s optimal behaviour: unconstrained exclusive 
conditional rebate) 
This outcome arises when ܥா is high (ܥா ൐ minሾ0.5,1 െ ߣሿ). In this case, I can capture 
the entire surplus, though E and B get nothing. This result is maintained as long as ܥா 
does not fall below a certain point, 0.5. 
2’) Constrained exclusion by I (I’s optimal behaviour: constrained exclusive 
conditional rebate) 
This outcome happens when ܥா decreases to the point where the competitive pressure 
from the possibility that E dominates the market (ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ) works, but ܥா remains 
high enough that exclusive conditional rebates are more profitable than exploitative 
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pricing (ܥா ൐ 0.5). In this case, although I can exclude E, I no longer captures the entire 
surplus of the economy. The rest of the surplus is shared by B. 
This shows that when ܥா is low, the possibility that E excludes I constrains I’s ability 
to obtain large profit from the exclusive conditional rebate, from which follows that the 
divergent outcomes, with limited profitability from the exclusive conditional rebate, 
may arise. 
Note that if ܥா ൏ 0.5 െ ߣ holds, I prefers not to introduce exclusive two-part tariff 
because the profit will be negative. 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Note also that Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 show that the profit is the same as the profit 
from the exclusive two-part tariff.  
3.3.2.4 Endogenous Pricing Type  
According to the results shown in Propositions 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, the surplus of I, E and 
B when I introduces competitive linear pricing, exploitative linear pricing , exclusive 
two-part tariffs and exclusive conditional rebates can be summarised in Table 3.1 and 
3.2 below. 
Table 3.1 Surplus of each player when Incumbent offers linear pricing 
ܽሻ	1 െ ߣ ൏ ܥா෪ 
ܥா Optimal I’s 
Behaviour 
I’s profit E’s profit B’s surplus 
ܥா෪ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 1) Competitive 
linear pricing 
ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ 
 
0 1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝ 
1 െ ߣ ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥா෪ 2) Unconstrained 
exploitative linear 
pricing  
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ 0 0 
1 െ ߣߙଶ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ 
3) 1st type 
constrained 
exploitative linear 
pricing 
ߙଶܥா ൅ ߣ ൅ 0.5ߙሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 ൅ ߙ െ ߝ 
 
1 െ ߣ െ ܥா
1 ൅ ߙ
െ ߝ 
0 
0.5 െ ߣߙଶ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ߣ
ߙଶ 
4) 2nd type 
constrained 
exploitative linear 
pricing 
ߙܥா ൅ ߣߙ െ 0.5ߙ െ ߝ 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ
ߙଶ
െ ߝ 
1 െ ߣߙଶ െ ܥா
൅ ߝ 
0 ൏ ܥா ൑ 0.5 െ ߣߙଶ 
5) Leaving the 
market 
0 1 െ ߣ െ ܥா 0 
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ܾሻ	1 െ ߣ ൒ ܥா෪ 
ܥா Optimal I’s 
Behaviour 
I’s profit E’s profit B’s surplus 
ܥாሖ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 1) Competitive 
linear pricing 
ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ 
 
0 1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝ 
1 െ ߣߙଶ ൏ ܥா ൑ ܥாሖ  
3) 1st type 
constrained 
exploitative linear 
pricing 
ߙଶܥா ൅ ߣ ൅ 0.5ߙሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 ൅ ߙ െ ߝ 
 
1 െ ߣ െ ܥா
1 ൅ ߙ
െ ߝ 
0 
0.5 െ ߣߙଶ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ߣ
ߙଶ 
4) 2nd type 
constrained 
exploitative linear 
pricing 
ߙܥா ൅ ߣߙ െ 0.5ߙ െ ߝ 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ
ߙଶ
െ ߝ 
1 െ ߣߙଶ െ ܥா
൅ ߝ 
0 ൏ ܥா ൑ 0.5 െ ߣߙଶ 
5) Leaving the 
market 
0 1 െ ߣ െ ܥா 0 
 
Table 3.2 Surplus of each player when Incumbent offers exclusive two-part tariff or 
conditional rebate 
ܥா Optimal I’s 
Behaviour 
I’s surplus E’s profit B’s surplus 
1 െ ߣ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 1’) Unconstrained 
exclusive two-part 
tariff or conditional 
rebate 
0.5 
 
0 0 
0.5 െ ߣ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ 2’) Constrained 
exclusive two-part 
tariff or conditional 
rebate 
ܥா ൅ ߣ െ 0.5 0 1 െ ߣ െ ܥா 
0 ൏ ܥா ൑ 0.5 െ ߣ Not using exclusive 
two-part tariff or 
conditional rebate 
0 1 െ ߣ െ ܥா 0 
 
By comparing I’s optimal profit when I introduces linear pricing and exclusive 
conditional rebates as summarised in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, 
Proposition 3.1 can be proven. 
3.3.3 Effect on Incumbent’s Ability to Set Extremely High Prices 
The baseline model in Chapter 2 makes a prediction that seems unlikely to happen in 
the sense that the incumbent sets an extremely high pre-discount price when it excludes 
E’s entry by conditional rebates or extremely high prices, exploiting the entrant’s 
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efficiency. This section examines to what extent the possibility that I is excluded by E 
can limit the ability to set extremely high prices.  
The results in the model analysed in this chapter show that the profitability of such 
behaviour is constrained by the competitive pressure that E dominates the market 
undermining the profitability of exploitative pricing when ܥா is smaller than 1 െ ߣ, in 
contrast to the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2. For instance, if ܥா ൌ 0.4, ߙ ൌ 0.5 
and ߣ ൌ 0.3, the optimal linear pricing for I is to set its price at 1.2, while the optimal 
exploitative price in the baseline model is 1.6. If ܥா ൌ 0.4 and ߙ ൌ 0.2 and ߣ ൌ 0.3, 
the optimal exploitative linear pricing for I is to set its price at 2.15, while that the 
optimal exploitative price in the baseline model is 3.4. 
Moreover, such competitive pressure also has an influence on the profitability of 
exclusive conditional rebates when ܥா is smaller than 1 െ ߣ. For example, assume that 
I will set the lowest possible ூܲோ when it prefers exclusive conditional rebates and that 
ߝ ൒ 0.001 must be satisfied. In these circumstances, if ܥா ൌ 0.5, ߙ ൌ 0.8 and ߣ ൌ 0.3, 
the incumbent will exclude E and obtain the profit of 0.5 by exclusive conditional 
rebates, such that ூܲோ ൌ 0.875  and ߚ ൌ 0.076 , which are 1.126 and 0.126 in the 
baseline model. If ܥா ൌ 0.5, ߙ ൌ 0.1 and ߣ ൌ 0.3, the incumbent will exclude E by 
setting ூܲோ  at 3.5 and ߚ at 2.701, which are 5.501 and 4.501 in the baseline model. 
While exclusive conditional rebate is optimal for I when ܥா ൌ 0.5 in the baseline model, 
in this case, exclusive conditional rebate is not optimal when ܥா ൌ 0.5 and ߣ ൏ 0.5. If 
ܥா ൌ 0.1, ߙ ൌ 0.1 and ߣ ൌ 0.3, the incumbent will exclude E by setting ூܲோ at 3.1 and 
ߚ at 2.701, which are 9.101 and 8.101 in the baseline model, although such pricing 
gives I negative profit. The relationship between the optimal nominal price, ூܲோ, and the 
optimal discounted price, ூܲோ െ ߚ, with ܥா is shown by Figure 3.4 below. 
When the difference from the baseline model is small but the entrant is efficient enough 
to enter the market (i.e., ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ ൏ 0.5), the competitive pressure still works. For 
example, if ܥா ൌ 0.1 , ߙ ൌ 0.8  and ߣ ൌ 0.8 , the incumbent’s optimal pricing is 
exploitative pricing such that the unit price is approximately equal to 1.15, 
corresponding to 1.225 in the baseline model. If ܥா ൌ 0.1, ߙ ൌ 0.1 and ߣ ൌ 0.8, the 
incumbent’s optimal pricing is exploitative pricing such that the unit price is 
approximately equal to 8.19, which is 9.1 in the baseline model. If ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ ൏ 0.5 
holds, exclusive conditional rebates are not compatible with equilibrium, because 
exploitative pricing is always more profitable. 
On the other hand, if ܥா  is weakly larger than 1 െ ߣ , the incumbent’s optimal 
behaviours are the same as the baseline model, because the possibility that the entrant 
dominates the market does not effectively constrain the incumbent’s behaviour. It 
follows that when the difference from the baseline model is small (i.e., ߣ is close to 1), 
the incumbent is more likely to set an extremely high price.  
Therefore, under this relaxed assumption about the must-stock property, the 
incumbent’s optimal pricing can have a more realistic values, although such a result 
occurs only when ܥா ൑ 	1 െ ߣ . Moreover, as with the baseline model, the optimal price 
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becomes lower when ߙ is high. These results imply that the equilibrium price is more 
likely to have a realistic value when ߣ is low or ߙ is high. 
3.4. Optimal Pricing Where There Is Uncertainty about Must-stock 
Proportion  
Chapter 2 analyses the baseline case where there is no uncertainty, and the result shows 
that I does not have an incentive to exclude the more efficient entrant by two-part tariffs 
or conditional rebates, because exploitative pricing is more profitable. This section 
analyses the case in which uncertainty exists about must-stock proportion, ߙ, and shows 
that I may have an incentive to exclude the more efficient entrant with two-part tariffs 
and conditional rebates.  
This section analyses an optimal behaviour of I when I offers (1) linear pricing and (2) 
conditional rebates individually. Specifically, it considers whether the extreme results 
persist, such that the optimal pricing for I is to set quite high so as to maximise profit 
from the must-stock part of the market. In the analysis of the cases where I offers 
conditional rebate, only the equilibrium such that E is excluded is analysed. Because 
conditional rebates and two-part tariffs have an equivalent effect, this section does not 
cover two-part tariffs. The next section covers the case in which market-share-based 
rebates have different effect from two-part tariffs and quantity-based rebates. 
This section is organised as follows. Section 4.1 explains the assumptions specific to 
this section. Section 4.2 then analyses the optimal behaviours of the incumbent, the 
entrant and the buyer when the incumbent offers linear pricing and an exclusive 
conditional rebate individually. That section also analyses the pricings the incumbent 
prefers and offers concluding remarks. 
3.4.1 Assumptions  
The assumption specific to this section is uncertainty about must-stock proportion, ߙ. 
Specifically, it is assumed that ߙ௜ ൌ ߙு or ߙ௅ on a 50-50 basis where 0 ൏ ߙ௅ ൏ ߙு ൏
1. It is also assumed that ߙ௜ is realised after I offers a pricing scheme to B and that I 
knows only the distribution of ߙ௜  (50-50). On the other hand, E and B make their 
decisions after observing that ߙ is realised. 
This scenario implies that the process of the game can be written as follows:  
1) ܥா is realised and known to I and E. 
2) I offers a pricing scheme to B. 
3) ߙ௜ is realised and known to E 
4) After observing the pricing scheme offered by I, E offers its price to B. 
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5) B determines whether it trades with I and E or not, along with the quantities that B 
purchases from I and E. If the total cost for B is the same, B prefers to purchase E’s 
good as often as possible. 
The difference from the baseline model is that the third stage, the realisation of ߙ௜, is 
added. 
 
3.4.2 Analysis  
This section analyses the game in which I can offer (1) linear pricing or (2) conditional 
rebates. Analysis of this model by the backward induction approach provides the 
following proposition, which will be proved in the following sections.  
 
Proposition 3.5. Suppose the incumbent can introduce either linear pricing or 
conditional rebate.  
i) If ܥா ൒ 	0.5 െ
αܪെαܮ
4αܪ
1െαܪെαܮ2αܪ െαത
,	the incumbent’s optimal behaviour is exclusive conditional 
rebate such that both ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1 and ூܲோ ൐ 1െCܧሺ1െαܮሻαܮ   hold. In the equilibrium, the 
entrant decides not to enter and the set of the buyer’s purchasing volume is ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ
	ሺ1, 0ሻ. 
If ܥா ൏ 	0.5 െ
αܪെαܮ
4αܪ
1െαܪെαܮ2αܪ െαത
,	the incumbent’s optimal behaviour is and exploitative linear 
pricing such that ூܲ௅
∗ ൌ 1െCܧሺ1െαܪሻαܪ . The set of the entrant’s price and the buyer’s 
purchasing volume in the equilibrium is given by  
ሺ ாܲ∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ቐቆ
ଵିഀಽഀಹሾଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻሿ
ଵିఈಽ , ߙ௅, 1 െ ߙ௅ቇ 	݂݅ߙ௜ ൌ ߙ௅
ሺܥா, ߙு, 1 െ ߙுሻ	݂݅ߙ௜ ൌ ߙு
ቑ. 
ii) The entrant obtains a profit of ሺαு െ α௅ሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ/αுሺ1 െ α௅ሻ if the incumbent 
introduces exploitative pricing in the equilibrium and ߙ௜ ൌ ߙ௅. Otherwise, the entrant’s 
profit is zero. The buyer’s surplus is always zero. 
iii) If ܥாሖ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1, prohibition of the conditional rebate increases the buyer’s profit, 
where  
ܥாሖ ൌ
ଷି஑ഥିಉಹషಉಽಉಹ
ସିଶ஑ഥିಉಹషಉಽಉಹ
 and ߙത ൌ ఈಹାఈಽଶ . 
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If  0.5 െ
ಉಹషಉಽ
రಉಹ
ଵିಉಹషಉಽమಉಹ ି஑ഥ
൑ ܥா ൑ ܥாሖ , prohibition of the conditional rebate increases the 
entrant’s profit. 
If ܥா ൏ 0.5 െ
ಉಹషಉಽ
రಉಹ
ଵିಉಹషಉಽమಉಹ ି஑ഥ
, prohibition of the conditional rebate changes neither the 
entrant’s profit nor the buyer’s surplus. 
 
Proposition 3.4 i) shows that, as in the baseline model, the exclusive conditional rebate 
is chosen by I in the equilibrium when ܥா is higher than a certain point, and I chooses 
exploitative pricing when ܥா is lower than the threshold. However, in this model, the 
threshold point is lower than 0.5. This point implies that in this case I may exclude the 
more efficient entrant by conditional rebate in the equilibrium, which never happens in 
the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2. This situation occurs because the existence 
of the uncertainty about the must-stock proportion only limits the profitability of 
exploitative pricing and does not affect the profitability of the exclusive conditional 
rebate. Note that I can exclude E and obtain monopoly profit by offering a two-part 
tariff, with an equivalent effect in this model if the two-part tariff is available because, 
as in the baseline model, conditional rebates and two-part tariffs have an equivalent 
effect in this model.  
The profitability of exploitative pricing is limited by the uncertainty because under such 
uncertainty, I cannot set a price such that I can completely exploit the profit in both the 
high ߙ case and the low ߙ case. Taking this constraint into account, I sets a price such 
that I can exploit the profit completely only when ߙ௜ ൌ ߙு  in the equilibrium. In 
exchange, E can obtain a positive profit when ߙ௜ ൌ ߙ௅  and I chooses exploitative 
pricing in the equilibrium, as shown in Proposition 3.4 ii). Note that the profit becomes 
larger as ܥா becomes smaller. On the other hand, the buyer’s surplus is always zero. 
The expected profit of I for each type of equilibrium pricing can be summarised in 
Figures 3.6. The details of each type of equilibrium pricing will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
Figure 3.6 Incumbent’s expected profit for each type of pricing 
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Proposition 3.5 iii) summarises the effect of prohibiting conditional rebates. The results 
show that if two-part tariffs and conditional rebates are prohibited, the improvement of 
E’s profit or B’s surplus can occur. If ܥா  is extremely high (i.e., ܥாሖ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1), the 
prohibition of conditional rebates improves B’s surplus, because in this situation, I 
introduces competitive linear pricing as its second best option, meaning that E’s profit 
remains zero. If ܥா is less than the threshold but is high enough to prefer exclusive 
conditional rebate to exploitative pricing, the prohibition on conditional rebates 
improves E’s profit, because in this situation I introduces exploitative pricing as its 
second best option, and B’s surplus is still zero. 
3.4.2.1 Optimal Linear Pricing  
In this section, the game where both I and E offers a linear pricing to B is analysed. In 
this game I, E and B make their decisions in turn. Let ாܲு
∗
 and ாܲ௅
∗
 denote E’s optimal 
response given I’s pricing when ߙ௜ is ߙு and ߙ௅, respectively. 
 
Analysis on this model by the backward induction approach provides Proposition 3.6, 
proven in the subsequent sections. 
Proposition 3.6. If the incumbent offers a linear price to the buyer, this game has a 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: 
ሺ ூܲ௅∗, ாܲு∗, ாܲ௅∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ
ቐ
ሺܥா െ ߝ,൅∞,൅∞, 1, 0ሻ	݂݅ܥா ൐ ܥாሖ
ሺଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ , ܥா,
ଵିഀಽഀಹሾଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻሿ
ଵିఈಽ , ߙ௜, 1 െ ߙ௜ሻ	݂݅ܥா ൑ ܥாሖ
ቑ , 
 where ܥாሖ ൌ
ଷି஑ഥିಉಹషಉಽಉಹ
ସିଶ஑ഥିಉಹషಉಽಉಹ
, ߙത ൌ ఈಹାఈಽଶ 	and ாܲ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that E decides not to enter. 
The results summarised in Proposition 3.6 show that as in the baseline model, 
competitive linear pricing is chosen by I in the equilibrium when ܥா is higher than a 
certain point, and I chooses exploitative pricing when ܥா is lower than the threshold. 
However, Proposition 3.6 shows that the equilibrium for exploitative linear pricing is 
the price at which I can exploit the profit completely only when ߙ௜ ൌ ߙு. It follows 
that the profitability of exploitative linear pricing is limited. On the other hand, the 
existence of the uncertainty about the must-stock proportion does not limit the 
profitability of competitive linear pricing.  
 
In order to prove Proposition 3.6, we first analyse B and E’s optimal behaviours. 
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The following lemmata about the optimal behaviours of B and E can be obtained by 
substituting ߙ௜ into ߙ in Lemmata 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
Lemma 3.4. Given ூܲ௅	and ாܲ, the buyer’s optimal purchasing volume is 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൏ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ 	൑ 1	
ሺߙ௜, 1 െ ߙ௜ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ߙ௜ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ൑ 1
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ቑ .  
Lemma 3.5. Given 	 ூܲ௅, the entrant’s optimal pricing is 
ாܲ∗ ൌ ൝
ூܲ௅	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா
ଵି௉಺ಽఈ೔
ଵିఈ೔ 	݂݅	 ூܲ
௅ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ଵି௉಺ಽఈ೔ଵିఈ೔ ൒ ܥா
ൡ. 
If 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா	݋ݎ	݂݅		 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	ሺ1 െ 	 ூܲ௅ߙ௜ሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ൏ ܥா	, E decides 
not to enter the market. 
 
In the baseline model, I’s optimal behaviours can be divided into two types. The first 
type is when I sets a competitive price to capture the entire market (competitive linear 
pricing). When I adopts this option, setting ூܲ௅  just below ܥா  maximizes I’s profit 
( ூܲ௅ ൌ ܥா െ ߝ). In this case, such pricing also may be optimal, since the profit does not 
depend on ߙ௜. 
The second type is for I to give up competing with E and exploit the profit from the 
must-stock part of the market by setting the price higher than 1 (“exploitative linear 
pricing”). This type of pricing is affected by uncertainty about ߙ. If I adopts this type 
of pricing, the resulting profit can be calculated as follows: 
(3.1)  ߎூ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ0.5ሺ ூܲ െ 0.5ሻߙு ൅ 0.5ሺ ூܲ െ 0.5ሻߙ௅	݂݅		1 ൏ ூܲ௅ ൑ ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ
0.5ሺ ூܲ െ 0.5ሻߙ௅	݂݅	 ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ ൏ ூܲ
௅ ൑ ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಽሻ஑ಽ
0	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൐ ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಽሻ஑ಽ
	
ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ	. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem gives I’s optimal behaviour, which is 
summarised in Lemma 3.6 below. 
 
Lemma 3.6. The incumbent’s optimal pricing is 
ூܲ௅
∗ ൌ ൝
ܥா െ ߝ	݂݅ܥா ൐ 	ܥாതതത
1െܥܧሺ1െߙܪሻ
ߙܪ 	݂݅ܥா ൑ ܥாതതത
ൡ  , where ܥாതതത ൌ
ଷିߙതെߙܪെߙܮߙܪ
ସିଶߙതെߙܪെߙܮߙܪ
, ߙത ൌ ఈಹାఈಽଶ  and ߝ  is a small 
positive amount. 
The entrant enters the market only if ܥா ൑ 	ܥாതതത. 
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Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Proposition 3.6 follows directly from Lemmata 3.4–3.6. 
3.4.2.2 Optimal Conditional Rebate  
Analysis of this model by the backward induction approach provides the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 3.7. [Optimal exclusive conditional rebate] The incumbent can exclude 
the entrant by offering the conditional rebate such that both ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1  and 
ூܲோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙ௅ሻሿ/ߙ௅ hold, and the expected profit is 0.5. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Proposition 3.7 shows that, as in the baseline model, I can obtain a monopoly profit by 
exclusive conditional rebate regardless of the values of ܥா and ߙ௜. This result implies 
that the existence of the uncertainty about the must-stock proportion does not limit the 
profitability of exclusive conditional rebates in contrast to exploitative pricing. Such an 
asymmetric effect of the uncertainty causes the exclusion of the more efficient entrant 
by conditional rebate, which never happens in the baseline model. 
Note that like in the baseline model, conditional rebates and two-part tariffs have an 
equivalent effect in this model. Incumbent firm I can exclude E and obtain a profit of 
0.5 by offering two-part tariff ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ such that both ூܲி ൌ 1 െ ூܲ௏ and 0 ൑ ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா 
hold. 
Note that I does choose the exclusive conditional rebate only if the profit is higher 
than that of exploitative pricing. The condition is shown in Proposition 3.5. 
3.4.2.3 Endogenous Pricing Type  
According to the results shown in Propositions 3.6 and 3.7, the surplus of I, E and B 
when I introduces competitive linear pricing, exploitative linear pricing and exclusive 
conditional rebates can be summarised in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Surplus of each player for each type of Incumbent’s pricing 
ܽሻ	Surplus of each player if ߙ௜ ൌ ߙு 
I’s Behaviour I’s profit E’s profit B’s surplus 
Competitive 
linear pricing 
ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ  
 
0 1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝ 
 
Exploitative 
linear pricing  
ሺ1 െ αுሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5αு 0 0 
Exclusive 
conditional 
rebate 
0.5 0 0 
 
bሻ	Surplus of each player if ߙ௜ ൌ ߙ௅ 
I’s Behaviour I’s profit E’s profit B’s surplus 
Competitive 
linear pricing 
ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ  
 
0 1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝ 
 
Exploitative 
linear pricing  
α௅
αு ሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ αுሻܥாሿ െ 0.5α௅ 
ሺαு െ α௅ሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ
αுሺ1 െ α௅ሻ  
0 
Exclusive 
conditional 
rebate 
0.5 0 0 
 
cሻ	Expected surplus of each player  
I’s Behaviour I’s profit E’s profit B’s surplus 
Competitive 
linear pricing 
ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ  
 
0 1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝ 
 
Exploitative 
linear pricing  
ߙഥ
αு ሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ αுሻܥாሿ െ 0.5 ߙഥ 0.5
ሺαு െ α௅ሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ
αுሺ1 െ α௅ሻ  
0 
Exclusive 
conditional 
rebate 
0.5 0 0 
* ߙത ൌ 0.5ߙு ൅ 0.5ߙ௅. 
 
With a comparison of I’s optimal profit when I introduces linear pricing and exclusive 
conditional rebates (as summarised in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.6), Proposition 3.5 can 
be obtained. 
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3.5. Optimal Pricing Where There Is Uncertainty about Size of 
Contestable Demand 
Section 4 analyses the case in which uncertainty exists about must-stock proportion and 
shows that I may have an incentive to exclude the more efficient entrant with two-part 
tariffs and conditional rebates. This section analyses the case in which there is 
uncertainty about the size of the contestable demand. The baseline model in Chapter 2 
covers only a quantity-based rebate, which is a rebate scheme such that B obtains a 
discount of ߚ when the purchase volume from I exceeds the threshold determined by I. 
In the baseline model, a quantity-based rebate and a market-share-based rebate (i.e., a 
rebate scheme such that B obtains a discount when the share of purchase volume from 
I to total purchase volume exceeds a threshold) have an equivalent effect, because the 
demand size is fixed to 1. However, as discussed below, under the assumption of the 
uncertainty about the size of the contestable demand, I may have an incentive to exclude 
the more efficient entrant, and the market-share-based conditional rebate works better 
than the quantity-based conditional rebate and two-part tariff.  
As with Chapter 2, this section analyses the optimal behaviour of I when I offers (1) 
linear pricing, (2) two-part tariffs, and (3) conditional rebates individually—
specifically, analyses whether the extreme results of optimal pricing for I being to set 
at a high price so as to maximise the profit from the must-stock part of the market persist. 
In the analysis of the cases where I offers two-part tariffs and conditional rebates, only 
the equilibrium such that E is excluded is analysed. 
This section is organised as follows. Section 5.1 explains the assumptions specific to 
this section. Section 5.2 then analyses the optimal behaviours of the incumbent, the 
entrant and the buyer when the incumbent offers linear pricing, an exclusive two-part 
tariff and an exclusive conditional rebate individually. Section 5.2 also analyses which 
pricings the incumbent prefers and presents concluding remarks. 
3.5.1 Assumptions  
The assumption specific to this section is uncertainty about the size of the contestable 
demand. In particular, while it is assumed that the size of the must-stock demand is 
fixed to ߙ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ, the size of the contestable demand is low or high on a 50-50 basis. 
When the size of the contestable demand is low, the amount is 1 െ ߙ. When the size of 
the contestable demand is high, the amount is	1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ, where ߠ ൐ 0. For simplicity, 
it is also assumed ߠ is small enough to guarantee that in the equilibrium, the incumbent 
will not choose the options such that its profit becomes zero with a 50% probability. 
The buyer’s demand size under the uncertainty about the size of contestable demand 
can be summarised in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7 Buyer’s demand size under uncertainty about the size of contestable 
demand 
 
Moreover, it is also assumed that the size of the contestable demand is realised after I 
offers a pricing scheme to B and I only knows the distribution of ߙ௜ (50-50). On the 
other hand, E and B make their decisions after observing that the size of the contestable 
demand is realised. 
This sequence of events implies that the process of the game can be written as follows:  
1) ܥா is realised and known to I and E. 
2) I offers a pricing scheme to B. 
3) The size of the contestable demand is realised and known to I and E. 
4) After observing the pricing scheme offered by I, E offers its price to B. 
5) B determines whether it trades with I and E or not, along with the quantities that B 
purchases from I and E. If the total cost for B is the same, B prefers to purchase E’s 
good as much as possible. 
The difference from the baseline model is that the third stage, namely the realisation of 
the size of the contestable demand, is added. 
In addition, this section assumes that I can offer not only quantity-based conditional 
rebates ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ, as with the baseline model, but also market-share-based conditional 
rebates. For simplicity, this section considers a market-share-based rebate scheme 
( ூܲெோ, ߚெ) such that the discount of ߚெ ∈ ሺ0, ூܲெோሿ is given only if I has a 100% share 
of B’s purchase volume. Since in this case, the total demand size can be larger than 1, 
this section does not assume that the threshold volume of quantity-based rebate, ߛ, is 
equal to 1. 
3.5.2 Analysis  
This section analyses the game where I can offer (1) linear pricing, (2) two-part tariffs, 
and (3) conditional rebates. Analysis of this model by the backward induction approach 
provides the following proposition, which will be proved in the following sections.  
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Proposition 3.8. Suppose the incumbent can introduce either linear pricing, two-part 
tariffs or conditional rebates.  
i) If ܥா ൒ 	0.5 െ 0.5ߠ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ, the incumbent’s optimal behaviour is exclusive market 
share-based rebate such that both ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൌ 1 and ூܲெோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻܥாሿ/
ሺߙ െ ߠሻ hold. In the equilibrium, the entrant decides not to enter and the set of the 
buyer’s purchasing volume is 
 ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ൜ ሺ1,0ሻ	݂݅ݐ݄݁	ܿ݋݊ݐ݁ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݁	݀݁݉ܽ݊݀	݅ݏ	ݏ݈݈݉ܽሺ1 ൅ ߠ, 0ሻ	݂݅	ݐ݄݁	ܿ݋݊ݐ݁ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݁	݀݁݉ܽ݊݀	݅ݏ	݈ܽݎ݃݁ൠ. 
If ܥா ൏ 	0.5 െ 0.5ߠ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ, the incumbent’s optimal behaviour is the exploitative 
pricing such that the unit price is equal to	ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ߙ. The set of the entrant’s 
price and the buyer’s purchasing volume in the equilibrium is given by  
ሺ ாܲ∗, ݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ
ቊ
ሺܥா, ߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅ݐ݄݁	ܿ݋݊ݐ݁ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݁	݀݁݉ܽ݊݀	݅ݏ	ݏ݈݈݉ܽ
ቀఏା஼ಶሺଵିఈሻଵିఈାఏ , ߙ, 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠቁ 	݂݅	ݐ݄݁	ܿ݋݊ݐ݁ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݁	݀݁݉ܽ݊݀	݅ݏ	݈ܽݎ݃݁
ቋ. 
ii) The entrant obtains a profit of 0.5ߠሺ1 െ ܥாሻ if the incumbent introduces 
exploitative pricing in the equilibrium and the size of the contestable demand is large. 
Otherwise, the entrant’s profit is zero. The buyer’s surplus is always zero. 
iii) If ܥா෢ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1, prohibition of two-part tariff and conditional rebate increases the 
buyer’s profit, where  
 ܥா෢ ൌ ଷାఏିఈସାଶఏିଶఈ. 
If 0.5 െ ଴.ହఏଵିఈ ൑ ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෢ , prohibition of two-part tariff and conditional rebate 
increases the entrant’s profit. 
If ܥா ൏ 0.5 െ ଴.ହఏଵିఈ , prohibition of two-part tariff and conditional rebate does not 
change the entrant’s profit or the buyer’s surplus. 
 
Proposition 3.8 i) shows that, as in the baseline model, exclusive conditional rebate is 
chosen by I in the equilibrium when ܥா is higher than a certain point, and I chooses 
exploitative pricing when ܥா  is lower than the threshold. However, in this model, I 
strictly prefers exclusive market-share-based rebates to exclusive two-part tariffs and 
exclusive quantity-based rebates, although in the baseline model these three types of 
price schedule have an equivalent effect. Moreover, in this model, the threshold point 
is lower than 0.5. This result implies that in this case, I may exclude the entrant by 
market-share-based rebate in the equilibrium, which never happens in the baseline 
model, because the existence of the uncertainty about the size of the contestable demand 
limits the profitability of exploitative pricing, exclusive two-part tariffs and exclusive 
conditional rebates and does not have an effect on the profitability of exclusive market-
share-based rebates.  
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The profitability of exploitative pricing is limited by the uncertainty because under such 
uncertainty, I cannot set a price such that I can completely exploit the profit in both the 
large contestable demand case and the small contestable demand case. Taking this 
constraint into account, I sets a price such that in the equilibrium I can exploit the profit 
completely only when the size of the contestable demand is small. In exchange, E can 
obtain a positive profit when the size of the contestable demand is small, and I chooses 
the exploitative pricing in the equilibrium, as shown in Proposition 3.4 ii). Note that the 
profit becomes larger as ܥா becomes smaller. On the other hand, the buyer’s surplus is 
always zero. 
The expected profit of I for each type of equilibrium pricing can be summarised in 
Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.6 below. The details of each type of equilibrium pricing will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
Figure 3.8 Incumbent’s expected profit for each type of pricing
 
 
Proposition 3.8 iii) summarises the effect of prohibiting conditional rebates. The results 
show that if two-part tariffs and conditional rebates are prohibited, the improvement of 
E’s profit or B’s surplus can occur. If ܥா  is extremely high (i.e.,ܥா෢ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1), the 
prohibition of conditional rebates improves B’s surplus, because in this situation, I 
introduces competitive linear pricing as its second best option, which entails that E’s 
profit remains zero. If ܥா  is less than the threshold but is high enough to prefer an 
exclusive market-share-based rebate to exploitative pricing, the prohibition of two-part 
tariffs and conditional rebates improves E’s profit, because in this situation I introduces 
exploitative pricing as its second-best option, so B’s surplus remains zero. 
The result summarised in Proposition 3.8 differs from the models analysed so far in the 
sense that I strictly prefers exclusive market-share-based rebates to exclusive two-part 
tariffs or quantity-based rebates. This preference exists because while I’s ability to 
obtain monopoly profit by exclusive market-share-based rebates is not undermined by 
uncertainty about the size of the contestable demand, such uncertainty limits the 
profitability of exclusive quantity-based rebates as well as exclusive two-part tariffs 
and exploitative pricing. Such asymmetric effects of uncertainty on exclusive market-
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share-based rebates and other exclusive pricing causes the exclusion of the more 
efficient entrants through market-share-based rebates, which does not occur in the 
baseline model. This result suggests that a market-share-based rebate is more harmful 
to the consumer than is a two-part tariff or a quantity-based rebate.  
3.5.2.1 Optimal Linear Pricing  
In this section, the game where both I and E offer linear pricing to B is analysed. In this 
game I, E and B make their decisions in turn. Let ாܲௌ
∗
 and ாܲ஻
∗
 denote E’s optimal 
response, given I’s pricing when the determined contestable demand size is small and 
big, respectively, and ݍ௞ௌ∗	and	ݍ௞஻∗ denote B’s optimal purchasing volume from ݇ ∈
ܫ, ܧ when the determined contestable demand size is small and big, respectively. 
Analysis of this model by the backward induction approach provides Proposition 3.9, 
to be proved in the following sections. 
Proposition 3.9. If the incumbent offers a linear price to the buyer, this game has a 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: 
ሺ ூܲ௅∗, ாܲௌ∗, ாܲ஻∗, ݍூௌ∗, ݍூ஻∗, ݍாௌ∗, ݍா஻∗ሻ ൌ
൝ ሺܥா െ ߝ,൅∞,൅∞, 1,1 ൅ ߠ, 0, 0ሻ	݂݅ܥா ൐ 	ܥா
෢
ሺଵିେಶሺଵିఈሻఈ , ܥா,
ఏା஼ಶሺଵିఈሻ
ଵିఈାఏ , ߙ, ߙ, 1 െ ߙ, 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ	݂݅ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෢
ൡ , 
 where ܥா෢ ൌ ଷାఏିఈସାଶఏିଶఈ and ாܲ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that E decides not to enter. 
 
The results summarised in Proposition 3.9 show that there are two types of equilibrium. 
In the first type, I sets the price slightly lower than E’s marginal cost, which entails that 
B purchases only from I regardless of the realised value of the contestable demand size. 
This equilibrium is equivalent to competitive linear pricing in the baseline model.  
In the second type of equilibrium, I sets the high price to exploit the profit from the 
must-stock part of the market. All contestable demand is covered by E’s product.  
Note that the profit from competitive linear pricing in this model is 1 ൅ 0.5ߠ times 
larger than that in the baseline model, so B’s surplus is also 1 ൅ 0.5ߠ times larger than 
that in the baseline model. 
On the other hand, the profit from exploitative linear pricing in this model is equal to 
that in the baseline model. The fact that the incumbent can exploit more when the 
determined contestable demand size is large implies that, in this case, the incumbent 
cannot fully exploit the profit through linear pricing. In this situation, E sets its price at 
ሾߠ ൅ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ and obtains a profit of ሺ1 െ ܥாሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ, meaning 
that B’s surplus is zero regardless of the determined demand size. 
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It follows that the incumbent is more likely to uses exploitative linear pricing in the 
sense that the threshold value of the entrant’s cost to change the type of pricing,	ܥா෢ , is 
lower than the threshold in the baseline model. 
 
In order to prove Proposition 3.9, we first analyse B and E’s optimal behaviours. 
 
The optimal behaviours if the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ are same as in 
Lemmata 2.1 and 2.2. The optimal behaviours if the determined contestable demand is 
1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ can be obtained by substituting 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ into 1 െ ߙ in Lemmata 2.1 and 
2.2 yielding the following lemmata.  
 
Lemma 3.7. Given ூܲ௅	and ாܲ, the buyer’s optimal purchasing volume is as follows: 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ, 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗	ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൏ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ 	൑ 1	
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ቑ. 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ, 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൏ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ 	൑ 1	
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௅ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ ൑ 1 ൅ ߠ
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ቑ. 
 
Lemma 3.8. Given 	 ூܲ௅, the entrant’s optimal pricing is as follows: 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ, 
ாܲ∗ ൌ ൝
ூܲ௅	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா
ଵି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈ 	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈ ൒ ܥா
ൡ. 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ, 
ாܲ∗ ൌ ൝
ூܲ௅	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா
ଵାఏି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈାఏ 	݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵାఏି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈାఏ ൒ ܥா
ൡ. 
 
We next consider the optimal behaviour of I. In this situation, two options are possible 
for the incumbent’s optimal price. The first option is to set a competitive price to capture 
the entire market (equivalent to competitive linear pricing in the baseline model), 
regardless of the size of the contestable demand size. The second option is to give up 
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competing with E and setting the maximum possible price to exploit the profit from the 
must-stock part of the market in both the large contestable demand case and the small 
contestable demand case (which is equivalent to exploitative linear pricing in the 
baseline model).  
Although theoretically there exists an alternative option for setting the maximum 
possible price to exploit the profit from the must-stock part of the market in either the 
large contestable demand case or the small contestable demand case, the price is so high 
that B decides not to purchase at all in that case. However, this option is excluded by 
the assumption that ߠ is small enough to guarantee that in the equilibrium, with a 50% 
probability the incumbent will not choose the options such that its profit becomes zero. 
 
Solving the profit-maximisation problem for I gives I’s optimal behaviour, which is 
summarised in Lemma 3.9 below. 
 
Lemma 3.9. The incumbent’s optimal pricing is 
ூܲ௅
∗ ൌ ൝ ܥா െ ߝ	݂݅ܥா ൐ ܥா
෢
ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈሻ
ఈ 	݂݅ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෢
ൡ , where ܥா෢ ൌ ଷାఏିఈସାଶఏିଶఈ. 
The entrant enters the market only if ܥா ൑ 	ܥா෢. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Proposition 3.9 follows directly from Lemmata 3.7–3.9.  
3.5.2.2 Optimal Two-Part Tariff  
Analysis of this model by the backward induction approach provides Proposition 3.10. 
Proposition 3.10. [Optimal exclusive two-part tariff] The incumbent can exclude the 
entrant by offering the two-part tariff such that ሺ ூܲி∗, ூܲ௏∗ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝ, ܥா െ ߝሻ 
and the expected profit is 0.5 ൅ 0.5ߠሺܥா െ 0.5ሻ െ ߝ. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Proposition 3.10 shows that, like in the baseline model, I can obtain monopoly profit 
through the optimal exclusive conditional rebate regardless of the values of ܥா when 
the realised contestable demand size is small. However, when the realised contestable 
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demand size is large, I cannot dominate the entire surplus of the market. On the other 
hand, B obtains a positive surplus. 
It follows that the profitability of the exclusive two-part tariff is limited by the existence 
of uncertainty about the size of the contestable as well as exploitative pricing. It follows 
that the incumbent does not exclude the more efficient entrant through exclusive two-
part tariffs if only linear pricing and conditional rebates are available for the incumbent, 
the same result as for the baseline model. 
3.5.2.3 Optimal Conditional Rebate  
Analysis of this model by the backward induction approach provides Proposition 3.11. 
 
Proposition 3.11. [Optimal exclusive conditional rebate] The incumbent can exclude 
the entrant by offering the market-share-based rebate such that both ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൌ 1 
and ூܲெோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻܥாሿ/ሺߙ െ ߠሻ hold, and the expected profit is 0.5ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ. 
The expected profit from the exclusive market-share-based rebate is always larger than 
the profit from the exclusive quantity-based rebate. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Proposition 3.11 shows that, as in the baseline model, I can obtain a monopoly profit 
by exclusive conditional rebates regardless of the values of ܥா  and the realised 
contestable demand size, and the expected profit from exclusive quantity-based rebate 
is strictly higher than that of exclusive market-share-based rebate.  
Note that I does choose the exclusive market-share-based rebate only if the profit is 
higher than that of exploitative pricing. The condition is shown in Proposition 3.8. 
3.5.2.4 Endogenous Pricing Type  
According to the results shown in Propositions 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11, the surplus of I, E 
and B when I introduces competitive linear pricing, exploitative linear pricing and 
exclusive conditional rebates can be summarised as in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 Surplus of each player for each type of Incumbent’s pricing 
ܽሻ	Surplus of each player if the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ  
I’s Behaviour I’s profit E’s profit B’s surplus 
Competitive 
linear pricing 
ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ  
 
0 1 െ ܥா ൅ ߝ  
 
Exploitative 
linear pricing  
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ 0 0 
Exclusive two-
part tariff 
0.5 0 0 
Exclusive 
market-share-
based rebate 
0.5ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ 0 0 
bሻ	Surplus of each player if the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ  
I’s Behaviour I’s profit E’s profit B’s surplus 
Competitive 
linear pricing 
ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻሺܥா െ 0.5ሻ െ ߝ
 
0 ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ ߝ
 
Exploitative 
linear pricing  
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ 0.5ߠሺ1 െ ܥாሻ 0 
Exclusive two-
part tariff 
0.5 ൅ ߠሺܥா െ 0.5ሻ െ ߝ 0 ߠሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ ߝ 
Exclusive 
market-share-
based rebate 
0.5ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ 0 0 
cሻ	Expected surplus of each player  
I’s Behaviour I’s profit E’s profit B’s surplus 
Competitive 
linear pricing 
ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻሺܥா െ 0.5ሻ െ ߝ
 
0 ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ ߝ 
Exploitative 
linear pricing  
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ 0.5ߠሺ1 െ ܥாሻ 0 
Exclusive two-
part tariff 
0.5 ൅ 0.5ߠሺܥா െ 0.5ሻ െ ߝ 0 0.5ߠሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ ߝ 
Exclusive 
market-share-
based rebate 
0.5ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻ 0 0 
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By comparing I’s optimal profit when I introduces linear pricing and exclusive 
conditional rebates, as summarised in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.8, Proposition 3.8 can be 
proved. 
3.6. Optimal Pricing Where Must-Stock Share, α, Is Not Fixed Over 
Time 
Chapter 2 analyses the baseline case where the game played only once and the result 
shows that I does not have an incentive to exclude the more efficient entrant than 
itself by two-part tariff or conditional rebate, because exploitative pricing is more 
profitable. This section analyses the case where the game is played repeatedly. 
Moreover, in order to consider the case where the result of the previous game affect 
the value of ߙ, it is assumed that the must stock property of the incumbent’s product 
is eroded when the buyer becomes familiar with the entrant’s product. 
This section is organised as follows. Section 6.1 explains the assumptions specific to 
this section. Then, Section 6.2 analyses the case where the game is played twice. In 
Section 6.3, the number of times that the game is played is a finite but large number. 
and 6.4 consider the cases where the game is playes infinitely.  
3.6.1 Assumptions  
The assumption specific to this chapter is that this section assumes that the game is 
played repeatedly. In other words, the game is played “ܶ” times. The basic assumptions 
of a game at period “ݐ”, where ݐ ൌ 1,… , ܶ and ܶ ൐ 1, are the same as that in the 
baseline model analysed in Chapter 2. For simplicity, in this game it is assumed that I 
offers linear pricing or conditional rebates because the results of the two-part tariff case 
and the conditional rebate case in Chapter 2 show that two-part tariffs and conditional 
rebates have equivalent effects. The variables regarding the price schedules of I and E 
at period ݐ are written as ூܲ௧, 15 ߚ௧ and ாܲ௧, whose definitions are the same as those in 
Section 3. The expected profits in the next game are discounted by the discount factor, 
δ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. For example, when the value of I’s profit in period	ݐ ൅ 1, ߎூ௧ାଵ, is evaluated 
at period ݐ, the expected value is described as ߜߎூ௧ାଵ. This implies that when ߜ is close 
to 1, I places much more weight on the profits in the future periods than I does when ߜ 
is close to zero. 
The must-have proportion of I’s good at period ݐ is written as ߙ௧ and ߙଵ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. In 
order to consider the case in which the result of the previous game affect the value of 
                                                            
15 The model analysed in this section does not differentiate  ூܲ௅ from ூܲோ because such a distinction is 
not necessary. As the analysis in Chapter 2 shows, where the incumbent offers a exploitative 
conditional rebate, a conditional rebate ሺ ூܲோ, ߚ, ߛሻ is synonymous with a linear pricing ሺ ூܲ௅ሻ; hence, it is 
possible to express all the possible sets of I’s linear pricing and conditional rebate offers by parameters, 
ሺ ூܲ௧, ߚ௧, ߛ௧ሻ. 
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ߙ, it is assumed that where the entry happens, or where the entrant sells positive units 
to the buyer, ߙ becomes 0 in the following games, for simplicity. In other words, the 
must-stock property of the incumbent’s product is eroded when the buyer becomes 
familiar with the entrant’s product. Specifically, this model assumes that ߙ௧ ൌ ߙଵ if the 
entry has not happened in the previous periods ሺݍாଵ ൌ ݍாଶ ൌ ⋯ ൌ ݍா௧ିଵ ൌ 0ሻ. On the 
other hand, ߙ௧ ൌ 0  if the entry has happened in the previous periods. Such the 
assumption is applicable in such a case that a user of a good can extract the true value 
of the good only if the user has enough experience to use the good.  
For simplicity, it is also assumed that the order of the game is such that I moves first 
and then E moves, given I’s action is not changed regardless of the previous periods 
when ݐ ൒ 2 and that when I expects that I will be excluded from the market by E’s 
response I does not offer any price but chooses to leave the market.  
Moreover, it is also assumed the goods are not storable. This assumption implies that B 
must consume what B purchases in the period. 
As in previous models, I chooses the pricing behaviour that maximises its profit. The 
expected profits for I and E in the next game are discounted by the discount rate, δ ∈
ሺ0,1ሻ. In addition, it is assumed that I and E are not allowed to borrow money from 
financial institutions. This assumption implies that the profits of the incumbent and the 
entrant in each game must not be negative. This assumption can be justified because a 
new entrant tends to have difficulty borrowing money from financial markets due to 
the lack of information on the likelihood that it will successfully enter the market, from 
the viewpoint of financial institutions. 
This multi-period assumption is similar to Ordover and Shaffer (2012). However, there 
is a difference from their model over the assumption about the effect of the buyer's 
choice in one period on the next period. While they assume that the buyer's contestable 
demand will be locked-in to the seller supplying the contestable unit in the second 
period, the model analysed in this section assumes that the must-stock property of the 
incumbent’s good is eroded when the buyer purchases from the entrant. Their 
assumption is more appropriate for a situation where buyers get locked-in, perhaps due 
to the necessity to learn how to use the specific product. On the other hand, the 
assumption in this paper can be more appropriate for a situation where a dominant 
incumbent with strong reputation such as the Intel case.  
In order to analyse the optimal pricing behaviours that I and E set and the quantities 
that the buyer purchases from the incumbent and the entrant in each stage at the 
equilibrium by backward induction, it will be shown that the incumbent may block the 
entry if the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent.  
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3.6.2 Optimal Pricing When ࢀ ൌ ૛ 
This section analyses the case in which the game is repeated twice. In other words, this 
model consists of two periods. Analysis on this model by the backward induction 
approach provides Proposition 3.12, which will be proved in this section. 
Proposition 3.12. Where the game is played twice and α is assumed to be zero after the 
entry happens, the incumbent will choose to exclude the entrant by introducing 
exclusive conditional rebates for the two periods if 0.5 ൑ ܥா ൑ 1 and to introduce 
exclusive conditional rebates in the first period and exploitative pricing in the second 
period if 0 ൏ ܥா ൏ 0.5  and ߜ ൒ ߜሚ , where 	ߜሚ ൌ ሾ0.5 െ 0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ/ሾ1 െ
0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ . Otherwise, the incumbent will choose to adopt exploitative 
pricing in the first period and leave the market in the second period.  
Proposition 3.12 shows that under the assumption that the game is played twice and the 
must-stock proportion, ߙ , is not fixed over time, the incumbent can use exclusive 
conditional rebates to exclude the more efficient entrant when the discount rate is large 
enough. Hence, in this model, the exclusion of the more efficient entrant by conditional 
rebate can happen, although it never happens in the baseline model. This difference 
arises because the long-term benefit from maintaining its advantage as the must-stock 
product can exceed the short-term profit from offering exploitative pricing in the first 
period. 
In order to prove Proposition 3.12, we first analyse the optimal behaviours of each 
player in the second period. Then, the optimal behaviours of each player in the first 
period, anticipating the result that would happen in the second period, are analysed. 
Incumbent firm I’s optimal behaviour in the second period is shown in Lemma 3.10. 
Lemma 3.10. In the second period, the incumbent’s optimal behaviour is to offer an 
exclusive conditional rebate if there is no entry in the first period and ܥா ൒ 	0.5, 
exploitative pricing if there is no entry in the first period and ܥா ൏ 	0.5, and competitive 
linear pricing if there is an entry in the first period and ܥா ൒ 	0.5; the incumbent will 
leave the market if there is an entry in the first period and ܥா ൏ 	0.5. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
Lemma 3.10 shows that I’s optimal behaviour in the second period varies according to 
whether I is as or more efficient than E (ܥா ൒ 	0.5).  
Where ܥா ൒ 	0.5 holds, according to Lemma 3.10, I’s optimal behaviour in the second 
period is to introduce exclusive conditional rebates, obtaining a profit of ߎூா஼஼ோ ≡ 0.5 
if ߙଶ ൌ ߙଵ, and to introduce competitive linear pricing, obtaining a profit of ߎூ஼௅ ≡
ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ if ߙଶ ൌ 0. 
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We next prove the rest of Proposition 3.12. As analysed in Chapter 2, if I decides to 
offer a pricing scheme in the first period such that ߙଶ ൌ ߙଵ  is the result, the most 
profitable option is exclusive conditional rebates. Because in this situation, I’s optimal 
behaviour in the second period is to introduce exclusive conditional rebates again, I’s 
total profit can be written as 
 ߎூா஼஼ோ ൅ ߜߎூா஼஼ோ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߜሻߎூா஼஼ோ ൌ 0.5 ൅ 0.5ߜ. 
To introduce exploitative conditional rebates in the first and second periods is the 
optimal behaviour for I regardless of the values of ߙଵ and δ where ܥா ൒ 	0.5 holds. 
This behaviour is optimal because an exclusive conditional rebate is the most profitable 
option in the first period, and ߎூா஼஼ோ ൐ ߎூ஼௅ holds. 
On the other hand, where ܥா ൏ 	0.5  holds, according to Lemma 2-1, I’s optimal 
behaviour in the second period is to introduce exploitative pricing by obtaining a profit 
of ߎூா௉ ≡ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙଵ if ߙଶ ൌ ߙଵ and to leave the market if ߙଶ ൌ 0.  
As analysed in Chapter 2, if I decides to offer a pricing scheme in the first period such 
that ߙଶ ൌ ߙଵ is caused as a result, the most profitable option in the first period is an 
exclusive conditional rebate. Because in this situation, I’s optimal behaviour in the 
second period is to introduce exploitative pricing, I’s total profit can be written as 
ߎூா஼஼ோ ൅ ߜߎூா௉. 
As analysed in Chapter 1, if I decides to offer a pricing scheme in the first period such 
that ߙଶ ൌ 0 is the result, the most profitable option in the first period is exclusive 
pricing. Because in this situation I’s optimal behaviour in the second period is to leave 
the market, I’s total profit is equal to ߎூா௉. 
Therefore, the condition that I introduces exclusive conditional rebates in the first 
period where ܥா ൏ 	0.5 holds can be written as 
ߎூா஼஼ோ ൅ ߜߎூா௉ ൒ ߎூா௉. 
Because ߎூா௉ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙଵ ൐ 0, this inequality can be modified to 
(3.2) ߜ ൒ ௽಺ಶುି௽಺ಶ಴಴ೃ௽಺ಶು . 
By substituting ߎூா௉ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙଵ  and ߎூா஼஼ோ ൌ 0.5  into Inequality 
(3.2), the condition that I chooses the first option in the equilibrium can be written as 
(3.3) ߜ ൒ ଴.ହି଴.ହఈభିሺଵିఈభሻ஼ಶଵି଴.ହఈభିሺଵିఈభሻ஼ಶ . 
Since ߎூா௉ ൐ ߎூா௉ െ ߎூா஼஼ோ ൐ 0 , the threshold value ሺߎூா௉ െ ߎூா஼஼ோሻ/ߎூா௉  is 
somewhere between 0 and 1. Hence, in this model, depending on the value of ߜ, the 
exclusion of the more efficient entrant can occur. Let  ߜሚ  denote ሾ0.5 െ 0.5ߙଵ െ
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ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ/ሾ1 െ 0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ. From the above discussion, Proposition 3.12 
can be proven directly. 
3.6.3 Optimal Pricing When ࢀ is a Finite but Large Number 
This section analyses the case in which the game is repeated by ܶ times, where ܶ is a 
large finite number. In this case, the results are similar to those analysed in Section 6.2. 
In other words, the following proposition holds; 
Proposition 3.13. Where the game is repeated ܶ times and α is assumed to be zero after 
the entry happens, the incumbent will choose to exclude the entrant by introducing 
exclusive conditional rebate for the entire periods if 0.5 ൑ ܥா ൑ 1  and to keep 
introducing exclusive conditional rebate until period ܶ െ 1 and exploitative pricing at 
period ܶ  if 0 ൏ ܥா ൏ 0.5  and ߜ ൒ ߜሚ , where 	ߜሚ ൌ ሾ0.5 െ 0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ/ሾ1 െ
0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ . Otherwise, the incumbent will choose to adopt exploitative 
pricing in the first period and to keep out of the market thereafter.  
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
The results show that as in the two-period model analysed in Section 6.2, if the game 
is repeated many times, the exclusion of the more efficient entrant through conditional 
rebates may happen, depending of the values of ߙଵ, ܥா, and δ, although the pricing that 
maximises I’s profit in the first period is exploitative. By adopting exclusive conditional 
rebate, I can secure the advantage of its product so that I’s profit in the long-run can be 
larger than when I maximises its profit in the first period. This result implies that 
securing the advantage, the must-stock property of its product, can be an incentive for 
an incumbent supplier to exclude the more efficient entrant by introducing exclusive 
conditional rebates. 
If the game is repeated twice and ߜ is larger than a certain threshold, I adopts exclusive 
conditional rebates in the first period and adopts exploitative pricing in the second 
period. If the game is repeated ܶ times and ߜ is larger than a certain threshold, I will 
adopt exclusive conditional rebates not only in the first period but also in the following 
periods. This is the difference from the one-shot game analysed in the previous sections 
in which I does not have an incentive to exclude E, despite that the exclusion is possible. 
The threshold values regarding whether the exclusion of the more efficient entrant 
happens or not when the game is played ܶ times is same as the threshold value when 
the game is repeated twice: ሾ0.5 െ 0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ/ሾ1 െ 0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ. 
Incumbent firm I’s expected total profit when I adopts exploitative pricing in the first 
period is ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙଵ  regardless of the number of times the game is 
played, since the profits in the subsequent periods are zero due to the loss of I’s 
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advantage. When I adopts exclusive conditional rebates, I’s expected total profits in the 
two-period model differ from those in the ܶ-period model. The profit in the second 
period in the two-period model is larger than that in the ܶ-period model because I took 
exploitative pricing in the second period. On the other hand, in the ܶ-period model, the 
profits from the third period are also counted in the expected total profit. As a result, 
the condition on whether the exclusion of the more efficient entrant happens or not in 
the two-period model is the same as that in the ܶ-period model.  
The threshold value, ሾ0.5 െ 0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ/ሾ1 െ 0.5ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙଵሻܥாሿ, is close 
to zero if ܥா is close to 0.5. As ܥா decreases from 0.5, the threshold value becomes 
larger. This increase implies that when ܥா is smaller than 0.5, the exclusion by I may 
not happen, and as ܥா decreases, such exclusion becomes less likely. 
3.6.4 Optimal Pricing When ࢀ Is Infinite 
This section analyses the case in which the game is repeated infinitely with a constant 
probability that the game will terminate. To make the model realistic, it is assumed that 
after one period is finished, the game continues to the next period with a probability of 
ߠ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. In this case, the results are similar to those analysed in Section 6.2. In other 
words, Proposition 3.14 holds. 
Proposition 3.14. Where the game is repeated infinitely with a constant probability 
that the game ends and α is assumed to be zero after the entry happens, the condition 
that I prefers to keep introducing exclusive conditional rebates is the same as the 
condition that I will choose to introduce exclusive conditional rebates in the first 
period shown in Proposition 3.12, except that ߜ is replaced by ߜߠ.  
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
The result shows that if the game is repeated infinitely with a constant probability that 
the game will terminate, the threshold value regarding whether the exclusion of the 
more-efficient entrant happens or not is equal to the value when the game is repeated 
twice multiplied by 1/ߠ.  
3.7. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
3.7.1 Summary  
This chapter has covered the four models expanding the baseline model analysed in 
Chapter 2. As with the baseline model, the results in all the four extended models show 
that the incumbent’s optimal behaviour is either exploitative pricing, on the one hand, 
94 
 
or exclusive conditional rebates or two-part tariffs, on the other. However, there are 
some differences from the baseline model.  
Section 3 has considered the case where the incumbent’s good is not literally must-
stock, but is only superior to the competitors’ products. If the entrant’s cost is lower 
than the buyer’s willingness to pay for 1 unit when the buyer purchases only from the 
entrant (i.e., ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ ), the profitability of exploitative pricing and exclusive 
conditional rebates or two-part tariffs is constrained by the possibility that the 
incumbent is excluded by the entrant. The equilibrium price is more likely to have a 
realistic value when ߣ is low or ߙ is high. On the other hand, because this possibility 
both constrains the profitability of exploitative pricing and exclusive conditional 
rebates or two-part tariffs, the result persists in this model, from the baseline model, 
that the incumbent does not introduce exclusive conditional rebates or two-part tariffs 
to exclude the entrant who is more efficient than the incumbent. 
Section 4 has examined the case assuming uncertainty about the must-stock proportion, 
ߙ. The result shows that the incumbent can introduce exclusive conditional rebates or 
two-part tariffs to exclude the more efficient entrants. This ability is enabled by the 
existence of uncertainty about the must-stock proportion limiting only the profitability 
of exploitative pricing and not having an effect on the profitability of exclusive 
conditional rebates. The profitability of exploitative pricing is limited by the uncertainty 
because under such uncertainty, the incumbent cannot set a price such that it can 
completely exploit the profit under the uncertainty. Note that like in the baseline model, 
conditional rebates and two-part tariffs have an equivalent effect in this model.  
The result that the incumbent can have an incentive to exclude the entrant by 
conditional rebates when there is the uncertainty about the must-stock proportion, is 
same as the conclusion of Chone and Linnemer (2016). However, Chone and Linnemer 
(2016) assume that the incumbent and the buyer jointly maximise their profit and the 
surplus is shared depending on the parameter of the competitor’s bargaining power 
against the buyer. In contrast, Chapter 2 and this chapter analyse the models where the 
share of the surplus between the incumbent and the buyer are determined not 
exogenously but endogenously. The results in this chapter show that the incumbent 
does not need to collude with the buyer, because the incumbent can dominate the entire 
surplus of the market by exclusive rebates or exploitative pricing in the model where 
the incumbent, the entrant and the buyer move sequentially.  
Moreover, it is also shown that relaxing the assumption that the incumbent cannot set 
the price larger than the buyer's willingness to pay for 1 unit, which is introduced in Ide 
et. al. (2016), makes the results differ from their model. As shown in Chapter 2, 
exclusive conditional rebate enables to obtain a monopoly profit by setting a high list 
price and a large discount to discourage the buyer to purchase from the entrant. While 
they conclude that the incumbent never uses a conditional rebate to exclude the entrant 
even when there is uncertainty about the entrant's cost or there exists a scale economy, 
this chapter shows that the incumbent may have an incentive to exclude the more 
efficient entrant when there is uncertainty about the must-stock proportion or the size 
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of the contestable demand. The future topic could be the analysis of the situations where 
there is uncertainty about the entrant's cost and the incumbent is allowed to set a high 
list price. 
Section 5 has scrutinized the case of uncertainty about the size of the contestable 
demand. It also shows that the incumbent can have an incentive to exclude the entrant 
by conditional rebate. However, the result in this model is different from the models 
analysed in the baseline model and in the previous sections in this chapter, in the sense 
that the incumbent strictly prefers exclusive market-share-based rebates to exclusive 
two-part tariffs or quantity-based rebates. This preference holds because such 
uncertainty limits the profitability of exclusive quantity-based rebates as well as 
exclusive two-part tariffs and exploitative pricing, while the incumbent’s ability to 
obtain monopoly profit by exclusive market-share-based rebates is not undermined by 
uncertainty about the size of the contestable demand. Such an asymmetric effect of 
uncertainty concerning exclusive market-share-based rebates and other exclusive 
pricing causes the exclusion of the more-efficient entrant by market-share-based rebate, 
which never happens in the baseline model. This result suggests that a market-share-
based rebate is more harmful to the consumer than is a two-part tariff or a quantity-
based rebate.  
Note that the results in Chapter 2 and this chapter show that the optimal threshold 
percentage of conditional rebates is always 100 per cent. However, in the real cases, 
the threshold can be less than 100 per cent. For example, in the Intel case, Intel offered 
95 per cent as the threshold to some computer manufacturers. As shown in the 
theoretical analysis by Chen and Shaffer (2014), the optimal threshold percentage can 
be less than 100 per cent in some cases such as the situation where there are more than 
one buyers and scale economies. Taking such a situation into account is a challenge for 
the future study.  
Section 6 has analysed the model such that the game is played more than once and the 
must-stock property of the incumbent’s good is eroded when the buyer becomes 
familiar with the entrant’s product. The analysis shows that exclusion of the more 
efficient entrant can happen. The results of the infinitely repeated game with a constant 
probability that the game ends also shows that the exclusion of the more efficient 
entrant is more likely to happen when the probability that the market disappears is high, 
for example where destructive innovation tends to occur. This result is similar to 
Ordover and Shaffer (2012) in the sense that the effect of the buyer's choice in one 
period on the next period gives the incumbent an incentive to exclude the entrant by 
conditional rebates, which implies that this model shows that the same result with their 
model can happen under the more flexible settings.  
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3.7.2 Policy Implications 
The results in Chapter 2 and this chapter support that the desirable approach to judge 
the illegality of conditional rebates is a case by case basis approach based on the effect 
on competition, as currently taken in many jurisdictions, rather than a per illegal 
approach. As summarised in the previous section, conditional rebates may improve the 
welfare, while in some situations it harms the welfare through excluding a competitor. 
This finding is consistent with the previous studies showing that conditional rebate can 
improve welfare such as Calzolari and Denicolo (2013), Kolay et. al. (2004) and 
Majumdar and Shaffer (2009). Moreover, the previous works such as Chone and 
Linnemer (2016), Chao et. al. (2018) and Ordover and Shaffer (2013) present the 
situations where conditional rebates may harm competition. The results in these two 
chapters can add other possible situations to them and help to identify when the harm 
on competition is more likely by suggesting situations when incumbent have an 
incentive to exclude an entrant by exclusive conditional rebates. 
With regard to methods to evaluate the illegality of conditional rebates, as introduced 
in Chapter 1, the AEC test is used to quantitatively evaluate the effect of conditional 
rebates on competition in practice. The AEC test compares the actual contestable share 
with the share that competitors who are as efficient as the dominant firm needs to 
compete with a dominant firm offering a rebate scheme based on the following formula; 
ݏ ≡ ோሺ஺ௌ௉ି஺஺஼ሻ/௏, 
where ݏ denotes the required share, and if ݏ is smaller than the required share, the rebate 
scheme is regarded as exclusive, because even the as-efficient competitor cannot 
compete with the dominant company by setting its price as equal to its cost given this 
rebate scheme; where ܴ is an amount of rebate given to the customer per unit; where 
ܣܵܲ is a sales price and ܣܣܥ is the average avoidable cost of the dominant firm; and 
where ܸ  denotes the number of the units that the customer requires to obtain the 
discount. The test is based on the rationale that when a dominant firm’s product is must-
stock for the buyers and it introduces a rebate scheme, the effective price of the 
dominant firm’s product for the contestable demand is lower than the dominant firm’s 
nominal price. When the effective price is lower than the dominant firm’s unit cost, the 
competitor who is as efficient as the dominant firm will be excluded from the market 
even if the competitor sets its lowest possible price (i.e., the dominant firm’s cost).  
Moreover, Scott Morton and Abrahamson (2016) suggest a similar approach to the AEC 
based on the metric called “effective entrant burden (EEB)”.  
The AEC test relies on the assumption that some part of the market is non-contestable 
(i.e., must-stock for buyers). This must-stock assumption is useful to consider the 
anticompetitive effect of conditional rebates. The existence of must-stock property can 
explain why a dominant firm can exclude its competitors by a conditional rebate and 
why competitors cannot react to the dominant company’s pricing with same pricing 
behaviour. 
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However, the analysis in Chapter 2 and this chapter clarify the problems of AEC tests 
(and the EEB approach). First of all, the AEC tests treat the must-stock proportion as a 
fixed value, and it is assumed that the proportion does not depend on any variable, 
including the dominant firm’s and the entrant’s price schedules. The baseline model 
analysed in Chapter 2 shows that when it is assumed that the incumbent’s product is 
literally must-stock, as in the AEC test, the incumbent does not use a conditional rebate 
to exclude the more efficient entrant, because covering only the must-stock market with 
high and exploitative pricing is more profitable. Furthermore, in such situation the 
incumbent may set an unrealistically high price, especially when the share of the must-
stock demand is small. This possibility suggests that the AEC test assumes a too strong 
assumption about the must-stock property. 
Such a strong assumption seems to hold in specific situations. Scott Morton and 
Abrahamson (2016) suggest that their EEB approach is especially suitable to evaluate 
product-line cases in which competitor do not sell all types of the products. The results 
in these two chapters confirm that their suggestion is reasonable. Those imply that the 
AEC test is likely to function properly when it is easy to differentiate between the 
products for the must-stock demand and the contestable demand. For example, such 
situation may happen when products consist of several parts and only an incumbent 
company can produce some part of the products by laws. The pulse oximetry product 
case (Masimo v. Tyco and Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco) can be a good example of such 
situation. In this case, the market consists of must-stock durable goods protected by the 
patents and contestable consumable goods and the rebate scheme applied to the 
purchase of both products. Another good example is found in Post Denmark II case.16 
In this case, Post Denmark has a statutory monopoly on the distribution of all letters, 
including direct advertisement mail, weighing up to 50 grams and the statutory 
monopoly covers 70 per cent of the bulk mail market. On the other hand, when it is 
difficult to differentiate between them as in the Intel case, the AEC test should be 
applied carefully.  
In addition, the model analysed in Section 3 of this section shows that if there is an 
alternative option for the buyer such that it purchases all units from the entrant, such a 
possibility constrain the incumbent’s behaviour. The result suggests that when the 
must-stock property is limited and when the entrant’s price, compared to the incumbent’ 
offer, is low enough to compensate the loss of not purchasing the incumbent’s product, 
the buyer purchases only from the entrant, which means the share of the must-stock 
demand under this condition is zero. This result implies that the AEC test may 
overestimate the exclusivity of conditional rebates.17  
In this way, one of the biggest problems of applying the AEC test is the difficulty in 
estimating the value of the must-stock share. In practice, the buyers’ internal documents, 
                                                            
16 See the European Court of Justice’s judgement in Case C23/14 (2015). 
17 The problem of the non-constant must-stock proportion is considered to happen when the demand 
elasticities of the must-stock part of the demand and the contestable demand differ.  
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in particular the quantities that the buyers think are must-stock are often used as proxies 
of the size of the must-stock demand. Alternatively, the share of the incumbent is 
sometimes used as the proxy. However, such figures do not take into account what the 
firms will actually do if the competitor decreases the price to a level equal to the 
incumbent’s cost. It follows that we must be careful when we apply the simple formula 
of the AEC test in practice. 
On the other hand, we have shown that uncertainty about the must-stock proportion 
itself gives an incumbent an incentive to exclude the more-efficient competitor. This 
result suggests that we may not need to identify the exact figure of the must-stock 
proportion to quantitatively analyse the effect of conditional rebates.  
Secondly, as shown in Chapter 2 and in this chapter, the fact that the incumbent can 
exclude the entrant by conditional rebate does not necessarily mean that the incumbent 
has an incentive to use a conditional rebate to exclude the entrant. The baseline model 
in Chapter 2 shows that if the incumbent’s product is must-stock, the incumbent has no 
incentive to exclude the entrant through exclusive rebates, because exploitative pricing 
is more profitable. This discussion is applicable to the AEC test. For example, the 
positive result of the AEC test does not give an answer as to why the dominant firm 
chose the exclusive conditional rebate rather than exploitative pricing. It might be true 
that the strong must-stock assumption is wrong. With respect to the incentive to exclude 
the more efficient competitors, the factors considered in this chapter—such as 
uncertainty about the must-stock proportion and the demand size and the vulnerability 
of must-stock property such that it becomes weaker when entrance happens—can help 
to evaluate whether the exclusion of the more efficient competitors through conditional 
rebates makes sense for the dominant firm.  
The results in these two chapters also imply that when we analyse the effect of 
conditional rebates or apply the AEC test, we must carefully consider what must-stock 
really means and to what extent a dominant firm’s product is must-stock in a specific 
case. Those points seem to be not well focused so far, and hence, there is no consensus 
about the details of the definition of must-stock property. However, as discussed in 
these two chapters, the exclusivity of conditional rebates can be influenced by 
assumptions about must-stock property. This effect implies that misunderstanding of 
the must-stock property in a specific case can crucially undermine the accuracy of the 
AEC test, since the AEC test assumes a quite strong must-stock property and can 
overestimate the exclusivity of conditional rebates if the must-stock property is not as 
strong as assumed. 
More precisely, the AEC test assumes that the product is homogeneous except that the 
buyers need to purchase the incumbents’ products for a certain amount, and they do not 
purchase at all when it is not possible. However, in real cases, it may be true that the 
must-stock property is no more than one type of vertical or horizontal product 
differentiation where the dominant firm has an advantage over its competitors. If that 
is the case, we can apply the more generalised AEC test by calculating the must-stock 
proportion through certain demand-estimation methods for differentiated markets. 
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3.8. Appendix B 
3.8.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1 
Suppose B purchases only from E (i.e., ሺݍூ, ݍாሻ ൌ ሺ0,1ሻ); B’s willingness to pay for 
each unit decreases by ߣ, which entails that B’s surplus is 1 െ ߣ െ ாܲ. Next, suppose B 
purchases only from I, and B’s surplus is 1 െ ூܲ௅. Finally, suppose B purchases ߙ units 
from I and 1 െ ߙ units from E, and B’s surplus is 1 െ ூܲ௅ߙ െ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ. Lemma 1-1 
shows that 1 െ ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 െ ூܲ௅ߙ െ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ holds if ூܲ௅ ൒ ாܲ . The condition that B 
prefers purchasing only from E to purchasing 1 െ ߙ units from E can be written as 
1 െ λ െ ாܲ ൒ 1 െ ߙ ூܲ௅ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ாܲ.  
This condition can be modified to  
(A3.1) ாܲ ൑ ூܲ௅ െ ఒఈ.  
Note that even if Equation (A3.1) holds, B will not trade with E when ாܲ exceeds B’s 
willingness to pay, 1 െ λ. This resistance implies that in order for E to sell 1 unit to B, 
the condition that 
(A3.2) ாܲ ൑ 1 െ λ 
must be satisfied. ■ 
3.8.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2 
Firm E’s optimal behaviour when it decides to sell 1 െ ߙ units is equivalent to the 
optimal behaviour in the case analysed in Chapter 2, which is shown in Lemma 2.2, as 
can displayed in Figure 3.5 below. 
Figure A3.1 E’s most profitable pricing to sell 1 െ ߙ units to B 
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The horizontal axis in Figure A3.1 represents E’s marginal cost, and the vertical axis 
represents I’s price ( ூܲ௅). The upward-sloping line shows that the minimum ூܲ௅ that E 
can sell 1 െ ߙ units to B without incurring a loss given. It follows that if ሺܥா, ூܲ௅ሻ is 
located below this line (the bottom-right grey shaded area), E must give up entering the 
market because E cannot enter with a non-negative profit. The down-ward sloping line 
shows ூܲ௅ such that B’s total cost to purchase ߙ units from I and 1 െ ߙ units from E is 
equal to B’s willingness to pay when E sets its lowest possible price ( ாܲ ൌ ܥா). This 
relationship implies if ሺܥா, ூܲ௅ሻ is located above this line (the top-right grey shaded 
area), E must give up entering the market, because for E it is impossible to offer a price 
that is acceptable for B with a non-negative profit. 
Hence, E can enter with a non-negative profit if ሺܥா, ூܲ௅ሻ is in the triangle bounded by 
the upward-sloping line, the down-ward sloping line and the vertical axis of the graph. 
If ሺܥா, ூܲ௅ሻ is in this area, as shown in Lemma 2.2, the optimal ாܲ depends on whether 
ூܲ௅ is larger than 1 or not. If ூܲ௅ ൐ 1 (the top-left vertical-striped area), E’s optimal price 
is ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ because B’s willingness to pay is binding in this situation. If 
ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 (the bottom-left horizontal-striped area), E’s optimal price is ூܲ௅  because I’s 
price is binding in this situation. 
Then consider E’s optimal behaviour when it decides to sell 1 unit to B. According to 
conditions ܣሻ and ܤሻ above, the condition that E can sell 1 unit to B is 
(A3.3) ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா ൅ ߣ/ߙ.  
In addition, according to the conditions ܤሻ and ܥሻ above, E cannot sell 1 unit if  
(A3.4) ܥா ൏ 1 െ ߣ.  
This inability is the case because if Equation (A3.4) does not hold, E cannot offer its 
price equal to or lower than B’s willingness to pay without incurring a loss. Hence, E 
can sell 1 unit if both Equations (A3.3) and (A3.4) are satisfied. In this situation, E will 
set the highest price satisfying both Equations (A3.1) and (A3.2). These two equations 
are equalised if 
ூܲ௅ െ ఒఈ ൌ 1 െ ߣ ↔ ூܲ௅ ൌ 1 ൅
ଵିఈ
ఈ ߣ.  
This condition implies that E’s most profitable price to sell 1 unit to B is ூܲ௅ െ ߣ/ߙ if 
(A3.5) ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 ൅ ଵିఈఈ ߣ, 
because Equation (A3.1) is binding in this situation. If Equation (A3.5) does not hold, 
E’s most profitable price to sell 1 unit to B is 1 െ ߣ, because Equation (A3.2) is now 
binding. 
From the discussion above, E’s optimal behaviour when it decides to sell 1 unit given 
ூܲ௅ and ܥா can be summarised as in Figure A3.2. 
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Figure A3.2 E’s most profitable pricing to sell 1 unit to B 
 
The horizontal axis in Figure A3.2 represents E’s marginal cost, and the vertical axis 
represents I’s price ( ூܲ௅). The upward-sloping line shows that the minimum condition 
of ூܲ௅ that E can sell 1 unit to B without incurring a loss, given as shown in Equation 
(A3.1). This minimum condition implies that if ሺܥா, ூܲ௅ሻ is located below this line (the 
bottom grey shaded area), E must give up to sell 1 unit to B because E cannot do so 
with a non-negative profit. 
Figures A3.1 and A3.2 imply that this case can be divided into eight sub-cases, 
depending on the values of	ܲ ூ௅ and ܥா, as summarised in Figure A3.3. 
 
Figure A3.3 E’s most profitable pricing to sell 1 unit to B 
i) if ߣ ൏ ߙ 
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ii) if ߣ ൒ ߙ 
 
In each case, E’s optimal response is presented below. 
iሻ 	 ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா	and viiiሻ		 ூܲ௅ ൐ ଵିሺଵିఈሻ஼ಶఈ 	ܽ݊݀	ܥா ൐ 1 െ ߣ 
If ሺ ூܲ௅, ܥாሻ is in those areas, there is no way for E to sell any unit profitably. Hence, E 
has no choice but not to enter the market. 
 
iiሻ 	ܥா ൑ ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா ൅	 ఒఈ and 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 
If ሺ ூܲ௅, ܥாሻ is in this area, while E can sell 1 െ ߙ units by setting ாܲ at ூܲ௅, there is no 
way to sell 1 unit profitably. Hence, E’s optimal pricing is to set ாܲ at ூܲ௅. 
 
iiiሻ 	 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா ൅	 ఒఈ and 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 
If ሺ ூܲ௅, ܥாሻ is in this area, E can either sell 1 െ ߙ units by setting ாܲ at ூܲ௅ or sell 1 unit 
by setting ாܲ  at ூܲ௅ െ ߣ/ߙ . The condition that E prefers to sell 1 െ ߙ  units can be 
written as 
 ሺ ூܲ௅ െ ܥாሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൐ ூܲ௅ െ ఒఈ െ ܥா.  
The inequality can be modified to 
(A3.6) ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா ൅ ఒఈమ. 
Hence, in this case, E’s optimal pricing is to set ாܲ at ூܲ௅ if (A3.6) holds and to set ாܲ 
at ூܲ௅ െ ߣ/ߙ if (A3.6) does not hold. 
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ivሻ 	 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா ൅	 ఒఈ and 	1 ൏ ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 ൅
ଵିఈ
ఈ ߣ 
If ሺ ூܲ௅, ܥாሻ is in this area, E can either sell 1 െ ߙ units by setting ாܲ at ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ
ߙሻ or sell 1 unit by setting ாܲ at ூܲ௅ െ ߣ/ߙ. The condition that E prefers to sell 1 െ ߙ 
units can be written as 
 ሺଵି௉಺ಽఈଵିఈ െ ܥாሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൐ ூܲ௅ െ
ఒ
ఈ െ ܥா.  
The inequality can be modified to 
(A3.7) ூܲ௅ ൏ ఈଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ. 
Hence, in this case, E’s optimal pricing is to set ாܲ at ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ if Equation 
(A3.7) holds and to set ாܲ  at ூܲ௅ െ ߣ/ߙ  if (A3.7) does not hold. Note that ூܲ௅ ൌ
ሾߙ/ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻሿሾܥா ൅ ߣ/ߙଶ ൅ 1/ߙሿ is an increasing function of ܥா  and passes the point 
that ( ூܲ௅, ܥாሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣ, 1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ/ߙ).  
 
vሻ 	 ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா ൅	 ఒఈ and 	 ூܲ௅ ൑
ଵିሺଵିఈሻ஼ಶ
ఈ  
If ሺ ூܲ௅, ܥாሻ is in this area, while E can sell 1 െ ߙ units by setting ாܲ at ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ
ߙሻ, there is no way to sell 1 unit profitably. Hence, E’s optimal pricing is to set ாܲ at 
ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ. 
 
viሻ 	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1 ൅ ଵିఈఈ ߣ and 	 ூܲ௅ ൑
ଵିሺଵିఈሻ஼ಶ
ఈ  
If ሺ ூܲ௅, ܥாሻ is in this area, E can either sell 1 െ ߙ units by setting ாܲ at ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ
ߙሻ or sell 1 unit by setting ாܲ at 1 െ ߣ. The condition that E prefers to sell 1 െ ߙ units 
can be written as 
 ሺଵି௉಺ಽఈଵିఈ െ ܥாሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൐ 1 െ ߣ െ ܥா.  
The inequality can be modified as ூܲ௅ ൏ 	ܥா ൅ ߣ/ߙ, which implies that this inequality 
does not hold in this case. This is because both ூܲ௅ ൏ 	ܥா ൅ ߣ/ߙ  and 	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1 ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ/ߙ  hold only if ܥா ൐ 1 െ ߣ , but there is no ܥா  such that both 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ ሾ1 െ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻܥாሿ/ߙ  and 	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ/ߙ  hold. Hence, in this case, E’s optimal 
pricing is to set ாܲ at 1 െ ߣ. 
 
viiሻ 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1 െ ߣ and 	 ூܲ௅ ൐ ଵିሺଵିఈሻ஼ಶఈ  
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If ሺ ூܲ௅, ܥாሻ is in this area, while E can sell 1 unit by setting ாܲ at 1 െ ߣ , there is no way 
to sell 1 െ ߙ units profitably. Hence, E’s optimal pricing is to set ாܲ at 1 െ ߣ . ■ 
3.8.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3 
In the linear pricing model analysed in Chapter 2, I’s optimal behaviours can be divided 
into two types, competitive linear pricing or exploitative linear pricing. Competitive 
linear pricing (i.e., ூܲ௅ ൌ ܥா െ ߝ) is not constrained by the possibility that E dominates 
the market by setting a price much lower than I’s price, because E cannot set its price 
below I’s price when I chooses competitive linear pricing. Hence, this section focuses 
only on exploitative pricing, in particular how such pricing is constrained by the 
possibility that E dominates the market. 
Exploitative linear pricing refers to a pricing behaviour that I gives up competing with 
E in the “contestable”18 part of the market and exploiting the profit from the must-stock 
part of the market. It follows that in order to use exploitative pricing, I sets a price low 
enough to guarantee that E can enter the market and prefers sell only 1 െ ߙ  units. 
Lemma 3.2 and Figure 3.5 show that the conditions are as follows: 
(A3.7) ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா ൅ ఒఈమ,  
(A3.8) ூܲ௅ ൏ ఈଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ and 
(A3.9) 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ ଵିሺଵିఈሻ஼ಶఈ . 
 
As shown in Figure 3.5, Equation (A3.7) is binding if ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ/ߙଶ, and Equation 
(A3.8) is binding if 1 െ ߣ/ߙଶ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ. Equation (A3.9) is binding if ܥா ൐ 1 െ ߣ. 
In the exploitative pricing equilibrium, I sells only ߙ units to B, and the profit is ሺ ூܲ௅ െ
0.5ሻߙ. Consequently, in such equilibrium, I sets the maximum price I can set. The 
maximum price that I can set to sell ߙ units to B can be written as 
ூܲ௅ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ሾଵିሺଵିఈሻሿ஼ಶఈ 	݂݅	ܥா ൐ 1 െ ߣ
ఈ
ଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ െ ߝ	݂݅1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ
ܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ	݂݅	ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
Incumbent firm ܫ offers such a price as long as this price does not fall under its unit 
cost, 0.5. It follows that the condition that I prefers to leave the market rather than 
offering exploitative linear pricing can be written as 
                                                            
18 Strictly speaking, under the assumption of this case, the entire of the market is contestable.  
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ቀܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ െ 0.5ቁ ߙ ൏ 0.  
The inequality can be modified to  
(A3.10)  ܥா ൑ 0.5 െ ఒఈమ. 
Hence, the profit-maximising price when I decides to introduce exploitative linear 
pricing can be written as 
ூܲ௅ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ሾଵିሺଵିఈሻሿ஼ಶఈ 	݂݅	ܥா ൐ 1 െ ߣ
ఈమ
ଵାఈ ቀܥா ൅
ఒ
ఈమ ൅
ଵ
ఈቁ െ ߝ	݂݅1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ ߣ
ܥா ൅ ఒఈమ െ ߝ	݂݅	0.5 െ
ఒ
ఈమ ൏ ܥா ൑ 1 െ
ఒ
ఈమ
൅∞	݂݅	ܥா ൑ 0.5 െ ఒఈమ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
, where ூܲ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that 
I decides to leave the market. 
 
If such profit exceeds I’s profit from competitive linear pricing (ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ), I prefers 
exploitative linear pricing to competitive linear pricing. This comparison leads directly 
to Lemma 3.3. ■ 
3.8.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2 
Proposition 3.2 can be proved by showing that in what situations the possibility that E 
excludes I by setting low price constrains I’s ability to set the exclusive two-part tariff 
such that I not only dominates the market, but also profits much (i.e., unconstrained 
exclusive two-part tariff).  
Lemma 2.5 shows that in the baseline model in Chapter 2, I can exclude E by offering 
a two-part tariff such that ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா . In this situation, such pricing is subject to the 
constraint of B’s willingness to pay (i.e., ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1 must hold). 
However, when there is a possibility that E excludes I, there is another condition to 
exclude E by a two-part tariff to eliminate that possibility. Entrant E can exclude I from 
offering the exclusive two-part tariff if B’s surplus when B purchases only from I is 
strictly larger than B’s surplus when B purchases only from E. This condition can be 
written as 
1 െ ூܲி െ ூܲ௏ ൐ 1 െ ߣ െ ாܲ. 
This condition can be modified to ாܲ ൐ ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ െ ߣ. 
It follows that I can eliminate the possibility that E dominates the market by offering a 
two-part tariff such that ܥா ൐ ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ െ ߣ, since ாܲ ൒ ܥா must hold. 
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Hence, the optimal exclusive two-part tariff can be obtained by solving the following 
profit-maximisation problem; 
max
	௉಺ಷ,௉಺ೇ
	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5 
 s. t. 	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1, ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா ൅ ߣ and ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem gives Proposition 3.2. ∎ 
3.8.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3 
Proposition 3.3 can be proved by showing in what situation the possibility that E 
excludes I by setting a low price constrains I’s ability to set the exclusive conditional 
rebate such that I not only dominates the market, but also obtains large profit (i.e., 
unconstrained exclusive two-part tariff).  
Lemma 2.8 shows that in the baseline model in Chapter 2, I can exclude E by offering 
a conditional rebate such that ூܲோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ߙ. In this situation, such pricing 
is subject to the constraint of B’s willingness to pay (i.e., 	 ூܲோ െ ߚ ൑ 1 must hold). 
However, when there is a possibility that E excludes I, there is another condition to 
exclude E by a conditional rebate to eliminate the possibility. Entrant E can exclude I, 
offering the exclusive conditional rebate if B’s surplus when B purchases only from I 
is strictly larger than B’s surplus when B purchases only from E. This condition can be 
written as 
1 െ ሺ ூܲோ െ ߚሻ ൐ 1 െ ߣ െ ாܲ. 
This condition can be modified to ாܲ ൐ ூܲோ െ ߚ െ ߣ. 
It follows that I can eliminate the possibility that E dominates the market by offering a 
conditional rebate such that ܥா ൐ ூܲோ െ ߚ െ ߣ since ாܲ ൒ ܥா must hold. 
Hence, the optimal exclusive two-part tariff can be obtained by solving the following 
profit-maximisation problem; 
max
௉಺ೃ,ఉ
ூܲோ െ ߚ െ 0.5 
 s. t. ூܲோ െ ߚ ൑ 1, ூܲோ െ ߚ ൏ ܥா ൅ ߣ and ூܲோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/ߙ. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem yields Proposition 3.3. ∎ 
3.8.6 Proof of Lemma 3.6 
According to Equation (3.1), the price that maximises I’s profits when I decides to 
introduce exploitative linear pricing is ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ  or 
ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಽሻ
஑ಽ . 
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The profit when setting ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ  is  
0.5 ቀଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ െ 0.5ቁ ߙு ൅ 0.5 ቀ
ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ
஑ಹ െ 0.5ቁ ߙ௅. 
The profit when setting ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಽሻ஑ಽ  is 0.5 ቀ
ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಽሻ
஑ಽ െ 0.5ቁ ߙ௅. 
Since 0.5 ቀଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ െ 0.5ቁ ߙு ൅ 0.5 ቀ
ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ
஑ಹ െ 0.5ቁ ߙ௅ െ 0.5 ቀ
ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಽሻ
஑ಽ െ
0.5ቁ ߙ௅ ൌ 0.5Cாαு ൅ 0.5 ଵିେಶ஑ಹ ߙ௅ ൐ 0 , the price that maximises I’s profits when I 
adopts this type of pricing is ଵିେಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ . The profit can be rewritten as ߎூ ൌ 1 െ
஑ಹି஑ಽ
ଶ஑ಹ െ 0.5αഥ െ Cாሺ1 െ
஑ಹି஑ಽ
ଶ஑ಹ െ αഥሻ, where αഥ ൌ
஑ಹା஑ಽ
ଶ . 
 
The condition that I prefers exploitative linear pricing to competitive linear pricing is 
 1 െ ஑ಹି஑ಽଶ஑ಹ െ 0.5αഥ െ Cா ቀ1 െ
஑ಹି஑ಽ
ଶ஑ಹ െ αഥቁ ൒ ܥா െ 0.5. 
 
This condition can be rewritten as ܥா ൑
ଷି஑ഥିಉಹషಉಽಉಹ
ସିଶ஑ഥିಉಹషಉಽಉಹ
. 
Note that 
ଷି஑ഥିಉಹషಉಽಉಹ
ସିଶ஑ഥିಉಹషಉಽಉಹ
൏ ଷି஑ഥସିଶ஑ഥ.	∎ 
3.8.7 Proof of Proposition 3.7 
According to the baseline model analysed in Chapter 2, by offering a rebate scheme 
such that ூܲோ െ ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൏ ܥா , ߛ ൌ 1  and ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1 hold, I can exclude E and 
obtain a profit of 0.5 (i.e., a monopoly profit) regardless of how efficient E is.  
This finding implies that in the model analysed in this section, the condition that I can 
exclude E when the realised value of ߙ is α௅ is 
ூܲோ െ ߚ/ሺ1 െ α௅ሻ ൏ ܥா ↔ ூܲோ ൐ ଵି஼ಶሺଵି஑ಽሻ஑ಽ . 
Similarly, the condition that I can exclude E when the realised value of ߙ is αு can be 
written as 
ூܲோ ൐ ଵି஼ಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ஑ಹ . 
Note that 
ଵି஼ಶሺଵି஑ಽሻ
஑ಽ ൐
ଵି஼ಶሺଵି஑ಹሻ
஑ಹ . 
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It follows that by offering the rebate scheme such that both ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1  and 
ூܲோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙ௅ሻሿ/ߙ௅  hold, I can exclude E by obtaining the monopoly profit 
regardless of the realised value of ߙ.∎ 
3.8.8 Proof of Lemma 3.9 
Since ଵି௉಺
ಽఈ
ଵିఈ ൏
ଵାఏି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈାఏ  holds if 	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1, 
Lemmata 3.7 and 3.8 imply that the quantities are given by 
ሺݍூௌ, ݍூ஻ሻ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ሺ1,1 ൅ ߠሻ				݂݅	 ூܲ
௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா
ሺߙ, ߙሻ						݂݅	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா	݋ݎ
																݂݅		 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	ܥா ൑ ଵି௉಺
ಽఈ
ଵିఈ
ሺ0, ߙሻ											݂݅	 ଵି௉಺ಽఈଵିఈ ൏ ܥா ൑
ଵାఏି௉಺ಽఈ
ଵିఈାఏ
		ሺ0,0ሻ																												݂݅	ܥா ൐ ଵାఏି௉಺
ಽఈ
ଵିఈାఏ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
. 
According to the assumption concerning ߠ, ሺݍூௌ, ݍூ஻ሻ ൌ 	 ሺ0, ߙሻ cannot happen in the 
equilibrium. 
Hence, there are two possible options for the incumbent’s optimal price. The first option 
is to set a price low enough to capture the entire market (which is equivalent to 
competitive linear pricing in the baseline model). The conditions of this type of pricing 
are 	 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	and		 ூܲ௅ ൏ ܥா  and the profit is given by ߎூ ൌ 0.5ሺ ூܲ െ 0.5ሻ ൅ 0.5ሺ1 ൅
ߠሻሺ ூܲ െ 0.5ሻ . Hence, setting ூܲ௅  just below ܥா  maximizes I’s profit ( ூܲ௅ ൌ ܥா െ ߝ ) 
when I decides to choose this option, and the expected profit is ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻሺܥா െ 0.5 െ
ߝሻ. 
The second option is to give up competing with E and exploiting the profit from the 
must-stock part of the market by setting the price higher than 1 (which is equivalent to 
exploitative linear pricing in the baseline model). In order to implement this type of 
pricing, either 		 ூܲ௅ ൑ 1	and 		 ூܲ௅ ൒ ܥா  or 	 ூܲ௅ ൐ 1	and 	ܥா ൑ ሺ1 െ ூܲ௅ߙሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ  must 
hold. If I adopts this option, the profit is given by  
ߎூ ൌ 0.5ߙሺ ூܲ െ 0.5ሻ ൅ 0.5ߙሺ ூܲ െ 0.5ሻ . Hence, setting ூܲ௅  at ሾ1 െ ܥாሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ/
ߙ	maximizes I’s profit ( ூܲ௅ ൌ ܥா െ ߝ) when I decides to choose this option, and the 
expected profit is ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ.  
The condition that the incumbent prefers competitive linear pricing to exploitative 
linear pricing is 
ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻሺܥா െ 0.5ሻ ൐ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ܥாሻ ൅ 0.5ߙ. 
This equation can be modified to 
ܥா ൐ ଷାఏିఈସାଶఏିଶఈ.∎ 
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3.8.9 Proof of Proposition 3.10 
The proof of Proposition 3.10 is divided into two steps. In Step 1 we find the optimal 
behaviours of B and E given the two-part tariff offered by I. In Step 2, we find the 
optimal exclusive two-part tariff anticipating the responses of B and E specified in Step 
1. 
Step 1: Optimal behaviours of B and E 
The optimal behaviours if the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ are same as in 
Lemmata 2.4 and 2.5. The optimal behaviours if the determined contestable demand is 
1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ can be obtained by substituting 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ into 1 െ ߙ in Lemmata 2.4 and 
2.5. Hence, the optimal behaviours of B and I can be written as follows: 
Given ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ	and ாܲ, the buyer’s optimal purchasing volume is as follows: 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ, 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௏ ൏ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲி ൅	 ூܲ௏ 	൑ 1	
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௏ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ቑ .  
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ, 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1 ൅ ߠ, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௏ ൏ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲி ൅	 ூܲ௏ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ 	൑ 1	 ൅ ߠ
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ	݂݅	 ூܲ௏ ൒ ாܲ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ ൑ 1 ൅ ߠ
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ቑ .   
Moreover, given ሺ ூܲி, ூܲ௏ሻ , the entrant’s optimal pricing anticipating the buyer’s 
optimal response above is as follows: 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ, 
ாܲ∗ ൌ ൞
ூܲ௏	݂݅	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௏ ൒ ܥா
ଵି௉಺ಷି௉಺ೇఈ
ଵିఈ 	݂݅	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵି௉಺ಷି௉಺ೇఈ
ଵିఈ ൒ ܥா
൅∞	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ൢ. 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ, 
ாܲ∗ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ூܲ௏	݂݅	 ூܲி ൅ ௉಺
ೇ
ଵାఏ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲ௏ ൒ ܥா
ଵାఏି௉಺ಷି௉಺ೇఈ
ଵିఈାఏ 	݂݅	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵାఏି௉಺ಷି௉಺ೇఈ
ଵିఈାఏ ൒ ܥா
൅∞	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
Note that ாܲ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that E decides not to enter. 
 
Step 2: Optimal exclusive two-part tariff 
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According to the optimal behaviours of B and E specified in Step 1, the conditions that 
I can exclude E through the two-part tariff regardless of the determined size of the 
contestable demand are ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1 , ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏/ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ ൑ 1  and ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா . In this 
situation, I’s expected profit is given by 
ߎூ ൌ 0.5ሺ	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5ሻ ൅ 0.5ሾ ூܲி ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻሺ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5ሻሿ ൌ 	 ூܲி ൅ ሺ1 ൅
0.5ߠሻሺ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5ሻ. 
Hence, the optimal exclusive two-part tariff can be obtained by solving the following 
profit-maximisation problem: 
max
	௉಺ಷ,௉಺ೇ
	 ூܲி ൅ ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻሺ ூܲ௏ െ 0.5ሻ 
 s. t. 	 ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏ ൑ 1, ூܲி ൅ ூܲ௏/ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ ൑ 1 and ூܲ௏ ൏ ܥா. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem gives Proposition 3.10.∎ 
3.8.10 Proof of Proposition 3.11 
The proof of Proposition 3.11 is divided into three steps. In Step 1 we find the optimal 
behaviours of B and E given the market-share-based rebate by I. In Step 2, we find the 
optimal exclusive market-share-based rebate anticipating the responses of B and E 
specified in Step 1. Step 1 shows that the expected profit from the optimal exclusive 
market-share-based rebate is always larger than the profit from the exclusive quantity-
based rebate. 
Step 1: Optimal behaviours of B and E 
The optimal behaviours if the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ are the same as 
in Lemmata 2.7 and 2.8. The optimal behaviours if the determined contestable demand 
is 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ can be obtained by substituting 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ into 1 െ ߙ in Lemmata 2.7 and 
2.8. Hence, the optimal behaviours of B and I can be written as below. 
Given ሺ ூܲெோ, ߚெሻ,	and ாܲ, the buyer’s optimal purchasing volume is as follows: 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ, 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ ൞
ሺ1, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ாܲ ൐ ூܲெோ െ ߚெ	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൑ 1
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙሻ	݂݅	 ாܲ ൑ ூܲெோ െ ఉ
ಾ
ଵିఈ 	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲெோߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൑ 1
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
ൢ .  
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ, 
111 
 
ሺݍூ∗, ݍா∗ሻ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ሺ1 ൅ ߠ, 0ሻ	݂݅	 ாܲ ൐ ூܲெோ െ ఉ
ಾ
ଵିఈାఏ 	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൑ 1
ሺߙ, 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ	݂݅	 ாܲ ൑ ூܲெோ െ ఉ
ಾ
ଵିఈାఏ 	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲெோߙ ൅ ாܲሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ ൑ 1 ൅ ߠ
ሺ0, 0ሻ	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
 .  
Moreover, given ሺ ூܲெோ, ߚெሻ , the entrant’s optimal pricing anticipating the buyer’s 
optimal response above is as follows: 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ, 
ாܲ∗ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ூܲெோ െ ఉ
ಾ
ଵିఈ 	݂݅	 ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲெோ െ
ఉಾ
ଵିఈ ൒ ܥா
ଵି௉಺ಾೃఈ
ଵିఈ 	݂݅	 ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵି௉಺ಾೃఈ
ଵିఈ ൒ ܥா
൅∞	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
If the determined contestable demand is 1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠ, 
ாܲ∗ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ூܲெோ െ ఉ
ಾ
ଵିఈାఏ 	݂݅	 ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൑ 1	ܽ݊݀	 ூܲெோ െ
ఉಾ
ଵିఈାఏ ൒ ܥா
ଵାఏି௉಺ಾೃఈ
ଵିఈାఏ 	݂݅	 ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	
ଵାఏି௉಺ಾೃఈ
ଵିఈାఏ ൒ ܥா
൅∞	݂݅	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
Note that ாܲ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that E decides not to enter. 
 
Step 2: Optimal exclusive market-share-based rebate 
According to the optimal behaviours of B and E specified in Step 1, the conditions that 
I can exclude E through the market-share-based rebate regardless of the determined size 
of the contestable demand are 
(A3.11) ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൑ 1,  
(A3.12) ூܲெோ െ ߚெ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൏ ܥா and 
(A3.13) ூܲெோ െ ߚெ/ሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ ൏ ܥா .  
In this situation, I’s expected profit is given by 
ߎூ ൌ 0.5ሺ ூܲெோ െ ߚெ െ 0.5ሻ ൅ 0.5ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻሺ ூܲெோ െ ߚெ െ 0.5ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻሺ ூܲெோ െ
ߚெ െ 0.5ሻ. 
According to Inequality (A3.11), the expected profit is maximised when ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൌ
1  holds. Since ߚெ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൐  ߚெ/ሺ1 െ ߙ ൅ ߠሻ , when Inequality (A3.13) holds, 
Inequality (A3.12) always holds. By substituting ூܲெோ െ ߚெ ൌ 1  into Inequality 
(A3.13), the equations can be rewritten as 
ூܲோ ൐ ଵି஼ಶሺଵିఈାఏሻఈିఏ . 
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Step 3: Exclusive quantity-based rebate is dominated by exclusive market-share-based 
rebate 
Step 2 shows that I can capture the entire surplus of the market by using the market-
share-based rebate in the sense that I can obtain the profit that I could obtain, supposing 
that I is the dominant producer in the market, which is equal to 0.5ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻ. This 
implies that I has an incentive to use a quantity-based rebate only if I can get a profit of 
0.5ሺ1 ൅ 0.5ߠሻ by using a quantity-based rebate. 
The discussion in the baseline model shows that in order to capture the entire surplus 
of the market by a quantity-based rebate when the determined contestable demand size 
is small, I must offer the rebate scheme such that the discounted price is equal to B’s 
willingness to pay ( ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1) and that the threshold volume to obtain the discount 
is equal to the demand size (ߛ ൌ 1).19 However, if I sets ߛ equal to 1, I cannot capture 
the entire surplus of the market by a quantity-based rebate when the determined 
contestable demand is great. This inability is due to B being unable to obtain a further 
discount when I purchases more than 1 unit. Hence, when the determined demand size 
is large, B will purchase only 1 unit from I and ߠ units because E’s price is equal to or 
lower than the discounted price of I’s product ( ாܲ ൑ 1). In other words, suppose I offers 
a rebate scheme such that ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1 and ߛ ൌ 1; the effective price for the units of I’s 
product that B purchases more than the threshold volume, 1, is equal to 1, so I cannot 
block the entry. In this situation, when the determined contestable demand size is large, 
E can enter the market by setting its price equal to the discounted price for I’s product 
(i.e., ாܲ ൌ ூܲோ െ ߚ ൌ 1), from which it follows that B’s surplus is zero while E obtains 
a profit of ሺ1 െ ܥாሻߠ. In this situation, I’s expected profit is equal to that granted by the 
exclusive two-part tariff, 0.5 ൅ 0.5ߠሺܥா െ 0.5ሻ.	∎ 
3.8.11 Proof of Lemma 3.10 
From the definition, the second period can be divided into the following two cases: 
ߙଶ ൌ ߙଵ and ߙଶ ൌ 0. 
If ߙଶ ൌ ߙଵ holds in the second period, the game is equivalent to one-shot game that is 
analysed in Chapter 2. Hence, from Proposition 2.4, the incumbent’s optimal behaviour 
in the second period is to use exclusive conditional rebates if ܥா ൒ 	0.5 and exploitative 
pricing if ܥா ൏ 	0.5. 
If ߙଶ ൌ 0, the game in the second period is a simple Bertrand game because I no longer 
has an advantage such that its product is must-stock, so B’s options are either to 
purchase only from I, to purchase only from E or to purchase not at all. These options 
imply that in this situation, I can trade with B only if ூܲଶ ൏ ܥா. Otherwise, I is excluded 
                                                            
19 Moreover, in order to block the entry, ூܲோ ൐ ሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܥாሿ/ߙ must hold. 
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from the market, because E will respond by setting ாܲଶ at ூܲଶ. This sequence of events 
implies that I’s optimal pricing in this situation is setting ூܲଶ at ܥா െ ߝ, where ߝ is a 
small positive number. Such pricing is equal to competitive linear pricing in Chapter 2. 
The profit from competitive linear pricing is 
ߎூ஼௅ ൌ ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ. 
Because ܥூ ൌ 0.5, the condition that I can trade with B and does offer its price such that 
ூܲଶ ൌ ܥா െ 0.5 െ ε  is ܥா ൒ 0.5. If ܥா ൏ 0.5 , I cannot trade with B, because E can 
respond by setting ாܲଶ at ூܲଶ even if I sets the lowest possible price, 0.5. Hence, in this 
situation, I decides to leave the market, and I’s profit in the second period is equal to 
zero.20 ■ 
3.8.12 Proof of Proposition 3.13 
As analysed in Section 6.2, when the entry happens in a certain period, the next game 
becomes a simple Bertrand game because I no longer has an advantage such that its 
product is must-stock. This change implies that if I introduces a pricing scheme at 
period ̂ݐ ∈ ሾ1, ܶሻ such that E can enter, the optimal behaviour thereafter	is to maximise 
profit in the Bertrand game in each period. According to Lemma 3.10, such behaviour 
is to offer competitive linear pricing to obtain a profit of ܥா െ 0.5 െ ߝ if ܥா ൒ 	0.5 and 
to leave the market if ܥா ൏ 	0.5.  
However, if ܥா ൒ 	0.5, I has no incentive to allow E’s entry, since the pricing behaviour 
that maximises I’s profit in each period under the condition that there is no entry in the 
previous periods is the exclusive conditional rebate, which blocks the entry. This 
situation is equivalent to what happens in the case of the two-period model analysed in 
the previous section. Hence, if ܥா ൒ 	0.5, I’s most profitable behaviour is to keep 
introducing exclusive conditional rebates.  
On the other hand, if ܥா ൏ 	0.5, the most profitable pricing for I that allows E’s entry 
is exploitative pricing, and the profit from such pricing exceeds the profit from 
exclusive conditional rebates that is the most profitable pricing, which blocks the entry 
(ߎூா௉ ൐ ߎூா஼஼ோ). In this situation, the maximum total expected profit when I introduces 
exploitative pricing at period ̂ݐ ∈ ሾ1, ܶሻ can be written as 
(A3.14) ቊ ߎூ
ா௉	݂݅	̂ݐ ൌ 1
∑ ߜ௧ିଵ	ߎூா஼஼ோ௧መ௧ୀଵ ൅ ߜ௧መߎூா௉	݂݅	1 ൏ ̂ݐ ൏ ܶቋ. 
Moreover, if ܥா ൒ 	0.5 and an entry has not happened previously until period ܶ െ 1, 
the game at period ܶ presents the same situation as the second game in the two-period 
                                                            
20 In this situation, after observing that I decided to leave the market, E will set the dominant price 
( ாܲଶ ൌ 1), so B’s surplus is zero. If a certain more complex assumption with regard to the first mover 
of the game is introduced and, as a result, the first mover of the second period becomes E, E’s optimal 
pricing is not 1 but 0.5, because otherwise I can trade with B. If that is the case, B can obtain a positive 
profit, 0.5.  
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model. Hence, I’s optimal behaviour at period ܶ is exploitative pricing. In this situation, 
I’s maximum total expected profit can be written as 
(A3.15) ∑ ߜ௧ିଵ	ߎூா஼஼ோ்ିଵ௧ୀଵ ൅ ߜ்ߎூா௉. 
Therefore, if ܥா ൏ 	0.5, I’s optimal behaviour is to introduce exploitative pricing at 
some time between period 1 and period ܶ . Let ߎூ௧መ  denote I’s total profit when I 
introduces exploitative pricing at period ̂ݐ ∈ ሾ1, ܶሿ. Note that from Equations (A3.14) 
and (A3.15), ߎூ௧መ െ ߎூ௧መିଵ ൌ ߜ௧መିଵሾߎூா஼஼ோ െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻߎூா௉ሿ  holds for ̂ݐ ൒ 	2.  This 
equivalence implies that the condition that I prefers to introduce exploitative pricing at 
period ̂ݐ ∈ ሾ1, ܶሿ  and to introduce exploitative pricing at period ̂ݐ െ 1  is equal to 
Inequality (3.3). It follows that when Inequality (3.3) is satisfied, I's optimal behaviours 
is introducing exploitative pricing only in the last period and introducing exclusive 
conditional rebate in the previous periods. ■ 
3.8.13 Proof of Proposition 3.14 
As analysed in Section 8.12, if ܥா ൒ 	0.5, I has no incentive to allow E’s entry. This 
lack of incentive occurs because the pricing behaviour that maximises I’s profit in each 
period under the condition that there is no entry in the previous periods is the exclusive 
conditional rebate, which blocks the entry. This result is equivalent to what happens in 
the case of the two-period model analysed in the previous section. Hence, if ܥா ൒ 	0.5, 
I’s most profitable behaviour is to keep introducing exclusive conditional rebates.  
On the other hand, if ܥா ൏ 	0.5, the most profitable pricing for I that allows E’s entry 
is exploitative pricing, and the profit from such pricing exceeds the profit from excusive 
conditional rebates that is the most profitable and that blocks the entry (ߎூா௉ ൐ ߎூா஼஼ோ).  
If ܥா ൏ 	0.5 holds and the entry has been blocked before period ̂ݐ ൒ 1 (ߙ௧መ ൌ ߙଵ), the 
maximum expected total profit when I keeps introducing exclusive conditional rebates, 
hereafter evaluated at period ̂ݐ, can be written as 
(A3.16) ∑ ߜ௧መିଵߠ௧መିଵ	ߎூா஼஼ோஶ௧መୀଵ ൌ ௽಺
ಶ಴಴ೃ
ଵିఋఏ . 
On the other hand, the maximum expected total profit when I introduces exploitative 
pricing at period ̂ݐ and will be kept out of the market thereafter evaluated at period ̂ݐ 
can be written as ߎூா௉. 
Hence, if ܥா ൏ 	0.5 holds and the entry has been blocked before period ̂ݐ, the condition 
that I prefers to continue introducing exclusive conditional rebates rather than 
introducing exploitative pricing at period ̂ݐ is 
(A3.17)  ௽಺
ಶ಴಴ೃ
ଵିఋఏ ൒ ߎூா௉. 
Equation (A3.17) can be modified to 
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(A3.18) ߜߠ ൒ ௽಺ಶುି௽಺ಶ಴಴ೃఏ௽಺ಶು . 
Equation (A3.18) is equal to the equation that substitutes ߜ into ߜߠ in Inequality (3.3). 
Because I faces the same problem in each period as long as the entry has never happened, 
if Equation (A3.18) holds I prefers to keep introducing exclusive conditional rebates 
rather than introducing exploitative pricing in a certain period.■ 
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Chapter 4: Platform Competition and Effects of 
Platform Parity Clauses with a Monopoly Platform, a 
Monopoly Seller and Uninformed Consumers  
4.1. Introduction 
In recent years, online platforms have grown rapidly. The companies behind these 
platforms offer a variety of services such as e-commerce and travel bookings, and they 
bring significant benefits to consumers and small and small–medium-sized enterprises 
by making the transactions between them easier. On the other hand, it has been pointed 
out that such platforms tends to have dominant power due to the characteristics of this 
area, including network effects and some types of contracts imposed by such platforms, 
which can have negative impacts on competition. Among such contracts, most-
favoured nation clauses (MFNs) or platform parity clauses have received much 
attention; these clauses prohibit companies using platforms from selling under more 
preferable conditions (e.g., better prices) on other platforms or their own website. 
National competition authorities have taken certain actions against these platforms, in 
particular against online booking platforms such as booking.com. In France, a law has 
even been established to prohibit the introduction of such clauses in the hotel industry.  
Most-favoured nation clauses themselves are not new business practices. Traditionally, 
MFNs have been used to refer clauses that guarantee that one party of the contract will 
not offer better trade conditions (e.g., lower price) to third parties than the conditions 
applied to the other party. The MFN clauses that have received attention recently differ 
from the traditional MFNs in the sense that such clauses are used in vertical situations 
(i.e., there are some intermediaries between sellers and buyers) and are not about the 
trade conditions between the parties but about the trade conditions applied to third 
parties, in particular the trade conditions for buyers who purchase on a platform. For 
this reason, some commentators prefer to call such clauses “platform parity clauses”. If 
the restrictions imposed by such clauses are prices, those clauses are often called “price 
parity clauses”. 
Platform parity clauses or MFNs are divided into two types, depending on scope. If the 
restriction imposed by the clauses regards selling under better trade conditions on other 
platforms, such clauses are called “wide” MFNs or parity clauses. On the other hand, if 
the restriction includes selling under better trade conditions on sales channels other than 
platforms, including direct sales by the party, such clauses are called “narrow” MFNs 
or parity clauses. 
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The debate regarding platform parity clauses or MFNs is on-going. In particular, there 
is a division of the views among the European competition authorities with respect to 
the approach towards narrow platform parity clauses. While French, Italian and 
Swedish authorities have concluded that narrow platform parity clauses can be justified 
in the hotel booking platform case,21 the German Federal Cartel Office published a 
decision that not only wide-platform parity clauses but also narrow-platform parity 
clauses should be prohibited.22 In its decision, the German authority denied the hotel 
booking platform’s claim to justify the platform parity clauses: that they improve 
efficiency by reducing the risk of free rides, which imposes a negative effect on the 
incentive to make investments in the industry, because those problems did not exist at 
all in the case.  
Moreover, the Competition and Market Authority prohibited the wide MFNs in the 
private motor insurance industry in 2014. In the industry, many consumers purchase 
their insurance through price comparison websites, which are two-sided platforms that 
match consumers searching for insurance with private car insurance companies. The 
Competition and Market Authority found that the wide MFNs imposed by the platforms 
against the insurance companies softened price competition between price comparison 
websites and was likely to increase the consumer prices. On the other hand, the 
Competition and Market Authority did not prohibit narrow MFNs, because their effect 
on competition is small. 
In the United States, the Department of Justice has alleged that the contracts between 
Apple and the major publishers violate the antitrust law, including MFN clauses, 
because the contracts harm the competition by increasing the e-book prices.23  
This chapter aims to analyse the effects of MFNs or parity clauses on competition and 
consumer welfare. 
4.2. Literature Review 
With regard to the issues related platform parity clauses or MFNs, some economic 
studies have been done already. According to Hviid and Fletcher (2017), the 
anticompetitive effects caused by parity clauses and MFNs, in particular wide-type, 
identified in the economic literature regarding these conduct can be summarised in the 
following three: (1) softening competition between retailers or platforms on the fees 
imposed on suppliers, (2) restricting the entrance of other retailers or platforms and (3) 
                                                            
21 See the French Competition Commission’s decision concerning practices implemented in the online 
hotel booking sector in 15-D-06 (2015). In the decision, the commission accepted the commitment 
proposed by Booking.com, including the removal of the wide MFNs. The commitment also includes 
the removal of narrow MFNs for off-line sales and loyalty customers. 
22 See the German Federal Cartel Office’s decision against HRS on Best price clauses in B9-66/10 
(2013). 
23 See U.S. v. Apple, Inc. et al., (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2012) (proposed final judgment as to defendants 
Hachette, HarperCollins, and Simon & Schuster). European Commission dealt with the similar case. 
See CASE AT.39847 – E-BOOKS. 
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eliminating price competition on platforms in the asymmetric market where suppliers 
set their prices on some platforms but other platforms can set the prices on their 
platforms, based on their previous works such as Hviid (2010) and Hviid (2015). Note 
that this and the next chapter cover the first effect. 
First, Boik and Corts (2015) examine the case where there is one supplier who sells its 
product through two competing differentiated platforms and analyse the effects of 
platform price parity clauses. They show that the clauses lead to higher commissions 
imposed by the platform, followed by the higher prices set by the supplier, since under 
the clauses, when one platform increases the fee to use the platform, the supplier no 
longer diverts the sales to the other platform by setting lower price on the platform. 
They also analyse the effects on entry and conclude that if the demand for the entrant 
platform is low compared to the incumbent platform and the fixed cost to enter the 
market is high to some extent, the entrance that could happen without the platform 
parity clauses would not happen after the platform introduces the clauses.  
Johanson (2017) considers a case of multiple suppliers and multiple retailers in which 
the retailers impose not a fixed fee per unit but a commission based on the suppliers’ 
revenues. He found that the agency model is a weapon against the suppliers in the sense 
that it gives a lower price for the buyer, raises buyers’ welfare higher and raises retailers’ 
welfare higher than does the wholesale model; however, when the agency model is used 
with parity clauses, the prices become higher, and consumers are harmed. Rey and 
Verge (2016) also examine the case where there are multiple differentiated suppliers 
and multiple differentiated retailers and the commissions paid by the suppliers to the 
retailers are determined based on secret negotiations between a supplier and a seller in 
which they share their (maximised) joint surplus depending on the parameter of the 
relative bargaining power between the supplier and the retailer. They also examine the 
effects of price parity clauses and conclude that the clauses do not have any effect on 
the equilibrium prices and profits in both the agency model and the wholesale model, 
because the commissions depend on the retailers’ costs.  
Although those studies do not regard direct sales by sellers using platforms, Johanson 
and Verge (2016) consider the possibility of sellers’ direct sales. In order to analyse the 
effects of platform price parity clauses, they adopt the linear inverse demand functions 
adapted from Ziss (1995), which include the parameters about the degrees of inter-
brand competition and intra-brand competition.24 They show that wide platform price 
parity clauses do not necessarily lead to higher commissions and higher final prices, 
because the constraints due to the possibility that the sellers prefer not to use a platform 
restrict the platforms’ ability to set high commissions. The degree of harm depends on 
the sellers’ ability to sale directly. When the sellers’ ability to direct sell is strong, the 
rise of consumer prices is unlikely, because in such cases the constraints by the 
possibility that the seller will not use the platform that raises the commission becomes 
                                                            
24 Specifically, the inverse demand for supplier ݆’s product on sales channel ݅ is given by, ݌௜௝ ൌ 1 െ
ݍ௜௝ െ ߙ∑ ݍ௜௞௞ஷ௝∈௃ െ ߚሺ∑ ݍ௛௝௛ஷ௜∈ூ ൅ ߙ ∑ ݍ௛௞௞ஷ௝∈௃ ሻ where ݅ ∈ ܫ ≡ ሼܣ, ܤ, ܦሽ (i.e. two platforms or 
direct sales) and ݆ ∈ ܬ ≡ ሼ1,… ,ܰሽ. 
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stronger. They also point out that the effects of wide platform price parity clauses and 
that of narrow platform price parity clauses gives equivalent outcomes, and hence, the 
remedies that replace wide parity clauses with the narrow type, as adopted in the hotel 
booking platform case in France, may be ineffective. 
While the above models do not regard investment, some studies have considered 
investment. Edelman and Wright (2018) have analysed the model that if buyers 
purchase a product through an intermediary rather than purchasing from the seller 
directly, the buyer obtains certain benefits, depending on the investment an 
intermediary makes. They point out that the examples of the benefits that buyers obtain 
by using an intermediary include the provision of complementary products, reduction 
of transaction costs and financial rebates referring to the credit and debit card industry. 
They show that an intermediary has an incentive to introduce price parity clauses (in 
their words, “price coherence”), when possible and that the introduction of such clauses 
increases investment by the intermediary to an excessive level at which the efficient 
outcome is not achieved, harming buyers. On the other hand, in the case where the price 
parity clause is not introduced, the amount of the investment that the platform makes is 
efficient, where the net benefit that the platform can make is maximised. 
Wang and Wright (2016) have studied this topic by introducing a model based on a 
search model in which consumers choose whether they search horizontally 
differentiated sellers directly or search on a platform. In their model, it is assumed that 
if a buyer chooses to search on a platform, in addition to obtaining a convenience benefit, 
as in Edelman and Wright (2018)’s model, the buyer can search at lower cost. They 
also assume that when a buyer finds a seller through searching on a platform, the 
consumer can switch to buy the product from the seller directly when the direct sales 
price is cheap enough without incurring an additional search cost (“showrooming”). 
They show that the introduction of wide price parity clause leads to higher commission 
fees imposed by the platform, a higher price for the consumer and higher profits for the 
platform, because such clauses limit constraints through showrooming on the 
platform’s ability to set a high commission. With regard to narrow price parity clauses, 
they conclude that while the clauses remove constraints by showrooming, the 
introduction of the narrow type can be beneficial for consumers when platforms 
compete and the competition is strong enough to limit the platforms’ ability to set high 
commissions. They also analyse an extension model where the reduction of search costs 
when using a platform depends on the investment that the platform makes, as presented 
by Edelman and Wright (2018). Wang and Wright (2016)  find that the introduction of 
price parity clauses by a platform in the presence of showrooming by buyers can 
increase the incentive for the platform to invest; however, the effects on the welfare is 
ambiguous because the investment achieved under the price parity clauses is excessive.   
One of the important motivations for enterprises to use such platforms, however, is to 
be known by consumers, and this motivation seems not to have been be examined 
closely in previous research. This point is important to consider whether the claim is 
appropriate to justify narrow-MFNs such that it can improve the efficiency by avoiding 
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free rides and reducing the incentive for investment. With that background, this chapter 
analyses economic models considering this aspect. Some economic studies have 
considered advertising through investment to inform consumers who may not know if 
the existence of products; this model is called an “informative advertising model”. First, 
Butters (1977) analysed the economic model that buyers know of products through 
advertisements, assuming monopolistic competition. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) 
later considered the horizontal product differentiation on the Hotelling line, assuming 
that only a part of consumers know about the existence of products by using an 
information technology similar to that of Butters (1977). 
Other studies have also examined uninformed consumers, although those models do 
not analyse the effects of price parity clauses or MFNs. In those models, it is assumed 
that while some consumers knows only one firm’s price, other consumers can find all 
the prices in the market in some way, such as using a “price clearing house” or price 
comparison websites. Initially, Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980) analysed the 
models in which firms selling a homogenous good compete for informed consumers 
under Bertrand competition, where firms sell homogenous products although each 
seller is the monopoly seller for uninformed consumers who only know about that 
seller’s good. In the equilibrium of their models, the sellers adopt mixed-strategy 
pricing, which implies that price dispersion occurs. Baye and Morgan (2001) have 
introduced a two-sided platform called the “information gatekeeper” in their model. In 
the assumptions of their model, sellers can inform consumers of their existence if those 
consumers subscribe to the information gatekeeper for a fee, if the sellers pay the 
advertisement fee to the gatekeeper.  
Some studies have applied Varian’s model to the case in which informed consumers 
get the information concerning the prices through platforms that make profit from fees 
to suppliers using the platform. Ronayne and Taylor (2018) extend Varian’s model by 
introducing a competitive sales channel, which is a price clearing house where two 
sellers can list their prices by paying commission, assuming that the sellers can set the 
prices of a homogenous good on the competitive sales channel or the direct sales 
channel. They show that if the competitive sales channel does not have many loyal 
consumers relative to the sellers (i.e., weak brand power), the competitive sales channel 
sets a low commission, and it follows that the sellers set low prices on the competitive 
sales channel to attract informed consumers and set high prices to exploit form 
uninformed loyal consumers. On the other hand, if the competitive sales channel has 
relatively strong brand power, the sales channel sets a high commission, and it follows 
that sellers compete with each other in their direct sales prices based on mixed strategies. 
It is also shown that the increase of the number of informed consumers does not always 
improve consumer welfare because while competition within channels is strengthened, 
competition between channels is weakened.  
Ronayne (2015) applies Varian’s model to the case in which informed consumers can 
get information on sellers’ prices for homogeneous goods through homogeneous price 
comparison websites, which list the prices of the sellers paying fees. He shows that in 
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the case in which price parity clauses are not allowed, while there exists a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium with respect to the fees of the platforms, the sellers set prices based 
on mixed-strategy in the equilibrium. He also concludes that the introduction of price 
comparison websites makes both informed and uninformed consumers worse off, due 
to the rise of expected prices by the sellers caused by the fees to the sellers, imposed by 
the websites. He also shows that if the sellers can do price discrimination (i.e., set 
different prices on the direct sales and each website), the introduction of MFNs by the 
price comparison website harms consumers, because the clauses soften the competition 
between the websites regarding the fees.   
Little empirical work has been done in this field. Mantovani et. al. (2017) examines the 
effect of the prohibition of price parity clauses in the European Union on the hotel prices. 
They show that the prices decreased shortly after the ban but bounced back thereafter. 
They conclude that the initial price decrease was compatible with the prohibition of the 
clauses, but the subsequent price increase may be caused by multiple factors. They 
suggest that one possible explanation is that after the removal of the clauses, the 
platforms need to compete, providing more customer experience thorough more 
investment and, hence, they need to pass through an increase of the investment costs to 
their fees. De los Santos et. al. (2019) analyse the e-book market to examine the effect 
of the transition from the wholesale model to the agency model, as well as MFNs in the 
case of e-books in the United States. They find that the switch to the agency model 
increased the prices on Amazon but had little effect on the prices on other e-book 
platform. They also carry out the counterfactual simulation and show that the 
introduction of MFNs would increase the prices of non-fiction books.  
This chapter and the next chapter analyse the behaviours of consumers, sellers and 
platforms in the platform industry (especially, in online hotel booking) and the effects 
on competition and consumer welfare of price parity clauses or MFNs (both narrow and 
wide) by applying the informative advertising model to this industry. This chapter 
considers the case in which both a platform and a seller are monopolist and examines 
the effect of a narrow price parity clause. Chapter 5 considers the case in which there 
are two platforms and two sellers and examines the effect of wide price parity clauses. 
None of the literature applying the informative advertisement model to the platform 
industry to analyse the effect of price parity clauses or MFNs. The closest literature to 
the model covered in this chapter is Wang and Wright (2016) in the sense that 
consumers who are not aware of product and do a searching behaviour to obtain the 
information about products are shed light on.  
This study will shed light upon the important but not widely discussed platforms’ 
function, building consumer awareness. This model especially suits industries in which 
building awareness of products or services among consumers is important and 
platforms have an significant tool by which to be known by consumers. Moreover, this 
study will clarify the effect of price parity clauses on the level of investment by 
platforms, which is also not covered in most of previous research. This point is also 
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important because investment by platforms is a crucial factor in improving platform’s 
function of getting attention from consumers and can enhance consumer welfare.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3 explains the assumptions of the model 
and the process of the game. Section 4 then analyses the special case such that there is 
no product differentiation. It first analyses the optimal behaviours of the platform, the 
seller and the consumers when the transportation cost is zero. Section 5 covers the 
optimal behaviours of those players when the transportation cost is positive. Both 
section 4 and 5 first analyse the case where the price parity clause is not allowed and, 
then, analyse the case where the clause is allowed. Finally, the effect of allowing a price 
parity clause on competition and on consumers is analysed. Section 6 offers concluding 
remarks and presents their implications for competition policy.  
4.3. Basic Assumptions 
Based on the motivations introduced in the previous section, this chapter and the next 
chapter aim to analyse competition such that the firms compete with each other through 
an intermediary platform.  
 
The basic structure of the model analysed in this chapter and the next chapter is similar 
to that of some of the previous studies related to platform price parity clauses, such as 
Boik and Corts (2015), Johanson and Verge (2016) and Wang and Wright (2016). That 
is, the model uses a the vertical structure consisting of three types of players: sellers, 
platforms and consumers. This chapter considers the case of only one seller (Seller 1) 
and one platform (Platform ܣ). In addition, like Johanson and Verge (2016) and Wang 
and Wright (2016), this analysis assumes that a seller can sell its product directly to 
consumers. 
 
Moreover, this chapter and the next chapter aim to consider the situation in which 
gaining awareness from consumers who may not be informed about the existence of a 
product is important for sellers, because one of the important incentives to use platforms 
is to enhance the probability of awareness among consumers, especially in markets 
related to online platforms. In order to consider this point, this chapter and the next 
chapter analyse the theoretical model based on the informative advertising model for 
platforms with product differentiation between sellers, introduced by Grossman and 
Shapiro (1980). The main difference between the models is that the model analysed in 
this chapter includes a vertical relationship. While the original model considers only 
the interaction between the sellers and the consumers, this model considers a situation 
in which the sellers can use platforms to create awareness among consumers. This 
approach is similar to that of Wang and Wright (2016), which assumes consumers need 
to search to buy a product on a platform or from the seller directly and that when they 
searching via the platform, consumers obtain the benefits of convenience and a lower 
search cost. However, this model is different from their approach in that this Chapter 
and Chapter 5 focus on the function of platforms that sellers use to become known by 
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consumers rather than on lower search costs or supplementary benefits.25 This focus is 
well-suited to the case of online platforms, where search costs are very low and where 
consumers do not care considerably about the source of their goods. 
 
In order to consider consumers’ limited awareness of products and the possibility of 
switching of sales channel by consumers, two types of parameters are introduced in this 
chapter. The first parameters are about consumers’ awareness of products. 
 
In specific, it is assumed that only a share of ߣଵ ∈ ሾ0,1ሻ know about the existence of 
products sold directly by Seller 1 and ߣ஺ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ and that consumers know about the 
existence of any product sold on Platform ܣ. Variable ߣଵ is assumed to be exogenous. 
 
On the other hand, the share of the consumers who are aware of the existence of the 
platform (ߣ஺) is assumed to depend on the amount of investment Platform ܣ has made 
in the present period, ܫ஺, and the investment it has made so far, ܫ஺, 26  where ܫ஺ ൒ 0 and 
ܫ஺ ൐ 0. Note that while ܫ஺  is an endogenous variable, ܫ஺  is an exogenous variable. 
Specifically, it is assumed that ߣ஺ ൌ ݃ሺܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ሻ, where ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൐ 0 and ݃ᇱᇱ ቀܫ஺ ൅
ܫ஺ቁ ൏ 0. It is also assumed the probability to be noticed cannot be 1 even if the platform 
makes the investment as much as possible. In other words, limூಲ→ାஶ݃ሺܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ሻ ൏ 1 holds. 
It can be assumed that ܫ஺ ൌ 0  without loss of generality because there is no rival 
platform. Hereafter, the investment function is simply written as ݃ሺܫ஺ሻ for simplicity. 
 
The assumption of exogeneity about the consumers’ awareness of the direct sales and 
the assumption that the consumers’ awareness of the product sold on the platform 
depends on the platform’s decision about investment imply that the seller cannot 
directly expand the number of consumers being aware of the product. This can be 
thought of as delegated information provision, and it is the difference from the original 
informative advertisement model, in which the sellers can expand the number by 
making their own investment.27 
 
The relationship between the sellers and the platforms is a client–agent relationship. 
When a seller contracts with a platform, it can sell its product on the platform. The 
seller decides the price of its product sold on the platform, ݌ଵ஺. In exchange, the seller 
needs to pay a commission, ஺݂, for each unit it sells. There are no further cost (e.g., 
upfront fee) to use the platform. In addition, the seller can also sell its product to 
                                                            
25 The other (technical) difference is that in the informative advertising model, the following 
assumption is not required: that consumers know the distribution of the reservation values of products 
they do not know, which is necessary to find equilibrium in search models. 
26 Rate of depreciation with respect to the invested capital in the previous period is not included in this 
model, because ܫ௞ can be interpreted as taking the depreciation into account. 
27 By assuming that ߣூ is an endogenous variable that depends on the amount of the seller's own 
investment, the seller can expand the number, although the model becomes much more complicated. 
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consumers directly. The price for the direct sales is given by ݌ଵ஽ . Although in this 
model there is only one seller, taking into account the continuity with the next chapter 
which assumes multiple platforms, we use ݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽. 
The other parameter is about the type of consumers’ search behaviour. Specifically, it 
is assumed that there are two types of consumers, namely active consumers and inactive 
consumers, and that only active consumers undertake searching behaviours to find sales 
channels. The proportion of active customer is given by ߙ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. That proportion is 
assumed to be independent from ߣଵ and ߣ஺. The proportion of the inactive consumers 
is 1 െ ߙ.  
 
1) Inactive consumers 
Inactive consumers are defined as those who choose only from the options they initially 
know and never do any searching. The options that a consumer initially knows are 
determined by whether a consumer is a part of ߣଵ or ߣ஺ consumers or not. An inactive 
consumer can purchase Seller 1’s product directly from the seller only if the consumer 
falls under the share of ߣଵ consumers, and such a consumer can purchase the product 
sold on Platform ܣ only if the consumer falls under the share of ߣ஺ consumers and 
Seller 1 contracts with the platform. Otherwise, they do not have the information on the 
product sold directly or the product sold on the platform. 
 
2) Active consumers  
Active consumers are defined as those who engage in searching behaviour and, as a 
result, may obtain information that they initially do not have. In other words, it is 
assumed that when such consumers have an awareness of a product sold on any sales 
channel at the beginning of the game (i.e., falling under a share of part of ߣଵ or ߣ஺ 
consumers), it will find the price of the product sold on the other sales channel to 
compare the prices and purchase the product at the best price (e.g., if such consumer is 
informed about only the Seller 1’s product sold on Platform ܣ, the consumer chooses 
the cheapest sales channel to purchase seller 1’s product. On the other hand, if 
consumers of this type are unaware of a product, they will not find the product. It 
follows that based on this definition, a consumer who has information neither about the 
seller’s products sold directly nor about those sold on the platforms (i.e., a share of ሺ1 െ
ߣଵሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻ consumers) cannot purchase the product, because such a consumer does 
not have any information about it when deciding to purchase, regardless of consumer 
type. 
 
The assumptions about the consumers'awareness of the platform and the direct sales 
and the existence of two types of consumers imply that eight types of consumers 
exist, depending on whether they initially know about the platform, initially know 
about the seller and are active consumers. The kinds of information that each type of 
consumers has after the active consumers finish searching can be summarised in 
Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 Information that each type of consumer has after the active consumers 
finish searching  
Consumer 
Type 
Initially 
knows 
Platform A 
Initially 
knows 
Seller 1 
Proportion Information 
after Searching 
Active Yes Yes ߙߣܣߣ1 ଵܲ஺, ଵܲ஽ 
Active Yes No ߙߣܣሺ1 െ ߣ1ሻ ଵܲ஺, ଵܲ஽ 
Active No Yes ߙሺ1 െ ߣܣሻߣ1 ଵܲ஺, ଵܲ஽ 
Active No No ߙሺ1 െ ߣܣሻሺ1 െ ߣ1ሻ n. a. 
Inactive Yes Yes ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ߣଵ ଵܲ஺, ଵܲ஽ 
Inactive Yes No ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ଵܲ஺ 
Inactive No Yes ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ ଵܲ஽ 
Inactive No No ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ n. a. 
 
 
As shown in the rightmost column of Table 4.1, after the active consumers finish 
searching, the information consumers have is one of the following four: (1) The product 
sold on the platform and the direct sales channel, (2) only the product sold on the 
platform, (3) only the product sold on the seller’s own sales channel or (4) no 
information about the product. The proportions of those four types of consumers are 
ߙሺߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߙሻߣ஺ߣଵ28 , ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ , ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ29	 and ሺ1 െ
ߣ஺ሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ respectively. 
 
With regard to consumers, to maintain consistency with the next chapter (which 
analyses the case of are two horizontally differentiated sellers), this chapter and next 
chapter assume the Hotelling model. Specifically, it is assumed that a unit mass of 
consumers is uniformly distributed over the unit interval and the unique seller is located 
at zero on the Hotelling line. It is also assumed that the consumers do not have 
preferences on where to buy the product. Hence, the utility of consumer ݔ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ when 
purchasing Seller 1’s product sold on Sales Channel ݉ is ݑ ൌ ݎ െ ߬ݔ െ ݌ଵ௠, where 
݉ ∈ ܣ,ܦ. The variable ߬ ൒ 0 can be understood as the transportation cost. For example, 
in the online hotel booking platform case where the seller is a hotel, ߬ can be interpreted 
as the transportation cost per unit distance for the consumers from the hotel to their 
destinations, which differs between consumers. Note that when 	߬ ൌ 0 , all the 
consumers have the same destination. It is also possible to interpret that ߬ denotes the 
difference in taste between consumers. For example, when considering a situation such 
that a retailer sells a product on the e-commerce platform, the transportation cost can 
be understood as the disutility due to the difference from their taste. In this situation, 
                                                            
 28 If ߙ ൌ 0, the share of the consumers who are aware of the product sold on both sales channels is 
ߣ஺ߣଵ. If ߣଵ ൌ 0, the share of such consumers is ߣ஺. 
29 If ߙ ൌ 0, the share of the consumers who are aware of only the product sold on the platform or the 
direct sale channels is ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ or ሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ, respectively. If ߣଵ ൌ 0, the shares are ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ or 0, 
respectively. 
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߬ ൌ 0 means that all the consumers have the same taste, which is equivalent to no 
product differentiation. The special case where ߬ ൌ 0  holds is covered in the next 
section and the general cases where such restriction is not assumed are covered in 
Section 5. 
 
This implies that the utility of the most distant consumer to purchase the product at 
Sales Channel ݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ  is ݎ െ ߬ െ ݌ଵ௠ . It follows that if ݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ െ ߬  all the 
consumers who are aware of the product will purchase the product at Sales Channel ݉ 
or the other one when the price is cheaper there. Hereafter, such price is referred to as 
“full-coverage price”. Note that there exist consumers such that even when the seller 
offers full-coverage price, because such consumers are unaware of product. On the 
other hand, if ݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ െ ߬, there exist consumers who will not purchase from it even 
they are aware of the product (hereafter, referred to as “non-full-coverage price”). 
 
From the proportions of the four types of consumers based on their information and the 
assumption about the utility, the demands of the product sold on both sales channels 
given ݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽ can be summarised in Figure 4.1 below.	30  
 
Figure 4.1 Utility of consumers when the platform price is full-coverage price and the 
direct sales price is non-full-coverage price 
 
 
                                                            
30 This illustration is based on Figure 6.1 of Belleflamme and Peitz (2015), which write a compact 
summary of the informative advertisement model. 
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The upper part of Figure 4.1 shows the utilities of consumers given ݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽ when 
݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ holds. The vertical axis denotes the utilities when they purchase the 
product on the platform and the direct sales channel. The horizontal axis denotes the 
location of consumers. The lower part of the figure shows the demand size of each of 
the four types of consumers. The first row of the diagram in the lower part shows the 
demand of the consumers who know both the platform price and the direct sales price. 
They purchase on the platform because the price is cheaper. On the other hand, the 
consumers shown in the second row only know the platform price. It follows that they 
only have two choices, purchasing on the platform or not purchasing. In this sense, they 
are “captive consumers”. The consumers in the third row are also captive consumers 
since they only know the direct sales price. However, some consumers decide not to 
purchase because the direct sales price is non-full-coverage price in this example. The 
consumers shown in the fourth row will not purchase the product because they do not 
have any information about the product. 
 
Several tie-breaking rules are also assumed. First, if ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽, the consumers with the 
information about the product sold on the platform and that sold directly by Seller 1 
will purchase the product on the platform with a probability of 0.5 and on the seller’s 
direct sales channel with a probability of 0.5. Second, if more than one options give the 
same expected profit, the platform prefers the option that more consumers will purchase 
on the platform, and the seller prefers the option that more consumers will purchase its 
product. 
 
Moreover, our interest is on the case where the seller sets full-coverage prices rather 
than the case where the seller sets non-full-coverage prices, because it seems that non-
full-coverage price is unlikely to be taken in the real cases. Taking this into account and  
making the model more simple, ݎ is assumed to be large enough to guarantee that the 
seller does not have an incentive to set non-full-coverage price for its direct sales in the 
equilibrium (ݎ ൒ 2߬).  
 
 
The sequence of the game is defined as follows: 
a) Platform ܣ decides the amount of investment and then decides the commission ( ஺݂) 
it offers to the sellers. 
b) Seller 1 decides whether they contract with the platform and, if so, decides the price 
sold on Platform (݌ଵ஺). At the same time, it decides the direct sales price (݌ଵ஽). 
c) Consumer decide whether to purchase the product of the seller or not and on which 
sales channel to purchase from. 
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4.4. Zero Transportation Cost Case 
This section analyses the case in which the transportation cost is assumed to be zero 
(߬ ൌ 0), which means that the utility to purchase the product is same for all consumers. 
This assumption also implies that when the consumers purchase the product in the 
equilibrium, the equilibrium prices should be full-coverage prices. 
Section 4.1 of this chapter analyses the case where a price parity clause are not allowed. 
Then, Section 4.2 analyses what happens when the clause is allowed and the effect on 
welfare of allowing the clause. In each subsection, the behaviours of the consumers, the 
sellers and the platform are analysed in turn.   
4.4.1 No Possibility of Price Parity Clause 
This section analyses the case in which the platform is not allowed to introduce a price 
parity clause. 
 
Analysis of this model provides the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4.1. Suppose the platform is not allowed to introduce a price parity clause 
and ߬ ൌ 0; there always exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the platform 
chooses the investment level ܫ஺∗ such that 
݃ᇱሺܫ஺∗ሻ ൌ ଵሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఌሻ  and sets the commission ஺݂
∗  and the sellers’ prices 
ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ	such that ሺ ஺݂∗, ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߝ, ݎ, ݎ െ ߝሻ, where ߝ is a small positive 
amount. 
 
Proposition 4.1 shows that the investment level in the equilibrium depends on the values 
of ݎ, ߙ and ߣଵ. According to the proposition, the optimal investment level rises when 
the reservation value for the consumer ݎ  becomes larger. Moreover, the optimal 
investment level lowers as the proportion of active consumers (ߙ) or the proportion of 
the consumers who are initially aware of the seller (ߣଵ) grows. This relationship occurs 
because when ߙ or ߣଵ becomes larger, more and more consumers purchase the product 
from the direct sales channel rather than through the platform, decreasing the marginal 
profit of the platform from the investment. This chain of events implies that the 
existence of direct sales decreases the platform’s profitability. In this sense, it is 
possible to say that the free riding by the seller happens due to the existence of the 
active consumers who initially only aware of the platform and then notices the direct 
sales after searching. 
With respect to the commission of the platform, the platform sets the price just below 
the reservation price of the consumers. It follows that the seller must set its price on the 
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platform equal to the commission, because the consumers will not purchase on the 
platform if it sets the price higher than that. This implies that the margin that the seller 
obtains from sales through the platform (݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂) is almost zero. On the other hand, 
the seller sets its direct sales price just below ݎ in order to avoid paying the commission 
to the platform as much as possible. 
Note that while ߙ and ߣଵaffects the optimal investment level, the optimal platform’s 
commission prices do not depend on ߙ and ߣଵ. 
4.4.1.1 Consumers’ Behaviour 
As shown in Table 4.1, eight types of consumers exist, depending on whether they 
initially know about the platform, initially know about the seller and are active 
consumers. The seller’s optimal pricing is to maximise the sum of the profits from each 
type of consumer. The consumers’ behaviour given the seller’s prices are summarised 
in Lemma 4.1. 
 
Lemma 4.1. The demand for the seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ, ݍଵ௠∗, 
where ݊ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ and ݉ ് ݊, given ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽, ஺݂, and ܫ஺, can be written as follows: 
 
݅ሻ When ݌ଵ௠ ൏ ݌ଵ௡, 
ݍଵ௠∗ ൌ ൜ߣ௠ ൅ ߙߣ௡ െ ߙߣ௠ߣ௡	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ0	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ ൠ. 
 
݅݅ሻ When ݌ଵ௠ ൌ ݌ଵ௡, 
ݍଵ௠∗ ൌ ൜ሺ1 െ 0.5ߙሻߣ௠ ൅ 0.5ߙߣ௡ െ 0.5ߣ௠ߣ௡	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ0	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ ൠ. 
 
ii݅ሻ When ݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݌ଵ௡, 
ݍଵ௠∗ ൌ ൜ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ௠ሺ1 െ ߣ௡ሻ		݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ0	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ ൠ. 
 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
 
Lemma 4.1 shows that no consumers purchase the product through Sales channel ݉ if 
the price sold on the platform is higher than the reservation value for the consumers 
(݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ).  
 
Lemma 4.1 also shows that the demand depends on whether the price on one sales 
channel is larger than that of the other sales channel. This dependence arises because 
while the share of ߣ௠ሺ1 െ ߣ௡ሻ consumers is aware of the product sold only on the sales 
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channel ݉ (i.e., they are “captive consumers”), the share of ߣ௠ߣ௡ consumers is aware 
of the product sold on both sales channels (i.e., they are “non-captive consumers”). If 
the price on one sales channel is cheaper than the price on the other sales channel, all 
the non-captive consumers purchase the product. If the price on the two sales channel 
is the same, half of the non-captive consumers purchase on one platform. 
4.4.1.2 Seller’s Behaviour 
Lemma 4.1 shows that the quantity that the consumers purchase from the seller depends 
on the price. If the lowest price that consumers are aware of is equal to or lower than ݎ, 
the consumers purchase the product through a sales channel offering the lowest price 
they know.  
For future reference, define  
(4.1) ߥ ≡ ߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺ߣଵ and 
(4.2) ߦ ൌ ሺ1 െ 0.5ߙሻߣ஺ ൅ 0.5ߙߣଵ െ 0.5ߣ஺ߣଵ, 
where ߥ is the number of consumers who are aware of the product sold on the platform 
or the product sold on the direct sales channel; ߦ is the number of consumers who 
purchase the product on the platform when ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽  holds and the prices are low 
enough to cover all the consumers (݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൌ ݎ). 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem for the seller provides the optimal seller's 
behaviours given the consumers’ response, summarised in Lemma 4.2. 
Lemma 4.2. Anticipating the consumers’ response specified in Lemma 4.1, given ஺݂, 
and ܫ஺, the optimal pricing policy for the seller ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ is   
ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ ൌ ൜ሺݎ, ݎ െ ߝሻ	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൏ ݎሺݎ ൅ ܾ, ݎሻ	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൒ ݎൠ, where ܾ is any positive amount and ߝ is a small 
positive amount. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C  
 
This lemma shows that regardless of the values of ஺݂ and ݎ, the seller sets the prices 
such that ݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݌ଵ஽. When the commission is higher than the reservation value for the 
consumers ( ஺݂ ൐ ݎ), the seller sets the direct sales price equal to ݎ and sets the platform 
price high enough to guarantee that no consumer purchase on the platform, because it 
incurs the loss from the sales on it. When the commission is equal to or lower than the 
reservation value for the consumers ( ஺݂ ൑ ݎ), the seller sets the platform price equal to  
ݎ and sets the direct sales price a little less than the platform price in order to avoid 
paying the commission to the platform as much as possible. Note that in any case, the 
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price that the consumers purchase the product is almost equal to their reservation value, 
which follows that the consumer surplus is almost equal to zero. This is because, while 
there is intra-brand competition between sales channels, there is a product monopoly 
and the demand is inelastic up to ݎ. 
4.4.1.3 Platform’s Behaviour Regarding Commission and Investment 
Lemmata 4.1 and 4.2 imply that the expected revenue that the platform obtains from 
the transaction on it can be written as 
ܴ஺ ൌ ൜ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ஺݂	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൏ ݎ0	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൒ ݎ ൠ. 
This implies that the optimal commission for the platform is setting ஺݂ just below ݎ. 
The total expected profit taking the investment into account is given by 
ߎ஺ ൌ ܴ஺൫݃ሺܫ஺ሻ൯ െ ܫ஺. 
 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem directly yields the optimal commission and 
investment set by the platform, given the seller and consumers’ response, as 
summarised in Lemma 4.3. 
 
Lemma 4.3. Anticipating the seller and consumers’ response specified in Lemmata 4.1 
and 4.2, the platform chooses the optimal investment level ܫ஺∗ such that 
݃ᇱሺܫ஺∗ሻ ൌ ଵሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఒభሻ	ሺ௥ିఌሻ		and sets the optimal commission ஺݂
∗ such that ஺݂∗ ൌ ݎ െ ߝ.  
   
Proof: See Appendix C 
 
Lemma 4.3 shows that the optimal invest level depends on the values of ݎ,	ߙ or ߣଵ. The 
optimal investment level becomes higher when ݎ gets higher or ߙ or ߣଵ gets lower. The 
optimal commission is equal to the reservation value of the consumers. 
From Lemma 4.1 to 4.3, Proposition 4.1 can be obtained directly. 
4.4.2 Allowing Price Parity Clause 
This section considers the case in which the platform is allowed to impose the price 
parity clause such that the seller’s prices must satisfy ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݌ଵ஽ and the seller cannot 
use the platform unless it accepts the offer including this restriction. 
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Analysis of this model provides the following proposition, to be proved in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
Proposition 4.2. Suppose the platform is allowed to introduce a price parity clause and 
߬ ൌ 0; there is a unique equilibrium in which the platform introduces a price parity 
clause. In this equilibrium, the platform chooses the investment level ܫ஺∗ such that 
݃ᇱሺܫ஺∗ሻ ൌ ଵሺଵିఒభሻ	௥ and sets the commission ஺݂
∗ and the sellers’ prices ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ	such 
that ሺ ஺݂∗, ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ ൌ ቀ ఒಲ
∗ሺଵିఒభሻ௥
ሺଵି଴.ହఈሻఒಲ∗ା଴.ହఈఒభି଴.ହఒಲ∗ఒభ , ݎ, ݎቁ,where ߣ஺
∗ ≡ ݃ሺ	ܫ஺∗ሻ . 
 
Proposition 4.1 shows that when the platform is allowed to introduce a price parity 
clause, the platform does introduce it, which follows that the commission imposed by 
the platform the investment level in the equilibrium depends on the values of ݎ, ߙ and 
ߣଵ . Proposition 4.1 also shows that the optimal investment level always rises by 
allowing a price parity clause.  
Both the platform price and the direct sales price in the equilibrium are equal to ݎ, which 
is the reservation value for the consumers. This implies that allowing a price parity 
clause does not change the direct sales price but decreases the platform price, although 
the amount of the decrease is negligibly small. 
On the other hand, the equilibrium commission can be higher than the equilibrium 
prices.31 This implies that the margin that the seller obtains from sales through the 
platform (݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂) can be negative. In this situation, the seller still chooses to use the 
platform because the seller can attract the active consumers who are initially only aware 
of the platform to purchase through the direct sales channel. The seller cannot sell to 
those customers unless it uses the platform. Under this equilibrium, the expected profit 
of the seller is same as the profit when the seller refuses the price parity clause, ߣଵݎ.  
4.4.2.1 Consumers’ Behaviour 
Since the introduction of the price parity clause does not constrain the consumers’ 
behaviours, the consumers’ response is given by Lemma 4.1. Hence, the consumers’ 
behaviours given the seller’s prices are summarised in Lemma 4.4. 
 
Lemma 4.4. The demand for the seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ, ݍଵ௠∗, 
where ݊ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ and ݉ ് ݊, given ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽, ஺݂ and ܫ஺, is same as the demand in the 
case where a price parity clause is not allowed, as specified in Lemma 4.1. 
                                                            
31 This situation happens when both ߙ ൐ ߣଵ and ߣ஺∗ ൐ ߙߣଵ/ሺߙ െ ߣଵሻ hold. 
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4.4.2.2 Seller’s Behaviour 
In this case, the seller has two options. The first option is to accept the price parity 
clause imposed by the platform and set the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݌ଵ஽. The second 
option for the seller is to refuse the offer by the platform and to concentrate instead on 
direct sales.  
 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem for the seller gives the optimal seller's 
behaviours given the consumers’ response, as summarised in Lemma 4.5. 
 
Lemma 4.5. Anticipating the consumers’ response, as specified in Lemma 4.4, given ஺݂ 
and ܫ஺, the optimal pricing policy for the seller is as follows:  
ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺݎ, ݎሻ	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൑ ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻ௥క
ሺ൅∞, ݎሻ	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൐ ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻ௥క
ቑ , where ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ൅∞  denotes that the seller 
refuses to accept the clause; 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
 
Lemma 4.5 shows that the seller’s optimal direct sales price is setting the prices equal 
to ݎ, which is the reservation value for the consumers. Whether the seller refuses to use 
the platform in the equilibrium depends on whether the commission is higher than a 
certain threshold. 
If the commission is lower than the threshold, the seller uses the platform and set the 
platform price equal to the direct sales price. It is also shown that the seller uses the 
platform even if the commission is higher than the optimal prices for the seller, which 
follows that the margin that the seller obtains from sales through the platform is 
negative (݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ ൏ 0). This is because the seller can attract the active consumers who 
are initially only aware of the platform to purchase through the direct sales channel. 
The seller cannot sell to those customers unless it uses the platform. Note that the 
condition that the threshold value is larger than ݎ is ߣ஺ ൐ ߙߣଵ/ሺߙ െ ߣଵሻ.  
4.4.2.3 Platform’s Behaviour Regarding Commission and Investment 
Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5 imply that the expected revenue that the platform obtains from 
the transaction on it can be written as follows 
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ܴ஺ ൌ ቐ
ߦ ஺݂	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൑ ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻ௥క
0	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൐ ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻ௥క
ቑ. 
This implies that the optimal commission for the platform is setting ஺݂ equal to ߣ஺ሺ1 െ
ߣଵሻݎ/	ߦ. The total expected profit taking the investment into account is given by 
ߎ஺ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻݎ݃ሺܫ஺ሻ െ ܫ஺. 
 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem directly yields the optimal commission and 
investment set by the platform, given the seller and consumers’ response, as 
summarised in Lemma 4.6. 
 
Lemma 4.6. Anticipating the seller and consumers’ response specified in Lemmata 4.4 
and 4.5, the platform chooses the optimal investment level ܫ஺∗ such that 
݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺∗ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ଵሺଵିఒభሻ	௥	 and sets the optimal commission ஺݂
∗  such that ஺݂∗ ൌ
ሺఒಲ∗ାఒభିఒಲ∗ఒభሻ௥
ሺଵି଴.ହఈሻఒಲ∗ା଴.ହఈఒభି଴.ହఒಲ∗ఒభ, where ߣ஺
∗ ≡ ݃ሺ	ܫ஺∗ሻ, where ߣ஺∗ ≡ ݃ሺ	ܫ஺∗ሻ . 
  
From Lemmata 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, Proposition 4.2 can be obtained directly. 
 
4.4.2.4 Effect on Consumer Welfare and Sellers’ Profits of Allowing 
Price Parity Clause 
Taking the results of the analysis above, this section analyses the effect of introducing 
the platform price parity clause on the welfare for each player. Comparison between 
the equilibrium sellers’ prices and the number of the consumers who are aware of the 
platforms summarised in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 yields the Proposition 4.3. 
 
Proposition 4.3. If the platform is allowed to offer a price parity clause, in the unique 
equilibrium, the consumer welfare always improves compared to the unique 
equilibrium where the clause is not allowed and the profit of seller always decreases.  
 
Proposition 4.3 shows that allowing the price parity clause increases consumer welfare. 
The price parity clause increases the investment, which affords more opportunities to 
be aware of the product for consumers. Although it increases the equilibrium direct 
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sales price, the effect of the increase on consumer welfare is negligible because it is just 
a slight increase.   
On the other hand, the price parity clause decreases the profit of the seller. While the 
clause improves the consumer awareness of the product due to the increase in the 
investment, this positive effect on the profit of the seller is surpassed by the negative 
effect caused by the increase of the commission imposed by the platform, which is 
higher than the equilibrium price. 
This result is in common with Wang and Wright (2016) in the sense that the price parity 
clause enables the platform to set a higher commission. However, while in this model 
the price parity clause increases the consumer welfare, in their model the clause 
decreases consumer surplus without competition between platforms. This is because 
their model takes into account the possibility that the more and more consumers are 
aware of the product through the investment by the platform. 
In this model, the clause increases the commission because the effect of the possibility 
that the seller decides not to use the platform is not strong enough to limit the ability of 
the platform to set a high commission. On the other hand, the consumer welfare is 
always improved because the positive effect of increasing awareness of the product is 
much larger than the negative effect thorough the higher price due to the higher 
commission, which is negligibly small. 
4.5. Positive Transportation Cost Case 
This section analyses the case in which the transportation cost is assumed to be positive 
(߬ ∈ ሺ0, ݎ)), which means that the utility to purchase the product is different between 
consumers. This assumption also implies that when the consumers purchase the product 
in the equilibrium, non-full-coverage price may be adopted as an equilibrium platform 
price. 
Like in the previous section, Section 5.1 of this chapter analyses the case where a price 
parity clause are not allowed. Then, Section 5.2 analyses what happens when the clause 
is allowed and the effect on welfare of allowing the clause.   
4.5.1 No Possibility of Price Parity Clause 
This section analyses the case in which the platform is not allowed to introduce a price 
parity clause. 
Analysis of this model provides the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4.4. Suppose the platform is not allowed to introduce a price parity clause; 
there always exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the platform chooses the 
investment level ܫ஺∗ such that 
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݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺∗ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ቐ
ଵ
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఒభሻ	ሺ௥ିଶఛሻ 	݂݅	ݎ ൒ 4߬	
଼ఛ
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఒభሻ	௥మ 	݂݅	ݎ ൏ 4߬
ቑ and sets the commission ஺݂∗  and the 
sellers’ prices ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ	such that  
ሺ ஺݂∗, ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ ൌ ቊ
ሺݎ െ 2߬, ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ	݂݅	ݎ ൒ 4߬
ቀ௥ଶ ,
ଷ௥
ସ , ݎ െ ߬ቁ 	݂݅	2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬
ቋ. 
 
Proposition 4.4 shows that like the zero transportation cost case, the seller may set the 
maximum full-coverage price for the platform and set the direct sales price slightly 
lower than the direct sales price in the equilibrium. However, such situation does not 
always happen in the positive transportation cost case. There are two patterns of 
equilibrium depending on whether ݎ ൒ 4߬	holds. The shape of the optimal investment 
differs depending on whether ݎ ൒ 4߬	holds or not, because when ݎ is high compared to 
߬, the marginal profit of the platform from the investment is high, which leads the higher 
investment level in the equilibrium. In any case, the investment level in the equilibrium 
depends on the values of ݎ, ߬, ߙ  and ߣଵ . According to the proposition, the optimal 
investment level rises when the reservation value for the consumer whose taste is 
closest to the seller’s product (ݎ) becomes larger or the degree of the reduction of the 
reservation value caused by the difference in taste (or the transportation cost (߬)) 
becomes smaller.  
Moreover, the optimal investment level lowers as the proportion of active consumers 
(ߙ) or the proportion of the consumers who are initially aware of the seller (ߣଵ) grows. 
This relationship occurs because when ߙ  or ߣଵ  becomes larger, more and more 
consumers purchase the product from the direct sales channel rather than through the 
platform, decreasing the marginal profit of the platform from the investment. This chain 
of events implies that the existence of direct sales decreases the platform’s profitability. 
In this sense, it is possible to say that the free riding by the seller happens due to the 
existence of the direct sales. 
With respect to the commission of the platform, if ݎ ൒ 4߬	 holds, like the zero 
transportation cost case, the platform sets the commission low enough to guarantee that 
the equilibrium prices are low enough that all the consumers who are aware of the 
product will purchase the product (i.e., “full-coverage price”). In this situation, the 
seller sets the price on the platform at the maximum full-coverage price, ݎ െ ߬ and sets 
the direct sales price just below the platform price. 
If ݎ ൏ 4߬	holds, the platform sets a higher commission in the equilibrium, which 
follows that the seller sets the equilibrium platform price so high that some consumers 
whose taste is at a distance from the seller’s product will not purchase the product, even 
if they have the information on it (i.e., “non-full-coverage price”), which does not 
happen in the zero transportation cost case. On the other hand, the seller sets the 
maximum full-coverage price for its direct sales channel.  
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This implies that regardless of whether ݎ ൒ 4߬	holds, the seller sets the direct sales 
price lower than the price on the platform in order to avoid paying the commission to 
the platform as much as possible. Moreover, while ߙ  and ߣଵ  affects the optimal 
investment level, the optimal platform’s commission prices do not depend on ߙ and ߣଵ. 
The proposition also implies that in the equilibrium, the margin that the seller obtains 
from each consumer purchasing through the platform (݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ ) is ߬ if ݎ ൒ 4߬ and 
0.25ݎ if ݎ ൏ 4߬. Hence, the margin that the platform obtains from each transaction is 
larger than the margin for the seller. Moreover, the result that the seller can obtain a 
substantial margin from the sales on the platform is the other notable difference from 
the zero transportation cost case where the profit of the seller from the sales on the 
platform is almost zero. 
4.5.1.1 Consumers’ Behaviour 
As shown in Table 4.1, eight types of consumers exist, depending on whether they 
initially know about the platform, initially know about the seller and are active 
consumers. The seller’s optimal pricing is to maximise the sum of the profits from each 
type of consumer. The consumers’ behaviour given the seller’s prices are summarised 
in Lemma 4.7. 
 
Lemma 4.7. The demand for the seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ, ݍଵ௠∗, 
where ݊ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ and ݉ ് ݊, given ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽, ஺݂, and ܫ஺, can be written as follows: 
 
݅ሻ When ݌ଵ௠ ൏ ݌ଵ௡, 
ݍଵ௠∗ ൌ ቐ
ߣ௠ ൅ ߙߣ௡ െ ߙߣ௠ߣ௡	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
ሺఒ೘ାఈఒ೙ିఈఒ೘ఒ೙ሻሺ௥ି	௣భ೘ሻ
ఛ 	݂݅	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ
0	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ
ቑ . 
 
݅݅ሻ When ݌ଵ௠ ൌ ݌ଵ௡, 
ݍଵ௠∗ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1 െ 0.5ߙሻߣ௠ ൅ 0.5ߙߣ௡ െ 0.5ߣ௠ߣ௡	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
ሾሺଵି଴.ହఈሻఒ೘ା଴.ହఈఒ೙ି଴.ହఒ೘ఒ೙ሿሺ௥ି	௣భ೘ሻ
ఛ 	݂݅	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ
0	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ
ቑ. 
 
ii݅ሻ When ݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݌ଵ௡, 
ݍଵ௠∗ ൌ ቐ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ௠ሺ1 െ ߣ௡ሻ	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
ሺଵିఈሻఒ೘ሺଵିఒ೙ሻሺ௥ି	௣భ೘ሻ
ఛ 	݂݅	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ
0	݂݅	݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ
ቑ. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
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Lemma 4.7 shows that no consumers purchase the product through Sales channel ݉ if 
the price sold on the platform is too high (݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ) and that the demand is elastic if the 
price is below the threshold but not too low (ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ). Moreover, if the price 
is weakly lower than the reservation value for the consumer whose taste is the most 
distant from the product (݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ െ ߬), all consumers who are aware of the product 
sold on Sales channel ݉ purchase the product through one of the two sales channel.  
 
Lemma 4.7 also shows that the demand depends on whether the price on one sales 
channel is larger than that of the other sales channel. This dependence arises because 
while the share of ߣ௠ሺ1 െ ߣ௡ሻ consumers is aware of the product sold only on the sales 
channel ݉ (i.e., they are “captive consumers”), the share of ߣ௠ߣ௡ consumers is aware 
of the product sold on both sales channels (i.e., they are “non-captive consumers”). If 
the price on one sales channel is cheaper than the price on the other sales channel, all 
the non-captive consumers purchase the product. If the price on the two sales channel 
is the same, half of the non-captive consumers purchase on one platform. 
4.5.1.2 Seller’s Behaviour 
Lemma 4.7 shows that the quantity that the consumers purchase from the seller depends 
on the price. If the lowest price that consumers are aware of is equal to or lower than 
ݎ െ 	߬ (i.e., full-coverage price), the consumers purchase the product through a sales 
channel offering the lowest price they know. However, if the lowest price that 
consumers are aware of is higher than ݎ െ 	߬  (i.e., non-full-coverage price), some 
consumers whose location is far from the seller on the Hotelling line32 do not purchase 
any product.  
Recall ߥ ≡ ߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺ߣଵ and 
ߦ ൌ ሺ1 െ 0.5ߙሻߣ஺ ൅ 0.5ߙߣଵ െ 0.5ߣ஺ߣଵ, 
where ߥ is the number of consumers who are aware of the product sold on the platform 
or the product sold on the direct sales channel; ߦ is the number of consumers who 
purchase the product on the platform when ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽  holds and the prices are low 
enough to cover all the consumers (݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬). 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem for the seller provides the optimal seller's 
behaviours given the consumers’ response, summarised in Lemma 4.8. 
Lemma 4.8. Anticipating the consumers’ response specified in Lemma 4.7, given ஺݂ 
and ܫ஺, the optimal pricing policy for the seller ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ is   
                                                            
32 In particular, consumers ݔ ∈ ሺሺݎ െ ݌ଵ௠ሻ/߬, 1ሿ will not purchase the product, where ݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ and ݌ଵ௠ is the lowest price as far as consumer ݔ is aware. 
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ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ ൌ ൞
ሺݎ ൅ ܾ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ݂݅	 ஺݂ ൒ ݎ
ቀ௥ା௙ಲଶ , ݎ െ ߬ቁ ݂݅	ݎ െ 2߬ ൏ ஺݂ ൏ ݎ,
ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ݂݅	 ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬ ൏ ݎ
ൢ	 , where ܾ  is any positive 
amount and ߝ is a small positive amount. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C  
 
This lemma shows that regardless of the values of ஺݂, ݎ and ߬, the seller sets the prices 
such that ݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݌ଵ஽. If the commission is equal to or higher than the willingness to pay 
of the consumer whose location is the closest to the seller, ݎ, the seller sets the direct 
sales price equal to the maximum full-coverage price (ݎ െ ߬) and sets the platform price 
high enough to guarantee that no consumer purchase on the platform, because it incurs 
the loss from the sales on it.  
When the commission is equal to or lower than the reservation value for the consumers 
( ஺݂ ൑ ݎ), the seller sets the platform price equal to ݎ and sets the direct sales price a 
little less than the platform price in order to avoid paying the commission to the 
platform as much as possible. Note that in any case, the price that the consumers 
purchase the product is almost equal to their reservation value, which follows that the 
consumer surplus is almost equal to zero. 
If the commission is lower than the threshold but higher than a certain threshold (ݎ െ
2߬ ൏ ஺݂ ൏ ݎ), the seller sets the non-full coverage price on the platform and set the 
maximum full-coverage price for its direct sales. If the commission offered by the 
platform is weakly lower than the certain threshold ( ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬), the seller will set its 
price for the product sold on the platform at the maximum full-coverage price and set 
the direct sales price a little less than the platform price. 
4.5.1.3 Platform’s Behaviour Regarding Commission and Investment 
Lemmata 4.7 and 4.8 imply that the expected revenue that the platform obtains from 
the transaction on it can be written as 
ܴ஺ ൌ ൞
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ஺݂	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ቀ௥ି௙ಲଶఛ ቁ ஺݂	݂݅	ݎ െ 2߬ ൏ ஺݂ ൏ ݎ
0	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൒ ݎ
ൢ , and the total expected 
profit taking the investment into account is given by ߎ஺ ൌ ܴ஺ ൬݃ ቀܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ൰ െ ܫ஺. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem yields the optimal commission and 
investment set by the platform, given the seller and consumers’ response, as 
summarised in Lemma 4.9. 
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Lemma 4.9. Anticipating the seller and consumers’ response specified in Lemmata 4.1 
and 4.2, the platform chooses the optimal investment level ܫ஺∗ such that 
݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺∗ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ቐ
ଵ
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఒభሻ	ሺ௥ିଶఛሻ 	݂݅	ݎ ൒ 4߬	
଼ఛ
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఒభሻ	௥మ 	݂݅	ݎ ൏ 4߬
ቑ	and sets the optimal commission ஺݂∗ 
such that  
஺݂∗ ൌ ቊ
	ݎ െ 2߬	݂݅	ݎ ൒ 4߬	
௥
ଶ 	݂݅	ݎ ൏ 4߬
ቋ . 
   
Proof: See Appendix C 
 
Lemma 4.9 shows two types of equilibrium depending on whether ݎ is weakly larger 
than 4߬  or not. If ݎ  surpasses the threshold, the platform sets its commission low 
enough to ensure that the seller sets the full-coverage price. If ݎ  is lower than the 
threshold, the platform sets its commission high enough to guarantee that the seller sets 
the non-full coverage price. In both cases, the optimal investment level becomes higher 
when ݎ gets higher or ߬,	ߙ or ߣଵ gets lower.  
From Lemma 4.7 to 4.9, Proposition 4.4 can be obtained directly. 
4.5.2 Allowing Price Parity Clause 
This section considers the case in which the platform is allowed to impose the price 
parity clause such that the seller’s prices must satisfy ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݌ଵ஽ and the seller cannot 
use the platform unless it accepts the offer including this restriction. 
When the platform offers a price parity clause, the platform has two options regarding 
its commission. The first option is to set a commission low enough to guarantee that 
the seller will react to set a price such that all the consumers know the product will be 
covered (hereafter, “full-coverage commission”). The second option is setting a 
commission high enough to let the seller set a price such that certain consumers are not 
covered (hereafter, “non-full-coverage commission”). 
Since the complexity of the equilibrium in the case where a price parity clause is 
allowed, as discussed below, it will be useful to define the following: 
݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ଵሺ	௥ିଶఛሻሺଵିఒభሻ, ߣ஺෢ ≡ ݃ ቀ	ܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ , ஺݂෡ ≡
ሾሺଵିఒభሻఒಲ෢ାఒభሿሺ௥ିଶఛሻ
ሺଵି଴.ହఈି଴.ହఒభሻఒಲ෢ା଴.ହఈఒభ,  
݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺෩ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ଵሺ	௥ିఛሻሺଵିఒభሻ, ߣ஺෪ ≡ ݃ ቀܫ஺෩ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ , ஺݂෩ ≡
ሺଵିఒభሻఒಲ෪ሺ௥ିఛሻ
ሺଵି଴.ହఈି଴.ହఒభሻఒಲ෪ା଴.ହఈఒభ, 
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ߣ஺തതത ≡ ఒభሺ௥ିଶఛሻሺଵିఒభሻఛ ൌ ݃ ቀܫ஺ഥ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ,	 ஺݂ഥ ൌ
ఒభሺ௥ିఛሻሺ௥ିଶఛሻ
ሾሺଵି଴.ହఈି଴.ହఒభሻ௥ିሺଶିଵ.ହఈିఒభା଴.ହఈఒభሻఛሿఛ,	 
݃ᇱ ቀ	ܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ଼ఛሺଵିఒభሻ௥మ, ߣ஺ሖ ≡ ݃ ቀ	ܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ, ஺݂ሖ ≡
ሾሺଵିఒభሻఒಲሖ ାఒభሿ௥
ଶሺଵି଴.ହఈି଴.ହఒభሻఒಲሖ ାఈఒభ, 
ߎ஺෢ ≡ ሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ, ߎ஺തതതത ≡ ఒభሺ௥ିఛሻሺ௥ିଶఛሻఛ െ ܫ஺ഥ , and 
ߎ஺ሖ ≡ ௥
మ
଼ఛ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ ܫ஺ሖ . 
 
The terms with the “hat” (e.g., ஺݂෡ ) refer to the optimal values, if the platform sets the 
maximum commission, that satisfy the condition for the commission to be full-coverage 
commission,33 and the seller does not have an option to refuse the price parity clause.   
The terms with the “tilde” (e.g., ஺݂෩ ) refer to the optimal values, if the platform sets the 
maximum full-coverage commission, that satisfy the condition for the commission to 
ensure that the seller accepts using the platform under the price parity clause.34 
The terms with the “bar” (e.g., ஺݂ഥ ) refer to the optimal values when the condition for the 
commission to be a full-coverage commission is equivalent to the condition for the 
commission to ensure that the seller accepts use of the platform offering the full-
coverage commission under the price parity clause.35 
The terms with the “acute” (e.g., ஺݂ሖ ) refer to the optimal values, if the platform sets the 
commission, that maximise the platform’s profit when the platform decides to offer 
non-full coverage commission if the seller does not have an option to refuse the price 
parity clause.36  
Note that when 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬ holds, ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ ൏ ߣ஺෪ and ܫ஺෡ ൏ 	 ܫ஺ሖ ൏ ܫ஺෩  hold. 
Analysis of this model provides the following proposition, to be proved in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
Proposition 4.5. Suppose the platform is allowed to introduce a price parity clause; 
there is a unique equilibrium in which the platform introduces a price parity clause.  
ܽሻ	When ݎ ൒ 4߬, the set of the platform’s investment level ܫ஺∗ and commission ஺݂∗ and 
the sellers’ prices ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ	in this equilibrium is 
                                                            
33 As discussed later, the condition for the commission to be a full-coverage commission is ஺݂ ൑ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ. 
34 As discussed later, the condition for the commission to ensure that the seller accepts use of the 
platform under the price parity clause is ஺݂ ൑ ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ/ߦ. 
35 This situation happens if ఔሺ௥ିଶఛሻక ൌ
ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
క ↔ ߣ஺ ൌ
ఒభሺ௥ିଶఛሻ
ሺଵିఒభሻఛ ൌ ߣ஺തതത. 
36 As discussed later, the profit is the a concave quadratic function on	 ஺݂, which is maximised when 
஺݂ ൌ ఔ௥ଶక.   
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ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗, ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ ൌ ൞
൫ܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯	݂݅	ߣ஺തതത ൒ ߣ஺෪
൫ܫ஺ഥ, ஺݂ഥ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯	݂݅	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪
൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯	݂݅	ߣ஺തതത ൑ ߣ஺෢
ൢ. 
When 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬, the set of the platform’s investment level ܫ஺∗ and commission ஺݂∗ 
and the sellers’ prices ሺ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ in this equilibrium is 
ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗, ݌ଵ஺∗, ݌ଵ஽∗ሻ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ൫ܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯	݂݅	ߣ஺ሖ ൏ ߣ஺෪ ൑ ߣ஺തതത൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯	݂݅	ܽሻ	ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪	݋ݎ	݂݅	ܾሻ	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺തതതത
	൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯	݂݅	ߣ஺തതത ൑ 	ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺෢
ቀܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ , ଷସ ݎ,
ଷ
ସ ݎቁ 	݂݅	ܽሻ	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺തതതത	݋ݎ
																											݂݅	ܾሻ	ߣ஺തതത ൑ 	 ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺෢ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
. 
 
ܾሻ The amount of the investment may decrease compared to when the price parity 
clause if ݎ ൏ 4߬, ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺തതതത  hold or if ݎ ൏ 4߬, ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	 ߣ஺෢ ൏
	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺෢  hold. Otherwise, the amount of investment always increases. 
 
Briefly explained, Proposition 4.5 shows that when the ratio of ݎ to ߬ is high (ݎ ൒ 4߬), 
the full-coverage equilibrium always occurs. However, when the ratio of ݎ to ߬ is low 
(2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬ ), not only full-coverage equilibrium but also the non-full-coverage 
equilibrium can occur, and the result depends on which type equilibrium is more 
profitable for the platform. Moreover, when the ratio of ݎ to ߬ is low and the full-
coverage equilibrium happens, the amount of the investment may be smaller than the 
non-price parity clause case. This is because in those situations, the platform choose to 
set a higher commission rather than making larger investment than the non-price parity 
clause case. 
  
Specifically, Proposition 4.5 shows that when the price parity clause is introduced and 
the ratio of ݎ to ߬ is weakly higher than a certain threshold (ݎ ൒ 4߬), there are three 
types of the equilibrium. In any case, the seller accepts use of the platform and set both 
the price on the platform and the direct sales price at the maximum full-coverage price, 
ݎ െ ߬. It follows that the equilibrium seller’s prices are almost equal to the equilibrium 
prices when the price parity clause is not allowed. The difference is that the direct sales 
price is slightly higher than that of the non-price parity clause case, because the price 
parity clause prohibits the seller from undercutting the direct sales price to avoid paying 
the commission. 
Among the three types, the platform can set the high commission without being 
constrained by the possibility that the seller does not use the platform only when the 
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optimal ߣ஺, if the seller does not have an option to refuse the price parity clause, is 
lower than a certain threshold (i.e., ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത). Note that this case is likely to happen 
when	߬ is close to zero. The result also shows that allowing the clause just causes a 
negligible increase in the direct sales price but increases the amount of investment, 
which follows the more consumers are aware of the product. In other two types of 
equilibrium, ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ ൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ൯	and	ሺܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ሻ, the possibility that the seller does not use 
the platform constrains the platform’s ability to set high commissions. In those 
situations, the platform makes a larger investment than the most efficient investment 
level if the seller does not have an option to refuse the price parity clause instead of 
setting a high commission. If ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ 	 ሺܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ሻ, the equilibrium commission can be 
smaller than when the price parity clause is not allowed. Otherwise, the equilibrium 
commission is higher than when the clause is not allowed. 
In any of the three types, the investment level is weakly higher than when the price 
parity clause is not allowed. The equilibrium investment remains the same only if both 
ߙ ൌ 0  and ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ ൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ൯  hold, since ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ 1/ሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ൑ 1/
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ൌ ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺∗ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ holds. Recall that in this situation, ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺෪ 
and ܫ஺෡ ൏ 	 ܫ஺෩  hold and ൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ൯ becomes an equilibrium only if ܫ஺෡ ൏ ܫ஺ഥ ൏ 	 ܫ஺෩  holds.  
 
If the ratio of ݎ to ߬ is lower than a certain threshold but not too low (2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬), the 
full-coverage equilibrium and the non-full-coverage equilibrium can both occur. 
Whether the full-coverage equilibrium happens or not is determined by which type of 
equilibrium is more profitable for the platform. When the platform prefers the full-
coverage equilibrium, there are three types of equilibrium, all the same as in the case in 
which ݎ ൒ 4߬ holds. It follows that in this situation, the platform can set the highest 
possible full-coverage commission (i.e., ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ ൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ൯ ) without being 
constrained by the possibility that the seller does not use the platform only if ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത 
holds and the profit is higher than the profit when the platform prefers the non-full 
coverage equilibrium. 
When the platform prefers the non-full-coverage equilibrium, there is only one type of 
equilibrium in which the seller sets both the price on the platform (i.e., ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ
൫ܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ ൯) and the direct sales price at 3ݎ/4.  
Note that the equilibrium seller’s price when the platform prefers the full-coverage 
equilibrium is equal to the equilibrium seller’s direct sales price when the price parity 
clause is not allowed. The equilibrium seller’s price when the platform prefers the non-
full-coverage equilibrium is equal to the equilibrium seller’s platform price when the 
price parity clause is not allowed. It follows that allowing the price parity clause 
decreases the equilibrium seller’s platform price when the platform prefers the full-
coverage equilibrium. When the platform prefers the non-full-coverage equilibrium, 
allowing the price parity clause increases the equilibrium seller’s direct sales price. 
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With respect to the effect on investment level of allowing the price parity clause, when 
the platform prefers the non-full-coverage equilibrium, the investment level is always 
weakly higher than when the price parity clause is not allowed, because ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ
8߬/ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻݎଶ ൑ 8߬/ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻݎଶ ൌ ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺∗ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ  holds. When the platform 
prefers the full-coverage equilibrium such that ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ ሺܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ሻ , the investment 
level is also always weakly higher than when the price parity clause is not allowed, 
since ܫ஺෡ ൏ 	 ܫ஺ሖ ൏ ܫ஺෩  holds. However, when the platform prefers the full-coverage 
equilibrium such that ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ ൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ൯  or ൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ൯ , the investment level can be 
smaller than when the price parity clause is not allowed, because in this situation the 
platform chooses to get the profit by setting the higher commission.  
Moreover, with respect to the effect on the equilibrium commission of allowing the 
price parity clause, if the non-full-coverage equilibrium arises, the equilibrium 
commission is always higher than when the clause is not allowed. On the other hand, if 
the full-coverage equilibrium happens, the commission can be larger or smaller than 
the equilibrium commission when the clause is allowed, because in this type of 
equilibrium, the platform prefers to gain profit from the larger volume of transactions 
rather than a high commission. 
Proposition 4.5 also shows that allowing the price parity clause weakly increases the 
investment level except for the certain special situations which can arise when 2߬ ൑
ݎ ൏ 4߬ holds and the platform prefers the full-coverage equilibrium to the non-full-
coverage equilibrium. The optimal amount of the investment does not change with the 
introduction of the clause when ߙ ൌ 0, and the gap of the investment in the two cases 
becomes larger as ߙ  increases. Moreover, the introduction of the clause weakly 
decreases the price on the platform and weakly increases the direct sales price. 
The effect of allowing a price parity clause on the equilibrium investment level, 
commission and prices can be summarised in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2 Effect of allowing a price parity clause on the equilibrium investment level, 
commission and prices  
݅ሻ	ݎ ൒ 4߬ 
Case Equilibrium when price parity 
clause is allowed 
ܫ஺ ஺݂ ݌ଵ஺ ݌ଵ஽
ߣ஺෪ ൒ ߣ஺തതത  ൫ܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯ + +/- 0 +*
ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪  ൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯ + + 0 +*
ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത  ൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯ + + 0 +*
ߣ஺തതത: ߣ஺  that the condition for the full-coverage commission ( ஺݂ ൑ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ) is equivalent to the 
condition for the seller's acceptance of the price parity clause ( ஺݂ ൑ ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ/ߦ). 
ߣ஺෪: The optimal ߣ஺ when the condition for the commission to ensure that the seller accepts the price 
parity clause and set the full coverage price is binding. 
ߣ஺෢: The optimal ߣ஺ when the seller does not have an option to refuse the price parity clause. 
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+: Allowing price parity clause increases the equilibrium value 
-: Allowing price parity clause decreases the equilibrium value 
+/-: Allowing price parity clause can increase or decrease the equilibrium value 
0: Allowing price parity clause does not change the equilibrium value 
+*: Allowing price parity clause only slightly increases the direct sales price 
 
݅݅ሻ	2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬ 
Case Equilibrium when price parity 
clause is allowed 
ܫ஺ ஺݂ ݌ଵ஺ ݌ଵ஽
ߣ஺ሖ ൏ ߣ஺෪ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൫ܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯ + +/- - 0 
ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪ ൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯ + +/- - 0 
ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀ ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺തതതത ൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯ +/- +/- - 0 
ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺෢  ൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ , ݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬൯ +/- +/- - 0 
ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀ ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺തതതത ൬ܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ , 34 ݎ,
3
4 ݎ൰ 
+ + 0 + 
ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺෢  ൬ܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ , 34 ݎ,
3
4 ݎ൰ 
+ + 0 + 
 
ߣ஺ሖ : The optimal ߣ஺  if the platform sets the non-full-coverage commission. 
 
4.5.2.1 Consumers’ Behaviour 
Since the introduction of the price parity clause does not constrain the consumers’ 
behaviours, the consumers’ response is given by Lemma 4.7. Hence, the consumers’ 
behaviours given the seller’s prices are summarised in Lemma 4.10. 
 
Lemma 4.10. The demand for the seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ, 
ݍଵ௠∗, where ݊ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ and ݉ ് ݊, given ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽, ஺݂ and ܫ஺, is same as the demand in 
the case where a price parity clause is not allowed, as specified in Lemma 4.7. 
4.5.2.2 Seller’s Behaviour 
In this case, the seller has two options. The first option is to accept the price parity 
clause imposed by the platform and set the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݌ଵ஽. The second 
option for the seller is to refuse the offer by the platform and to concentrate instead on 
direct sales.  
 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem for the seller gives the optimal seller's 
behaviours given the consumers’ response, as summarised in Lemma 4.11. 
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Lemma 4.11. Anticipating the consumers’ response, as specified in Lemma 4.4, given 
஺݂ and ܫ஺, the optimal pricing policy for the seller is as follows:  
ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ሻ	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൑ ݉݅݊ ቂఔక ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ,
ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
క ቃ	
ቀ௥ଶ ൅
క௙ಲ
ଶఔ ,
௥
ଶ ൅
క௙ಲ
ଶఔ ቁ 	݂݅	
ఔ
క ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ ൏ ஺݂ ൑
ఔ
క ൜ݎ െ 2 ቂ
ఛఒభሺ௥ିఛሻ
ఔ ቃ
଴.ହൠ
ሺ൅∞, ݎ െ ߬ሻ	݂݅	 ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻక ൏ ஺݂ ൑
ఔ
క ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ	݋ݎ
݂݅	 ஺݂ ൐ ݉ܽݔ ൤ఔక ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ,
ఔ
క ൜ݎ െ 2 ቂ
ఛఒభሺ௥ିఛሻ
ఔ ቃ
଴.ହൠ൨ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
,	 
where ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ൅∞ denotes that the seller refuses to accept the clause. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
 
Lemma 4.11 shows that when the seller accept the price parity clause, the seller prefers  
to set the maximum full-coverage price (ݎ െ ߬) for both the platform price and the direct 
sales price if the commission is equal to or lower than a certain threshold (i.e. ஺݂ ൑
ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ). In this situation, the seller does accept the price parity clause and set the 
full-coverage price if the commission is low enough to guarantee that the expected 
profit is weakly larger than the profit when the seller refuses the clause and sets the 
maximum full-coverage price (i.e. ஺݂ ൑ ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ/ߦ). 
When ஺݂ ൐ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ holds, the expected profit for accepting the price parity clause 
with setting the non-full-coverage price is higher than the expected profit for accepting 
the clause with setting the full-coverage price. In this situation, the seller does accept 
the price parity clause and set the non-full-coverage price if the commission is low 
enough to guarantee that the expected profit is weakly larger than the profit when the 
seller refuses the clause and sets the maximum full-coverage price. Note that, the non-
full-coverage price in equilibrium is lower than the non-full-coverage price on the 
platform in the previous case (݌ଵ஺ ൌ ௥ା௙ಲଶ ).  
4.5.2.3 Platform’s Behaviour Regarding Commission and Investment 
Lemmata 4.10 and 4.11 imply that the expected revenue that the platform obtains from 
the transaction on it can be written as follows: 
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ܴ஺ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
ۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۖ
ۓ ߦ ஺݂	݂݅	 ஺݂ ൑ min ቂఔక ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ,
ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
క ቃ	
ߦ ቆ௥ି
഍೑ಲ
ഌ
ଶఛ ቇ ஺݂	݂݅	
ఔ
క ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ ൏ ஺݂ ൑
ఔ
క ൜ݎ െ 2 ቂ
ఛఒభሺ௥ିఛሻ
ఔ ቃ
଴.ହൠ
0	݂݅	 ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻక ൏ ஺݂ ൑
ఔ
క ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ	or
݂݅	 ஺݂ ൐ max ൤ఔక ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ,
ఔ
క ൜ݎ െ 2 ቂ
ఛఒభሺ௥ିఛሻ
ఔ ቃ
଴.ହൠ൨ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۖ
ۗ
. 
 
The total expected profit taking the investment into account is given by 
ߎ஺ ൌ ܴ஺൫݃ሺܫ஺ሻ൯ െ ܫ஺. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem gives the optimal commission and 
investment set by the platform given the seller and consumers’ response, which are 
summarised in Lemma 4.12 below. 
 
Lemma 4.12. Anticipating the seller and consumers’ response specified in Lemmata 
4.10 and 4.11, the platform chooses the optimal investment level ܫ஺∗ and the optimal 
commission ஺݂∗ as follows. 
1) Where ݎ ൒ 4߬, the set of the platform’s investment and commission and the sellers’ 
prices is 
ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ ൞
൫ܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ൯	݂݅	ߣ஺തതത ൒ ߣ஺෪
൫ܫ஺ഥ, ஺݂ഥ ൯	݂݅	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪
൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ൯	݂݅	ߣ஺തതത ൑ ߣ஺෢
ൢ. 
Where 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬, the set of the platform’s investment and commission and the 
sellers’ prices is 
ሺܫ஺∗, ஺݂∗ሻ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ൫ܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ൯	݂݅	ߣ஺ሖ ൏ ߣ஺෪ ൑ ߣ஺തതത൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ൯	݂݅	ܽሻ	ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪	݋ݎ	݂݅	ܾሻ	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺തതതത
	൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ൯	݂݅	ߣ஺തതത ൑ 	ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺෢
൫ܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ ൯	݂݅	ܽሻ	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺തതതത	݋ݎ
											݂݅	ܾሻ	ߣ஺തതത ൑ 	 ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺෢ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
. 
2) The amount of the investment may decrease compared to when the price parity 
clause is not allowed if 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬, ߣ஺ሖ ൐ ߣ஺തതത	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺തതതത hold. Otherwise, the 
amount of investment always increases. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
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From Lemmata 4.10 to 4.12, Proposition 4.5 can be obtained directly. 
4.5.2.4 Effect on Consumer Welfare of Allowing Price Parity Clause 
Taking the results of the analysis above, this section analyses the effect of introducing 
the platform price parity clause on the welfare for each player.  
Analysis on this model provides the following proposition, as proven in the following 
section. 
 
Proposition 4.6. Allowing a price parity clause improves the consumer welfare except 
for the following cases; 
ܽሻ	ݎ ൒ 4߬, ߙ ൌ 0 and ߣ஺തതത ൑ ߣ஺෢, 
b) 2߬ ൑ 	ݎ ൏ 4߬,	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	, ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺തതതത and ߣ஺തതത ൑ ቂߙ ൅	 ሺଵିఈሻ௥
మ
ଵ଺ఛమ ቃ ߣ஺∗, 
c) 2߬ ൑ 	ݎ ൏ 4߬,	ߣ஺തതത ൑ 	 ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺,ሖ ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺෢  and ߣ஺෢ ൑ ቂߙ ൅	ሺଵିఈሻ௥
మ
ଵ଺ఛమ ቃ ߣ஺∗, 
d) 2߬ ൑ 	ݎ ൏ 4߬, ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪,ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺തതതത and ߣ஺ሖ ൑ 	 ൣఒభାఈఒಲ
∗ሺଵିఒభሻ൧൫ଵ଺ఛమି௥మ൯
ሺଵିఒభሻ௥మ ൅ ߣ஺
∗	and 
e) 2߬ ൑ 	ݎ ൏ 4߬,	ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	 ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺ሖ , ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺෢  and ߣ஺ሖ ൑ 	 ൣఒభାఈఒಲ
∗ሺଵିఒభሻ൧൫ଵ଺ఛమି௥మ൯
ሺଵିఒభሻ௥మ ൅ ߣ஺
∗. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
 
Proposition 4.6 shows that allowing the price parity clause can improve or harm 
consumer welfare in contrast to the case where the utility to purchase the product is 
same for all consumers (zero transportation cost), in which the clause simply improves 
the consumer welfare and decreases the profit of the seller. The clause can do either 
because it can have both two positive effects and a negative effect on consumer welfare. 
The increase of investment by the introduction of the clause has a positive effect on the 
consumer surplus by creating more opportunities to be aware of the product (consumer 
awareness effect). Moreover, the decrease of the seller’s platform price also has a 
positive effect (platform price effect). On the other hand, the consumer surplus from 
the rise of the direct sales price through the introduction of the clause increases after 
the introduction of the clause (direct sales price effect), having a negative effect on the 
consumer surplus. This negative direct sales price effect may exceed the positive effect, 
consumer awareness effect and platform price effect. 
In the zero transportation cost case, there is no platform price effect and negligibly 
small direct sales effect. On the other hand, there is a substantial consumer awareness 
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effect. Hence, in this case, the price parity clause always improve the consumer welfare. 
However, in the positive transportation cost case, the total effect is ambiguous.  
According to Proposition 4.6, if ݎ ൒ 4߬ (which is equivalent to case ݅ሻ	in Table 4.2), 
the introduction of the price parity clause harms consumer welfare only on the 
extremely limited occasion that the investment does not change with the introduction 
of the clause. In this situation, the clause only slightly increases the seller’s direct sales 
price. It follows that when the decrease of the consumer welfare happens, the effect is 
negligibly small.  
If 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬, when the full-coverage equilibrium happens in the case where the price 
parity clause is allowed (equivalent to the first four rows of case ݅݅ሻ	in Table 4.2), the 
introduction of the price parity clause harms consumer welfare if the equilibrium 
investment level is smaller than when the clause is not allowed and the amount of the 
decrease of the investment level is large enough to exceed the positive effect through 
the decrease in the seller’s platform price (Proposition 4.6 b) and c)).  
If 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬ and the non-full-coverage equilibrium happens when the price parity 
clause is allowed (as in the last two rows of case ݅݅ሻ	in Table 4.2), the introduction of 
the price parity clause harms consumer welfare if the negative effect through the 
increase of the seller’s direct sales price is large enough to exceed the positive effect 
through the increase in the consumers’ awareness of the product (Proposition 4.6 d) and 
e)).  
Note that unlike the effect on consumer welfare, the effect on the seller’s profit in 
allowing the price parity clause is ambiguous. This effect remains unclear because the 
price parity clause have the following four effects that can change the seller’s profit: 
(1) the change in consumers’ awareness due to the change in the investment level, (2) 
the change in the behaviours of the consumers who are aware of both the platform and 
the direct sales channel (i.e. only half of such consumers purchases directly), (3) the 
change in the platform’s commission and (4) the change in the seller’s prices. As shown 
in Table 4.2, the net effect of the four effects can be positive or negative to the seller’s 
profit, the total effect on the seller’s profit is ambiguous. 
4.6. Policy Implications and Conclusions  
The analysis on the monopoly platform case in this chapter shows that in the case where 
the utility to purchase the product is same for all consumers (zero transportation cost), 
allowing the price parity clause simply improves the consumer welfare, because it 
improves the consumer awareness and only slightly increases the equilibrium direct 
sales price. However, the clause decreases the profit of the seller, because its positive 
effect on the profit of the seller thorough the increased consumer awareness is surpassed 
by the negative effect caused by the increase of the commission imposed by the 
platform, which is higher than the equilibrium price. 
150 
 
This chapter also shows that in the case where the utility to purchase the product is 
different between consumers (positive transportation cost), the effect of allowing the 
price parity clause is not straightforward as the zero transportation cost case. The 
introduction of the price parity clause generally increases the platform’s investment, 
which has a positive effect on the consumer surplus by affording more opportunities to 
be aware of the product. On the other hand, it also has the negative effect on the 
consumer surplus by the rise of the direct sales price, and in some situations the net 
effect on the consumer welfare can be negative.  
These result imply that the claim that narrow price parity clauses by platforms is 
justified because it could be necessary to prevent free rides by sellers using a platform. 
However, at the same time, the result of the analysis also shows that the effect on 
consumer welfare from the introduction of price parity clauses is not always positive, 
because the rise of the direct sales price may offset the positive effect, which implies 
that prohibition of narrow price parity clause may have positive effects on consumer 
welfare.  
Moreover, the comparison between the zero transportation cost case and the positive 
transportation cost case shows that when the transportation cost is small, allowing price 
parity clause is more likely to increase the consumer welfare and decrease the profit of 
the seller. The margin of the seller can obtain from the sales on the platform depends 
on the amount of transportation cost, which follows that the more diversity of the 
consumers means the more room for making profit for the seller.  
Those results are in common with the other previous literature analysing the effect of 
narrow price parity clauses in a dominant platform situation, Wang and Wright (2016), 
in the sense that the price parity clause enables the platform to set a higher commission 
and can harm the consumer welfare. However, this study shows that the consumer 
welfare can be improved by the clause. This is because the positive effect through 
improving the consumer awareness may exceed its negative effect. The point that the 
more consumer awareness enabled by the price parity clause are not taken into account 
in the previous studies including Wang and Wright (2016).  
The results in the case of more than one platform and one seller and the effects of wide 
price parity clauses are discussed in the next chapter. 
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4.7. Appendix C 
4.7.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1 
If a consumer has the information on the seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉, where 
݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ and ݌ଵ௠ is the lowest price as far as the consumer is aware of it, the utility 
of the consumer to purchase the seller’s product on the platform is ݎ െ ݌ଵ௠. Hence, the 
condition that the consumer purchases on sales channel ݉ is written as ݎ െ ݌ଵ௠ ൒ 0.  
 
This implies that, supposing all the consumers with the information that the product 
sold are on sales channel ݉  when they make a decision about purchasing, and 
supposing ݌ଵ௠  is the unique lowest price as far as they know, the demand for the 
seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉ is 1 if	݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ and 0 if ݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ.  
 
According to Table 4.1, the share of the consumers who are aware of the product sold 
only on sales channel ݉  when they make a decision about purchasing is 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ௠ሺ1 െ ߣ௡ሻ. The share of the consumers who are aware of the product sold on 
both sales channels is given by ߙሺߣ௠ ൅ ߣ௡ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߙሻߣ௠ߣ௡. 
 
If ݌ଵ௠ ൏ ݌ଵ௡ ൑ ݎ or ݌ଵ௠ ൏ ݎ ൏ ݌ଵ௡ holds, all of the consumers who are aware of the 
product sold on both sales channels and all of the consumers who only are aware of the 
product sold on sales channel ݉ will purchase the product on sales channel ݉, which 
yields that the demand in this case is equal to ߣ௠ ൅ ߙߣ௡ െ ߙߣ௠ߣ௡.  
If ݌ଵ௡ ൏ ݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ holds, only the consumers who only are aware of the product sold on 
sales channel ݉ will purchase the product on the sales channel ݉ as long as the utility 
for the consumer is positive or equal to zero. Hence, the demand in this case is ሺ1 െ
ߙሻߣ௠ሺ1 െ ߣ௡ሻ. 
If ݌ଵ௠ ൌ ݌ଵ௡ ൑ ݎ holds, half of the consumers who are aware of the product sold on 
both sales channels and all of the consumers who only are aware of the product sold on 
sales channel ݉ will purchase the product on the sales channel ݉ as long as the utility 
for the consumer is positive or equal to zero, meaning that the demand for each sales 
channel is equal to ሺ1 െ 0.5ߙሻߣ௠ ൅ 0.5ߙߣ௡ െ 0.5ߣ௠ߣ௡. 
If ݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ and ݌ଵ௡ ൐ ݎ hold, the demand for each sales channel is zero, because the 
prices the consumer face is larger than their reservation value.∎ 
4.7.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2 
Lemma 4.1 implies that the expected profit for the seller can be written as follows: 
 
݅ሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ, ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ 
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ߎଵ ൌ ቐ
ߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽
ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݌ଵ஽
ቑ. 
 
݅݅ሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ 
ߎଵ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ. 
 
݅݅݅ሻ	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ 
ߎଵ ൌ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽. 
 
݅ݒሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݎ, ݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ 
ߎଵ ൌ 0. 
 
Lemma 4.2 can be obtained by solving this profit-maximisation problem. The proof is 
divided into two steps. In Step 1 we find the prices for the seller in each of the four 
cases: (݅ሻ both ݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽ do not exceed ݎ, (݅݅ሻ only ݌ଵ஺ does not exceed ݎ, (݅݅݅ሻ only 
݌ଵ஽ does not exceed ݎ, and (݅ݒሻ both ݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽ exceed ݎ. In Step 2, we compare the 
profits in each case to find the equilibrium price.  
 
Step 1: Optimal prices in each of four cases 
In this step, we find the optimal prices for the seller in each of the four cases. Step 1 is 
divided into the four substeps, each covering one of the four cases.  
 
Substep 1.1: Optimal prices if	݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ 
This case can be divided into three sub-cases depending on the relationship between 
݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽. 
ܽሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൌ ݌ଵ ൑ ݎ 
In this case, the expected profit is ߎଵ௣భಲୀ௣భವஸ௥ ൌ ߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂. 
Since this profit is monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ, which is subject to ݌ଵ ൑ ݎ, this 
profit is maximised when setting ݌ଵ ൌ 	ݎ. The maximum expected profit for the seller 
can be written as 
ߎଵ∗	௣భಲୀ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ ൌ ߥݎ െ ߦ ஺݂. 
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ܾሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ 
In this case, the expected profit is 
ߎଵ௣భಲழ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽. 
Since this profit is monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽, this profit is maximised 
when setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺ	ݎ െ ߝ, ݎሻ . The maximum expected profit for the seller can 
be written as 
ߎଵ∗	௣భಲழ௣భವஸ௥ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺ߣଵሻݎ െ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ ஺݂ ൅ ߝሻ ൌ ߥݎ െ ሺߣ஺ ൅
ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ ஺݂ െ ߝ. 
 
ܿሻ	݌ଵ஽ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ 
In this case, the expected profit is 
ߎଵ௣భವழ௣భಲஸ௥ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽. 
Since this profit is	monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽, this profit is maximised 
when setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ, ݎ െ ߝሻ. The maximum expected profit for the seller can 
be written as 
ߎଵ∗	௣భವழ௣భಲஸ௥ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ஺݂ െ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ
ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻߝ ൌ ߥݎ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ஺݂ െ ߝ. 
 
The results of the three cases imply that the revenues are almost same because the seller 
sets the price equal to or just below ݎ . It is also shown that ߎଵ∗	௣భವழ௣భಲஸ௥ ൐
ߎଵ∗	௣భಲୀ௣భವஸ௥ ൐ ߎଵ∗	௣భಲழ௣భವஸ௥, since the commission that the seller need to pay is the 
lowest when ݌ଵ஽ ൏ ݌ଵ஺. 
Hence, if the seller decides to set prices such that both prices are full-coverage price, 
this profit is maximised when setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ, ݎ െ ߝሻ.  
 
Substep 1.2: Optimal prices if ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ 
In this case, the expected profit is 
ߎଵ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ. 
Since this is monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ஺, this profit is maximised when setting 
݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݎ . The maximum expected profit for the seller can be written as 
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ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ஺݂ሻ. However, setting such prices will not be chosen by the 
seller because setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ, ݎ െ ߝሻ is more profitable.  
 
Substep 1.3: Optimal prices if ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ 
In this case, the expected profit is 
ߎଵ ൌ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽. 
Since this is monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ஽, this profit is maximised when setting 
݌ଵ஽ ൌ ݎ . The maximum expected profit for the seller can be written as 
ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻݎ. 
 
Substep 1.4: Optimal prices if	݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݎ, ݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ 
This case can be chosen in the equilibrium because the profit is always zero. 
 
Step 2: Comparing the four cases 
Step 1 shows that there are two types of pricing that can be optimal for the seller. The 
first one is setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ, ݎ െ ߝሻ. The second one is setting ݌ଵ஽ at ݎ and ݌ଵ஺ 
high enough to guarantee that no consumers purchase through the platform (݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݎ). 
The condition that the seller prefers to set ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ, ݎ െ ߝሻ can be written as 
ߥݎ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ஺݂ ൐ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻݎ. 
The condition can be modified as ஺݂ ൏ ݎ .∎ 
4.7.3 Proof of Lemma 4.5 
In this case, the seller has two options. The first option is to accept the price parity 
clause imposed by the platform and set the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݌ଵ஽. As shown in 
Section 4.7.2, if the seller sets the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݌ଵ஽, the seller’s expected 
profit is maximised when it sets the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൌ ݌ଵ. The expected 
profit is ߥݎ െ ߦ ஺݂. 
 
The second option for the seller is to refuse the offer by the platform and to concentrate 
on its direct sales. If the seller takes this option, the seller’s expected profit is given by 
ߎଵ ൌ ൜ߣଵ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ0	݂݅	݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ ൠ. 
Since this profit is monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ஽ , this profit is maximised when 
setting ݌ଵ஽	at ݎ. The maximum expected profit for the seller is ߣଵݎ. 
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Hence, the condition that the seller prefers to accept the price parity clause can be 
written as 
ߥݎ െ ߦ ஺݂ ൒ ߣଵݎ. 
This condition can be modified as ஺݂ ൑ ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻݎ/	ߦ. ∎ 
4.7.4 Proof of Lemma 4.7 
If consumer ݔ has the information on the seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉, 
where ݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܦ and ݌ଵ௠ is the lowest price as far as consumer ݔ is aware of it, the 
utility of consumer ݔ to purchase the seller’s product on the platform is ݎ െ ߬ݔ	 െ ݌ଵ௠. 
Hence, the condition that consumer ݔ purchases on sales channel ݉ is written as ݎ െ
߬ݔ	 െ ݌ଵ௠ ൒ 0. This inequality can be modified to ݔ ൑ ሺݎ െ	݌ଵ௠ሻ/߬. 
 
This implies that, supposing all the consumers with the information that the product 
sold are on sales channel ݉  when they make a decision about purchasing, and 
supposing ݌ଵ௠  is the unique lowest price as far as they know, the demand for the 
seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉ is 1 if	݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ െ ߬, ሺݎ െ	݌ଵ௠ሻ/߬ if ݎ െ ߬ ൏
݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ and 0 if ݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ.  
 
According to Table 4.1, the share of the consumers who are aware of the product sold 
only on sales channel ݉  when they make a decision about purchasing is 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ௠ሺ1 െ ߣ௡ሻ. The share of the consumers who are aware of the product sold on 
both sales channels is given by ߙሺߣ௠ ൅ ߣ௡ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߙሻߣ௠ߣ௡. 
 
If ݌ଵ௠ ൏ ݌ଵ௡ holds, all of the consumers who are aware of the product sold on both 
sales channels and all of the consumers who only are aware of the product sold on sales 
channel ݉ will purchase the product on sales channel ݉ as long as the utility for the 
consumer is positive or equal to zero, which yields that the total share is equal to ߣ௠ ൅
ߙߣ௡ െ ߙߣ௠ߣ௡. Hence, the demand in this case can be obtained through multiplying 
ߣ௠ ൅ ߙߣ௡ െ ߙߣ௠ߣ௡ by the demand for the seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉ 
suppose all the consumers only have the information about the product sold on sales 
channel ݉. 
If ݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݌ଵ௡ holds, only the consumers who only are aware of the product sold on sales 
channel ݉ will purchase the product on the sales channel ݉ as long as the utility for 
the consumer is positive or equal to zero. Hence, the demand in this case can be obtained 
through multiplying ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ௠ሺ1 െ ߣ௡ሻ by the demand for the seller’s product sold on 
sales channel ݉ suppose all the consumers only have the information about the product 
sold on sales channel ݉. 
If ݌ଵ௠ ൌ ݌ଵ௡ holds, half of the consumers who are aware of the product sold on both 
sales channels and all of the consumers who only are aware of the product sold on sales 
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channel ݉ will purchase the product on the sales channel ݉ as long as the utility for 
the consumer is positive or equal to zero, meaning that the total share is equal to 
ሺ1 െ 0.5ߙሻߣ௠ ൅ 0.5ߙߣ௡ െ 0.5ߣ௠ߣ௡. Hence, the demand in this case can be obtained 
by multiplying ሺ1 െ 0.5ߙሻߣ௠ ൅ 0.5ߙߣ௡ െ 0.5ߣ௠ߣ௡  by the demand for the seller’s 
product sold on sales channel ݉ suppose all the consumers only have the information 
about the product sold on sales channel ݉.∎ 
4.7.5 Proof of Lemma 4.8 
Lemma 4.7 implies that as long as ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ	and	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ hold the expected profit for the 
seller can be written as follows: 
 
݅ሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬, ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ 
ߎଵ ൌ ቐ
ߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽
ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݌ଵ஽
ቑ. 
 
݅݅ሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ 
ߎଵ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ஽߬ ቁ ݌ଵ஽. 
 
݅݅݅ሻ	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ 
ߎଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ஺߬ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽ 
 
݅ݒሻ	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ, ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ 
ߎଵ
ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ߬ ቁ ሺߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂ሻ	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽
ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ஺߬ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ ቀ
ݎ െ ݌ଵ஽
߬ ቁ ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ஺߬ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ ቀ
ݎ െ ݌ଵ஽
߬ ቁ ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݌ଵ஽ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
 
Lemma 4.8 can be obtained by solving this profit-maximisation problem. The proof is 
divided into two steps. In Step 1 we find the optimal prices for the seller in each of the 
four cases when ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ	and 	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ  hold: (݅ሻ  both ݌ଵ஺  and ݌ଵ஽  are full-coverage 
price, (݅݅ሻ only ݌ଵ஺ is full-coverage price, (݅݅݅ሻ only ݌ଵ஽ is full-coverage price, and (݅ݒሻ 
both ݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽ are non-full-coverage price. In Step 2, we find the optimal price for 
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the seller when ݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݎ	or	݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ holds and compare with the optimal profits when 
݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ	and	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ hold.  
 
Step 1: Optimal prices when ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ	and	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ hold 
In this step, we find the optimal prices for the seller in each of the four cases, which is 
divided based on whether the prices are full-coverage price (i.e., weakly lower than ݎ െ
߬) or not. Step 1 is divided into the four substeps, each covering one of the four cases.  
 
Substep 1.1: Optimal prices if	݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ 
This case can be divided into three sub-cases depending on the relationship between 
݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽. 
ܽሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൌ ݌ଵ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ 
In this case, the expected profit is ߎଵ௣భಲୀ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ ൌ ߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂. 
Since this profit is monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ, which is subject to ݌ଵ ൑ ݎ െ ߬, this 
profit is maximised when setting ݌ଵ ൌ 	ݎ െ ߬. The maximum expected profit for the 
seller can be written as 
ߎଵ∗	௣భಲୀ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ ൌ ߥሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ ߦ ஺݂. 
 
ܾሻ	݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ 
In this case, the expected profit is 
ߎଵ௣భಲழ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽. 
Since this profit is monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽, this profit is maximised 
when setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺ	ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ . The maximum expected profit for the 
seller can be written as 
ߎଵ∗	௣భಲழ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ ஺݂ ൅ ߝሻ. 
 
ܿሻ	݌ଵ஽ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ 
In this case, the expected profit is 
ߎଵ௣భವழ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽. 
Since this profit is	monotonically increasing on	݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽, this profit is maximised 
when setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ. The maximum expected profit for the 
seller can be written as 
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ߎଵ∗	௣భವழ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ஺݂ െ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ
ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻߝ. 
 
The results of the three cases imply that ߎଵ∗	௣భವழ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛ ൐ ߎଵ∗	௣భಲୀ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ ൐
ߎଵ∗	௣భಲழ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ, since 
ߎଵ∗	௣భವழ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛ െ ߎଵ∗	௣భವୀ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛ ൌ 0.5ሾߙሺߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߙሻߣ஺ߣଵሿ ஺݂ െ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅
ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻߝ ൐ 0 and 
ߎଵ∗	௣భವୀ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛ െ Πଵ∗	௣భಲழ௣భವஸ௥ିఛ ൌ 0.5ሾߙሺߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߙሻߣ஺ߣଵሿ ஺݂ ൅ ሺ1 െ
ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻߝ ൐ 0 hold. 
Hence, if the seller decides to set prices such that both prices are full-coverage price, 
this profit is maximised when setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ. Note that if ஺݂ ൒
ݎ െ ߬, the profit from the sales through the platform cannot be positive. In this situation, 
setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ will not be chosen in the equilibrium, because 
setting the platform price high enough to guarantee that no consumers purchase on the 
platform is more profitable. 
 
Substep 1.2: Optimal prices if ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ 
In this case, the expected profit is 
ߎଵ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛழ௣భವ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ ቀ௥ି௣భವఛ ቁ ݌ଵ஽. 
ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ  is monotonically increasing on 	݌ଵ஺ , and ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ
ߣ஺ሻߣଵ ቀ௥ି௣భವఛ ቁ ݌ଵ஽ is a concave quadratic function on ݌ଵ஽. However, since it is assumed 
that ݎ ൒ 2߬ , ቀ௥ି௣భವఛ ቁ ݌ଵ஽  is maximised when setting ݌ଵ஽  at ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝ  if ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ 
and ݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ െ ߬ must hold. Hence, the set of ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ that maximises ߎଵ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛழ௣భವ 
is ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝሻ.  
However, ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝሻ  will not be chosen by the seller in the 
equilibrium because setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ is more profitable.  
 
Substep 1.3: Optimal prices if ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ 
In this case, the expected profit is 
ߎଵ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛழ௣భವ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ቀ௥ି௣భಲఛ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽. 
Note that ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽  is monotonically increasing on 	݌ଵ஽ , and 
ቀ௥ି௣భಲఛ ቁ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ is a concave quadratic function on ݌ଵ஺. Since 
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݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬  and ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ  must hold, the set of ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ  that maximises 
ߎଵ௣భಲஸ௥ିఛழ௣భವ is ሺmaxሾሺݎ ൅ ஺݂ሻ/2, ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝሿ , ݎ െ ߬ሻ .  
Note that maxሾሺݎ ൅ ஺݂ሻ/2, ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝሿ is equal to ሺݎ ൅ ஺݂ሻ/2 if ஺݂ ൐ ݎ െ 2߬  and ݎ െ
߬ ൅ ߝ if ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬. However, if ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬ holds, ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ 
will not be chosen by the seller because setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ is more 
profitable.  
Moreover, even if ஺݂ ൐ ݎ െ 2߬ holds, the profit from the sales through the platform 
cannot be positive when ஺݂ ൐ ݎ  holds. In this situation, setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺሺݎ ൅
஺݂ሻ/2, ݎ െ ߬ሻ will not be chosen in the equilibrium, because setting the platform price 
high enough to guarantee that no consumers purchase on the platform is more profitable. 
 
Substep 1.4: Optimal prices if	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ, ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ 
This case can be divided into three sub-cases depending on the relationship between 
݌ଵ஺  and ݌ଵ஽ : ܽሻ	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൌ 	݌ଵ஽ ൌ ݌ଵ ൑ ݎ , ܾሻݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൏ 	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎand ܿሻ	ݎ െ
߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ. 
 
The profits of the first three cases is 
ߎଵ௣భಲୀ	௣భವவ௥ିఛ ൌ ቀ
ݎ െ ݌ଵ
߬ ቁ ሺߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂ሻ. 
ߎଵ௣భವவ௣భಲவ௥ିఛ ൌ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ ቀ
ݎ െ ݌ଵ஺
߬ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ
൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ஽߬ ቁ ݌ଵ஽. 
ߎଵ௣భಲவ௣భವவ௥ିఛ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ቀ
ݎ െ ݌ଵ஺
߬ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ
൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ஽߬ ቁ ݌ଵ஽. 
 
Note that those profits depend on ቀ௥ି௣భಲఛ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ and ቀ
௥ି௣భವ
ఛ ቁ ݌ଵ஽ , and they are 
concave quadratic functions on ݌ଵ஺ and ݌ଵ஽. 
As discussed in Substep 1.3, ቀ௥ି௣భಲఛ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ is maximised by setting ݌ଵ஺ at 
௥ା௙ಲ
ଶ  if 
஺݂ ൐ ݎ െ 2߬  and setting ݌ଵ஺  at ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝ  if ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬ . Moreover, as discussed in 
Substep 1.2, ቀ௥ି௣భವఛ ቁ ݌ଵ஽ is maximised by setting ݌ଵ஽ at ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝ. 
Those imply that if ஺݂ ൐ ݎ െ 2߬	 hold, while ቀ௥ି௣భಲఛ ቁ ሺ݌ଵ஺ െ ஺݂ሻ  is maximised by 
setting ݌ଵ஺  at ௥ା௙ಲଶ  and ቀ
௥ି௣భವ
ఛ ቁ  ݌ଵ஽  is maximised by setting ݌ଵ஽  at ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝ . 
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However, such pricing will not be chosen by the seller in the equilibrium because 
setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ቀ௥ା௙ಲଶ , ݎ െ ߬ቁ is more profitable in this situation.  
Similarly, ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬ holds, the profit is maximised when setting the platform price 
and the direct sales price slightly higher than ݎ െ ߬. However, such pricing will not be 
chosen by the seller in the equilibrium because setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ 
is more profitable.  
 
In summary, in this case, the set of optimal prices for the seller satisfying  ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ	 
and	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ is  ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ if ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬	holds. 
If ݎ െ 2߬ ൏ ஺݂ ൑ ݎ	holds, the optimal set of the prices is  ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ቀ௥ା௙ಲଶ , ݎ െ ߬ቁ 
or ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ In this situation, the seller prefers to set ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ቀ௥ା௙ಲଶ , ݎ െ
߬ቁ, since ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ቂሺ௥ି௙ಲሻ
మ
ସఛ െ ሺݎ െ ߬ െ ஺݂ሻቃ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻߝ ൌ ሺ1 െ
ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ሺ௥ି௙ಲିଶఛሻ
మ
ସఛ ൅ ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻߝ ൐ 0. 
When ஺݂ ൐ ݎ, any prices satisfying ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ	and	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ will not be chosen in the 
equilibrium. 
 
Step 2: Optimal prices when ݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݎ	or	݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ 
If the seller sets ݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ, the revenue from the direct sales price become zero, which 
follows that the seller does not have an incentive to set such prices because the cost 
from direct sales is zero. 
If the seller sets ݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݎ, the sales on the platform is zero. The expected profit is equal 
to ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻ݌ଵ஽, which is maximised at ሺߙߣ஺ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ when 
setting ݌ଵ஽  at ݎ െ ߬  since ݎ ൒ 2߬  holds. Hence, the set of optimal prices satisfying 
݌ଵ஺ ൐ ݎ	or	݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ is ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ ൅ ܾ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ,	where ܾ is any positive amount. 
Then, compare this pricing with the optimal prices satisfying ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ	and	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ. If 
஺݂ ൑ ݎ holds, ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ቀ௥ା௙ಲଶ , ݎ െ ߬ቁ  or ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ െ ߝሻ  is chosen in the 
equilibrium, because by setting ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ ൅ ܾ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ the seller will lose the sales 
thorough the platform. 
If ஺݂ ൐ ݎ, ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ ൅ ܾ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ is chosen in the equilibrium, because any prices 
satisfying ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ	and	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ.∎ 
4.7.6 Proof of Lemma 4.9 
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If the platform decides to set its commission such that ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬, Seller 1's expected 
profit is maximised when ஺݂ ൌ ݎ െ 2߬. In this situation, the expected profit is given by 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ. 
If the platform to set its commission such that ݎ െ 2߬ ൏ ஺݂ ൑ ݎ, the expected profit is 
given by ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ቀ௥ି௙ಲଶఛ ቁ ஺݂, which is a concave quadratic function that is 
maximised when ஺݂ ൌ ௥ଶ, since the FOC is ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ
௥ିଶ௙ಲ
ଶఛ ൌ 0. The profit is 
ሺଵିఈሻఒಲሺଵିఒభሻ௥మ
଼ఛ .  
Note that 
 ሺଵିఈሻఒಲሺଵିఒభሻ௥
మ
଼ఛ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ ൌ
ሺଵିఈሻఒಲሺଵିఒభሻ
଼ఛ ሾݎଶ െ 8߬ݎ ൅ 16߬ଶሿ ൌ
ఒಲ
଼ఛ ሺݎ െ 4߬ሻଶ ൒ 0. 
It follows that the expected profit when setting ௥ଶ is always equal to or larger than the 
profit when setting ݎ െ 2߬. However, that commission is not chosen when ௥ଶ ൑ ݎ െ 2߬ 
holds, because the value is below the assumed range (ݎ െ 2߬ ൏ ஺݂ ൑ ݎ). The condition 
can be modified to ݎ ൒ 4߬. If this condition is satisfied, Seller 1’s profit increases as 
the price decreases, which implies that setting ஺݂ ൌ ݎ െ 2߬ is more profitable. 
With regard to the optimal amount of investment, the total expected profit for the seller 
can be rewritten as 
ߎ஺ ൌ ൝
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ሺܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ሻሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ െ ܫ஺	݂݅	ݎ ൒ 4߬
	ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ሺܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ሻ ࢘
૛
଼ఛ െ ܫ஺	݂݅	ݎ ൏ 4߬
ൡ. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem gives Lemma 4.9.	∎ 
4.7.7 Proof of Lemma 4.11 
In this case, the seller has two options. The first option is to accept the price parity 
clause imposed by the platform and set the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݌ଵ஽. If the seller takes 
this option and sets the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൌ ݌ଵ, the seller’s expected profit can 
be written as 
ߎଵ௣భಲୀ௣భವ ൌ ൞
ߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂	݂݅	݌ଵ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ߬ ቁ ሺߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂ሻ	݂݅	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ ൑ ݎ
0	݂݅	݌ଵ ൐ ݎ
ൢ. 
 
If the seller and sets the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽, the seller’s expected profit can be 
written as 
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ߎଵ௣భಲழ௣భವ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ	 ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽		݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ	 ஺݂ሻ ൅ ቀ௥ି௣భವఛ ቁ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽		݂݅	݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ
ቀ௥ି௣భಲఛ ቁ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ	 ஺݂ሻ ൅ ቀ
௥ି௣భವ
ఛ ቁ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽		݂݅	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ
ቀ௥ି௣భಲఛ ቁ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ	 ஺݂ሻ	݂݅	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ ൏ ݌ଵ஽
0	݂݅	ݎ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
.
. 
The second option for the seller is to refuse the offer by the platform and to concentrate 
on its direct sales. If the seller takes this option, the seller’s expected profit is given by 
ߎଵோாி௎ௌா ൌ ൞
ߣଵ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
ߣଵ ቀݎ െ ݌ଵ஽߬ ቁ ݌ଵ஽	݂݅	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ
0	݂݅	݌ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ
ൢ. 
Lemma 4.11 can be obtained by solving this profit-maximisation problem. The proof 
is divided into two steps. In Step 1, we find the optimal prices when the seller accepts 
the price parity clause. Step 1 is divided into two parts. In the first part, we find the 
optimal prices when the seller sets the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽. Then, we show that 
the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ are not optimal for the seller. In Step 2, we find the 
optimal prices when the seller refuses the price parity clause. In Step 3, we compare the 
profits in each case to find the equilibrium price.  
 
Step 1: Optimal seller’s prices when the seller accepts the price parity clause 
With regard to the profit when the seller accepts the offer by the platform and the seller 
sets the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൌ ݌ଵ, if the seller decides to set the price such 
that	݌ଵ ൑ ݎ െ ߬, the profit is given by ߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂. Hence, the price that maximises the 
profit is ݌ଵ ൌ ݎ െ ߬, and the maximised expected profit is ߥሺݎ െ ߬	ሻ െ 	ߦ ஺݂. 
If the seller decides to set the price such that	݌ଵ ൐ ݎ െ ߬, the profit is given by ሾሺr െ
݌ଵሻ/߬ሿሺߥ݌ଵ െ 	ߦ ஺݂ሻ. Hence, the price that maximises the profit is ݌ଵ ൌ ݎ/2 ൅ ߦ݂/2ߥ, 
since in this situation the expected profit is a quadric concave function and the FOC is 
ሺݎߥ െ 2ߥ݌ଵ ൅ ߦ ஺݂ሻ/߬ ൌ 0 . The maximised expected profit is ߥሺݎ െ ߦ ஺݂/ߥሻଶ/4߬ . 
However, that price is not chosen when ݎ/2 ൅ ߦ݂/2ߥ	 ൑ 	ݎ െ ߬ holds, because the price 
is below the assumed range. The condition can be modified to ݎ ൒ ߦ ஺݂/ߥ ൅ 2߬. If ݎ ൏
ߦ ஺݂/ߥ ൅ 2߬ holds, setting ݌ଵ ൌ ݎ/2 ൅ ߦ݂/2ߥ	is more profitable than setting ݌ଵ ൌ ݎ െ
߬, since ߥሺݎ െ ߦ ஺݂/ߥሻଶ/4߬ െ ߥሺݎ െ ߬	ሻ െ 	ߦ ஺݂ ൌ ߥሺݎ െ ߦ ஺݂/ߥ െ 2߬ሻଶ/4߬ ൐ 0. 
 
Then, consider the case where when the seller accepts the offer and the seller decides 
to set the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽. If ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ ൑ ݎ െ ߬, the price that maximises 
the profit is ሺ݌ଵ஺,݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬ െ ߝ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ, where ߝ is a small non-negative amount. 
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However, this pricing is dominated by ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஽ ൌ ݎ െ ߬, since in this situation the 
commission that the seller needs to pay is smaller.  
If the seller decides to set the prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ holds, the seller’s 
profit is given by 
ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ	 ஺݂ሻ ൅ ቀ௥ି௣భವఛ ቁ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽. 
Since it is assumed ݎ ൒ 2߬ , that the second term of this profit increases as ݌ଵ஽ 
approaches to ݎ െ ߬. Hence, the prices that maximises the profit is ሺ݌ଵ஺,݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ
߬, ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝሻ when setting such prices such that ݌ଵ஺ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஽  holds. However, 
ሺ݌ଵ஺,݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ ൅ ߝሻ cannot be an equilibrium because this is dominated by 
ሺݎ െ ߬, ݎ െ ߬ሻ. 
If the seller decides to set the prices such that ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ holds, the seller’s 
profit is given by 
 ቀ௥ି௣భಲఛ ቁ ሺߣ஺ ൅ ߙߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺ߣଵሻሺ݌ଵ஺ െ	 ஺݂ሻ ൅ ቀ
௥ି௣భವ
ఛ ቁ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ݌ଵ஽. 
The first term and the second term of this profit are quadric concave functions on ݌ଵ஺ 
and ݌ଵ஽ respectively, which are maximised when the direct sales price is ሺݎ ൅ ஺݂ሻ/2 
and ݎ/2, respectively. It follows that if the seller sets the direct sales price at ݌̂ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ െ
߬, ݌ଵ஺  that maximises the profit in this situation is ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌̂ଵ஽ െ ߝ as long as ݌̂ଵ஽ ൑
ݎ/2 ൅ ߦ݂/2ߥ  holds. However, these pricings are dominated by ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ ൌ
ሺ݌̂ଵ஽, ݌̂ଵ஽ሻ, since in this situation the commission that the seller needs to pay is smaller. 
In addition, the prices such that ݌̂ଵ஽ ൐ ݎ/2 ൅ ߦ݂/2ߥ  will not be chosen in the 
equilibrium since in this situation, the profit increases as ݌̂ଵ஽ becomes smaller.  
Hence, the set of prices that satisfies ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஽ will not be chosen by the seller in the 
equilibrium.  
 
Step 2: Optimal seller’s prices when it refuses the price parity clause 
Since it is assumed that ݎ is high enough to guarantee that the seller does not have an 
incentive to set non-full-coverage price for its direct sales in the equilibrium (ݎ ൒ 2߬).  
(ݎ ൒ 2߬), the profit when the seller refuses the offer and sells only through direct sales 
is maximised by setting ݌ଵ஽ at ݎ െ ߬.  
 
Step 3: Comparing the two cases 
According to the results in Step 1 and Step 2, the prices that maximise the seller’s 
expected profit in the two cases (i.e., accepting the price parity clause and refusing the 
clause) are summarised Table A4.1. 
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Table A4.1 ሺ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஽ሻ that maximises the seller’s expected profit 
Case 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ ߦ ஺݂ߥ ൅ 2߬ ݎ ൒
ߦ ஺݂
ߥ ൅ 2߬ 
Accept ሺݎ2 ൅
ߦ ஺݂
2ߥ ,
ݎ
2 ൅
ߦ ஺݂
2ߥ ሻ 
ሺݎെ ߬,ݎെ ߬ሻ
Refuse ሺ൅∞, ݎ െ ߬ሻ ሺ൅∞, ݎ െ ߬ሻ 
 
Table A4.2 shows that if ݎ ൒ ߦ ஺݂/ߥ ൅ 2߬, the condition that the seller accept the 
condition if ݎ ൒ ߦ ஺݂/ߥ ൅ 2߬ is 
ߥሺݎ െ ߬	ሻ െ 	ߦ ஺݂ െ	ߣଵሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൒ 0. 
This inequality can be modified to 
(A4.1) ஺݂ ൑ ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻక . 
 
In addition, if 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ ߦ ஺݂/ߥ ൅ 2߬, the condition that the seller accepts the price 
parity clause is 
ߥ ൬ݎ െ ߦ ஺݂ߥ ൰
ଶ
4߬ െ	ߣଵሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൒ 0 ↔ ൬ݎ െ
ߦ ஺݂
ߥ ൰
ଶ
൒ 4߬ߣଵሺݎ െ ߬ሻ. 
This condition can be modified to 
(A4.2) ஺݂ ൑ ఔక ൜ݎ െ 2 ቂ
ఛఒభሺ௥ିఛሻ
ఔ ቃ
଴.ହൠ. ∎ 
4.7.8 Proof of Lemma 4.12 
The proof of Lemma 4.12 is divided into three steps. In Step 1, we find the equilibrium 
investment level and commission if the platform introduces a price parity clause. In 
Step 2, we show that the platform’s profit increases if the platform introduces a price 
parity clause and, hence, the platform has an incentive to introduce it when it is allowed.  
In the case covered in Step 1, the platform can set both full-coverage commission and 
non-full-coverage commission. Hence, we first find the optimal investment level and 
commission when the platform decides to set full-coverage commission and non-full-
coverage commission, respectively (Substep 1.1 and 1.2). Compare the optimal to find 
the equilibrium and analyse whether the equilibrium investment level is the level in the 
case where the price parity clause is not allowed (Substep 1.3). 
 
Step 1: Equilibrium investment level and commission if the platform offering a price 
parity clause  
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If the platform offers a price parity clause, the platform has two options regarding its 
commission. The first option is setting a full-coverage commission such that ݎ ൒
ߦ ஺݂/ߥ ൅ 2߬. The second option is setting a non-full-coverage commission. 
 
Substep 1.1: Optimal full-coverage commission 
If the platform decides to set a full-coverage commission such that ݎ ൒ ߦ ஺݂/ߥ ൅ 2߬ ↔
஺݂ ൑ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ, the platform’s profit-maximisation problem given ߣ஺, determined 
by its investment, is 
max௙ಲ ߦ ஺݂ subject to ஺݂ ൑ min ቂ
ఔ
క ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ,
ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
క ቃ. 
Since this revenue is monotonically increasing on ஺݂, the commission that maximises 
the platform’s revenue is ஺݂ ൌ min ቂఔక ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ,
ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
క ቃ. In this situation, the  
maximised expected revenue is minሾߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ, ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻሿ.  
The condition that ஺݂ ൑ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ is binding is 
ఔ
క ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ ൑
ఒಲሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
క . 
This condition can be modified to  
(A4.4) ߣ஺ ൒ ఒభሺ௥ିଶఛሻሺଵିఒభሻఛ ≡ ߣ஺തതത. 
If Inequality (A4.4) holds, the commission that maximises the platform’s revenue given 
ߣ஺  is ஺݂ ൌ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ . In this situation, the total expected profit for the platform 
taking the investment into account is given by 
ߎ஺ ൌ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ െ ܫ஺ ൌ ሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ ܫ஺. 
Let  
ܫ஺෡ ≡ argmaxூಲ 	ሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ ܫ஺ , 
ߣ஺෢ ≡ ݃ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ and 
஺݂෡ ≡ ఔ൫ఒಲ෢൯క൫ఒಲ෢൯ ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ ൌ
ሾሺଵିఒభሻఒಲ෢ାఒభሿሺ௥ିଶఛሻ
ሺଵି଴.ହఈି଴.ହఒభሻఒಲ෢ା଴.ହఈఒభ. 
ሺܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ሻ is the optimal commission and the investment when the platform decides to set 
a commission low enough to guarantee the full-coverage price by the seller if ߣ஺෢ ൒ ߣ஺തതത. 
If ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത , ሺܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ሻ  is no longer optimal because in this situation the optimal 
commission is bounded by Inequality (A4.1) rather than ஺݂ ൑ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ. 
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If ߣ஺ ൏ ߣ஺തതത holds, the commission that maximises the platform’s revenue given ߣ஺ is 
஺݂ ൌ ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ/ߦ. In this situation, the total expected profit for the platform 
taking the investment into account is given by 
ߎ஺ ൌ ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ ܫ஺ ൌ ሺ	ݎ െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ െ ܫ஺. 
 
Let  
ܫ஺෩ ≡ argmaxூಲ 	ሺ	ݎ െ ߬ሻ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ ܫ஺ , 
ߣ஺෪ ≡ ݃ ቀܫ஺෩ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ and  
஺݂෩ ≡ 	ఒಲ෪ሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻక൫ఒಲ෪൯ ൌ
ሺଵିఒభሻఒಲ෪ሺ௥ିఛሻ
ሺଵି଴.ହఈି଴.ହఒభሻఒಲ෪ା଴.ହఈఒభ. 
ሺܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ሻ is the optimal commission and the investment when the platform decides to set 
a commission low enough to guarantee the full-coverage price by the seller if ߣ஺෪ ൑ ߣ஺തതത. 
If ߣ஺෪ ൐ ߣ஺തതത , ሺܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ሻ  is no longer optimal because in this situation because in this 
situation the optimal commission is bounded by ஺݂ ൑ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ  rather than 
Inequality (A4.1). 
 
Note that ܫ஺෡ ൏ ܫ஺෩  and ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺෪ hold because 
 ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ଵሺ	௥ିଶఛሻሺଵିఒభሻ ൐
ଵ
ሺ	௥ିఛሻሺଵିఒభሻ ൌ ݃
ᇱ ቀܫ஺෩ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ.  
It follows that if ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪ holds, neither ሺܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ሻ nor ሺܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ሻ is the optimal pair of 
commission and investment. In this situation, the platform has an incentive to increase 
the investment from ܫ஺෡  and an incentive to decrease the investment from ܫ஺෩ . The 
optimal investment is the investment such that the two constraints on the commission, 
஺݂ ൑ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ and Inequality (A4.1), are equivalent. In this situation, the optimal 
investment ܫ஺ഥ  satisfies ݃ ቀܫ஺ഥ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ߣ஺തതത, and the optimal commission is 
஺݂ഥ ൌ ఔ൫ఒಲതതതത൯క൫ఒಲതതതത൯ ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ ൌ
ఒಲതതതതሺଵିఒభሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
క൫ఒಲതതതത൯ ൌ
ఒభሺ௥ିఛሻሺ௥ିଶఛሻ
ሾሺଵି଴.ହఈି଴.ହఒభሻ௥ିሺଶିଵ.ହఈିఒభା଴.ହఈఒభሻఛሿఛ. 
 
In summary, when the platform decides to set a full-coverage commission, the optimal 
investment is either ܫ஺෡ ,	ܫ஺෩  or ܫ஺ഥ .  
 
Substep 1.2: Optimal non-full-coverage commission 
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If the platform decides to set a non-full coverage commission such that ஺݂ ൐
ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ, the platform’s profit-maximisation problem given ߣ஺ determined by its 
investment is 
max௙ಲ 	 ߦ ቆ
௥ି഍೑ಲഌ
ଶఛ ቇ ஺݂ subject to 
ఔ
క ሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ ൏ ஺݂ ൑
ఔ
క ൜ݎ െ 2 ቂ
ఛఒభሺ௥ିఛሻ
ఔ ቃ
଴.ହൠ. 
It follows that if ሺߥ/ߦሻሼݎ െ 2ሼሾ߬ߣଵሺݎ െ ߬ሻሿ/ߥሽ଴.ହሽ ൑ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ  holds, there does 
not exist ஺݂ that satisfies both Inequality (A4.2) and ஺݂ ൐ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ. The condition 
can be modified to ߣ஺ ൑ ߣ஺തതത . Hence, if ߣ஺ ൑ ߣ஺തതത  holds, the platform will not set a 
commission such that ݎ ൏ ߦ ஺݂/ߥ ൅ 2߬. 
If ߣ஺ ൐ ߣ஺തതത holds, because the platforms profit is a concave quadratic function on ஺݂, the 
commission that maximises the platform’s revenue given ߣ஺ is ஺݂ ൌ ߥݎ/2ߦ. Note that 
஺݂ ൌ ߥݎ/2ߦ satisfies Inequality (A4.2) because 
ߥݎ
2ߦ ൑
ߥ
ߦ ൝ݎ െ 2 ቈ
߬ߣଵሺݎ െ ߬ሻ
ߥ ቉
଴.ହ
ൡ ↔ ݎ2 ൒ 2 ቈ
߬ߣଵሺݎ െ ߬ሻ
ߥ ቉
଴.ହ
↔ ݎଶ െ 4߬ߣଵߥ ݎ ൅
4߬ଶߣଵ
ߥ
↔ ൬ݎ െ 2߬ߣଵߥ ൰
ଶ
൅ ሺߥ െ ߣଵሻ 4߬
ଶߣଵ
ߥଶ ൐ 0. 
Moreover, ߥݎ/2ߦ ൐ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ must hold because the optimal commission must be 
high enough to let the seller set a non-full-coverage price. The condition can be 
modified to ݎ ൏ 4߬. If ݎ ൏ 4߬ holds, the commission that maximises the platform’s 
revenue given ߣ஺  is ஺݂ ൌ ߥݎ/2ߦ . In this situation, the total expected profit for the 
platform taking the investment into account is given by 
ߎ஺ ൌ ఔ௥
మ
଼ఛ െ ܫ஺ ൌ
௥మ
଼ఛ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ ܫ஺. 
 
Let 
ܫ஺ሖ ≡ argmaxூಲ
௥మ
଼ఛ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ ܫ஺, 
ߣ஺ሖ ≡ ݃ ቀ	ܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ and 
஺݂ሖ ≡ ఔ൫ఒಲሖ ൯௥ଶక൫ఒಲሖ ൯ ൌ
ሾሺଵିఒభሻఒಲሖ ାఒభሿ௥
ଶሺଵି଴.ହఈି଴.ହఒభሻఒಲሖ ାఈఒభ. 
ሺܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ ሻ is the optimal commission and the investment when the platform decides to set 
a non-full-coverage commission if ߣ஺ሖ ൐ ߣ஺തതത. If ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത, ሺܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ ሻ is no longer optimal 
because when the platform makes the investment of ߣ஺ሖ , there exists no ஺݂ that satisfies 
both Inequality (A4.2) and ஺݂ ൐ ߥሺݎ െ 2߬ሻ/ߦ. In this situation, the platform can set a 
non-full-coverage commission by making the investment more than the most efficient 
level, ܫ஺ሖ . If the platform takes this option, the total expected profit is maximised when 
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it makes the investment just above ܫ஺ഥ . However, the platform never chooses this option 
since setting ሺܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ሻ is more profitable than setting ሺܫ஺ഥ ൅ ߝ, ஺݂ሖ ሻ.  
 
Substep 1.3: Comparing the two types of the equilibria 
This part compares the platform’s profit when the platform decides to set the optimal 
full-coverage commission and the optimal non-full-coverage commission.  
If ݎ ൒ 4߬ holds, because the platform never sets the commission high enough to let the 
seller set a non-full-coverage price, the pair of the equilibrium commission and 
investment in the equilibrium is 
ሺ ஺݂∗, ܫ஺∗ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ሻ	݂݅	ߣ஺෪ ൑ ߣ஺തതത
ሺܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ሻ	݂݅	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪
ሺܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ሻ	݂݅	ߣ஺෢ ൒ ߣ஺തതത
ቑ. 
Note that ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ 1/ሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ ൑ 1/ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ  holds. 
Moreover, ܫ஺෡ ൏ ܫ஺෩  and ܫ஺ഥ  become equilibrium if ܫ஺෡ ൏ ܫ஺ഥ ൏ ܫ஺෩ . Hence, if ݎ ൒ 4߬ holds, 
the equilibrium investment is always equal to or higher than the case where the price 
parity clause is not allowed.37 
 
If 2߬ ൏ ݎ ൏ 4߬ holds, the platform may set the commission high enough to let the seller 
set a non-full-coverage price if ߣ஺ሖ ൐ ߣ஺തതത holds. In this situation, the platform prefers to 
set ሺܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ ሻ if the expected profit is larger than the expected profit when it sets the 
commission low enough to guarantee the full-coverage price. Suppose if ߣ஺ሖ ൐ ߣ஺തതത, the 
pair of the optimal commission and investment when the platform decides to set a 
commission low enough to guarantee the full-coverage price by the seller is ሺܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ሻ if 
ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	ߣ஺ሖ  and ൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ൯ if ߣ஺തതത ൑ ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺ሖ , because ܫ஺ሖ ൏ ܫ஺෩  and ߣ஺ሖ ൏ ߣ஺෪ hold if 2߬ ൏
ݎ ൏ 4߬. These two inequlaities can be proved as follows: 
݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺෩ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ െ ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ଵሺ	௥ିఛሻሺଵିఒభሻ െ
଼ఛ
ሺଵିఒభሻ௥	మ ൌ
௥మି଼ఛ௥ା଼ఛమ
ሺ	௥ିఛሻሺଵିఒభሻ௥మ  and ݎ
ଶ െ 8߬ݎ ൅
8߬ଶ ൏ 0 if 4߬ െ 2√2߬ ൏ ݎ ൏ 4߬ ൅ 2√2߬ holds.  
In this situation, the condition that the platform prefers to set ሺܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ ሻ when ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏
	ߣ஺ሖ  holds can be written as 
ߎ஺ሖ ൌ ௥
మ
଼ఛ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ	ܫ஺ሖ ൐
ఒభሺ௥ିఛሻሺ௥ିଶఛሻ
ఛ െ ܫ஺ഥ ൌ ߎ஺തതതത. 
The condition can be modified to  
                                                            
37 If ߙ ൐ 0, the equilibrium investment is strictly higher than in the case where the price parity clause is 
not allowed. 
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(A4.5) ܫ஺ሖ െ ܫ஺ഥ ൏ ௥
మ
଼ఛ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ
ఒభሺ௥ିఛሻሺ௥ିଶఛሻ
ఛ . 
The condition that the platform prefers to set ሺܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ ሻ when ߣ஺തതത ൑ ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺ሖ  holds can be 
written as 
ߎ஺ሖ ൌ ௥
మ
଼ఛ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ	ܫ஺ሖ ൐ ሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ
ܫ஺෡ ൌ ߎ஺෢ . 
The condition can be modified to 
(A4.6) ܫ஺ሖ െ ܫ஺෡ ൏ ௥
మ
଼ఛ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅ ߣଵቃ െ ሺ	ݎ െ 2߬ሻ ቂሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ݃ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൅
ߣଵቃ. 
 
If ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത holds, the platform never sets the commission high enough to let the seller 
set a non-full-coverage price. In this situation, the pair of the equilibrium commission 
and investment in the equilibrium is ሺܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ሻ if ߣ஺ሖ ൏ ߣ஺෪ ൑ ߣ஺തതത and ሺܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ሻ	if	ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏
ߣ஺෪. 
Note that ܫ஺ሖ ൐ ܫ஺෡  and ߣ஺ሖ ൐ ߣ஺෢ hold if 2߬ ൏ ݎ ൏ 4߬, since 
݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ െ ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺෡ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ ଼ఛሺଵିఒభሻ௥	మ െ
ଵ
ሺ	௥ିଶఛሻሺଵିఒభሻ ൌ
ିሺ௥ିସఛሻమ
ሺ	௥ିଶఛሻሺଵିఒభሻ௥మ ൏ 0.  
It follows that ሺܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ሻ cannot be an equilibrium if both 2߬ ൏ ݎ ൏ 4߬ and ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത hold. 
We next examine whether ܫ஺ and ߣ஺ increase by allowing a price parity clause. Note 
that ݃ᇱ ቀܫ஺ሖ ൅ ܫ஺ቁ ൌ 8߬/ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻݎ	ଶ ൑ 8߬/ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻݎ	ଶ . It follows that ܫ஺ሖ  is 
equal to or larger than the equilibrium investment in the case where the clause is not 
allowed. In addition, ܫ஺ሖ ൏ ܫ஺෩  holds. Hence, suppose 2߬ ൏ ݎ ൏ 4߬ , the equilibrium 
investment is always equal to or greater than the case in which the price parity clause 
is not allowed if ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത holds, if ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ  holds and Inequality (A4.5) does not 
hold, or if both ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺ሖ  holds and Inequality (A4.6) does not hold. On the other 
hand, if both ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ  and Inequality (A4.5) hold or if both ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	 ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺ሖ  and 
Inequality (A4.6) hold, the equilibrium investment can be smaller than the case where 
the price parity clause is not allowed. 
 
Step 2: Improvement of the platform’s profit by the introduction of a price parity clause 
Recall that ߎ஺തതതത is the platform’s profit when the pair of the equilibrium investment and 
commission is ൫ܫ஺ഥ , ஺݂ഥ ൯. If ݎ ൒ 4߬, ߎ஺തതതത is strictly larger than the platforms profit in the 
case where the clause is not allowed, because while the equilibrium price on the 
platform does not change with the introduction of the clause, the introduction of the 
clause raises the equilibrium investment and the commission. When the equilibrium 
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pair is ൫ܫ஺෩ , ஺݂෩ ൯ or ൫ܫ஺෡ , ஺݂෡ ൯, the option is the most profitable that ensures the profit is 
greater than ߎ஺തതതത.  
Similarly, if ݎ ൑ 4߬, ߎ஺ሖ  is strictly larger than the platform’s profit in the case where the 
clause is not allowed and when the equilibrium pair is other than ൫ܫ஺ሖ , ஺݂ሖ ൯, the platform’s 
profit is larger than ߎ஺ሖ . This result implies that if the platform is allowed to introduce 
the clause, it always prefers to introduce it. ∎ 
4.7.9 Proof of Proposition 4.6 
With regard to consumer surplus (CS), if all consumers have the information only on 
the product sold on sales channel ݉  and ݌ଵ௠ ൑ ݎ െ ߬  holds, the surplus of such 
consumers is 
׬ ሺݎ െ ߬ݔ	 െ ݌ଵ௠ሻ݀ݔ ൌ ݎ െ ଴.ହ߬ െଵ଴ ݌ଵ௠. 
If all consumers have the information only on the product sold on sales channel ݅ and 
if ݌ଵ௠ ൐ ݎ െ ߬ holds, the surplus of such consumers is 
׬ ሺݎ െ ߬ݔ	 െ ݌ଵ௠ሻ݀ݔ
ೝష೛భ೘
ഓ଴ ൌ ሺ௥ି௣భ೘ሻ
మ
ଶఛ . 
 
Let ܥܵ∗ and ܥܵ∗∗ denote the consumer surplus in the equilibrium when the price parity 
clause is not allowed and the consumer surplus in the equilibrium when the clauses are 
allowed respectively. ܥܵ∗ can be written as 
ܥܵ∗ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ 0.5ሺߣ஺∗ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺∗ߣଵሻ߬ ൅ ߣଵߝ	݂݅	ݎ ൒ 4߬	
ሺଵିఈሻሺఒಲ∗ିఒಲ∗ఒభሻ௥మ
ଷଶఛ ൅ 0.5ሺߙߣ஺∗∗ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߙߣ஺∗ߣଵሻ߬	݂݅	2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬
ሺଵିఈሻሺఒಲ∗ିఒಲ∗ఒభሻ௥మ
ଷଶఛ ൅
ሺఈఒಲ∗ାఒభିఈఒಲ∗ఒభሻ௥మ
଼ఛ 	݂݅	ݎ ൏ 2߬ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
, where 
ߣ஺∗	is ߣ஺ that is realised in equilibrium in the case where the price parity clause is not 
allowed. 
 
Next, we compare ܥܵ∗∗ with ܥܵ∗. 
Where ݎ ൒ 4߬,  
ܥܵ∗∗ ൌ ൞
0.5൫ߣ஺෪ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺෪ߣଵ൯߬	݂݅	ߣ஺෪ ൒ ߣ஺തതത
0.5ߣଵሺݎ െ ߬ሻ	݂݅	ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪
0.5൫ߣ஺෢ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺෢ߣଵ൯߬	݂݅	ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത
ൢ. 
171 
 
Note that ߣ஺∗ ൑ ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺෪ and ߣ஺തതത achieve equilibrium only if ߣ஺෢ ൏ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪, as shown 
in the proof of Lemma 4.6.38 Moreover, the introduction of the price parity clause does 
not change the price on the platform and increases the direct sales price only slightly. 
Those result imply that ܥܵ∗∗ ൒ ܥܵ∗ holds if ݎ ൒ 4߬ except when both ߙ ൌ 0 and ߣ஺෢ ൑
ߣ஺തതത hold.  
 
Where 2߬ ൑ ݎ ൏ 4߬, 
 ܥܵ∗∗ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ 0.5൫ߣ஺෪ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺෪ߣଵ൯߬	݂݅	ߣ஺ሖ ൏ ߣ஺෪ ൑ ߣ஺തതത0.5ߣଵሺݎ െ ߬ሻ	݂݅	ܽሻ	ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪	݋ݎ	݂݅	ܾሻ	ߣ஺෢ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺തതതത
0.5൫ߣ஺෢ ൅ ߣଵ െ ߣ஺෢ߣଵ൯߬	݂݅	ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൑ ߎ஺෢
൫ఒಲሖ ାఒభିఒಲሖ ఒభ൯௥మ
ଷଶఛ 	݂݅	ܽሻ	ߣ஺ሖ ൑ ߣ஺തതത ൏ ߣ஺෪	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺തതതത	݋ݎ
																							݂݅	ܾሻ	ߣ஺തതത ൏ 	ߣ஺෢ ൏	ߣ஺ሖ 	ܽ݊݀	ߎ஺ሖ ൐ ߎ஺෢ ۙ
ۖۖ
ۘ
ۖۖ
ۗ
. 
If ߣ஺ሖ ൏ ߣ஺തതത	holds ܥܵ∗∗ ൏ ܥܵ∗ can happen only if the equilibrium investment level is 
lower than the equilibrium investment when the clause is not allowed, because the 
introduction of price parity clause does not change the direct sales price and decreases 
the price on the platform in this situation.  
If ߣ஺ሖ ൒ ߣ஺തതത	holds, ܥܵ∗∗ ൏ ܥܵ∗ can happen if the introduction of the clause increases the 
direct sales price without decreasing the platform price or decreases the equilibrium 
investment. 
 
Where ݎ ൏ 2߬,  
ܥܵ∗∗ ൌ ቐ
ሺఒಲሖ ାఒభିఒಲሖ ఒభሻ௥మ
ଷଶఛ 	݂݅	ߣ஺ේ ൒
ଷఒభ
ଵିఒభ
ఒభ௥మ
଼ఛ 	݂݅	ߣ஺ේ ൏
ଷఒభ
ଵିఒభ
ቑ. 
In this situation, ܥܵ∗∗ ൏ ܥܵ∗  can happen if 	ߣ஺ේ ൒ 3ߣଵ/1 െ ߣଵ  holds, because the 
introduction of the clause increases the direct sales price without decreasing the 
platform price. If	ߣ஺ේ ൏ 3ߣଵ/1 െ ߣଵ, ܥܵ∗∗ ൏ ܥܵ∗ always holds. This is because 
ܥܵ∗∗ െ ܥܵ∗ ൌ ఒభ௥మ଼ఛ െ
ሺଵିఈሻ൫ఒಲ∗ିఒಲ∗ఒభ൯௥మ
ଷଶఛ െ
൫ఈఒಲ∗ାఒభିఈఒಲ∗ఒభ൯௥మ
଼ఛ ൌ
െ ሺଵିఈሻ൫ఒಲ∗ିఒಲ∗ఒభ൯௥మଷଶఛ െ
ఈఒಲ∗ሺଵିఒభሻ௥మ
଼ఛ ൏ 0. 
Comparing ܥܵ∗	with ܥܵ∗∗ gives Proposition 4.3. ∎ 
                                                            
38 ߣ஺∗ ൌ ߣ஺෢ holds only if ߙ ൌ 0. 
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Chapter 5: Platform Competition and Effects of 
Platform Parity Clauses Where There Exist Duopoly 
Platforms, Duopoly Sellers and Uninformed 
Consumers  
5.1. Introduction  
Chapter 4 analyses the case in which there is one monopoly platform and one monopoly 
seller in order to analyse the effect of the price parity clause such that the seller must 
not set its direct sales price lower than its price sold on the platform, called a “narrow 
price parity clause”. By contrast, this chapter analyses a model where there exists 
competition between two platforms (Platform ܣ and ܤ) and between two sellers (Seller 
1 and 2) in order to analyse the effect of wide price parity clauses, which prohibit sellers 
from selling at lower prices on other platforms. To simplify the discussion and focus 
on the effects of wide price parity clauses, in this section, the possibility of direct sales 
to consumers by the sellers are excluded.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the differences between the 
assumptions from Chapter 4 and the assumptions made in this chapter. Section 3 then 
analyses the optimal behaviours of the platforms, the sellers and the consumers when 
there are two platforms and two sellers and when price parity clauses are not allowed. 
The effect on competition and the consumers when the two platforms can impose price 
parity clauses on the seller is analysed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents 
concluding remarks and the implications for competition policy that derive from this 
chapter’s analysis.  
5.2. Basic Assumptions 
Most basic assumptions of this chapter are common to Chapter 4’s assumptions, as 
follows. In order to consider the effect of wide price parity clauses, it is assumed that 
there are three types of players: two sellers (Seller 1 and Seller 2), two platforms 
(Platform ܣ and Platform B) and consumers.  
 
Moreover, as with Chapter 4, this chapter analyses the theoretical model based on the 
informative advertising model for platforms with product differentiation between 
173 
 
sellers. This model covers the situation in which getting awareness from consumers 
who may not be informed about the existence of a product is important for sellers. 
 
In order to consider consumers’ limited awareness of products and the possibility of 
consumers switching of sales channels, parameters regarding consumers’ awareness of 
products are introduced. 
 
In particular, it is assumed that only a share of ߣ௞ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ consumers know about the 
existence of any product sold on Platform ݇, where ݇ ൌ ܣ	or	ܤ. It is assumed that ߣ௞ 
depends on the amount of investment Platform ݇ has made, ܫ௞, where ܫ௞ ൒ 0. Note that 
while ܫ௞  is an endogenous variable, ܫ௞  is an exogenous variable. Specifically, it is 
assumed that the two platforms have the same investment function such that ߣ௞ ൌ
݃ሺܫ௞ሻ , where ݃ᇱሺܫ௞ሻ ൐ 0  and ݃ᇱᇱሺܫ௞ሻ ൏ 0 . It is also assumed the probability to be 
noticed cannot be 1 even if it makes the investment as high as possible. In other words, 
limூೖ→ାஶ݃ሺܫ௞ሻ ൏ 1 holds.  
 
The assumptions about the consumers'awareness of the platforms imply that four types 
of consumers exist, depending on the information consumers have: (1) The product(s) 
sold on both platforms, (2) only the product(s) sold on Platform ܣ, (3) only the product 
sold on Platform ܤ or (4) no information about either product. The proportions of those 
four types of consumers are ߣ஺ߣଵ , ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ , ሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣଵ	 and ሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻሺ1 െ ߣଵሻ 
respectively. 
 
 
With regard to consumers, it is assumed that a unit mass of consumers are uniformly 
distributed over the unit interval (Hotelling model). The relationship between the sellers 
and the platforms is a client–agent relationship. When a seller contracts with a platform, 
it can sell its product on the platform. The seller decides the price of its product sold on 
the platform, ݌௜௞ where ݅ ൌ 1	or	2,	݇ ൌ ܣ	or	ܤ. In exchange, the seller needs to pay a 
commission, ௞݂, for each unit it sells. There are no further cost (e.g., upfront fee) to use 
the platform. It is assumed that Seller 1 is located at 0 and Seller 2 is located at 1. The 
utility of consumer ݔ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ when purchasing Seller 1’s product sold on the sales 
channel ݇ is ݑ ൌ ݎ െ ߬ݔ െ ݌ଵ௞, and the utility when purchasing Seller 2’s product is 
ݒ ൌ ݎ െ ߬ሺ1 െ ݔሻ െ ݌ଶ௞. The variable ߬ ൐ 039 can be understood as the transportation 
cost. The definition of the utility functions implies that the utility of the most distant 
consumer to purchase the product of Seller ݅ ∈ 1	,2 at Sales Channel ݇ ∈ ܣ	, ܤ is ݎ െ
߬ െ ݌௜௞.  
 
                                                            
39 When it is assumed that ߬ ൌ 0, the equilibrium behaviours of the sellers and platforms are different 
from the ߬ ൐ 0 case. This is because in this situation the competition the sellers are facing is Bertrand 
model rather than Hotteling model.   
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From the proportions of the four types of consumers based on their information and the 
assumption about the utility, the demands of the product sold on both sales channels 
given ݌ଵ஺, ݌ଵ஻, ݌ଶ஺ and ݌ଶ஻ can be summarised in Figure 5.1 below.	40  
 
Figure 5.1 Utility of consumers when ݌ଵ஺ ൏ ݌ଶ஺ ൏ ݌ଵ஻ ൌ ݌ଶ஻  
 
 
 
 
The sequence of the game is defined as follows. 
1. Two platforms decide the amount of investment, and then decide the commission 
( ௞݂) they offer to the sellers. 
2. Two sellers decide whether they contract with the platform and, if so, decide the price 
sold on each platform (݌௜௞). 
3. Consumers decide whether they purchase the product of the sellers or not and through 
which sales channel they purchase. 
 
In addition, the following assumptions are specific to this chapter.  
 
                                                            
40 This illustration is also based on Figure 6.1 of Belleflamme and Peitz (2015). 
175 
 
- [No direct sales] Chapter 4 assumes that there are two types of consumers, active 
consumers and inactive consumers, and only active consumers carry out searching 
behaviours to obtain information about prices that they initially do not have. In this 
chapter, for simplicity, it is assumed that all the consumers are inactive consumers, who 
choose only from the options they initially know and never search. It follows that direct 
sales by the sellers never happen. This assumption also implies that a seller can sell the 
product only if it contracts with at least one platform. 
 
- [Large ݎ to guarantee full-coverage price equilibrium] Variable ݎ is assumed to be 
large enough to guarantee that all the consumers who have information about at least 
one of the seller’s products purchase the product in the equilibrium (ݎ ൒ 2߬). The 
reason is that if it does not hold, there will be no competition between sellers. 
 
- [Tie break rule] It is assumed that if a seller sets the same price on the two platforms 
(݌௜஺ ൌ ݌௜஻), the consumers with the information about the product sold on Platform ܣ 
and that sold on Platform ܤ  will purchase the product on Platform ܣ  with the 
probability of 0.5 and on Platform ܤ with the probability of 0.5. 
If there is more than one set of equilibrium prices for the sellers, the seller prefers to set 
prices such that it can sell more on the platform offering the lower commission.  
5.3. No Possibility of Price Parity Clause 
This section analyses the case where the platform is not allowed to introduce a price 
parity clause. 
Analysis on this model by the backward induction approach provides Proposition 5.1, 
which will be proved in the following sections. 
 
Proposition 5.1. Suppose the platform is not allowed to introduce a price parity clause, 
there always exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the platforms choose the 
investment level ሺܫ஺∗, ܫ஻∗ሻ such that 
ܫ஺∗ ൌ ܫ஻∗ ൌ ܫ∗ and 
݃ᇱሺܫ∗ሻ൫1 െ ݃ሺܫ∗ሻ൯ ൌ 1ݎ െ ߬. 
Then, each platform sets a commission based on the cumulative distribution function, 
ܪሺ ௞݂ሻ such that  
ܪሺ ௞݂ሻ ൌ ൞
0	݂݋ݎ	 ௞݂ ∈ ሾ0, ሺ1 െ ߣ∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻሿ
ଵ
ఒ∗ ቂ1 െ
ሺଵିఒ∗ሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
௙ೖ ቃ ݂݋ݎ	 ௞݂ ∈ ሺሺ1 െ ߣ
∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ	
1	݂݋ݎ	 ௞݂ ∈ ሾሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ൅∞ሻ
ൢ,   
where	݇ ∈ ܣ, ܤ and ߣ∗ ൌ ݃ሺܫ∗ሻ.  
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The sellers set their prices such that   
݌ଵ௞∗ ൌ ݌ଶ௞∗ ൌ ൞
௞݂ ൅ ߬			݂݅	0 ൑ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ 1.5߬
ݎ െ 0.5߬	݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ 	 ௟݂	݋ݎ
																								݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬	ܽ݊݀	 ௟݂ 	൑ ௞݂
ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ߝ	݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൏ ௟݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
ൢ, 
where ߝ is a small positive amount. 
 
Proposition 5.1 shows that in the equilibrium the two platforms make the same amount 
of investment. Note that if ݎ is high or ߬ is low, the optimal amount of investment, ܫ∗ 
rises, so the equilibrium share of the consumers who are aware of each platforms, ߣ∗, 
also rises. 
The result can be summarised in Corollary 5.1. 
Corollary 5.1. If there are two sellers and two platforms, the amounts of the investment 
made by the two platforms and the share of the consumers being aware of the two 
platforms in the equilibrium increases as ݎ increases and decreases as ߬ increases. 
 
Recall that ߬  is a transportation cost parameter and if ߬  is high, the utility for the 
consumer located at a distance from a seller is smaller. It follows that low ߬ compared 
to ݎ means that the two sellers’ products are similar to each other, and, hence, the 
product is less differentiated. It follows that there will be fierce competition between 
the two sellers. Corollary 5.1 shows that when there is a fiercer competition, the amount 
of the investment and the share of the consumers being aware of each platform are 
smaller.  
Moreover, the effectiveness of the investment determined by the form of the investment 
function and the share of the consumers who are aware of each platform before they 
make investment ܫ also have the influence on the values of ܫ∗ and ߣ∗ . However, there 
is no straightforward relationship between these factors and the values of ܫ∗ and ߣ∗.  
Proposition 5.1 also shows that while the sellers adopt pure strategies like the results in 
Chapter 4, the platforms adopt mixed strategies, whose support is ௞݂ ∈ ൫ሺ1 െ ߣ∗ሻሺݎ െ
߬ሻ, ݎ െ ߬൯ in the equilibrium, because each platform has an incentive to undercut its 
commission as long as the other platform’s commission is higher than a certain 
threshold. It follows that dispersion of the platforms’ commissions is found in the 
equilibrium. The range of the dispersion of the platforms’ commissions becomes wider 
as the utility of the farthest consumer (ݎ െ ߬) gets larger, because the equilibrium 
consumer awareness (ߣ∗) depends on ݎ െ ߬. This growth in the support reflects that if 
ߣ∗ is close to 1, there are few captive consumers for each platform. On the other hand, 
if ߣ∗ is close to zero, almost all consumers who are aware of the platform are captive 
consumers to it. 
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Note that by differentiating the cumulative distribution function, the following 
probability distribution function holds: 
݄ሺ ௞݂ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣ
∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ
ߣ∗ ௞݂ଶ
. 
The result implies that the probability decreases in ௞݂.  
Moreover, the average commission under this mixed-strategy equilibrium is given by 
݂̅ ൌ න ݄ሺ ௞݂ሻ ௞݂݀ ௞݂
௥ିఛ
ሺଵିఒ∗ሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
ൌ ቈሺ1 െ ߣ
∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ
ߣ∗ ݈݊ ௞݂ ൅ ܥ቉ሺଵିఒ∗ሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
௥ିఛ
ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣ
∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ
ߣ௟ ሾ݈݊ሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ ݈݊ሺ1 െ ߣ
∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻሿ
ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣ
∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ
ߣ௟ ݈݊ ൬
1
1 െ ߣ∗൰. 
 
This shows that the expected commission is increasing in ݎ െ ߬. It also shows that the 
expected commission rises when ߣ௟ lessens, since 
∂݂/߲̅ߣ௟ ൌ െሺݎ െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߣ∗ሻ/ߣ∗ଶ ൏ 0. 
 
The popularity of the other platform drives lower commission because when ߣ∗ is high, 
the number of captive consumers for each platform is small. In this situation, the 
necessity to undercut the commission increases.  
 
On the other hand, the two sellers’ prices on one platform are equal. The prices depend 
on the commission that a platform actually imposed. When the commission which a 
platform proposes is low, the sellers set prices such that they can get a margin of ߬, 
because setting the price is the best response for each seller, given the other seller’s 
price. However, when the commission is high, they cannot transfer the high commission 
to the consumers to get that margin, because the willingness to pay of the consumer 
who is located in the middle now works as a constraint.  
5.3.1 Consumers’ Behaviour 
In this case, there are four types of consumers: those who know both Platform ݇ and 
Platform ݈, those who know only Platform ݇, those who know only Platform ݈, and 
those who do not know any platform. 
Let ܳ௜, ܳ௝ denote the total demand for each seller’s product and ݍ௜ሺ݌௜, ݌௝ሻ denote the 
demand for Seller ݅’s product when all consumers have the same information such that 
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the lowest prices of Seller ݅’s product and Seller ݆’s product they know are ݌௜ and ݌௝, 
respectively. Note that ݌௜௞ ൌ ൅∞ if Seller ݅ does not sell its product on Platform ݇. 
Similarly, ݌௜ ൌ ൅∞ if the consumers are not aware of Seller ݅’s product. 
The demand of the three types of consumers can be summarised in Lemma 5.1. 
 
Lemma 5.1. i) [Product demand when all consumers have the same information]  
The product demand when all consumers have the same information can be written as 
follows: 
 
ܽሻ	if	݌௝ ൏ ݎ െ ߬ 
ݍ௜ሺ݌௜, ݌௞ሻ 	ൌ ቐ
1
0.5 െ ௣೔ି	௣ೕଶఛ0
   
݂݅	݌௜ ൑ ݌௝ െ ߬
	݂݅	݌௝ െ ߬ ൏ ݌௜ ൑ ݌௝ ൅ ߬
݂݅	݌௜ ൐ ݌௝ ൅ ߬
ൢ 
 
ܾሻ	if	ݎ െ ߬ ൑ ݌௝ ൏ ݎ 
ݍ௜ሺ݌௜, ݌௞ሻ 	ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ 10.5 െ ௣೔ି	௣ೕଶఛ௥ି௣೔
ఛ0
									 			
	݂݅	݌௜ ൑ ݌௝ െ ߬
݂݅	݌௝ െ ߬ ൏ ݌௜ ൑ 2ݎ െ ߬ െ ݌௝
݂݅	2ݎ െ ߬ െ ݌௝ ൏ ݌௜ ൑ ݎ
݂݅	݌௜ ൐ ݎ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
 
 
ܿሻ	if	݌௝ ൒ ݎ 
ݍ௜ሺ݌௜, ݌௞ሻ 	ൌ ቐ
1௥ି௣೔
ఛ0
 
݂݅	݌௜ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
	݂݅	ݎ െ ߬ ൏ ݌௜ ൑ ݎ
݂݅	݌௜ ൐ ݎ
ൢ. 
 
ii) [Total product demand from consumers who have different information] The 
demand for Seller i’s product can be written as 
ܳ௜ ൌ ߣ௞ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿݍ௜൫݌௜௞, ݌௝௞൯ ൅ ሾ1 െ ߣ௞ሿߣ௟ݍ௜൫݌௜௟, ݌௝௟൯
൅ ߣ௞ߣ௟ݍ௜ ቀ݉݅݊ሺ݌௜௞, ݌௜௟ሻ,݉݅݊൫݌௝௞, ݌௝௟൯ቁ. 
 
iii) [Platform demand] Let ܳ௞ denote the quantity of products sold on Platform k. The 
quantity can be written as  
ܳ௞ ൌ ߣ௞ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿൣݍ௜൫݌௜௞, ݌௝௞൯ ൅ ݍ௝൫݌௜௞, ݌௝௞൯൧ ൅
ߣ௞ߣ௟ሾߛ௜௞ݍ௜ ቀ݉݅݊ሺ݌௜௞, ݌௜௟ሻ,݉݅݊൫݌௝௞, ݌௝௟൯ቁ ൅ ߛ௝௞ݍ௝ ቀ݉݅݊ሺ݌௜௞, ݌௜௟ሻ,݉݅݊൫݌௝௞, ݌௝௟൯ቁሿ , 
where ߛ௜௞ ൌ ቐ
1	݂݅	݌௜௞ ൏ ݌௜௟
0.5	݂݅	݌௜௞ ൌ ݌௜௟
0	݂݅	݌௜௞ ൐ ݌௜௟
ቑ. 
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Proof: See Appendix D 
 
This lemma shows that depending on the prices, the constraint that binds the demand 
of a seller’s product varies. If the price of the other seller’s product is relatively high or 
if the consumers do not have the information about the other seller’s product, the 
demand is determined by the possibility that the consumers decide not to buy the 
seller’s product. On the other hand, if the difference between the prices of the two 
sellers’ products is small, the demand is constrained by the price of the other seller’s 
product. This result reflects price competition under the standard Hotelling model. 
5.3.2 Seller’s Behaviour 
The two sellers are symmetric in the sense that they face an equivalent demand function 
as shown in Lemma 5.1, and their marginal costs are the same ( ஺݂ for the transaction 
through Platform ܣ and ஻݂  for the transaction through Platform ܤ). Therefore, it is 
natural to consider that there exists a symmetric equilibrium with respect to the two 
sellers’ pricing as long as the commissions are not too high. 
The sellers’ optimal pricing are summarised in Lemma 5.2. 
 
Lemma 5.2. [Optimal sellers’ platform choices and prices] Anticipating the consumers’ 
response specified in Lemma 5.1, given ஺݂, ஻݂, ܫ஺ and ܫ஻, the optimal behaviour of the 
seller is as follows: 
i) If ஺݂ ൑ ݎ and ஻݂ ൑ ݎ hold, both sellers decide to use both platforms. 
ii) If ஺݂ ൑ ݎ and ஻݂ ൑ ݎ hold, the sellers’ optimal pricing policy is   
݌ଵ௞∗ ൌ ݌ଶ௞∗ ൌ ൞
௞݂ ൅ ߬											݂݅	0 ൑ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ 1.5߬
ݎ െ 0.5߬	݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൏ 	 ௟݂	݋ݎ
																				݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬	ܽ݊݀	 ௟݂ 	൑ ௞݂
ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ߝ	݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൏ ௟݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
ൢ, 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ݇, ݈ ∈ ܣ, ܤ and ݇ ് ݈. 
 
Proof: See Appendix D 
 
The optimal price on Platform ݇ given ௞݂ can be summarised in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Seller’s price on a platform under the full-coverage symmetric equilibrium 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that when the commission is low, the sellers’ optimal price increases 
as the commission grows, because in this case, the optimal price is such that each seller 
obtains a margin of ߬. However, when the commission is higher than a certain point 
( ௞݂ ൒ ݎ െ 1.5߬), such pricing is no-longer full-coverage price in the sense that the 
consumers whose location is distant from the sellers (i.e., consumers located near the 
middle of the Hotelling line) prefer not to purchase the product. In this situation, the 
optimal price is constrained by the willingness to pay of the consumer located the 
middle of the Hotelling line. If a platform sets a commission higher than ݎ െ ߬, the 
optimal reaction by the seller to set such a high price that consumers who are in the 
middle of the Hotelling line are not covered and the two sellers are not in the direct 
competition, which is the case we ruled out by assumption. In this situation, the optimal 
price for the sellers is ሺݎ ൅ ௞݂ሻ/2. 
5.3.3 Platform’s Behaviour regarding Commission and Investment 
Lemma 5.2 implies that if the commission that one platform sets is higher than the other 
platform’s commission, the price that the sellers set for the platform also be higher than 
the other. It follows that the transactions on the platform are smaller. 
Taking this into account, the profits for Platform ݇ can be written as follows: 
 	
ܽሻ	 ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ 	߬ 
ߎ௞ ൌ ቐ
ߣ௞ ௞݂	݂݅	 ௞݂ ൏ ௟݂
ߣ௞ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻ ௞݂	݂݅	 ௞݂ ൌ ௟݂
ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻ ௞݂	݂݅	 ௞݂ ൐ ௟݂
ቑ 
	
ܾሻ	ݎ െ 	߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ 
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ߎ௞ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
ߣ௞
ߣ௞ ሺ௥ି௙ೖሻ௙ೖ	ఛ 	݂݅	 ௞݂ ൏ ௟݂
ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻ ሺ௥ି௙ೖሻ௙ೖ	ఛ 	݂݅	 ௞݂ ൌ ௟݂
ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻ ሺ௥ି௙ೖሻ௙ೖ	ఛ 	݂݅	 ௞݂ ൐ ௟݂ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
. 
 
The profit of a platform is shown by Figure 5.3 below. 
 
Figure 5.3 Platform’s profits  
 
The inverted U-shaped graphs in Figure 5.3 are Platform ݇’s profit when it sets a 
commission high enough to guarantee that the sellers respond to set such high prices 
that some consumers prefer not to purchase the products through the platform (i.e., non-
full-coverage equilibrium happens). Because the number of the consumers who prefer 
not to purchase increases as the commission increases, the profit decreases when the 
commission is low and when the commission is higher than a certain point, 0.5ݎ.  
The upward-sloping straight lines in Figure 5.3 are Platform ݇’s profit when it sets a 
commission low enough that the sellers set prices such that the consumers who are 
aware of at least one platform will purchase a product. The platform’s profit is directly 
proportional to ௞݂, because the consumers who are aware of at least one platform will 
purchase a product (i.e., full-coverage equilibrium happens). In other words, the value 
of ௞݂ does not affect the demand. 
As shown in Figure 5.3, when the platform’s commission is lower than ݎ െ ߬, the full-
coverage equilibrium happens, and the platform’s profit is given by one of the upward-
sloping straight lines. When the commission is higher than ݎ െ ߬, the non-full-coverage 
equilibrium occurs, and the profit is given by one of the inverted U-shaped graphs. 
These results are consistent with Lemma 5.2. Since the profit when the commission is 
high enough to result in the non-full-coverage equilibrium decreases in ௞݂ , the 
platforms do not have an incentive to set commissions higher than ݎ െ ߬ . Hence, 
hereafter, we consider only the cases in which the platforms set the commissions equal 
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to or less than ݎ െ ߬, which are represented as the upward-sloping straight lines in 
Figure 5.3.  
Figure 5.3 also shows three pairs of inverted U-shaped graphs and upward-sloping 
straight lines. The graphs show that the profit differs depending on the relationship 
between the two platforms’ commissions (i.e., higher, lower or equal). The top graph 
of the three inverted U-shaped graphs and the top graph of the three upward-sloping 
straight lines are the profits when Platform ݇ offers a commission lower than Platform 
݈ ’s commission. In this situation, the platform gains the transactions of all the 
consumers who aware of both platforms, whose number is given by ߣ௞ߣ௟. The number 
of the consumers who purchase through the platform is given by ߣ௞. 
The middle graphs are the profits when Platform ݇ offers the same commission as 
Platform ݈’s commission. In this situation, the transactions related to the consumers 
aware of both platforms are equally divided, and the number of consumers purchasing 
through the platform is ߣ௞ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻ.  
The bottom graphs represent the profit when one platform offers a commission higher 
than the another platform’s commission. In this situation, only the consumers who are 
aware of only the platform purchase the product through the platform, and the number 
of consumers purchasing through the platform is ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻ. 
These figures imply that as long as the relation with the other platform’s commission 
is not changed, the profit is maximised when the commission is equal to ݎ െ ߬. It 
follows that the platform can obtain at least a profit of ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ by setting its 
commission at ݎ െ ߬. When the other platform’s commission is equal to or higher than 
ݎ െ ߬, the profit rises to ߣ௞ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ or ߣ௞ሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, respectively.  
The discussion above implies that Platform ݇’s profit given the other platform’s profit 
can be summarised in Figure 5.4 below. 
 
Figure 5.4 Platform ݇’s profit given ௟݂  
1) ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൏ ௟݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ 
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2) ௟݂ ൑ ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ 
 
 
Figure 5.4.1 shows the profit of Platform ݇ if the competing platform’s commission is 
high (i.e., equal to or close to ݎ െ ߬). In this situation, if the platform decides to set a 
commission higher than that of the other platform, the platform’s profit is maximised 
ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ when it sets its commission at ݎ െ ߬. However, in this case, the 
platform can secure greater profit by setting its commission lower than that of the other 
platform (i.e., ௞݂ ൌ ௟݂ െ ߝ, where ߝ is a small non-negative amount). In this situation, 
the platform can obtain a profit of ߣ௞ሺ ௟݂ െ ߝሻ. 
However, the profit that Platform ݇ can obtain by setting its commission slightly lower 
than that of the competing platform decreases as ௟݂  diminishes. If the competing 
platform’s commission is lower than ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ as shown in Figure 5.4.2, giving 
up the consumers who are aware of both platforms, charging ݎ െ ߬, and securing the 
profit of ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ  is more profitable. This situation arises if ௟݂ ൑ ሺ1 െ
ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ.  
The result shows that a platform does not have an incentive to set a commission such 
that ௞݂ ൐ ݎ െ ߬ or ௞݂ ൏ ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ regardless of the value of the other platform’s 
commission. Platform ݇’s best response given Platform	݈’s commission can be written 
as follows: 
௞݂ ൌ ൜ݎ െ ߬		݂݅	 ௟݂ ൑ ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ	݋ݎ	݂݅	 ௟݂ ൐ 	ݎ െ ߬௟݂ െ ߝ	݂݅	ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൏ ௟݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൠ. 
Moreover, the above discussion shows that each platform has an incentive to undercut 
the commission if the other platform’s commission satisfies ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൏ ௟݂ ൑
ݎ െ ߬. However, if the other platform’s commission decreases to ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, the 
platform’s profit is then maximised by raising the commission to ݎ െ ߬. This result 
implies that there does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium with respect to platforms’ 
commissions, meaning that the only possible equilibrium is a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium. Solving the profit-maximisation problem for the platforms gives the 
optimal platforms’ commissions and investment, as summarised Lemma 5.3. 
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Lemma 5.3. [Optimal platforms’ investment and commissions] Anticipating the 
responses by the consumers and the sellers specified in Lemmata 5.1 and 5.2, the 
optimal behaviours of the two platforms are as follows: 
i) Both platforms choose the investment level such that 
ܫ஺∗ ൌ ܫ஻∗ ൌ ܫ∗ and 
݃ᇱሺܫ∗ሻ൫1 െ ݃ሺܫ∗ሻ൯ ൌ 	 1ݎ െ ߬. 
ii) Both platforms set their commissions based on the cumulative distribution function, 
ܪሺ ௞݂ሻ such that, where  
ܪሺ ௞݂ሻ ൌ ൞
0	݂݋ݎ	 ௞݂ ∈ ሾ0, ሺ1 െ ߣ∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻሿ
ଵ
ఒ∗ ቂ1 െ
ሺଵିఒ∗ሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
௙ೖ ቃ ݂݋ݎ	 ௞݂ ∈ ሺሺ1 െ ߣ
∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ	
1	݂݋ݎ	 ௞݂ ∈ ሾሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ൅∞ሻ
ൢ, 
where ߣ∗ ൌ ݃ሺܫ∗ሻ.   
iii) Each platform’s expected profit is given by ߣ∗ሺ1 െ ߣ∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ.  
 
Proof: See Appendix D 
 
Lemma 5.3 shows a unique equilibrium with respect to the platforms’ commission in 
which each of the two platforms chooses the mixed strategy whose support is ௞݂ ∈
൫ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ݎ െ ߬൯. Therefore, the commissions will disperse.  
This lemma also shows that the expected profit of each platform in this equilibrium is 
equal to the maximum profit that it can obtain when its commission is higher than the 
rival platform’s commission. This is because, under the mixed-strategy equilibrium, all 
commissions included in the support of the mixed strategy must give the same expected 
profit, and when a platform sets its commission at ݎ െ ߬, the expected profit is the profit 
when the other platform sets the commission lower than the platform. 
From Lemmata 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, Proposition 5.1 can be obtained directly. 
 
Note that this result also shows that the existence of the competition lowers the 
platform’s commission although the effect on the sellers’ prices in the equilibrium are 
ambiguous. According to Lemma 5.2, if there exists only one platform, the platform’s 
optimal commission is ݎ െ ߬, because in this situation the monopoly platform does not 
need to care about the possibility that it loses profit to the other platform’s undercutting 
of the commission. In this situation, both sellers’ prices are equal to ݎ െ 0.5߬. This 
equality implies that if there is only one platform, the entry of a platform decreases the 
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commission, but the extent of the decrease is uncertain because the optimal 
commissions after the entry are determined based on the mixed strategy. It follows that 
the entry may not change the optimal prices from the sellers, because if the realised 
commissions of the two platforms are larger than ݎ െ 1.5߬, the optimal sellers’ prices 
remain ݎ െ 0.5߬. 
Moreover, the result that while there is no price dispersion in the sellers’ prices, there 
exists a price dispersion in the platforms’ commissions may look unrealistic, which is 
caused by the uncertainty about the rival’s behaviour. In real cases, each platform may 
deal with this uncertainty in various ways. One possibility is that platforms introduce 
certain actions to reduce the uncertainty. Section 4 discusses that introduction of price 
parity clauses to reduce such uncertainty.41  
5.4. Allowing Price Parity Clause  
5.4.1 Assumptions 
This section considers what happens when two platforms are allowed to impose the 
price parity clauses such that the seller’s prices must satisfy ݌௜௞ ൑ ݌௜௟ for both sellers. 
To simplify the discussion, in this section it is also assumed that sellers already decide 
to use both platforms and that platforms have strong power enough to guarantee that 
when a platform imposes a price parity clause, the sellers must accept it and sell on both 
platforms (i.e., ݍଵ௞ ൐ 0 and ݍଶ௞ ൐ 0 hold as long as ௞݂ ൑ ݎ holds). In other words, the 
options such that a seller decides not to use one of the two platforms are assumed to be 
excluded. Recall that in the no-price-parity-clause case, the sellers always choose to use 
the platforms. This choice implies that the additional assumption that the sellers decide 
to use both platforms does not change the results in the case where the price parity 
clause is not allowed. What difference ensues if this additional assumption is relaxed is 
discussed in Section 4.5. 
Note that the dominant platform model analysed in Chapter 4 shows that in some 
situations (e.g., when ߣ஺෪ ൒ ߣ஺തതത), the possibility that the seller decides not to use a 
platform does not effectively change the platform’s behaviour in the equilibrium.  
5.4.2 Analysis 
Analysis on this model provides Proposition 5.2, which will be proved in this section. 
                                                            
41 Another possibility is that platforms try to acquire a competitive advantage against their rivals by 
reducing the costs for sellers other than commissions or providing consumers some benefits such as 
lowering search costs. 
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Proposition 5.2. Suppose the two platforms are allowed to offer a price parity clause. 
In the unique equilibrium, the two platforms introduce price parity clauses, and the two 
platforms make the same amount of investment, which is strictly larger than the 
equilibrium investment in the case where the clause is not allowed. Then the platforms 
sets commissions as if they are colluding with each other, whose amount is strictly 
higher than the equilibrium commission in the case where the clause is not allowed. 
The equilibrium sellers’ prices are equal to or higher than the highest possible prices 
that can be realised in the case where the clause is not allowed.  
 
Proposition 5.2 shows that if the price parity clause is allowed, the platforms always 
introduce them. It also shows that the equilibrium investments and the commissions are 
strictly higher than those when the clause is not allowed. The two platforms set the 
same commissions, whose amount is equal to the level that they would set if they 
colluded with each other.  
This result implies that the price parity clause excludes the possibility that the 
transactions of the consumers who are aware of both platforms are dominated by the 
other platform through undercutting its commission (which is the cause of the mixed-
strategy equilibrium in the case where the clause is not allowed); hence, the two 
platforms can set their highest possible price. In this way, the price parity clause enables 
the platforms to avoid the commission-cutting condition and to set their commissions 
to the level that they would set if they colluded with each other. The higher commission 
enabled by the price parity clauses guarantees that they can invest more.  
The result shows that in contrast to the equilibrium prices when the price parity clause 
is not allowed, the four prices, the prices of the two sellers on the two platforms, in the 
equilibrium are all equal ( ݌ଵ஺ ൌ ݌ଵ஻ ൌ ݌ଶ஺ ൌ ݌ଶ஻ ൌ ݎ െ 0.5߬ ), because the 
commissions of the two platforms are equal. The equilibrium prices can be higher than 
those when the clause is not allowed. On the other hand, one of the striking results in 
this study is that the sellers’ equilibrium prices may be unchanged even when the clause 
is not allowed. This result is same as Johanson and Verge (2016). They show that the 
possibility that the sellers refuse to use platforms offering price parity clauses constrains 
the  platform’s ability to set high commissions (they call it as “supplier’s participation 
constraint”), which follows that the equilibrium prices of the sellers do not change. In 
our, the situation such that the prices do not change by allowing the clauses happen 
because the sellers’ equilibrium prices are constrained by the willingness to pay of the 
consumer, whose location is in the middle of the Hoteling line when the commissions 
are high. This constraint is binding at the equilibrium commission in the case where the 
clause is allowed. Even in the case where the clause is not allowed, the constraint is 
binding when the realised commission under the mixed-strategy equilibrium is high.  
As shown Section 4.3 of this chapter, the prohibition of the price parity clauses is likely 
to raise the sellers’ prices if the equilibrium share of the consumers who are aware of 
187 
 
each platform in the non-price-parity-clauses case, ߣ∗, is high or if ݎ is high compared 
to ߬.  
 
In order to prove Proposition 5.2, first we consider the case where both platforms offer 
the price parity clause; we then shows that this case is the equilibrium. 
Since the introduction of the price parity clause does not constrain the consumers’ 
behaviours, the consumers’ behaviour given the seller’s prices are summarised in 
Lemma 5.4. 
 
Lemma 5.4. The demand for the seller’s product sold on sales channel ݉ ∈ ܣ	, ܤ, ݍଵ௠∗ 
and ݍଶ௠∗,  where ݊ ∈ ܣ	, ܤ and ݉ ് ݊, given ݌ଵ஺,	݌ଵ஻,	݌ଶ஺, ݌ଶ஻, ஺݂, ஻݂, ܫ஺ and ܫ஻, are 
same as the demand in the case where a price parity clause is not allowed specified in 
Lemma 5.1. 
 
Then, consider the optimal prices of the sellers when the platforms offer the price parity 
clauses. In this situation, the sellers need to set ݌௜஺ ൌ ݌௜஻ ൌ ݌ଵ.	 The seller’s optimal 
pricing if the platforms offer the price parity clause is summarised in Lemma 5.5. 
 
Lemma 5.5. [Optimal sellers’ prices] Anticipating the consumers’ response specified 
in Lemma 5.4, given ஺݂, ஻݂, ܫ஺ and ܫ஻, if the platforms offer the price parity clause the 
optimal behaviour of the seller is as follows: If ஺݂ ൑ ݎ and ஻݂ ൑ ݎ hold, the sellers’ 
optimal pricing policy is  
݌ଵ஺∗ ൌ ݌ଵ஻∗ ൌ ݌ଶ஺∗ ൌ ݌ଶ஻∗ ൌ ቊ ݂ ൅ ߬		݂݅	0 ൑ ݂ ൑ ݎ െ 1.5߬ݎ െ 0.5߬		݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ቋ, 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ݂ ൌ ఒಲሺଵି଴.ହఒಳሻ௙ಲାሺଵି଴.ହఒಲሻఒಳ௙ಳఒಲାఒಳିఒಲఒಳ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix D 
 
Lemma 5.5 shows that when the weighted average of the two platforms’ commission, 
݂, is weakly lower than ݎ െ 1.5߬, the sellers’ optimal price increases as commission 
becomes larger. The weight is based on the share of transactions on each platform. The 
optimal price is equal to the sum of the weighted average of the commissions and ߬. It 
follows that each seller obtains a margin of ߬. When the commissions are relatively 
high (i.e., the weighted average of the commissions are higher than ݎ െ 1.5߬), setting 
݂ ൅ ߬ is no-longer full-coverage price in the sense that the consumers whose location 
is distant from the sellers (i.e., consumers who locate near the middle of the Hotelling 
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line) prefer not to purchase the product. In this situation, the assumption to guarantee a 
full-coverage equilibrium ensures that all consumers aware of at least one platform 
purchase the product for the price of ݎ െ 0.5߬, which is equal to the willingness to pay 
of the consumer located the middle of the Hotelling line.   
Consider next the optimal behaviours of the platforms. Lemma 5.5 shows that both 
sellers sets the same prices on both platforms when the weighted average of the two 
platforms commissions is equal to or less than ݎ െ ߬. This finding implies that as long 
as the weighted average of the two platforms’ commissions is equal to or less than ݎ െ
߬, each platform’s profit does not change based on the magnitude relation of the two 
platforms’ commissions. In this situation, the transactions through Platform ݇ are given 
by ߣ௞ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻ, because the price parity clause guarantees that the prices on the two 
platforms are equal, and the expected profit is ߣ௞ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻ ௞݂. Note that each platform 
does not have an incentive to set a commission above ݎ െ ߬, because if the platform 
sets such a high commission, the full-coverage price equilibrium is not maintained, so 
the high commission results in the loss of transactions. Hence, the optimal commission 
for each platforms is ݎ െ ߬. Moreover, no platform has an incentive to deviate from this 
equilibrium by ceasing to offer the price parity clause: If a platform stops offering the 
clause, there is a possibility that the competing platform lowers its commission to 
capture the transactions for the consumers who are aware of both platforms. Hence, the 
expected profit cannot be larger than the profit when both platforms offer the price 
parity clause.  
Note that when both platforms do this pricing, the joint profits of the platforms are 
maximised. This mutual benefit implies that when the price parity clause is allowed, 
the equilibrium commissions are the same as the commissions when the two platforms 
collude with each other.  
Given this optimal commission, the total expected profit for Platform ݇ can be written 
as 
ߎ௞ ൌ ݃ሺܫ௞ሻሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ ܫ௞. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem yields 
݃ᇱሺܫ௞ሻሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻ ൌ 	 ଵ௥ିఛ. 
Since the two platforms are symmetric, the optimal investment for both platform is the 
same. Hence, 
݃ᇱሺܫ∗∗ሻ൫1 െ 0.5݃ሺܫ∗∗ሻ൯ ൌ 	 ଵ௥ିఛ, where ܫ஺ ൌ ܫ஻ ൌ ܫ∗∗. 
These results are summarised Lemma 5.6. 
Lemma 5.6. [Optimal platforms’ investment and commissions] Anticipating the 
responses by the consumers and the sellers specified in Lemmata 5.4 and 5.5, the 
optimal behaviours of the two platforms are as follows: 
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i) Both platforms introduce price parity clauses. 
ii) Both platforms choose the investment level such that 
ܫ஺∗ ൌ ܫ஻∗ ൌ ܫ∗∗ and 
݃ᇱሺܫ∗∗ሻ൫1 െ 0.5݃ሺܫ∗∗ሻ൯ ൌ ଵ௥ିఛ. 
iii) Both platforms set their commissions such that 
 ஺݂∗∗ ൌ ஻݂∗∗ ൌ ݎ െ ߬. 
iv) Each platform’s expected profit is given by ߣ∗∗ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ∗∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, where ߣ∗∗ ൌ
݃ሺܫ∗∗ሻ. 
 
Lemma 5.6 shows that when the two platforms are allowed to introduce price parity 
clauses, both platforms introduce the clauses to avoid the loss of the transactions 
through the reduction of the other platform’s commission.42 It is also shown that the 
equilibrium commission is equal to the supremum of the support of the platforms’ 
mixed strategy in the equilibrium, if the price parity clause is not allowed. Since there 
is no point mass in the density of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium 
commission is higher than the commission realised when the clause is not allowed.  
In this way, the price parity clause makes it possible for the platforms to avoid the 
commission-cutting condition and to set their commissions to the level that they would 
set if they colluded with each other. Hence, in the equilibrium, the sellers choose their 
prices based on the pure strategy given that the platforms set the commissions based on 
the pure strategy. On the other hand, when the price parity clause is not allowed, the 
equilibrium prices of the sellers depend on the platforms’ commissions, which are 
realised based on the mixed-strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium sellers’ prices on a 
platform are equal to the equilibrium sellers’ prices where the clause is allowed, ݎ െ
1.5߬, only if the realised commission on the platform satisfies ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൑ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ 
and ௞݂ ൑ ௟݂. Otherwise, the equilibrium sellers’ prices on the platform are lower than 
the equilibrium prices where the clause is allowed. 
Note that as shown in the case where the price parity clause is not allowed, the 
equilibrium investment, ܫ∗∗, and the equilibrium share of the consumers who are aware 
of each platform, ߣ∗∗ , are high when ݎ is high compared to ߬. This correlation implies 
that Corollary 5.1 holds even when the two platforms are allowed to use price parity 
clauses. 
                                                            
42 This result is consistent with the online booking platform case in Europe. For example, according to 
the German Federal Cartel Office, three booking platforms, HRS, Booking.com and Expedia, 
introduced the clauses.  
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With regard to the equilibrium investment, the equilibrium investment where the price 
parity clause is allowed is strictly higher than the equilibrium investment where the 
clause is not allowed. This rule can be proved as follows. 
According to Lemmata 5.5 and 5.6,  
݃ᇱሺܫ∗ሻ൫1 െ ݃ሺܫ∗ሻ൯ ൌ ݃ᇱሺܫ∗∗ሻ൫1 െ 0.5݃ሺܫ∗∗ሻ൯. 
This equation can be modified as follows: 
(5.1) ݃ᇱሺܫ∗ሻ൫1 െ 0.5݃ሺܫ∗ሻ൯ െ ݃ᇱሺܫ∗∗ሻ൫1 െ 0.5݃ሺܫ∗∗ሻ൯ ൌ 0.5݃ᇱሺܫ∗ሻ݃ሺܫ∗ሻ ൐ 0. 
If it is assumed that ܫ∗ ൒ ܫ∗∗ , according to the assumptions, ݃ሺܫ∗ሻ ൐ ݃ሺܫ∗∗ሻ  and 
݃ᇱሺܫ∗ሻ ൏ ݃ᇱሺܫ∗∗ሻ hold. It follows that ݃ᇱሺܫ∗ሻ൫1 െ ݃ሺܫ∗ሻ൯ െ ݃ᇱሺܫ∗∗ሻ൫1 െ ݃ሺܫ∗∗ሻ൯ ൏ 0. 
However, this inequality contradicts Equation (5.1).  
 
From this result and Lemmata 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, Proposition 5.2 can be obtained directly. 
5.4.3 Effect on Consumer Welfare of Allowing Price Parity Clause 
Taking the results of the analysis above, this section analyses the effect of introducing 
the platform price parity clause on consumer welfare. As shown in Chapter 4, two 
elements affect consumer welfare. The first element is the sellers’ prices, and consumer 
welfare decreases as the prices become higher. The second element is the number of 
the consumers who are aware of the platforms. Consumer welfare increase as this 
number increases (i.e., high ߣ஺  and ߣ஻ ), because more and more consumers can 
purchase the product. Note that according to Proposition 5.2, allowing price parity 
clauses always increases the number of the consumers who are aware of the platforms. 
Comparison between the equilibrium sellers’ prices and the number of the consumers 
who are aware of the platforms summarised in Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 yields the 
Proposition 5.3. 
 
Proposition 5.3. If the platform is allowed to offer a price parity clause, in the unique 
equilibrium, the consumer welfare improves compared to the unique equilibrium where 
the clause is not allowed when both of the realised commissions under this mixed 
strategy, in the case where the clause is not allowed, are equal to or greater than ݎ െ
1.5߬. Otherwise, the consumer surplus can be larger or smaller.    
 
Proposition 5.3 implies the rise of the commissions, which always occurs when 
allowing price parity clauses may not always be followed the rise of the sellers’ prices, 
meaning that allowing the clause may improve the consumer welfare. This is because 
in the case where the price parity clause is not allowed, the platforms adopt the mixed 
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strategy whose support is ௞݂ ∈ ൫ሺ1 െ ߣ∗ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ݎ െ ߬൯, where ߣ∗ denotes ߣ realised in 
the equilibrium in the case where the price parity clause is not allowed. When the 
realised commissions under this mixed strategy are greater than the thresholds that the 
willingness to pay of the consumer whose location is in the middle of the Hotteling line 
starts binding (i.e., ௞݂ ൒ ݎ െ 1.5߬), the equilibrium sellers’ prices are the same as those 
in the case in which the clause is not allowed. The probability that the realised 
commission is lower than the threshold is 
ܪሺݎ െ 1.5߬ሻ ൌ ଵఒ೗ ቂ1 െ
ሺଵିఒ೗ሻሺ௥ିఛሻ
௥ିଵ.ହఛ ቃ ൌ
ఒ∗ሺ௥ିఛሻି଴.ହఛ
ఒ∗ሺ௥ିଵ.ହఛሻ . 
 
This equation implies that the equilibrium sellers’ prices in the non-price-parity-clauses 
case are always equal to those in the case where the clauses are allowed if 
(5.2)  ߣ∗ሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ 0.5߬ ൑ 0. 
In other words, if Inequality (5.2) holds, the prohibition of the price parity clauses 
always raise the sellers’ prices. Note that Inequality (5.2) is likely to hold when ߣ∗ or ݎ 
is low or when ߬ is high. 
Moreover, even if Inequality (5.2) does not hold, the probability that the rise of the 
sellers’ prices by the introduction of price parity clauses will happen increases when ߣ∗ 
or ݎ is low or when ߬ is high. This increase occurs because 
 
డுሺ௥ିଵ.ହఛሻ
డఒ∗ ൌ
଴.ହఛ
ఒ∗మሺ௥ିଵ.ହఛሻ ൐ 0, 
డுሺ௥ିଵ.ହఛሻ
డ௥ ൌ
଴.ହሺଵିఒ∗ሻఛ
ఒ∗ሺ௥ିଵ.ହఛሻ ൐ 0, and  
డுሺ௥ିଵ.ହఛሻ
డఛ ൌ െ
ሺఒ∗ା଴.ହሻሺ௥ିଵ.ହఛሻାଵ.ହሾఒ೗ሺ௥ିఛሻି଴.ହఛሿ
ఒ∗ሺ௥ିଵ.ହఛሻమ  hold. 
Note that if Inequality (5.2) does not hold, ߲ܪሺݎ െ 1.5߬ሻ/߲߬ ൏ 0. 
Therefore, the prohibition of the price parity clauses is likely to raise the sellers’ prices 
(and, hence, improve the consumer welfare) if the equilibrium share of the consumers 
who are aware of each platform in the non-price-parity-clauses case, ߣ∗, is high or if ݎ 
is high compared to ߬. Note that ߣ∗ is high when the technology related to investment 
is sophisticated or ݎ is high compared to ߬. 
Note that when the equilibrium sellers’ prices in non-price-parity-clauses case is equal 
to the equilibrium prices in the case when the clauses are allowed, the sellers suffer 
losses instead of consumers. These losses imply that if it is assumed that sellers can 
also make an investment that improves consumer welfare, such as improving the quality 
of their service, the introduction of price parity clauses may harm consumer welfare 
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through underinvestment by the sellers even when the sellers’ prices after the 
introduction of the clauses do not change. 
With regard to the number of the consumers who are aware of the platforms, the 
introduction of price parity clauses increases investment, and more consumers are 
aware of the two platforms. However, due to the decreasing return of scale of the 
investment, this effect diminishes when the equilibrium shares of the consumers who 
are aware of the platforms are high in the case where the clauses are not allowed. 
In summary, allowing the price parity clause has the two opposite effects on consumer 
welfare, the negative effect through higher prices and the positive effect through the 
improvement of consumer awareness. Moreover, the negative effect through the rise of 
the sellers’ prices does not always ensue. It follows that the consumer welfare (and the 
sellers’ profits) can improve with the introduction of the price parity clauses.  
However, as shown in Corollary 5.1, the improvement of consumer welfare through the 
introduction of price parity clauses is unlikely to occur when there is a fierce 
competition between the two sellers (i.e., high ݎ compared to ߬), since the increase of 
the sellers’ price is likely to occur when ݎ is high compared to ߬.  
5.4.4 Effect on Sellers’ Profits of Allowing Price Parity Clause  
This section analyses the effect of allowing a price parity clause on the seller’s surplus. 
The following two elements affect the sellers’ profits. The first element is the sellers’ 
margins in selling a unit. Allowing price parity clauses always decreases the sellers’ 
margins. Proposition 5.2 implies that the equilibrium margin when the clauses are 
allowed is 0.5߬. On the other hand, according to Proposition 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, the 
equilibrium margin when the clauses are not allowed is larger than 0.5߬.  
The second element is the number of the consumers who are aware of the platforms. 
Consumer welfare increases as the number becomes larger (i.e., high ߣ஺  and ߣ஻ ), 
because more and more consumers can purchase the product. Note that according to 
Proposition 5.2, allowing price parity clauses always increases the number of the 
consumers who are aware of the platforms. 
Comparison between the equilibrium platforms’ commissions and the number of the 
consumers who are aware of the platforms, summarised in Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, 
yields Proposition 5.4. 
 
Proposition 5.4. If the platforms are allowed to offer a price parity clause, in the unique 
equilibrium, the sellers’ profits can be larger or smaller.    
 
Proposition 5.4 shows that the effect on the sellers’ profits of allowing price parity 
clauses is always ambiguous. This ambiguity is always present is because allowing 
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price parity clauses always has two opposite effects on the sellers’ profits: the negative 
effect through higher commission and the positive effect through the improvement of 
consumer awareness.   
As discussed in Section 4.3, due to the decreasing return of scale of the investment, this 
effect becomes smaller when the equilibrium shares of the consumers who are aware 
of the platforms are high in the case where the clauses are not allowed. 
5.4.5 Effect of the Possibility That a Seller Decides Not to Use a 
Platform under the Price Parity Clause 
In the model analysed in this section, to simplify the discussion, it is assumed that 
platforms have strong enough power to guarantee that when a platform imposes a price 
parity clause, the sellers must accept it and sell on both platforms. This section 
considers what change can happen in the case that this assumption is relaxed. 
If this assumption is relaxed, a seller may decide not to use a platform when the 
platforms impose the price parity clauses on the sellers. This situation can arise when 
the commissions of the two platforms are not equal. Each seller prefers to use only one 
platform if the commission of one platform is high compared to that of the other 
platform, such that each seller obtains a larger profit when using only the platform 
offering the commission lower than the profit it would get when using both platforms. 
In other words, selling only on the platform offering the lower commission to avoid 
paying the high commission can compensate for the loss of the sales to the consumers 
who are only aware of the platform offering the higher commission. It follows that the 
price parity clauses may not eliminate the possibility that the other platform undercuts 
its commission to deprive transactions.  
In order to analyse this possibility, we define ௞݂෩ 	ሺ ௟݂ሻ as the maximum commission of 
Platform ݇ such that the sellers decides to use both Platform ݇ and ݈ under the price 
parity clauses rather than using only Platform ݇, given the other platform’s commission, 
௟݂. This definition implies that when Platform ݇ wants to dominate the transactions of 
non-captive consumers, it needs to set its commission lower than ௞݂෩ 	ሺ ௟݂ሻ. 
Analysis of this model provides the following proposition, to be proved in this section.  
 
Proposition 5.5. Suppose two platforms are allowed to offer a price parity clause 
without a compulsory power. 
1) If ௞݂෩ 	ሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൑ ሾ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ holds, both platforms set their commissions at 
ݎ െ ߬, and both sellers set their prices for both platforms at ݎ െ 0.5߬ in the equilibrium. 
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2) If ௞݂෩ 	ሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൐ ሾ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ holds and there exists ௟݂෡ ∈ ሺሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ, ݎ െ
߬ሻ such that ௞݂෩ ൫ ௟݂෡൯ ൌ ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ, both platforms set the commission based on the 
mixed strategy whose support is ௞݂ ∈ ൫ ௟݂෡, ݎ െ ߬൯. Further,	 ௟݂෡ is higher than the lower 
bound of the support of the mixed strategy in the case where price parity clauses are 
not allowed, ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ. 
Proposition 5.5 shows that there are two possible scenarios such that the introduction 
of price parity clauses increases the equilibrium commissions and sellers’ prices, which 
are explained in the first half and the second half, respectively. The first scenario is that 
the threat of the possibility that the undercutting of the commission happens is not 
strong enough to change the optimal behaviours of the platforms, and hence, setting the 
collusive commissions (i.e., ஺݂ ൌ ஻݂ ൌ ݎ െ ߬ ) is still an equilibrium. The second 
scenario is that the threat of such possibility is strong enough to change the optimal 
behaviours of the platforms, and, hence, in the equilibrium, there is no pure Nash 
equilibrium for the two platforms’ commissions. On the other hand, the support of the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium is smaller than that in the case where price parity clauses 
are not allowed, in the sense that the lower bound of the support is higher. It follows 
that the two platforms are more likely to set higher commissions compared to the case 
in which they are not allowed to offer a price parity clause. 
Proposition 5.5 suggests that the implication in the previous sections—that the price 
parity clauses have the same effect as that of cartels in the sense that the clauses enable 
firms to set commissions as if they collude—may be too strong, because if there is a 
possibility that the sellers choose to use only one platform, the increase of the 
commissions is limited or does not happen. At the same time, this proposition implies 
that price parity clauses can still harm consumers or sellers in the sense that the clauses 
may raise the commissions to the collusive level or raise the lesser support of the mixed 
strategy regarding the commissions.  
 
The first half of Proposition 5.5 can be proved as follows.  
 
The first scenario refers to the situation where each platform does not have an incentive 
to deviate from where both platforms set their commissions as if they are colluding with 
each other, which is equal to the equilibrium commission in the case where the price 
parity clauses have compulsory power. The condition that this situation happens is that 
a platform’s profit when both platforms set their commission at ݎ െ 	߬ is equal to or 
larger than the profit when one platform undercuts the commission to encourage the 
sellers not to use the other platform. The condition can be written as ߣ௞ ௞݂෩ 	ሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൑
ߣ௞ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ. This condition can be modified to  
(5.3) ௞݂෩ ሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൑ ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ. 
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If Inequality (5.3) holds, both platforms set their commissions at ݎ െ ߬  in the 
equilibrium, as shown in Figure 5.5, meaning that the optimal behaviours of the 
platforms are the same as in the case where the platforms introduce compulsory price 
parity clauses. 
 
Figure 5.5 Platform ݇’s profit given that ௟݂ ൌ ݎ െ ߬ 
 
Next, we prove the second half of Proposition 5.5. The second scenario refers to the 
situation in which each platform no longer has an incentive to set a commission close 
to the lower bound of the support of the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the case where 
the price parity clauses are not allowed, ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ. This situation happens when 
there exists ௟݂ ∈ ሺሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ  such that ௞݂෩ ሺ ௟݂ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ . Let ௟݂෡  
denote ௟݂ ∈ ሺሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ  that satisfies ௞݂෩ ൫ ௟݂෡൯ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ . In this 
situation, if Platform ݈’s commission is equal to ௟݂෡ , Platform ݇’s profit decreases when 
it undercuts the commission to expand its consumer base as shown in Figure 5.5. Hence, 
a platform does not have an incentive to sets a commission such that ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൏
௞݂ ൏ ௟݂෡ . This lack of incentive implies that ௞݂ ∈ ሺሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ, ௟݂෡ሻ  is no longer 
included in the support of the mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this situation, the support 
is ௞݂ ∈ ሺ ௟݂෡, ݎ െ ߬ሻ. Therefore, in this scenario, the expected commissions are higher 
than in the case where the price parity clauses are not allowed, and this rise may 
furthermore increase the sellers’ prices and harm consumers. 
 
Figure 5.6 Platform ݇’s profit given that ௟݂ ൌ ௟݂෡  
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This result can be summarised in the second half of Proposition 5.5. 
5.5. Policy Implications and Conclusions  
This chapter covers a duopoly platform case and analyses the effect of wide price parity 
clauses. The models analysed in this chapter show that wide price parity clauses enable 
platforms to set higher commissions compared to when the clauses are not allowed, and 
these higher commissions cause two different effects: the increase of sellers’ prices and 
the increase of investment by platforms. While the former has a negative impact on 
consumer welfare, the latter has a positive impact on consumer welfare.  
The analysis of the case where the price parity clauses are not allowed shows that while 
the sellers adopt pure-strategies, the platforms adopt mixed strategies in the equilibrium. 
This analysis differs from the results in the models of Varian (1980) and the models 
extending it to a two-sided platform case, such as Ronayne (2015), in which the 
platforms adopt the pure strategies and the sellers adopt mixed strategies in the 
equilibrium. This difference reflects the fact that while those models assume 
homogeneous sellers and platforms, in this model only the platforms are homogenous; 
the sellers are horizontally differentiated. On the other hand, the analysis on the case 
where both sellers and platforms are differentiated is a challenge for the future study.  
The result of the analysis in this chapter also show that wide price parity clauses have 
a more straightforward effect on competition in the sense that the clauses make it 
possible for the platforms to avoid the competition by undercutting commissions and 
setting their commissions to the level at which they would set them if colluding with 
each other, in contrast to the effect of narrow price parity clauses analysed in Chapter 
4. The result is consistent with one of the most popular explanations on the 
anticompetitive effect of (wide) price parity clauses, softening the competition 
regarding platforms’ commissions in economic literature such as Boik and Corts (2015) 
and Ronayne and Taylor (2018). The analysis in this chapter clarifies the mechanism 
of such a competitive effect in the sense that it shows the following: Without wide price 
parity clauses, the platforms try to undercut each other’s commissions until setting the 
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highest full-coverage commission is more profitable and the clauses eliminate the 
possibility of undercutting by the other platform.  
With respect to the effect of price parity clauses on consumer welfare, when the sellers’ 
prices rise with the introduction of the price parity clauses, consumer welfare is harmed 
if the negative effect of the rise of the sellers’ prices outweighs the positive effect of 
the increase of consumer awareness through the larger investment by the platforms. It 
is also shown that the improvement of net consumer welfare through the introduction 
of price parity clauses is unlikely to occur when the equilibrium shares of the consumers 
who are aware of the platforms are high, as in the case where the clauses are not allowed 
or when the consumers are highly differentiated. Moreover, given the possibility that 
sellers can make investment that improves consumer welfare, the introduction of price 
parity clauses may harm the consumer welfare through underinvestment by the sellers 
even when the sellers’ prices after the introduction of the clauses does not change. 
The result is similar to the dominant platform case analysed in Chapter 4. The analysis 
in Chapter 4 shows that the narrow price parity clause increases the investment of the 
platform by preventing the seller’s free riding by setting a higher price on the platform, 
which then increases the platform’s commission. With respect to the seller’s prices, 
while the narrow price parity clause weakly increases the direct sales price, it weakly 
decreases the price of the seller’s product sold on the platform. Considering that the 
possible price rise by the narrow parity clause is limited to the direct sales price and 
that preventing free riding is a more plausible reason for introducing price parity clauses 
than avoiding the competition through undercutting commissions, the results of these 
two chapters are favourable to the approach that narrow price parity clauses should be 
treated in a more generous manner than are wide price parity clauses, an approach that 
has been adopted in some European countries such as the United Kingdom and France.  
The result also clarifies the limitation of this type of theory of harm in the sense that 
the rise of platforms’ commissions through softening competition by price parity 
clauses does not always cause the rise of sellers’ prices. This is because the willingness 
of consumers to pay can constrain high prices. This result is same as Johanson and 
Verge (2016), while other previous studies such as Wang and Wright (2016) and Boik 
and Corts (2015) find that price parity clauses always raise the prices of sellers. This is 
because in Johanson and Verge (2016) the platform’s ability to set high commissions 
is bound by supplier’s participation constraint”, which follows that the equilibrium 
prices of the sellers do not change. The result in this study shows that when the price 
parity clauses does not increase the prices, the consumer welfare increases with the 
introduction of price parity clauses because there is no negative effect from the rise of 
sellers’ prices and a positive effect through the larger investment by the platforms. 
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However, in this situation, the sellers’ welfare can be harmed, because the sellers cannot 
pass on the rise of the commissions to the consumers.43  
In this way, according to the result, wide price parity effects have effects similar to 
those of cartels. However, the result also shows that the negative effect can be offset by 
the positive effect through the larger investment44 and the analysis in Section 4.5 shows 
that the negative effects on consumers and sellers may not be as strong as those of 
cartels. It follows that the effect-based approach is preferable to per se illegal approach, 
which is adopted in many jurisdictions to judge cartels and in which almost all conduct 
is regarded as illegal. The result also suggests that when competition authorities 
considers whether they should intervene in platforms’ wide price parity clauses, the 
fierceness of the competition between the two sellers can be an important factor to 
evaluate the effects of such clauses on consumers. Although an effect of narrow price 
parity clauses in the context where there are multiple platforms and direct sales is 
possible, this investigation falls outside of the scope of this study.  Furthermore, the 
difference between the monopoly platform case and other types of anticompetitive 
effects of price parity clauses, such as blocking entry, is outside of the scope of this 
thesis. These topics are worth considering for future research.  
                                                            
43 This implies that if investment by sellers is taken into account, the negative effect on consumer 
welfare through the smaller investment by sellers can offset the positive effect on the consumer welfare 
by the larger investment from the platforms.  
44 However, in most jurisdictions, it is extremely difficult or impossible to justify cartels with this kind 
of claim.  
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5.6. Appendix D 
5.6.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1 
The proof of Lemma 5.1 is divided into three steps. In Step 1 we find the demand of 
Seller ݅’s product when all consumers have the same information such that such that 
the lowest prices of Seller ݅’s product and Seller ݆’s product of which they know are ݌௜ 
and ݌௝ respectively. In Step 2, we find the total product demand of each seller’s product 
from the consumers who have different information. In Step 3, we find the quantity of 
the products sold on each platform. 
 
Step 1: Product demand when all consumers have the same information 
Let ݔො denote the location of an indifferent consumer for whom the utility of purchasing 
Seller ݅’s product at the lowest available price is equal to the utility of purchasing Seller 
݆’s product at the lowest available price. In such situation, ݍ௜ ൌ ݔො and ݍ௝ ൌ 1 െ ݔො hold, 
implying that ݎ െ ߬ݔො െ ݌௜ ൌ ݎ െ ߬ሺ1 െ ݔොሻ െ ݌௝ holds. This equation can be modified 
to ݔො ൌ 0.5 െ ௣೔ି௣ೕଶఛ . Substituting this modification into ݍ௜ ൌ ݔො and ݍ௝ ൌ 1 െ ݔො gives; 
ݍ௜ ൌ 0.5 െ
௣೔ି௣ೕ
ଶఛ . 
 
Note that 0 ൑ ݍ௜ ൑ 1 must be satisfied. It follows that ݍ௜ ൌ 0.5 െ ሺ݌௜ െ	݌௝ሻ/2߬ does 
not hold if ݌௜ ൑ ݌௝ െ ߬  or if ݌௜ ൐ ݌௝ ൅ ߬ . If ݌௜ ൑ ݌௝ െ ߬ , ݍ௜ ൌ 1 and if ݌௜ ൐ ݌௝ ൅ ߬ , 
ݍ௜ ൌ 0. 
 
Moreover, as shown in the dominant platform case, if ݌௜  is higher than a certain 
threshold (݌௜ ൐ ݎ െ ߬ ), 	ݍ௜  decreases as ݌௜  increases because the consumers whose 
locations are far from the seller decide not to buy. In that case, ݍ௜ is given by ሺݎ െ
	݌௝ሻ/߬ . It follows that if ሺݎ െ	݌௝ሻ/߬ ൏ 0.5 െ ሺ݌௜ െ	݌௝ሻ/2߬  holds, this constraint is 
binding. In other words, not purchasing is the more attractive alternative option than 
switching to buy the other seller’s product. The inequality can be modified as ݌௜ ൐
2ݎ െ ߬ െ ݌௝ . Note that if 	ݎ ൐ 	݌௜ , ݍ௜  becomes zero because ሺݎ െ	݌௜ሻ/߬  becomes 
negative. This relationship implies that if ݎ ൐ ݌௝ ൅ ߬  holds, this situation cannot 
happen, because in this case, the constraint by the other seller’s price is always binding. 
Moreover, if ݎ െ ߬ ൑ ݌௝ െ ߬ ↔ ݌௝ ൒ ݎ holds, the constraint by the other seller’s price 
is never binding.  
 
Step 2: Total product demand from consumers who have different information 
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There are four types of consumers; those who know both Platform ݇ and Platform ݈, 
those who know only Platform ݇, those who know only Platform ݈, and those who do 
not know any platform. The proportion of the four types are given by ߣ௞ߣ௟,	ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻ, 
ሺ1 െ ߣ௞ሻߣ௟ and ሺ1 െ ߣ௞ሻሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻ, respectively. 
The demand of ݅’s product from the consumers who know the products sold on both 
Platform ݇  and Platform ݈  is equal to ߣ௞ߣ௟ݍ௜ ቀ݉݅݊ሺ݌௜௞, ݌௜௟ሻ,݉݅݊൫݌௝௞, ݌௝௟൯ቁ . The 
demand from the consumers who know the products sold on only Platform ݇ is equal 
to ߣ௞ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿݍ௜൫݌௜௞, ݌௝௞൯. The demand from the consumers who know the products sold 
on only Platform ݈ is equal to ሾ1 െ ߣ௞ሿߣ௟ݍ௜൫݌௜௟, ݌௝௟൯. The demand from the consumers 
who do not know any platform is zero. 
The total product demand of each seller’s product from the consumers is the sum of 
that demand. 
 
Step 3: Platform demand 
The consumers who know only Platform ݇ purchase only through the platform. The 
demand of such consumers is ߣ௞ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿൣݍ௜൫݌௜௞, ݌௝௞൯ ൅ ݍ௝൫݌௜௞, ݌௝௞൯൧. The consumers 
who know only Platform ݈ and the consumers who do not know any platform do not 
purchase through Platform ݇. 
The consumers who know both Platform ݇ and Platform ݈ will buy through the sales 
channel that offers the lower price. In the case where the seller sets the same price on 
the two platforms, the demand is equally divided according to the tie-break rule. Hence, 
the number of consumers who know both platforms and purchase Seller ݅’s product 
through Platform ݇ is 
 ߣ௞ߣ௟ݍ௜ ቀ݉݅݊ሺ݌௜௞, ݌௜௟ሻ,݉݅݊൫݌௝௞, ݌௝௟൯ቁ if ݌௜௞ ൏ ݌௜௟  
and 0.5ߣ௞ߣ௟ݍ௜ ቀ݉݅݊ሺ݌௜௞, ݌௜௟ሻ,݉݅݊൫݌௝௞, ݌௝௟൯ቁ if ݌௜௞ ൌ ݌௜௟ . If ݌௜௞ ൐ ݌௜௟ , the demand is 
zero.  
Similarly, Seller ݆’s product through Platform ݇ is  
ߣ௞ߣ௟ݍ௝ ቀ݉݅݊ሺ݌௜௞, ݌௜௟ሻ,݉݅݊൫݌௝௞, ݌௝௟൯ቁ if ݌௝௞ ൏ ݌௝௟  
and 0.5ߣ௞ߣ௟ݍ௝ ቀ݉݅݊ሺ݌௜௞, ݌௜௟ሻ,݉݅݊൫݌௝௞, ݌௝௟൯ቁ if ݌௝௞ ൌ ݌௝௟. 
 
The total platform demand is the sum of those demand. ∎ 
5.6.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2 
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The proof of Lemma 5.2 is divided into two steps. In Step 1 we prove paragraph i) of 
the lemma, which is about the optimal sellers’ platform choices. In Step 2, we prove 
paragraph ii), which is about the optimal sellers’ prices.  
 
Step 1: Optimal sellers’ platform choices prices 
If ஺݂ ൑ ݎ and ஻݂ ൑ ݎ holds, a seller can obtain non-negative profits through the sales on 
each platform by setting the price below the marginal cost. In other words, there exist 
݌௜௞ such that ݌௜௞ ൑ ݎ and ݍ௜௞ ൐ 0. Taking the symmetry of the two sellers, this implies 
that both sellers decide to use both platforms. 
 
Step 2: Optimal sellers’ prices 
The assumptions imply four types of consumers: those who know both Platform ݇ and 
Platform ݈, those who know only Platform ݇, those who know only Platform ݈, and 
those who know neither. The proportions of the four types are given by ߣ௞ߣ௟,	ߣ௞ሺ1 െ
ߣ௟ሻ,ሺ1 െ ߣ௞ሻߣ௟ and ሺ1 െ ߣ௞ሻሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻ, respectively.  
Under the symmetric equilibrium, the consumers who know the product sold on only 
Platform ݇ , whose proportion is given by ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻ, will purchase Seller ݅  or ݆’s 
product sold on Platform ݇, and the consumers who know the product sold on both 
platforms, whose proportion is given by ߣ௞ߣ௟ , will purchase Seller ݅  or ݆’s product 
through the sales channel that offers the lowest price. 
The expected profit of the seller under the symmetric equilibrium can be simplified as 
ߎ௜ ൌ
൞
ߣ஺ݍ௜൫݌௜஺, ݌௝஺൯ሾ݌௜஺ െ ஺݂ሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣ஻ݍ௜൫݌௜஻, ݌௝஻൯ሾ݌௜஻ െ ஻݂ሿ																		݂݅	݌௜஺ ൏ ݌௜஻
ߣ஺ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ஻ሻݍ௜൫݌௜஺, ݌௝஺൯ሾ݌௜஺ െ ஺݂ሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ 0.5ߣ஺ሻߣ஻ݍ௜ሺ݌௜஻, ݌௝஻ሻሾ݌௜஻ െ ஻݂ሿ	݂݅	݌௜஺ ൌ ݌௜஻ ൌ ݌௜
ߣ஺ሾ1 െ ߣ஻ሿݍ௜൫݌௜஺, ݌௝஺൯ሾ݌௜஺ െ ஺݂ሿ ൅ ߣ஻ݍ௜൫݌௜஻, ݌௝஻൯ሾ݌௜஻ െ ஻݂ሿ																			݂݅	݌௜஺ ൐ ݌௜஻
ൢ. 
This profit consists of two terms: the profit on Platform ܣ and that on Platform ܤ, which 
implies that the optimal price on Platform ܣ  must be the price that maximises 
ݍ௜൫݌௜஺, ݌௝஺൯ሾ݌௜஺ െ ஺݂ሿ, and the optimal price on Platform ܤ  must be the price that 
maximises ݍ௜൫݌௜஻, ݌௝஻൯ሾ݌௜஻ െ ஻݂ሿ. 
The analysis of dominant platform case in Chapter 4 implies that there are two types of 
equilibrium: the equilibrium where sellers set the prices such that all consumers who 
are aware of at least one seller’s product purchase the product (full-coverage price 
equilibrium) and the equilibrium where sellers set the prices such that all the consumers 
are not fully covered. Because it is assumed that the second type of equilibrium never 
happens, the only possible equilibrium is the full coverage price equilibrium. It follows 
that the platforms will not set commissions higher than ݎ െ ߬, since if they set such 
prices, the full coverage price equilibrium will not occur. Hence, hereafter, only 
consider the case where ஺݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ and ஻݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ hold. 
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 According to Lemma 5.1, under the full-coverage price equilibrium, ݍ௜ ൌ 0.5 െ
௣೔ೖି	௣ೕೖ
ଶఛ  holds. This implies that the expected profits of the two sellers depends on ሺ
ଵ
ଶ െ
௣భೖି௣మೖ
ଶఛ ሻ(	݌ଵ௞ െ ௞݂) and ሺ
ଵ
ଶ െ
௣మೖି௣భೖ
ଶఛ ሻ(	݌ଶ௞ െ ௞݂) respectively. 
Those functions are concave quadratic functions of ݌ଵ௞ and ݌ଶ௞ respectively as long as 
ݎ െ ߬ݔො௞ െ ݌௜௞ ൒ 0 holds. The FOCs are given by 
ଵ
ଶ െ
ଶ௣భೖି௣మೖି௙ೖ
ଶఛ ൌ 0 and 
ଵ
ଶ െ
ଶ௣మೖି௣భೖି௙ೖ
ଶఛ ൌ 0. 
From these equations, the following response functions can be obtained; 
(A5.1) ݌ଵ௞ ൌ ௣మೖା௙ೖାఛଶఛ , 
(A5.2) ݌ଶ௞ ൌ ௣భೖା௙ೖାఛଶఛ . 
 
By solving Equation (A5.1) and (A5.2), the symmetric equilibrium price ݌ଵ௞ ൌ ݌ଶ௞ ൌ
௞݂ ൅ ߬ can be obtained.  
Note that if ݌ଵ௞ ൌ ݌ଶ௞ ൌ ௞݂ ൅ ߬, ݍଵ௞ ൌ ݍଶ௞ ൌ 0.5 holds. Hence, the condition that this 
equilibrium exists is 
ݎ െ ߬ݔො െ ݌ଵ௞ ൌ ݎ െ ߬ݔො െ ݌ଶ௞ ൌ ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ௞݂ െ ߬ ൒ 0. 
This is because some consumers located near the middle of the Hotelling line will not 
purchase the product. 
This condition can be modified to 
(A5.3) ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ 1.5߬. 
 
If Inequality (A5.3) does not hold, the maximum price that ݍଵ௞ ൌ ݍଶ௞ ൌ 0.5 holds must 
satisfy ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ݌௜௞ ൌ 	ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ݌௝௞ ൌ 0. Hence, the symmetric equilibrium price 
is ݌ଵ௞ ൌ ݌ଶ௞ ൌ ݎ െ 0.5߬. In this situation, the equilibrium price does not increase as ௞݂ 
increases. It follows that if ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൏ ௟݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬, by setting ݌ଵ௞ ൌ ݌ଶ௞ ൌ ݎ െ
0.5߬ െ ߝ  and ݌ଵ௟ ൌ ݌ଶ௟ ൌ ݎ െ 0.5߬ , where ߝ  is small non-negative amount, the two 
sellers can get more profit than setting ݌ଵ௞ ൌ ݌ଶ௞ ൌ ݌ଵ௟ ൌ ݌ଶ௟ ൌ ݎ െ 0.5߬.  
 
From the discussion above, the optimal pricing when the sellers sell on both platforms 
and set the same price on each platform can be written as 
݌ଵ௞ ൌ ݌ଶ௞ ൌ ൝
௞݂ ൅ ߬
ݎ െ 0.5߬
ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ߝ
 
݂݅	 ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ 1.5߬
݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬	ܽ݊݀	 ௟݂ 	൑ ௞݂	݋ݎ	 ௟݂ ൐ ݎ െ ߬
݂݅	ݎ െ 1.5߬ ൏ ௞݂ ൏ ௟݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬
ቑ. 
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Since such pricing is the best response to the other seller, there is no incentive for each 
seller to change their prices. Moreover, if a seller stops using one platform (Platform ݈), 
the profit for the seller becomes ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻݍ௜௞൫݌௜௞, ݌௝௞൯ሺ݌௜௞ െ ௞݂ሻ ൅
ߣ௞ߣ௟൫݌௜௞, ݌௝௞൯ሺ݌௜௞ െ ௞݂ሻ, which is strictly smaller than the profit when the seller sets 
the optimal pricing under the symmetric equilibrium. This is because while the profit 
from the consumers who are aware of only Platform ݇ is the same as the profit under 
the symmetric equilibrium, in this case, the profit from the consumers who are aware 
of only Platform ݈ becomes zero, and the profit from the consumers who are aware of 
both platforms is equal to or smaller than the profit under the symmetric equilibrium. 
Hence, neither seller has an incentive to stop using one of the two platforms. Therefore, 
the symmetric equilibrium is the pure strategy equilibrium.∎ 
5.6.3 Proof of Lemma 5.3 
The proof of Lemma 5.3 is divided into two steps. In Step 1 we prove the optimal 
commissions set by the platforms. In Step 2, we prove the optimal investment levels 
chosen by the platforms. 
Step 1: Optimal commissions set by the platforms 
Figure 5.4 implies that Platform ݇’s best response given Platform	݈’s commission can 
be written as follows: 
௞݂ ൌ ൜ݎ െ ߬	݂݅	 ௟݂ ൑ ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ	݋ݎ	݂݅	 ௟݂ ൐ 	ݎ െ ߬௟݂ െ ߝ	݂݅	ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൏ ௟݂ ൑ ݎ െ ߬ ൠ. 
 
This shows that there is no pure Nash equilibrium for the two platforms’ commissions. 
It also shows that ௞݂ ∈ ሾ0, ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻሿ	or ௞݂ ∈ ሺݎ െ ߬,൅∞ሿ will never be chosen 
by the platforms because there exist at least one ௞݂ ∈ ሺݎ െ ߬, ൅∞ሿ that they can obtain 
the larger profit when they set such a commission. 
Then, we examine the mixed strategy equilibrium in this model. Since ௞݂ ∈
ሺሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ  only can be equilibrium commission, considering the 
cumulative distribution function, ܪሺ ௞݂ሻ, that is continuous on (ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ, ݎ െ ߬). 
Let ݄ሺ ௞݂ሻ denote the density function. 
In this situation, the expected profit for platform ݇ can be written as 
(A5.4) ߨ௞ ൌ ׬ ሾሺ1 െ ܪሺ ௞݂ሻሻ௥ିఛሺଵିఒ೗ሻሺ௥ିఛሻ ߣ௞ ௞݂ ൅ ܪሺ ௞݂ሻߣ௞ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿ ௞݂ሿ݄ሺ ௞݂ሻ݀ ௞݂. 
 
Note that ݄ሺ ௞݂ሻ ൒ 0, ݄ሺ ௞݂ሻ ൌ 0 for ௞݂ ∉ ሺሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ  
and ׬ ݄ሺ݂ሻ݂݀௥ିఛሺଵିఒ೗ሻሺ௥ିఛሻ ൌ 1 must hold. 
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In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the expected profit when the platform sets ௞݂ ∈
ሺሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ should be constant. This implies that the following equation 
holds:  
ሾ1 െ ܪሺ ௞݂ሻሿߣ௞ ௞݂ ൅ ܪሺ ௞݂ሻߣ௞ሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿ ௞݂ െ ܿ ൌ 0,  where ܿ  is a constant which has a 
positive value, since the platform obtains a positive profit by setting ௞݂ ∈
ሺሾ1 െ ߣ௟ሿሾݎ െ ߬ሿ, ݎ െ ߬ሻ. 
 
This equation can be modified to 
(A5.5) ܪሺ ௞݂ሻ ൌ ଵఒ೗ ሾ1 െ
௖
ఒೖ௙ೖሿ. 
 
Since the cumulative distribution function when ௞݂ is equal to the upper bound of the 
mixed strategy must be 1, ܪሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൌ 1 must hold. 
 
According to Equation (A5.5),  
ܪሺݎ െ ߬ሻ ൌ ଵఒ೗ ቂ1 െ
௖
ఒೖሾ௥ିఛሿቃ ൌ 1.  
This equation can be modified to 
(A5.6) ܿ ൌ ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ. 
 
By substituting Equation (A5.6) into Equation (A5.5), ܪሺ ௞݂ሻ can be obtained.  
 
Step 2: Optimal investment levels chosen by the platforms  
The analysis of the optimal commission shows that the expected profit of each 
platforms is ߣ௞ሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ. 
With regard to the optimal amount of investment, the total expected profit for the 
platforms can be written as 
ߎ௞ ൌ ݃ሺܫ௞ሻሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻሺݎ െ ߬ሻ െ ܫ௞. 
Solving this profit-maximisation problem produces 
݃ᇱሺܫ௞ሻሺ1 െ ߣ௟ሻ ൌ ଵ௥ିఛ. 
Since the two platforms are symmetric and since the equilibrium investment for both 
platforms is same, Lemma 5.3 can be obtained.	∎ 
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5.6.4 Proof of Lemma 5.5 
According to Lemma 5.4, under the full-coverage price equilibrium, ݍ௜஺ ൌ ݍ௜஻ ൌ
0.5 െ ௣೔ି	௣ೕଶఛ  holds. It follows that the expected profits of the two sellers can be written 
as 
ߎ௜ ൌ ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣ஻ሻ ቀଵଶ െ
௣೔ି௣ೕ
ଶఛ ቁ ሺ	݌௜ െ ஺݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣ஻ ቀ
ଵ
ଶ െ
௣೔ି௣ೕ
ଶఛ ቁ ሺ	݌௜ െ ஻݂ሻ ൅
ߣ஺ߣ஻ ቀଵଶ െ
௣೔ି௣ೕ
ଶఛ ቁ ሺ	݌௜ െ 0.5 ஺݂ െ 0.5 ஻݂ሻ. 
 
The FOC is 
ߣ஺ሺ1 െ ߣ஻ሻ ቀଵଶ െ
ଶ௣೔ି௣ೕି௙ಲ
ଶఛ ቁ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣ஺ሻߣ஻ ቀ
ଵ
ଶ െ
ଶ௣೔ି௣ೕି௙ಳ
ଶఛ ቁ ൅ ߣ஺ߣ஻ ቀ
ଵ
ଶ െ
ଶ௣೔ି௣ೕି଴.ହ௙ಲି଴.ହ௙ಳ
ଶఛ ቁ ൌ 0.  
Since the two sellers are equivalent, the equilibrium price is supposed to be 
symmetric. Hence, the equation can be modified as 
݌ଵ ൌ ݌ଶ ൌ ߬ ൅ ఒಲሺଵି଴.ହఒ࡮ሻ௙ಲାሺଵି଴.ହఒ࡭ሻఒಳ௙ಳఒಲାఒಳିఒಲఒಳ ൌ ߬ ൅ ݂, 
where ݂ ൌ ఒಲሺଵି଴.ହఒ࡮ሻ௙ಲାሺଵି଴.ହఒ࡭ሻఒಳ௙ಳఒಲାఒಳିఒಲఒಳ . 
Note that if ݌ଵ ൌ ݌ଶ ൌ ݂ ൅ ߬, ݍଵ஺ ൌ ݍଵ஻ ൌ ݍଶ஺ ൌ ݍଶ஻ ൌ 0.5 holds. Hence, the 
condition under which this equilibrium exists is 
ݎ െ ߬ݔො െ ݌ଵ ൌ ݎ െ ߬ሺ1 െ ݔොሻ െ ݌ଶ ൌ ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ݂ െ ߬ ൒ 0. 
This inequality holds, because some consumers located near the middle of the 
Hotelling line will not purchase the product. 
This condition can be modified to 
(A5.7) ݂ ൑ ݎ െ 1.5߬. 
 
If Inequality (A5.7) does not hold, the maximum price that ݍଵ஺ ൌ ݍଵ஻ ൌ ݍଶ஺ ൌ ݍଶ஻ ൌ
0.5 holds must satisfy ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ݌ଵ ൌ 	ݎ െ 0.5߬ െ ݌ଶ ൌ 0. Hence, the symmetric 
equilibrium price is ݌ଵ ൌ ݌ଶ ൌ ݎ െ 0.5߬. In this situation, the equilibrium price does 
not increase as ݂ increases. ∎  
206 
 
References  
Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton (1987), “Contracts as a barrier to entry”, American 
Economic Review, 77, June, p. 388-401. 
Baye, Michael R and John Morgan (2001), “Information gatekeepers on the internet 
and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets”, American Economic 
Review, 91, p. 454-474. 
Belleflamme, Paul and Martin Peitz (2015), Industrial Organization Markets and 
Strategies, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Bishop, Simon and Mike Walker (2010), The economics of EC competition law: 
concepts, application and measurement, Sweet and Maxwell. 
Boik, Andre and Kenneth Corts (2016), “The effects of platform MFNs on competition 
and entry”, Journal of Law and Economics, 59, p. 105-134. 
Bork, Robert H. (1978), The antitrust paradox, New York, Free Press. 
Butters, Gerard R. (1977), “Equilibrium distributions of sales and advertising prices”, 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, Oct, p. 465-491. 
Calzolari, Giacomo and Vincenzo Denicolo (2013), “Competition with exclusive 
contracts and market-share discounts”, American Economic Review, 103(6), p. 
2384-2411. 
Chao, Yong, Guofu Tan and Adam Chi Leung Wong (2018), “All-units discounts as a 
partial foreclosure device”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 155-
180. 
Chen, Zhijun and Greg Shaffer (2014), “Naked Exclusion with Minimum-Share 
Requirements”, RAND Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 45, 
No. 1, p. 64-91. 
Chone, Philippe and Laurent Linnemer (2016), “Nonlinear pricing and exclusion:II. 
Must-stock products”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 47, No. 3, p. 631-660 
Competition and Market Authority (2014), Private motor insurance market 
investigation Final report 
207 
 
De los Santos, Babur and Matthijs R. Wildenbeest (2017), “E-book pricing and vertical 
restraints”, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 15, p. 85-122. 
Edelman, Benjamin G and Julian Wright (2015), “Price coherence and excessive 
interme-diation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130, p. 1283-1328. 
Fumagalli, Chiara and Massimo Motta (2006), “Exclusive dealing and entry, when 
buyers compete”, American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Jun., 2006), p. 785–
95. 
Grossman, Gene M. and Carl Shapiro (1984), “Informative advertising with 
differentiated products”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, Jan, 63-81. 
Hviid, Morten (2010), Summary of the literature on price guarantees, Report for Ofcom, 
University of East Anglia. 
Hviid, Morten (2015), Vertical agreements between suppliers and retailers that specify 
a relative price relationship between competing products or competing retailers, 
paper prepared for the OECD Competition Committee Hearing on Across Platform 
Parity Agreements, DAF/COMP(2015)6, OECD. 
Hviid, Morten and Amelia Fletcher (2017), “Broad retail price MFN clauses: Are they 
RPM “at its worst”?””, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 81, No. 1, p. 61-98. 
Ide, Enrique, Juan-Pablo Montero, and Nicolás Figueroa (2016), “Discounts as a barrier 
to Entry”, American Economic Review, 106 (7), p.1849-77. 
International Competition Network (2009), Report on the Analysis of Loyalty 
Discounts and Rebates under Unilateral Conduct Laws 
Johansen, Bjorn Olav and Thibaud Verge (2016), “Platform price parity clauses with 
direct sales”, Working Paper. 
Johnson, Justin P. (2017), “The agency model and MFN clauses”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 84, p. 1151-1185. 
Karlinger, Liliane and Massimo Motta (2012), “Exclusionary pricing when scale 
matters”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 60, Issue 1, p. 75-103. 
208 
 
Kolay, Sreya, Greg Shaffer and Janusz A. Ordover (2004), “All-Units Discounts in 
Retail Contracts”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 13, No. 3, 
p. 429-459. 
Kobayashi, B. H. (2005) “The economics of loyalty rebates and antitrust law in the 
United States”, Competition Policy International, 1, p. 115-48.  
Maier-Rigud, Frank P. (2006), “Article 82 rebates: Four common fallacies”, European 
Competition Journal, Vol. 2, 2006, p. 85-100. 
Majumdar, Adrian and Greg Shaffer (2009), “Market-Share Contracts with 
Asymmetric Information”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 18, 
No. 2, p. 393-421. 
Mantovani, Andrea, Claudio Piga and Carlo Reggiani (2017), “The dynamics of online 
hotel prices and the EU Booking.com case”, Working Paper. 
Motta, Massimo (2009), “Michelin II – the treatment of rebates”. In: Lyons, Bruce [ed.] 
(2009), Cases in European competition policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, p.27-49. 
Ordover, Janusz A. and Greg Shaffer (2013), “Exclusionary Discounts”, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 31, Issue 5 (Sep 2013), p. 569-86. 
Posner, Richard A. (1976), Antitrust law: An economic perspective, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
Rusmussen, E., M. Ramseyer and J. Wiley (1991), “Naked exclusion”, American 
Economic Review, 81 (5), p.1137-45. 
Rey, Patrick and Thibaud Verge (2016), “Secret contracting in multilateral relations”, 
Working Paper  
Ronayne, David (2015), “Price comparison websites”, Working Paper. 
Ronayne, David and Greg Taylor (2018), “Competing sales channels”, Working Paper. 
Rosenthal, Robert W (1980), “A model in which an increase in the number of sellers 
leads to a higher price", Econometrica, 48, 1575-1579. 
209 
 
Scott Morton, Fiona M. and Zachary Abrahamson (2016), “A Unifying Analytical 
Framework for Loyalty Rebates”, Working Paper. 
Varian, Hal (1980), “A model of sales", American Economic Review, 70, 651-659. 
Vickers, John (2008) “Abuse of market power”. In: Buccirossi, Paolo [ed.] (2008) 
Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, MIT Press, p. 415-32. 
Wang, Chengsi and Julian Wright (2016), “Search platforms: Showrooming and price 
parity clauses”, Working Paper. 
Whinston, M. D. (2006), “Exclusionary vertical contracts”. In: Whinston, M. D (2006) 
Lectures on Antitrust Economics, Whinston, M. D., Cambridge, MIT Press, p. 133-
197. 
Ziss, Steffen (1995), “Vertical separation and horizontal mergers”, Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 43, p. 63-75. 
 
